




Translated by Jeremy Desmond
THE MASYUMI PARTY BETWEEN 
DEMOCRACY AND INTEGRALISM
The Masyumi Party, which was active in Indonesia from 1945 to 1960,constitutes the boldest attempt to date at reconciling Islam and democracy. 
Masyumi proposed a vision of society and government which was not bound 
by a literalist application of Islamic doctrine but rather inspired by the values 
of Islam. It set out moderate policies which were both favourable to the West 
and tolerant towards other religious communities in Indonesia. Although the 
party made significant strides towards the elaboration of a Muslim democracy, 
its achievements were nonetheless precarious: it was eventually outlawed in 
1960 for having resisted Sukarno’s slide towards authoritarianism, and the 
refusal of Suharto’s regime to reinstate the party left its leaders disenchanted 
and marginalised. Many of those leaders subsequently turned to a form of 
Islam known as integralism, a radical doctrine echoing certain characteristics 
of 19th-century Catholic integralism, which contributed to the advent of 
Muslim neo-fundamentalism in Indonesia.
This book examines the Masyumi Party from its roots in early 20th-century 
Muslim reformism to its contemporary legacy, and offers a perspective on 
political Islam which provides an alternative to the more widely-studied 
model of Middle-Eastern Islam. The party’s experience teaches us much 
about the fine line separating a moderate form of Islam open to democracy 
and a certain degree of secularisation from the sort of religious intransigence 
which can threaten the country’s denominational coexistence.
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Author’s Note
Since the 1970s, the term “Islamist” has taken on a pejorative con-notation, as it has come to encompass all radicals, including those 
who are ready to use violence to impose their vision of Islam’s role in 
society. Th is was not, however, the original acceptation of this term, 
which merely referred to Muslims who wished to see their religion play 
a role in public life, thus meaning that it could quite readily be applied 
in relation to Masyumi’s leaders.
 I have used, for convenience’ sake, the term “modernist” and 
“reformist” interchangeably with relation to Islam, except in cases where 
it might lead to confusion. Th e two movements are very similar, 
although reformism, unlike its modernist counterpart, includes the 
proponents of Wahhabi fundamentalism.
 I have often referred to the secular nationalists simply as “nation-
alists”, in contrast to the representatives of political Islam. It should 
not be forgotten however that the latter were also nationalists insofar 
as they also supported the struggle for national independence.
 Since independence, Indonesian spelling has undergone two re-
forms. Th e fi rst one, in 1947, replaced “oe” by “u”, while the second, 
in 1972, changed “dj” into “j”, “tj” into “c”, “sj” into “sy” and “ch” 
into “kh”. I have respected these new rules when using terms in Indo-
nesian, except for quotations. For proper nouns, I have used the most 
common spelling; there is no general rule concerning people’s names: 
certain Indonesians have adapted their names, others have not (Sukarno, 
for example, is still often written Soekarno). Arabic terms are written 
here according to their Indonesian transcription, which is sometimes 
slightly diff erent to that used in English.
 All quotations from the Koran come from the Saheeh Interna-
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Introduction
At its height, the Masyumi Party, with a membership of tens of  millions, was without doubt the largest Islamic party in the world. 
It represented the most comprehensive attempt to reconcile Islam and 
democracy, for a movement of this size at least, yet its history is not 
without a certain number of inconsistencies and contradictions. It was 
founded in 1945 with the intention of rapidly establishing an Islamic 
state in Indonesia, but was eventually banned in 1960 for having reso-
lutely defended a universal model of parliamentary democracy.
A Contextualised Approach to the Relation between 
Islam and Politics
Although the leaders of Masyumi were the champions of a humanist 
tradition within the Muslim reform movement which came to promi-
nence during the fi rst decades of the 20th century, they also contri-
buted, from the late 1960s onwards, to the radicalisation which led to 
the party’s original message being lost. What is initially most striking 
about these party leaders is the unexpected compromises they made, 
but also their constant wavering between an ambitious programme of 
secularisation and an overcautious tendency to emphasise the impor-
tance of religion. Th ese apparent contradictions require one to examine 
the movement closely through a contextualised study of the links be-
tween Islam and politics.
 Th e history of Masyumi contradicts the short-sighted essentialist 
perception of the relationship between Islam and politics which is based 
on the premise that Islam knows no separation between the temporal 
and the spiritual, and which, as a result, “reduces the study of Muslim 
xiii
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societies to a study of their theology.” 1 Indeed, it is surprising to notice 
to what extent the Western perspective on Islam today is willing to 
let itself be limited to a narrow vision of a militant and insular Islam, 
despite many repeated warnings from specialists in the fi eld.2 Th is 
seems to be leading to the formation of a strange “holy alliance which 
unites the most outspoken form of Islam to the most stereotypical form 
of Orientalism resulting in a version of Islam being posited that is 
historically inaccurate, ideologically loaded and intellectually dubious.” 3 
Contrary to what is claimed by a whole body of work which is both 
imprecise and deliberately polemical, the concept of Islam as din wa 
dawl  (religion and state) is neither a monolithic programme nor a his-
torically incontrovertible fact.4 Going beyond these facile generalisations 
and understanding the link between Islam and politics from a genuinely 
historical perspective involves painstaking work. It requires original 
research examining a specifi c place and time, based on an exhaustive 
study of local sources. Such research must go beyond a literal and lazy 
interpretation of koranic norms and be founded upon a critical analysis 
of the concrete experience of those who invoked those norms within 
a political context. Various studies have already adopted this approach 
to show that the compromises which were reached in diff erent parts 
of the Muslim world between divine commands and human realities 
were clearly both historically determined and transient.5 An eminently 
xiv Introduction
1 Burhan Ghalioun, Islam et politique. La modernité trahie (Paris: La Découverte, 
“Textes à l’appui /islam et société ”, 1997), p. 9.
2 Robert Hefner contends that Islamism is too often seen through the prism of 
the transformation it underwent in the 1970s, infl uenced by a new generation 
of activists. Th ese activists sometimes received their religious instruction outside 
of traditional educational circuits, and they based their authority not on any ex-
haustive knowledge of sacred texts, but rather on their ability to propose simple 
and accessible interpretations justifying their political activity. See Robert W. 
Hefner and Patricia Horvatich, eds., Islam in an Era of Nation-States: Politics and 
Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 1997), Introduction.
3 Ghassan Salamé, Maghreb-Machreq-Monde arabe, September 1990, quoted by 
François Burgat, L’islamisme en face, 2002 (1st ed., 1995), p. 17. A good example 
of this interpretation can be found in Anne-Marie Delcambre, L’Islam des interdits 
(Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 2003).
4 See, for example, the pamphlet written by Jean-Claude Barreau, De l’islam en 
général et de la modernité en particulier (Paris: Pré aux Clercs, 1991).
5 Concerning works written in French on this topic, the reader can refer in parti-
cular to those written by Olivier Carré, François Burgat, Marc Gaborieau, Olivier 
Roy, Gilles Kepel, Jean-Louis Triaud and Malika Zeghal, cited in the bibliography.
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useful distinction has also been established between the religion of Islam, 
founded by Mohammad, and Islam as it manifests itself in various 
societies or civilisations.6
A Complex and Little-Known History with a 
Disputed Heritage
Th e Indonesian case presents a particular interest in the greater histori-
cal scheme of things for two main reasons. Th e fi rst is the speed and 
diversity of the changes proposed by Masyumi. Th ese transformations 
were, in equal measure, contradictory and essential, and they took place 
over the course of almost a single generation (those who came to power 
after independence). Th ey thus allow one to grasp within the space 
of a lifetime the important issues which have dominated the Muslim 
world since the middle of the 19th century. Such a historical study 
allows an analysis of the political, religious, cultural and social mecha-
nisms at play in Indonesia at a time when it was faced with an essential 
choice between, on the one hand, a Western-inspired Muslim demo-
cracy, and on the other, a form of Islam integralism which is partially 
responsible for the renewed growth in fundamentalism witnessed by 
the country over the past 20 years. Th e surprising discovery that there 
could coexist within a single group, and sometimes even within a single 
leader, two apparently contradictory positions leads one to the conclu-
sion that, as far as Indonesia is concerned at least, the idea of a clear 
and unambiguous border between secularism and religion needs to 
be revised. 
 Th e history of Masyumi reveals the scope of its secularisation pro-
ject. It extended to the very heart of activist Islam, and mirrored the 
fi rst of the fi ve principles of Indonesia’s national ideology (Pancasila) 
which asserted the belief in a single God, thus establishing a link rather 
than an opposition between secularism and religion. It also suggests that 
if one is prepared to examine how the norms of Islam were actually 
implemented in public life, the simple juxtaposition between secular 
modernism on the one hand, and activist Islam on the other, simply 
disappears. In other words, contrary to what has sometimes been 
Introduction xv
6 Translator’s note: Th is distinction is rendered more concisely in French by using 
“islam” to refer to the former and “Islams ” to refer to the latter. Such uses of the 
word are not possible in English, however.
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affi  rmed, a whole range of positions exists on the spectrum of ideas 
which goes from Mustapha Kemal to Rachid Rida.7
 Th e second reason why this historical study of Masyumi is impor-
tant lies in the fact that it concerns a form of Islam which is not only 
peripheral and Asian, but also atypical. Avoiding the Arabo-Muslim 
paradigm which dominates the fi eld of Islamic studies enables us to 
bring to the analysis of political Islam a perspective which can no 
longer be avoided today, given the demographic reality of the Muslim 
world. More than half of the global Muslim population lives today in 
Asia, and the Indonesian archipelago—which has the largest Muslim 
population in the world—contains almost as many Muslims as the 
whole of the Arab world.8 Th e importance of this so-called peripheral 
Islam, far from its original homeland, off ers one a broader perspective 
on the Muslim religion.9 In addition, links can be established here with 
the vast question of Westernisation dealt with by Denys Lombard, who 
rightly points out the extent of Islam’s role in that process.10 In short 
then, since the fi rst decade of the 20th century, Indonesia has been 
the backdrop to a delicately balanced conjunction of two value systems 
with universal pretensions—Islam and European-inspired political 
modernism—both of which came from outside Indonesia and have so 
often found their legitimacy challenged in the archipelago.
xvi Introduction
7 An example of this binary opposition can be found in Martine Gozlan, Pour 
Comprendre l’intégrisme islamiste (Paris: Albin Michel, 1995). On the other hand, 
Shamsil A.B. should be commended for his attempt to classify political Islam into 
diff erent categories, going from the “global mindset” of the Muslim Brotherhood 
or Mawdudi to the “rooted practice” inspired by the mode of government used 
in the Malay kingdoms where a ruler does not base his Islamic legitimacy on his 
own expertise but rather on a circle of “bhramic” ulamas. Shamsul A.B., “Islam 
Embedded: ‘Moderate’ Political Islam and Governance in the Malay World”, in 
Islam in Southeast Asia, Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Cen-
tury, ed. K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), pp. 103–20.
8 Anne-Laure Dupont, Atlas de l’islam dans le monde. Lieux, pratiques et idéologie 
(Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2005).
9 As the valuable collection of texts on Islam edited by Greg Fealy and Virginia 
Hooker demonstrates, Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Source-
book (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006).
10 Denys Lombard, Le carrefour javanais, vol. 3 (Paris: Éditions de l’EHESS, 
1990).
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 Th is sometimes complicated balance between modernism and Islam 
has remained at the heart of divisive moments in recent Indonesian 
history 11 and the importance of Masyumi’s role in the debates on this 
question during the 1950s and 60s means that the party has occupied 
an important place in the country’s historical narrative.12 Th e fi rst of 
these divisive periods occurred at the beginning of the 1970s and cen-
tred on the fi gure of Nurcholish Madjid; a second one took place in 
the 1990s focussed on the actions of the minister for justice of the day, 
Yusril Ihza Mahendra, who was president of a party claiming its heri-
tage from Masyumi.13
 Th ese disputes thrived on a fairly widespread ignorance within the 
country of the historical details of the Masyumi party. Few scholarly 
works have examined this topic, which no doubt partly explains why 
the fi eld of Islamic studies has for so long lacked a comparative study 
exploring the relations between religion and politics in Indonesia. Out-
side the classic studies dealing with the history of Indonesia since inde-
pendence —notably the three scholarly tomes written by George Kahin, 
Benedict Anderson and Herbert Feith14 — a good number of authors 
have touched on the history of Masyumi. However, only six authors 
have made a genuine contribution to establishing the modernist party’s 
history. Four of those were either party members or sympathisers. 
Harun Nasution, in 1965, devoted his MA thesis at McGill University 
to examining the question of an Islamic state in Masyumi’s ideology; 
Muhammad Asyari in his thesis at the same university in 1976 looked 
at the role of the ulama within Masyumi in the period 1945–52; 
Deliar Noer initially wrote an MA thesis in 1960 at Cornell University 
Introduction xvii
11 For further analysis of these issues, see Rémy Madinier and Andrée Feillard, 
Th e End of Innocence: Indonesian Islam and the Temptations of Radicalism (Singa-
pore: NUS Press, 2011).
12 Th is issue was analysed by Greg Fealy and Bernard Platzdasch, “Th e Masyumi 
Legacy: Between Islamist Idealism and Political Exigency”, Studia Islamika 12, 1 
(2005): 73–99.
13 See infra. Epilogue.
14 George MacTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1952); Benedict R.O’G Anderson, Java in a Time 
of Revolution, Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1961); Herbert Feith, Th e Decline of the Constitutional Democracy in 
Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962).
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on the history of Masyumi up to 1957, before developing his work 
further in 1987 in a book entitled Islam on the National Stage ; fi nally, 
Yusril Ihza Mahendra, mentioned above, attempted in his 1993 doc-
toral thesis to establish a comparison between Masyumi and Jamaat-i-
Islami in Pakistan.15 
 All of this research was carried out conscientiously, in particular 
Deliar Noer’s, and unlike the hagiographies written about certain 
Masuyumi leaders, these studies were factually accurate. Nonetheless, 
their authors’ involvement in the historical events they were writing 
about made it diffi  cult for them to possess a suffi  ciently critical per-
spective on their subject matter. Th ere were two consequences to this, 
which at fi rst sight appear to be contradictory. Th e fi rst of these no 
doubt owes to the authors’ concern not to be accused of writing an 
account justifying the party and its policies. Th is preoccupation was 
exacerbated by the very dim view taken of Masyumi by the New Order 
authorities, which too often led the authors to focus on a minute de-
scription of the facts and thus fail entirely to develop any analysis. 
Th e embarrassing question of Darul Islam—a dissident fundamentalist 
movement which emerged from circles close to Masyumi—was thus 
only dealt with summarily, as were the internal party confl icts. Th e 
second consequence stems from the fi rst and concerns the false impres-
sion of ideological and political coherence that one gets from the 
writings of Masyumi’s leaders, and which shroud, it seems to me, a 
major aspect of the party’s history. Th ey lead one to believe that the 
party’s aspiration to found an Islamic state made perfect sense to its 
leaders and so does not need to be expounded upon. On the contrary, 
however, this aspiration corresponds to an ill-defi ned, multi-faceted 
project which abounded with contradictions.
 Th e diversity of the various branches within Masyumi have been 
examined by B.J. Boland, Allan A. Samson and Luthfi  Assyaukanie in 
their respective books on the question of political Islam in Indonesia, 
but as they study the entire spectrum of Islamic movements, they do 
not look in depth at the modernist party. Boland studies the period 
from 1945 to the 1970s and only devotes a few dozen pages to 
xviii Introduction
15 Yusril Ihza Mahendra, “Modernisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik Islam: 
satu Kajian Perbandingan kes Parti Masyumi di Indonesia dan Jama’at-i-Islami di 
Pakistan (1940–1960)”, PhD diss., Kuala Lumpur University, 1993. [Translator’s 
note: translations of all titles in Indonesian can be found in the bibliography.]
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16 B.J. Boland, Th e Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (Th e Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff , 1982); Allan Arnold Samson, “Islam and Politics in Indonesia”, PhD 
diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1972; Luthfi  Assyaukanie, Islam and the 
Secular State in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009).
17 Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000 ); Fealy and Platzdasch, “Th e 
Masyumi Legacy”; Bernard Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the 
Emerging Democracy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009); 
Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia, Piety and Pragmatism (Singa-
pore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010).
Masyumi. Samson writes on the New Order era and proposes a useful 
distinction between “constitutionalist Islamists” and “Sharia-minded 
Islamists” within the party, though he does not detect how these two 
opposing points of view were in fact intertwined. Assyaukanie’s work 
astutely identifi es Masyumi as the model of a “democratic Islamic 
state”, which he distinguishes both from a “democratic religious state” 
and a “democratic liberal state”. However, his book only contains about 
a dozen pages on the history of the party.16 Finally, we should mention 
the work of Robert Hefner, Greg Fealy, Bernard Platzdasch and Masdar 
Hilmy, who have undoubtedly contributed to a better understanding 
of the movements which emerged from Masyumi; their research, how-
ever is mainly focussed on the party’s contemporary legacy rather than 
an analysis of its doctrine and its activity in the 1950s.17
A Religious, Political, Social and Cultural History
Th e history of Indonesia’s Muslim intellectuals and of the political doc-
trines they elaborated is a fi eld of research which has been progressively 
expanded both by native scholars and by foreign academics. Masyumi, 
through its leading fi gures, contributed to the construction of an 
Islamic political doctrine, but it was above all a political party con-
stantly confronted with events. It is for this reason that the chapters 
which follow will be founded upon the party’s political history, which 
has up until now been poorly understood. An exhaustive analysis of 
the party’s main press organs (notably the daily newspaper, Abadi, and 
magazines such as Hikmah, Suara and Partai Masyumi ), its archives and 
the writings of its leaders will allow us to better follow in Chapter 2 the 
party’s establishment in the throes of the country’s revolution. Chap-
ter 3 will then look at its gradual identifi cation with Indonesia’s fragile 
Introduction xix
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parliamentary democracy, which, as we shall see in Chapter 4, ulti-
mately led to its prohibition and decline. Although our study of the 
party’s history accords considerable importance to this political aspect, 
it is essential to explore other approaches also, notably those looking 
at the intellectual and social backgrounds of its leaders, which will be 
examined in Chapter 1. Th ese leaders were the scions of a vast re-
formist movement which reached Indonesia at the beginning of the 
last century, but also the products of a new education system set up by 
the Dutch colonial administration a few years later. Th is multi-layered 
approach is a necessary prerequisite to examining Masyumi’s dual goal 
of not only founding an Islamic state, which will be looked at in Chap-
ter 5, but also of establishing an Islamic society, which we shall examine 
in Chapter 6.
 Masyumi’s programme was indeed a two-pronged one, but while 
its political aspect was largely documented and elaborated through party 
programmes and the political writings of its leaders, its social facet was 
never comprehensively formulated and thus needs to be inferred from 
its political activity. By adopting an approach towards primary sources 
that goes beyond the mere study of offi  cial documents and looks also 
at Masyumi’s reaction to events, I wish to show to what extent the 
latter was constitutive of the party’s identity and hence of its political 
and social programme for Indonesia. Th is detailed analysis has allowed 
me to highlight certain inconsistencies in the party’s doctrine. Some 
of these are an inherent part of a classical phenomenon in politics 
whereby a party’s programme is at a certain remove from the events 
which gave birth to it;18 other inconsistencies can be found in the 
disparity between what Masyumi actually achieved and what its pro-
gramme aspired to accomplish. To go beyond these inevitable contra-
dictions, one has to apprehend the social make-up of the “Masyumi 
family”; the dearth of relevant primary material in this area makes it 
necessary to contrive other means which will allow us to shed light 
on the question indirectly. Although it is far from giving us the whole 
picture, this approach does enable us at least to appreciate the gap be-
tween the ideal of a society based on a rigorist interpretation of Islam 
and a reality which was more fallible, more Indonesian and, in short, 
more human.
18 Cf. Serge Berstein, “Les partis”, in Pour une histoire politique, ed. René Rémond 
(Paris: Seuil, 1996 [1st ed. 1988]), pp. 49–84.
xx Introduction
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Political Genesis and Historical Lineage 1
1
chapter  one 
Th e Party’s Infancy:
Its Political Genesis and 
Historical Lineage
The history of the men and organisations behind the creation of Masyumi in November 1945 is clearly marked by a dialectical 
movement inherent in Indonesian Islam. Th is dynamic oscillated for 
four decades between a tendency to assert the diff erent sensibilities 
which existed within it and a necessity for these diff erent strands to 
unify. From the opening years of the 20th century, the desire amongst 
Indonesia’s Islamic modernists to establish organisational structures 
which would enable them to exist on the political landscape contained 
the seeds of their split from the country’s traditionalist Muslims. Th ese 
“pioneers of traditionalism”,1 in response to the initiatives undertaken 
by modernists and in an attempt to defend the values which they con-
sidered to be under threat from the reformist zeal of Muhammadiyah 
and Sakerat Islam, set up their own movement in 1926: Nahdlatul 
Ulama. Th e two branches of Islam also experienced periods of unity, 
however, between 1937 and 1943 with the Supreme Islamic Council 
of Indonesia (Madjelis Islam A’la Indonesia, MIAI) and later from 
1945 to 1952 with Masyumi.
 Th e extent of the Muslim community’s contribution to Indone-
sian politics and society cannot be reduced, however, to the polar 
opposites of traditionalism and modernism. In the 1920s, for example, 
1 To use the expression employed by Andrée Feillard in Islam et armée dans 
l’Indonésie contemporaine: Les pionniers de la tradition (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995).
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a movement began to emerge which, while not rejecting Islam, wished 
to limit it to the sphere of people’s private lives. Th is nationalist secu-
lar current entered the political scene in 1927 with the creation of 
Sukarno’s Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI). Th e grassroots of this new 
party were sociologically very close to the supporters of modernism—
they had often attended the same Dutch schools and knew each other 
from their participation in certain organisations together—and indeed 
the PNI provided serious competition to Muslim parties and organisa-
tions for public support. Finally, it should be noted that within the 
modernist movement certain cracks had begun to appear which resulted 
as much from the clash of ambitious personalities as from diff erences 
of opinion concerning political strategy (there was a constant debate 
in particular concerning the attitude to be adopted towards the Dutch 
colonists). Th ese cracks led to several schisms within the movement, 
and this break-up of the Muslim body politic during the interwar years 
was the most signifi cant political legacy inherited by Masyumi. In order 
to understand such a legacy, it is necessary to examine both the main 
stages in the formation of this Islamic political movement and the way 
in which its leaders, in their writings, turned their interpretation of 
history into a political tool.
Perspectives on the History of Indonesian Islam—
References to the Founding Fathers
Th e advent of Islam in Indonesia remains today a very controversial 
historical topic. Th ere is no clear historical evidence which allows one 
to point to the existence of Muslim states in the country before the 
emergence in the 13th century of Samudra-Pasai, a small principality 
in the region of North Sumatra.2 Indian Muslims who used the ancient 
2 Th e fi rst tombstone revealing the presence of a Muslim dynasty in the Malay 
region dates back to 1297 and belonged to Sultan Malik as-Salih from Samudera 
Pasai. Marco Polo signalled the existence of the trading kingdoms of Perlak and 
Samudera Pasai on his way to Sumatra in 1292. For a comprehensive overview 
of the diff erent studies on the arrival of Islam in Indonesia, see G.W.J. Drewes, 
“New Light on the Coming of Islam to Indonesia”, B.K.I. 124 (1968): 433–59. 
Drewes contests in particular the hypothesis of an earlier Islamisation based on 
the discovery of the Leran Tombstone, an Islamic Tombstone in Java carrying the 
date 1082. Th e work carried out by Ludvik Kalus and Claude Guillot has con-
fi rmed Drewe’s doubts, showing that the Leran Tombstone was no doubt removed 
from its original cemetery somewhere in the Middle East to be used as ballast on 
a boat; “La stèle de Leran (Java) datée de 475/1082”, Archipel 67 (2004). On the 
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Islamisation of the region, see also Ahmad Ibrahim et al., eds., Readings on Islam 
in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 1985), p. 407 
and Alijah Gordon, ed., Th e Propagation of Islam in the Malay Archipelago (Kuala 
Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Institute, 2001), p. xxv.
3 Indian infl uences have been highlighted by several studies in Javanese literature: 
P.J. Zoetmulder, Pantheism and Monism in Javanese Suluk Literature: Islamic and 
Indian Mysticism in an Indonesian Setting (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995) has shown 
how certain Javanese texts (suluk) show Islamic infl uences which have come 
through India and Hindu-Javanese. Th e study of Serat Centhini led Soebardi to 
the same conclusion in “Santri-Religious Elements as Refl ected in the Book of 
Tjentini”, B.K.I. 127 (1971): 331–49. On the way in which Serat Centhini is 
part of the process of Islamisation, see Marcel Bonneff , “Centhini, servante du
Javanisme”, Archipel 56 (1998): 483–511.
4 Concerning these expeditions and the other aspects of the Chinese infl uence 
on Indonesian Islam, see Denys Lombard, Le Carrefour javanais, vol. 2 (Paris: 
L’EHESS, 1990), Chapter 1.
maritime network running from the Indian Ocean to the China Seas 
appear to have played an important role in the spread of Islam.3 Th eir 
part in the Islamisation of the region was made easier by the infl uence 
of Indian culture in the Indianised kingdoms of Java and Sumatra, 
but they were not the only ones to contribute to this process. Chinese 
Muslims, in particular during the great Ming maritime expeditions in 
the fi rst half of the 15th century, clearly had a role to play as well, 
though it is somewhat more diffi  cult to know the exact nature of this 
infl uence.4
 It seems certain in any case that after Islam was embedded in the 
north of Sumatra, there was, from the second half of the 14th century 
onwards, a tolerant attitude towards the Muslim religion within the 
Hindu-Buddhist royal court in Majapahit, in East Java. Later in the 
15th century, the sultanate of Malacca on the Malay peninsula emerged 
as the main commercial hub in the region, and Islam spread along 
the trade routes leading to and from it, notably those concerning the 
trade of spices, to the northeast towards Brunei, to the southeast in the 
direction of the northern Javanese coast and further east to the Maluku 
Islands. When Malacca was seized in 1511 by the Portuguese, this gave 
a considerable boost to the sultanate of Aceh, located to the north of 
Pasai, which, along with other sultanates, became the new focal point 
for Muslim trade in the region.
 On the island of Java during the 15th century, the development 
of sultanates on its north coast, in the area known as Pasisir, meant 
that it progressively removed itself from the dominion of the Indianised 
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kingdom of Majapahit, enabling Islam to spread further along the trade 
routes established by Muslims. Th e expansion of Islam on the island 
can be partly explained by the role of Sufi sm, which seems to have 
contributed to the acceptance of Islam in certain Hindu-Buddhist royal 
courts. After the shift in power from the Majapahit kingdom to the 
sultans of Pasisir in the 16th century, the Islamisation of Java, which 
up until then had been largely peaceful, became more belligerent. In 
1527, the small Muslim coastal kingdom of Demak precipitated the 
collapse of the last Hindu-Buddhist kingdom in Daya, and by the 
middle of the 16th century, the entire north coast of Java was governed 
by Muslims, namely the sultans of Cirebon and Banten. At the end 
of the 16th century, a successor to the Majapahit kingdom appeared 
with the rise of the kingdom of Mataram, which had by then been 
Islamised and whose emergence constituted a signifi cant step in the 
Islamisation of the inner regions of the island. Th is expansion of Islam 
was in large part due to the educational and missionary work of 
the Koranic schools and the Sufi  orders who took on the mantle of 
the age-old pioneering tradition and combined proselytising with the 
clearing and cultivation of forestlands.5
 After three centuries of gradual Islamisation between the 13th and 
16th centuries, Islam had become the lodestar which all governments 
needed to use as their reference point. Is it possible, though, to regard 
this period as a sort of golden age in Indonesia when a true Islamic 
state existed? In other words, are the partisans of an Islamic state 
(Negara Islam) in Indonesia justifi ed in using the pre-colonial period 
as a sort of model to aspire to? Th e answer is undoubtedly no, for the 
simple reason that Islamic law was never used as the exclusive source of 
law—and this is true also for other parts of Southeast Asia—but had 
to give way also to local customary law, known as adat, particularly in 
Java and in the Minangkabau region in Central Sumatra. A majority 
of the Malay legal codes contained references to sharia law but these 
references were mainly confi ned to the domains of commercial and 
marriage law. In the area of criminal law, for example, the sentence of 
5 According to Martin van Bruinessen, however, most of the orders still present 
today in the country had not appeared before the second half of the 18th cen-
tury. “L’Asie du Sud-Est”, in Les Voies d’Allah. Les Ordres mystiques dans l’islam des 
origines à aujourd’hui, ed. Alexandre Popovic and Gilles Veinstein (Paris: Fayard, 
1986), pp. 274–84. On the same topic, see also his book, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren 
dan tarekat. Tradisi-Tradisi Islam di Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1995).
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corporal punishment provided for by Koranic penal law (hudud ) was 
generally commuted to a fi ne.6
 Th e expansion of Islam began to slow when European colonists 
arrived in the region. Th e Portuguese arrived in the Maluku Islands in 
1521 and were later replaced by the Dutch, whose infl uence, though 
initially confi ned to the east of the country, gradually expanded over 
the course of the 17th and 18th centuries. While it is true that the 
VOC 7 never really supported either of the two main Christian religions
—indeed the Protestant Dutch saw Catholicism as their biggest threat
—the monopoly which the Dutch company held over the traditional 
trade routes from the town of Batavia (founded in 1619) and from 
Melacca (captured from the Portugese in 1641), weakened the position 
of the sultanates on the Indonesian archipelago considerably. In the 
19th century, after the VOC went bankrupt, the Dutch crown took 
over their operations and Christianity prospered in the non-Islamic 
parts of the country thanks to the loosening of restrictions which had 
been imposed on missionaries by the previous colonial authorities.8 
Th is period also saw the weakening of the sultanate “model of govern-
ment”: in 1825, the Sultanate of Palembang, which had replaced the 
kingdom of Srivijaya, disappeared, followed in 1860 by the Sultanate 
of Banjarmasin and in 1903 by the Sultanate of Aceh.
 A close examination of the place which this glorious period of 
Indonesian Islam held in Masyumi’s collective consciousness, through 
the analysis of the speeches and writings by its main leaders, brings a 
number of discoveries to light. Th e fi rst of these is that references to 
that golden age were, in fact, rare. In the 15 or so treatises written by 
the party’s main theorists on the political role of Islam, reference to 
Indonesia’s Islamic past was, at best, minimal and more often than not 
non-existent. In the case of speeches made by party leaders, the choice 
to omit references to Indonesia’s Islamic past was not a rhetorical one; 
6 A.C. Milner, “Islam and the Muslim State”, in Islam in Southeast Asia, ed. M.B. 
Hooker (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983), pp. 27–8.
7 Abbreviation of Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, the Dutch East India Com-
pany. On the VOC’s religious policy, see Karel Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism and 
Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Confl icts, 1596–1950 (Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: 
Rodopi, 1993).
8 See Remy Madinier, “Les chrétiens d’Indonésie à l’époque contemporaine: heurs 
et malheurs du statu quo religieux dans l’Archipel”, in Christianisme, modernité et 
démocratie en Asie, ed. Paul Jobin (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2008), pp. 145–58.
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they were often abundantly illustrated with other historical examples. 
Isa Anshary, for example, in his book, Th e Philosophy of the Combat 
of Islam, refers to Roosevelt, Ernst Renan and Mohammad ‘Abduh; 
he also mentions Hitler and Mussolini, but he says nothing about 
the history of his own country.9 Th e same can be said about most 
of the books written by a whole range of Masyumi theorists—Zainal 
Abidin Ahmad, Moenawar Chalil, HAMKA, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, 
Mohammad Natsir, Jusuf Wibisono and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara—all 
of whom wrote abundantly over the years on the political philosophy 
of their party.10
 Th e second important discovery concerning references by Mas-
yumi leaders to Indonesia’s Muslim past is that where they did exist 
they were often brief in nature and rarely developed to any great 
extent.11 Th e sultanates that existed in Indonesia, for example, were 
9 Isa Anshary, Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam (Medan: Saiful, 1949 [2nd edition, 
1951]), p. 287. We shall return later to the references to Western history and to 
the founders of Islamic modernism.
10 See Zainal Abidin Ahmad, Islam dan Parlementarisme (Bandung: Aliran Islam, 
1950), p. 80 and Dasar-dasar Ekonomi dalam Islam (Jakarta: Sinar Ilmu, 1950), 
p. 140; Isa Anshary, Revolusi Islam (Surabaya: Hasan Aidid, 1953), p. 59; Aqidah 
jama’ah dan imamah (CV Publicita, 1969 [2nd edition, 1975]), p. 23; Mujahid 
Da’wah, Pembimbing Muballigh Islam (Bandung: Diponegoro, 1968 [4th edition, 
1991]), p. 318; Chalil Moenawar, Ulil-Amri, Solo, AB Sitti Sjamsijah, 1958; 
HAMKA, Islam dan Demokrasi, Bukit Tinggi, Tjerdas (undated); Kasman Singo-
dimejo, Renungan dari Tahanan (Jakarta: Permata, 1967 [4th edition, 1974]); 
Pancasila dan sedjarahnja (Jakarta: Lembaga Riset dan Perpustakaan, 1961), p. 26; 
Mohammad Natsir, Capita Selecta, vol. 1 (Bandung: IW. Van Hoeve, 1946; vol. 2, 
Jakarta: Pustaka Pendis, [undated]); Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Islam sebagai 
pedoman hidup, Kumpulan karangan terpilih disunting oleh Ajip Rosidi, vol. 1 
(Jakarta: Idayu, 1986); Ekonomi dan Keuangan: makna ekonomi Islam, Kumpulan 
karangan terpilih disunting oleh Ajip Rosidi, vol. 2 (Jakarta: Idayu, 1988); Moham-
mad Roem, Semangatnya tak kunjung padam (Jakarta: Yayasan Idayu, 1977), p. 
40, Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, Wawasan Politik Seorang Muslim Patriot. Kumpulan 
Karangan (Jakarta: YP2LPM, 1984).
11 One of the few exceptions to this general rule is a book by HAMKA, Antara 
fakta dan Khayal, “Tuanku Rao” (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1974), p. 364, in which 
the former Masyumi deputy refutes in great detail the claims made by one of 
his friends, Mangaradja Onggang Parlindungan, in a book entitled Tuanku Rao 
(80 per cent of which he alleges to be false), devoted to Haji Piobang, one of 
the instigators of the Padri movement at the beginning of the 19th century (see 
infra). Beyond HAMKA’s desire to restore the historical truth on Haji Piobang’s 
life, it is diffi  cult to see what motivated him to undertake such a project, as he 
never draws any conclusions about Piobang himself.
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never presented as a model for political government, and no mention 
was made either of the Wali Songo, the nine saints who are tradi-
tionally thought to have converted Java to Islam. When explaining the 
development of their religion or elaborating their theories on a Muslim 
state, Masyumi’s writers systematically preferred to turn to examples 
taken from the life of the Prophet or from the accounts of the great 
Arab dynasties.12
 Th e few references to Indonesia’s past which did exist were there 
to prove that Islam’s part in the Indonesian struggle for independence 
was a long-established one. Th e historical fi gures referred to had often 
won their place in history thanks to their resistance to colonial rule 
between 1825 and 1830, as opposed to their part in the spread of 
Islam. Th ose most frequently mentioned were Diponegoro, a Javanese 
prince and hero of the Java War between 1825 and 1830; Sultan 
Agung, sovereign of Mataram who held out in Batavia when it was 
besieged by the Dutch in 1825 and again in 1830; and fi nally Tuanku 
Imam Bonjol, the spiritual mentor of the resistance movement against 
the Dutch in Minangkabau. Th ere were also occasional references made 
to Sultan Hasanuddin of Makassar, who in 1667 repelled a prolonged 
assault by the VOC before fi nally surrendering, and also to Cik di Tiro, 
one of the instigators of the holy war in Aceh against Dutch troops 
between 1880 and 1903.13
12 See, for example, Mohammad Natsir’s 1936 article, “Islam and Culture” (“Islam 
dan Kebudayan”), dealing with the former grandeur of Muslim civilisation in 
which he makes no reference to Indonesia. Natsir, Capita Selecta, pp. 3–6. How-
ever, the major states in Islamic history were not considered as models. Cf. infra 
Chapter 5.
13 See, for example, Isa Anshary’s speech in Magelang, Abadi, 8 September 1954. 
See also Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, “Perlu wajah baru di Indonesia”, a text written 
in 1958 and published in Wawasan Politik Seorang Muslim Patriot. Kumpulan 
Karangan (Jakarta: YP2LPM, 1984), pp. 246 ff . Of the 132 articles contained in 
the two volumes of Mohammad Natsir’s Capita Selecta, only two allude to the 
history of Indonesian Islam. Th e fi rst, “Perspectives on Fictional Works” (“Peman-
dangan tentang buku2 roman”, vol. 1, p. 41) looks at the novel’s cultural role. 
Natsir explained that he decided to write the article after receiving a copy of the 
book devoted to Tuanku Imam Bonjol. His article avails of references to Western 
literature—Cyrano de Bergerac, Voltaire, Zola, Locke and Montesquieu—but no 
mention is made of the heroes of Indonesian Islam. In the “Indonesian Revo-
lution” (“Revolusi Islam”, vol. 2, p. 124), he merely recalls the spirit of sacrifi ce 
(semangat pengurbanan) of heroes such as Sultan Hasanuddin, Cik di Tiro, Tuanku 
Imam Bonjol, Diponegoro and Sultan Hidayat, devoting most of his article to 
the Muslim organisations of the opening decades of the century.
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 When referring to these fi gures, historical details concerning them 
were never really developed or analysed. As they were national heroes, 
a simple reference to their name suffi  ced. Mayumi’s pantheon, then, 
was also the nation’s pantheon and it was made up entirely of indi-
viduals who would later become national heroes in the Republic of 
Indonesia.14 By doing this, Masyumi’s theorists wished to draw atten-
tion to the prominent role played by religion in motivating those 
whom the entire nation recognised as being its founding fathers, rather 
than focussing on fi gures whose importance was limited only to the 
Muslim community. Th is choice was clearly a political one and it gave 
the party the ammunition it needed to fend off  attacks from secular 
nationalists.
Although it has been clearly established that Diponegoro was a 
Muslim who was devoted to his religion and that within his na-
tionalist spirit, which was set alight by his opposition to the Dutch 
colonization, lay in fact the soul of a true Muslim, this has been 
forgotten intentionally by half of our national leaders. Even though 
this omission may be understandable, as it is in accordance with a 
desire to conceal the multiple factors which remind us of the merits 
of Islam and its combat and a preference for emphasizing other 
nationalist factors, such an attitude constitutes a sort of betrayal of 
history.15
Th is determination by Masyumi’s leaders to depict Islam as an integral 
part of the nationalist project was not limited to their historical por-
trayal of the colonial period but extended also to the revolutionary 
period. Isa Anshary, for example, mentioned, amongst the heroes of 
Islam, General Sudirman, the fi rst commander-in-chief of the Indo-
nesian armed forces who was also a devout Muslim and a supporter of 
Masyumi.16 Mohammad Natsir even added Bung Tomo (Sutomo), a 
hero of the war of independence, to this list, claiming that in Novem-
ber 1945, he had launched the rebellion against English troops in 
14 See Jacques Leclerc, “Iconologie politique du timbre poste indonésien”, Archipel 
6 (1973).
15 Concerning the celebration by the Republic of the centenary of Diponegoro, 
see Hikmah, 15 January 1955.
16 Speech by Isa Anshary in Magelang, Abadi, 8 September 1954.
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Surabaya to the cry of “Allah is great.” 17 Th is claim made by Masyumi’s 
president was designed to include Sutomo’s military feat in a long 
Muslim tradition embodying an Indonesian nation which pre-existed 
colonisation and which had struggled “for [the previous] 350 years not 
using mortars and canons (mortar dan meriam) but using faith and 
devotion (iman dan takwa).” 18
 By paying homage to the important fi gures of Indonesia’s past 
in this way, Masyumi’s leaders were glorifying a more intense vision 
of Islam rather than one which saw it as a “state institution”. Th is 
more intense form of Islam would be able to instil in every believer 
the revolutionary spirit necessary to transform the world, and it gave 
a strong pedagogical dimension to the party’s message. A Muslim hero 
and, by extension, a national hero was somebody who, in the name 
of religion, never gave up the fi ght and thus showed the way for the 
entire umma to follow. Isa Anshary, in one section of his booklet, Th e 
Revolution of Islam, entitled “the hero of Islam” illustrated clearly how 
becoming a hero was accessible to all.19 It was a section of the book 
which glorifi ed the religious dimension of the struggle carried out by 
those Indonesian Muslim patriots ( putera-patriot Muslimin Indonesia) 
who, despite their involvement in the fi ght for independence, had re-
mained in the background of history.
 Even during Masyumi’s darkest hours, the notion of a Muslim 
as somebody who, like his illustrious forebears, would be able to use 
his faith to fi nd the resources of courage and self-sacrifi ce necessary 
for his cause remained a constant theme in the rhetoric used by the 
party’s theorists. Th is vision is borne out in the following lines written 
by Kasman Singodimedjo from the confi nes of his cell shortly after 
Masyumi was banned:
A Muslim must continue the struggle. Muslim law obliges him to 
do so. He must struggle throughout his whole life. Life is a strug-
gle. A Muslim today must not be fearful. He must not consider 
that his previous struggles have failed, merely that they have not 
17 Bun Tomo was one of the most emblematic fi gures of the passionate youth 
groups (the pemuda) who played an important role in the Indonesian Revolution. 
See Benedict O.G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resis-
tance, 1944–1946 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 155–8.
18 Speech by Natsir in Makassar, Abadi, 24 June 1955.
19 “Pahlawan Islam”, in Isa Anshary, Revolusi Islam (Surabaya: Hasan Aidid, 1953).
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attained their goals. Th e struggle led by Tengku Umar, Tuanku 
Imam Bonjol, Diponegoro, H.O.S. Cokroaminto, H.A. Salim and 
others has not failed; it has not yet reached its goals. We who are 
still alive have to continue their struggle.20
In the eyes of Masyumi, then, the history of Indonesian Islam never 
attained the status of a golden age which the contemporary period 
could draw upon for solutions to its problems. Th eir historical vision 
of pre-colonial Indonesia contained no trace of the “fabled past” which 
Denys Lombard has identifi ed amongst certain groups of Indonesian 
Muslims.21 None of the Islamic states which had existed in Indonesia 
constituted for Masyumi a model to be followed. Th e reason for this 
was not so much because of the imperfect nature of their institutions 
and their application of Islamic law—something which people were 
largely ignorant of in the 1950s—and more due to a certain interpre-
tation of history which was characteristic of the modernist Islamic 
movement.
Th e Legacy of Muslim Reformism
Th is brief description of the Islamisation of Indonesia does not do 
justice to the sociological complexity that arose from the haphazard 
nature of the region’s conversion. Th e varying degrees of acculturation 
on Java have long been refl ected in the distinction established between 
two groups of Muslims: the abangan and the santri. Th e former refers 
to those village communities who practised a popular religion consisting 
of “a balanced integration of animist, Hinduistic and Islamic elements, 
a basic Javanese syncretism which is the island’s true folk tradition, the 
basic substratum of its civilisation.” 22 Th e second group, the santri, 
20 Kasman Singodimejo, Renungan dari Tahanan, p. 33.
21 He employs Jacques Goff  ’s expression. Lombard, Le carrefour javanais, p. 26.
22 I am using the terms employed by the American anthropologist, Cliff ord Geertz 
in Th e Religion of Java (London: Th e Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-MacMillan 
Ltd, 1960), p. 5. Geertz added a third group to the traditional distinction made 
between santri and abangan: the priyayi, made up of aristocrats and descendants 
of the Javanese aristocracy. Th is classifi cation has been contested by numerous 
Islamicists, as it is based more on social than religious divisions. Other criticisms 
of Geertz’s classifi cations as well as the debates it has provoked can be found 
summarised in Koentjaraningrat, Javanese Culture (Singapore: Oxford University 
Press, 1985).
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takes its name from the pupils of Koranic schools, known as pesantren. 
Th e santri are sometimes referred to as kaum putihan, meaning the 
“white group”, a term which takes its meaning from the colour of the 
garment they wore. Th e use of the term gradually evolved to refer to 
the most pious Muslims, often from trading backgrounds, who were 
partisans of a religious tradition which consisted “not only of a careful 
and regular execution of the basic rituals of Islam—the prayers, the 
Fast, the Pilgrimage—but also of a whole complex of social, charitable 
and political Islamic organizations.” 23
 Th is distinction is operative so long as one does not assume that 
it marks out a rigid frontier between the two groups but rather desig-
nates two polar extremes which allow for a whole range of variations 
in-between.24 It will be an important distinction for our study insofar 
as it overlaps with the division between Muslims who wished to limit 
Islam to the private sphere (the “religiously neutral” nationalists, to use 
the Indonesian expression netra agama) and those who, on the other 
hand, actively campaigned for its involvement in politics (the Islamists, 
in the strict sense of the term). Up until the 19th century, then, Islam 
for a large number of the Muslim faithful in Indonesia amounted to 
an orthodox Sunnite veil—of the Shafi ’i school—discreetly covering a 
considerable variety of syncretic and heterodox practices. Th ese mul-
tiple variations of Islam in the country provided a fertile terrain for 
the demands made by reformist organisations calling for more ortho-
dox religious practices. In Java and particularly in the heart of the 
former domains of the kingdom of Mataram—the Islamic successor 
to the Hindu-Buddhist empire of Majapahit—Muslim belief adopted 
syncretic religious practices which presented Islam as a simple recep-
tacle (wadah) allowing the believer to cultivate the essential values of 
Javanese culture, namely spiritual purifi cation and the ultimate expe-
rience of unity between the human and the divine.25 In these regions, 
23 Ibid., p. 6.
24 Concerning Geertz’s tripartite categorisation, Denys Lombard has rightly 
pointed out that “such a tripartism is not at all like the Indo-European version, 
and it is only by twisting words that one can discern a ‘structure’.” Lombard, 
Le Carrefour javanais, p. 78.
25 For a description of these synthetic practices and spiritual compromises, see 
James Peacock, Indonesia: An Anthropological Perspective (Pacifi c Palisades, CA: 
Goodyear, 1973). For a more historical analysis of the process, see MC. Ricklefs, 
Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from the Fourteenth to the Early 
Nineteenth Centuries (Norwalk: EastBridge, 2006).
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Muslims worshipped the keramat (holy places and saints’ tombs), gave 
off erings to the spirits, held slametan or kenduri (ceremonial meals for 
the spirits), and used azimat (amulets) to protect themselves from evil 
spirits. Th e condemnation of these practices, which was part of the 
reformist struggle against heresy, superstition and innovation (bid’ah), 
gave rise to a fundamental shift within the santri community which, 
over time, left its mark on the political destiny of Indonesian Islam.26 
It led to the emergence of a split between the supporters of a complete 
reform of these practices, composed mainly of modernists, and the 
traditionalists who defended a certain religious status quo. Reformism, 
then, encouraged its members to let their religious faith inspire an 
active participation in the nationalist movement, but at the same time, 
it sowed the seeds within the Muslim community of a division which 
would, to a large extent, be responsible for the failure of political Islam.
 During the fi rst decade of the 20th century, the Muslim commu-
nity in Indonesia was aff ected by the vast reform movement pervading 
the entire Muslim world at that time. By the end of the 18th century, 
in India and in several Middle Eastern countries, voices were speaking 
out to denounce the paralysis of the Muslim world’s institutions and 
social structures. As a result of their experience of colonisation, which 
constantly demonstrated to them the indisputable technical superiority 
of the West, Muslim thinkers increasingly denounced the excessive 
rigidity of Islam’s interpretation of the divine message. Its vitality, they 
felt, had gradually been smothered by the codifi cation attempted by 
the founders of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence between the 
eighth and ninth centuries. Following the tradition of such illustrious 
theologians as al-Ghazali in the 12th century and Ibn Taimiyya in the 
14th century, the reformist movement wanted to reclaim the legacy of 
the fi rst generation of Muslims, those “devout pioneers” (Salaf   ) who 
gave their name to the Salafi  movement (Salafi yya).27 Th is evolution 
26 Among the traditions which reformists were most critical of included the cele-
bration of the Prophet’s birth (mawlid al-nabi ), recitations of odes to the Prophet 
such as Barzanji, Qasidat al-Burdah, Diba’i. For a complete account these debates, 
see Fauzan Saleh, Modern Trends in Islamic Th eological Discourses in 20th Century 
Indonesia: A Critical Survey (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 86–91.
27 See Article “Islah”, E12 online, 2008. For a clear overview of the diff erent 
generations of the reformist movement, see Sabrina Mervin, Histoire de l’Islam. 
Fondements et doctrines (Paris: Flammarion editions, Champs Université, 2000), 
pp. 152–68.
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took place almost simultaneously in India and the Middle East. In 
India, the movement began with Shah Walli Ullah (d. 1762), was 
carried on by Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), founder of the Aligarh 
Muslim University, and was fi nally led by Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938), 
the spiritual father of the Pakistani nation. In the Middle East, Jamal 
al-Din al-Afghani, having travelled throughout India, Central Asia and 
Europe, returned home to denounce the region’s European imperialism 
and the conservatism of feudal Muslim leaders who were opposed to 
any modernisation in their countries. Th is reformist movement advo-
cated a return to the Koran, stripped of all the commentaries which 
had skewed its message, the adoption of European technical progress, 
the struggle against fatalism and the recognition of freedom and reason. 
Al-Afghani, the father of modern Pan-Islamism, exercised a considerable 
infl uence over the entire Muslim world. His main disciple, the Egyptian 
Mohammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), campaigned throughout his life for the 
reform of the curriculum in Al-Azhar, the Islamic university in Cairo. 
He maintained that true Islam was not in contradiction with modern 
science and he campaigned for the introduction of mathematics, history 
and geography courses. ‘Abduh is considered by a number of writers 
to be the father of modernism, a branch of the reformist movement 
which emphasised the need to open up to the West in order to incor-
porate its model of democratic institutions.
 However, within the reformist movement, a fundamentalist wing 
developed which was much more intransigent towards the West. Fol-
lowing in the footsteps of Mohammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1791), 
this branch wished to restore Islamic belief and dogma to their original 
purity. It idealised primitive Muslim society and its goal was not to 
elaborate new interpretations of the holy books, but simply to return 
to the letter of the Koran. Wahhabism was supported by the Ibn Saud 
dynasty which has come to power twice in Saudi Arabia (once from 
1804 to 1818 and again from 1926 to the present day) and its mes-
sage attracted many followers throughout the Muslim world. In India, 
it inspired two movements: the Faraizi from Bengal and the Tariqa-i 
Muhammadiyah led by Syed Ahmad Barelwi.28 It should be noted that 
28 See article “Hind”, E12 online, 2008. Two recent studies of Indian Islam are 
also worth consulting: Marc Gaborieau, Un autre islam. Inde, Pakistan, Bangladesh 
(Paris: Albin Michel 2007); and Denis Matringe, Un islam non arabe, Horizons 
indiens et pakistanais (Paris: Téraèdre, 2005).
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some of Mohammad ‘Abduh’s followers were attracted by Wahhabi fun-
damentalism. Led by the Syrian Rashid Rida, they developed ‘Abduh’s 
analysis of Islam along much narrower lines. Th eir journal, Al-Manar 
(“the Lighthouse”) often became the mouthpiece for the Hanbali 
School’s rigid interpretations, and was more infl uenced by the funda-
mentalism of Ibn Taimiya, the most radical opponent of both the 
offi  cials in charge of medieval schools of jurisprudence and of Sufi  in-
novations, than by the conciliatory theologian al-Ghazali who inspired 
‘Abduh. Th is neo-fundamentalism gained some success between the 
two world wars through the foundation of two important groups: the 
Association of Algerian Muslim Ulema founded by Ben Badis and the 
Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt. Th ese were 
followed later in the 1940s with the foundation in India of Jama’at-i 
Islami, a branch of neo-fundamentalism which paralleled somewhat the 
Persatuan Islam movement in Indonesia led by Ahmad Hassan. Th ese 
thinkers distinguished themselves from the modernism of ‘Abduh by 
their more intransigent attitude towards the West, and this infl exibility 
no doubt explains their success amongst radical Muslims whose move-
ment began to develop from the 1970s onwards, built on the ruins of 
a more conciliatory form of modernism.
 Th e revival which took place at the end of the 19th century 
was not limited to the emergence of reformist ideas. In Indonesia, 
as elsewhere, some supporters of the schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
(madhhab), who had also noticed the development of practices consi-
dered to be heterodox, began to mobilise themselves. Under pressure 
from the reformists who tarnished with the same brush the rites ori-
ginating from the principal schools of jurisprudence and certain forms 
of polytheism (shirk), they set out to restore Islam to what they con-
sidered to be its purest form: medieval Islam.29 Like the modernists, 
they adopted Western methods of teaching and developed a vast mis-
sionary activity. In Indonesia, some ulama but also certain important 
Sufi  orders, such as the Sammaniyah, the Qadiriyah wa Naqshbandiyah 
and the Naqshabandiyah Khaliddiyah, attempted to persuade their 
fellow Muslims who were infl uenced by customary practices (adat) or 
29 Th e same phenomenon took place in India with the Deobandi movement 
founded in 1867 which assembled the moderate disciples of Sayyid Ahmad 
Barelwi wishing to remain loyal to the Hanafi  School.
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by Javanese spirituality movements (aliran kebatinan or kejawen) to 
adopt a more orthodox form of Islam, which generally meant the form 
taught by the Shafi ’i school. In reality, numerous religious dignitaries 
often departed from the teachings preached by the founders of the 
schools of jurisprudence but preferred instead to adhere to the subse-
quent teachings of an imam who regularly strayed from the original 
message.30 As a result, in a number of regions in the country, Islam 
had taken on a local fl avour and while the partisans of a strict Shafi ’i 
tradition remained sensitive to some of these religious rites, they en-
deavoured to correct what they considered to be their most obscuran-
tist aspects.
 Th e traditionalists’ mobilisation can be seen as a combination of 
their desire for modernity and their need to invoke religious orthodoxy. 
It was an approach which was not altogether diff erent in nature from 
that of the reformists, and indeed some traditionalists were active for 
a time within modernist organisations. However, their historical eras 
of reference, which were the yardsticks for their respective orthodoxies, 
diff ered. While the traditionalists founded their practice on texts largely 
taken from the speculations on Islam during the medieval period, the 
reformists set out to use resources taken exclusively from the earliest 
days of Islam. Th ese resources could be used either as the basis for 
a new interpretation considered more appropriate for contemporary 
times—in the case of modernists—or they could be used as a model 
for contemporary behaviour if one simply took refuge in the craven 
imitation of the customs and practices of the fi rst Muslims—as was 
the case with the fundamentalists.
 Middle-Eastern reformism fi rst manifested itself in Indonesia at 
the beginning of the 19th century with the Padri movement.31 Th is 
branch of Islam, inspired by Wahhabism, was introduced to West Su-
matra by pilgrims who had been very taken by the new rigorist move-
ment they had observed during their stay in Mecca. Th e reforms which 
they attempted to impose ran up against a reluctant population who 
30 Deliar Noer, Th e Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1973 [2nd edition, 1978]), p. 300.
31 It was long thought that the term “Padri” came from the port of Pedir from 
which Muslims set out on their pilgrimage to Mecca. It is now considered more 
likely to have come from the Portuguese word “padre”, given by the Portuguese 
explorers to religious fi gures, including Muslim ones.
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were very attached to the syncretism embodied in their customary prac-
tices (adat). Th e leaders of the Padri movement, namely Haji Miskin 
and Tuanku Nan Rinceh, launched a civil war which ended with their 
new moral order being imposed across most of the Minangkabau re-
gion. It was hereafter forbidden to organise cock-fi ghting, betting or to 
consume tobacco, alcohol and opium; in addition, it became obligatory 
for men to wear beards, for women to wear a veil and for everyone to 
wear white clothes and pray fi ve times a day. It was fi nally the inter-
vention of Dutch troops in 1838 that ended this campaign carried out 
by the Padri, and with it came to a close the fi rst Wahhabi experiment 
in Indonesia.32 Th e infl uence of Wahhabism, which symbolised intran-
sigence and fanaticism, remained limited to this region, and Masyumi 
never considered it to be an exemplar. By focussing on the resistance 
of the Tuanku Imam Bonjol during the Padri War, mentioned earlier, 
they chose to see in it the embodiment of stubborn defi ance towards 
the colonist rather than the symbol of civil strife.33
 Th e infl uence of the modernist branch of Muslim reformism in 
Indonesia was of an altogether diff erent nature. It spread mainly by 
means of periodicals controlled by two groups: those of Arab descent 
and the Minangkabu diaspora in Indonesia. Masyumi’s future leaders, 
who were to participate in this proliferation of intellectual and religious 
activity from the 1920s onwards, drew many of their beliefs from it. 
Th e growth of the reformist movement in the Middle East at the end 
of the 19th century had coincided with a marked increase in the num-
ber of Indonesian pilgrims travelling to the Holy Land, due in no 
small part to the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which made the 
journey easier and cheaper. Between 1850 and 1910, the number of 
pilgrims soared from 2,000 to 20,000 per year; 34 their journey did not 
32 For further reading on this intervention, see Christine Dobbin, Islamic Reviv-
alism in a Changing Peasant Economy: Central Sumatra, 1784–1847 (London and 
Malmö: Curzon Press, 1983), XII: 300. Th ough they did not openly claim to 
be part of the Wahhabi movement, two other puritan movements were also 
present in Java. At the end of the 17th century, in the Banten region, religious 
leaders, dressed in Arab clothing, outlawed tobacco and opium. At the beginning 
of the 19th century, the Badiah movement in the north of Java showed similar 
characteristics.
33 With the exception of the book, mentioned above, written by HAMKA on 
Haju Piobang.
34 Lombard, Le carrefour javanais, p. 66.
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always come to an end at Mecca either, and some who were attracted 
by Mohammad ‘Abduh’s ideas travelled on to Cairo to continue their 
studies at Al-Azhar University.35 Th is was the case for Syeikh Muham-
mad Alkalali, who came from the Minangkabau region and who, after 
his stay in the Middle East, settled in Singapore.36 Th ere, in the com-
pany of some of his fellow students, he edited, starting from 1905, 
the periodical Al-Imam which disseminated in Malay the ideas of Rida’s 
journal Al-Manar. Th eir example was soon to be followed in Minang-
kabau, where in 1911 the periodical magazine Al-Munir (in Malay, but 
written using the Jawi script) was published in Padang under the edi-
torship of H. Abdullah Ahmad, H. Abdul Karim Amrullah and Sutan 
Muhammad Salim.37 Two more periodical magazines were to follow: 
Al-Mizan, published in Maninjau, and in Padang Panjang, Al-Munir 
al-Manar, the successor to Al-Munir, which had stopped publication in 
1915. Th e religious fi gures of the Minangkabau region clearly played a 
signifi cant role in the diff usion of reformist ideas,38 and at the begin-
ning of the 1930s, another generation, which included future Masyumi 
fi gures, continued this tradition of publishing. In Medan, one of the 
35 Mona Abaza, Indonesian Students in Cairo: Islamic Education, Perceptions and 
Exchanges, Cahier d’Archipel (Paris: EHESS, 1994).
36 Th e Minangkabau region was at that time in the throes of a debate arising 
from the dispute over adat. It opposed the traditional leaders, who defended the 
matrilineal system which was deeply rooted in the region, and the radical ulamas 
who wished to put an end to it. A movement inspired by the “Young Turks” and 
led by Datuk Sutan Maharadja even attempted to modernise adat by focussing 
on, amongst other things, its feminist dimension. Cf. Taufi q Abdullah, Schools 
and Politics: Th e Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra (1927–1933) (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp. 8–13. Several Minangkabau religious 
fi gures, such as Sjech Ahmad Chatib, who became imam of the Al Haram mosque 
in Mecca, refused to return to their native region in protest at this modernisation 
of adat. Noer, Th e Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, p. 19.
37 H. Abdul Karim Amrullah—sometimes known as HAKA or Hadji Rasil—had 
a son called Hadji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah (HAMKA) who became presi-
dent of Muhammadiyah and was also a Masyumi deputy in Parliament. Sutan 
Muhammad Salim was K.H. Agus Salim’s father, one of the most eminent fi gures 
in the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia and one of Masyumi’s founders.
38 Another group, the Hadrami community—composed of Arabs from Hadra-
mont and their descendants—also played an important role. One of their repre-
sentatives, Hamid Algadri, explained that during the colonial period, most of his 
friends read periodicals from Egypt which propagated modernist ideas, in parti-
cular those belonging to Al-Afghani.
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most active publishing centres in the country, Zainal Abidin Ahmad 
published Pandji Islam, while HAMKA and Yunan Nasution published 
Pedoman Masjarakat. Th ese two weekly periodicals were amongst the 
most prestigious publications in the country and attracted contributions 
from prominent fi gures in the nationalist movement, such as Sukarno 
and Mohammad Hatta. Th ey allowed the Minangkabau who had settled 
in Java to stay in contact with their home region. Mohammad Natsir, 
who was living at the time in Bandung, published his fi rst articles in 
these periodicals under the pseudonym A. Moechlis.39
 With the growth of the fi rst reformist organisations, there was 
quite an unprecedented development in publishing activity, which 
spread across most of Indonesia. To name but a few examples of these 
publications, Muhammadiyah published no fewer than six periodicals 
(Penyiar Islam, Pancaran Amal, Suara Muhammadiyah, Almanak Mu-
hammadiyah and Suara Aisyah) and Persatuan Islam published four ( Al 
Lisan, Al Fatwaa, Pembela and Al Taqwa).40 Generally, a few thou-
sand copies of each periodical were printed and they constituted the 
main outlet for relaying reformist ideas in Indonesia. Th e religious and 
political ideas of Masyumi’s future leaders were forged through reading 
these publications, and for many of them also through participating 
in them. As in the Middle East, few books were in circulation, with 
the exception of collections of articles. Th ese periodicals, then, in their 
sections containing letters to the editor, allowed a prompt and precise 
response to be given to the questions which intrigued readers, and 
their pages were often full of heated debates.41 By getting around the 
control which the colonial authorities exercised over public life, and by 
allowing people to exchange ideas across the country, these publications 
constituted a veritable sounding board for the future Masyumi leaders’ 
political ideas.
39 Further details on Natsir’s childhood and education can be found in Audrey 
R. Kahin, Islam Nationalism and Democracy: A Political Biography of Mohammad 
Natsi (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), pp. 1–9.
40 “Media Massa Islam”, Ensiklopedi Islam (Jakarta: Pt Ichtiar Baru van Hoeve, 
1993).
41 For an analysis of the debates published in Pembela Islam which opposed the 
modernists belonging to Persis on the one hand, and the traditionalists and na-
tionalists on the other, see Howard M. Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform 
in Twentieth Century Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell 
University Press, 1970), Chapters 4 and 6.
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 From their earliest writings, the party’s future leaders identifi ed 
themselves clearly with the ideas of this reformist movement. References 
to the movement’s principal theorists crop up regularly throughout 
their articles, speeches and lectures. Al-Ghazali, for example, who is 
considered a forerunner of the movement, was referred to in glowing 
terms by Mohammad Natsir in an article published in 1937 in Pedo-
man Masjarakat. Natsir, who compared his work to that of Th omas 
à Kempis, the author of Th e Imitation of Christ, explained that “700 
years before David Hume”, al-Ghazali had managed to solve the thorny 
question of causality.42
 Th e theorists most often mentioned were the founders of modern 
reformism, Al-Afghani and Mohammad ‘Abduh. For Masyumi mem-
bers, Al-Afghani was generally considered to be the father of Pan-
Islamism who made it possible for the Muslim world, downtrodden 
by colonialism, to rediscover its dignity.43 Mohammad ‘Abduh, on the 
other hand, embodied a spirit of tolerance and opposition to all forms 
of religious extremism, and his memory was evoked in a speech given 
in Medan by Mohammad Natsir in December 1953, during which he 
warned his fellow Muslims against the dangers of the radical solutions 
proposed by the separatist movement Darul Islam.44
 It is in Masyumi’s adherence to the central points of the reformist 
doctrine, however, rather than in mere references to the movement’s 
founding fathers, that the party’s reformist identity is most clearly visi-
ble. Direct references by Masyumi leaders to ijtihad, the right to inter-
pret holy texts, were nonetheless relatively few and initially, in fact, 
references to it only appeared implicitly. Th ese could be found in the 
arguments condemning the passivity of taqlid, which was considered 
to be the practice of faith without any personal discernment.
Islam clearly forbids any blind belief in the theories and criticisms 
which are not founded on divine revelation, that is to say, which 
only carry over the old interpretations from generation to generation 
without verifying their sacred nature.
42 “Abu Hamid Bin Muhammad Bin Muhammad Al-Ghazali”, reproduced in 
Natsir, Capita Selecta, vol. 1, pp. 19–23.
43 See, for example, the short analysis provided by Anshary, Falsafah Perdjuangan 
Islam, p. 62 and by Jusuf Wibisono, Hikmah, 3 April 1954.
44 Abadi, 2 December 1953. See. infra, Chapter 3.
Chap1 (1-60).indd   20 8/14/15   5:36:22 PM
Political Genesis and Historical Lineage 21
‘And do not pursue that of which you have no knowledge. Indeed, 
the hearing, the sight and the heart—about all those [one] will be 
questioned’ (Koran, 17:39) 45
 After the split from Masyumi by the traditionalist Nahdlatul 
Ulama branch in 1952, the importance of itjihad was asserted more 
clearly. A few months after this split, which undermined Masyumi con-
siderably, Isa Anshary took advantage of some time he had to spend 
in hospital to launch an appeal to the Muslim community which, ac-
cording to him, needed to accomplish a genuine internal revolution, the 
cornerstone of which would be ijtihad. It would of course be carried 
out according to strict guidelines and could only be performed by the 
religious authorities who were qualifi ed to do so. It should also go 
hand in hand with a critical mindset and spirit of contradiction (ruh 
intikad ) on the part of the entire umma. Only if these two conditions 
were fulfi lled could the “struggle in the way of God” ( jihad ) progress:
How can we fulfi l the commandments of the Koran if our minds 
and our thoughts are bound by the chains of taqlid ?… How can 
we turn fanaticism into conviction if we do not free our minds 
from this archaic submission to the domination of taqlid ? Th e door 
leading to ijtihad is open to ulama and jurists who possess the abil-
ity to perform it. Ijtihad purifi es our thoughts and our interpreta-
tions which are still erroneous and fallacious, and it confi rms those 
thoughts and convictions which are in keeping with the principles 
of the true religion …. Th e struggle will not achieve its goal if we 
are satisfi ed with an audience which is great in number but which 
is composed of corpses who obey orders without question and are 
devoted but lacking in conviction. It is the ‘discipline of corpses’ 
like that seen in fascist and communist countries …. Blessed is 
the Muslim community which has ulamas capable of carrying out 
ijtihad, the basis of any jihad. Blessed is the Islamic struggle which 
possesses an umma endowed with critical faculties. Th e revolution 
of Islam will be quick and fresh if it is carried out by ulama who 
are able to carry out ijtihad and by an umma that possesses critical 
faculties.46
45 Mohammad Natsir, “Sikap Islam terhadap kemerdekaan-berfi kir”, Pandji Islam, 
April–June 1940, in Capita Selecta, vol. 1, pp. 206–29.
46 Isa Anshary, “Ruh Intikad dan Idjtihad”, in Revolusi Islam (Surabaya: Hasan 
Aidid, 1953), pp. 31–4.
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 It is nonetheless quite diffi  cult to discern in any precise way what 
the leaders of Masyumi meant by ijtihad.47 Th e exercise of this right 
to interpret sacred texts was never accompanied by any preliminary 
declaration. As we will examine later, Masyumi’s unique position on 
the political landscape—in particular its almost visceral attachment to 
the principles of democracy—did not stem from their exegesis of reli-
gious texts. Whenever religious texts were referred to, it was invariably 
in order to settle a contentious debate which was at the centre of a 
dispute with other branches of Islam. To take an example from 1958, 
Moenwar Chalil, one of the most infl uential ulamas within Masyumi, 
published a booklet devoted to the notion of Ulil-Amri. Th is title, 
meaning “those who hold the command”, had been at the centre of 
a bitter controversy a few years earlier in 1954 when at a meeting of 
ulamas belonging to Nahdlatul Ulama, the term had been used to refer 
to President Sukarno, thus making him a sort of religious leader whom 
all Muslims had to obey. In response, Moenwar Chalil, along with the 
rest of Masyumi, raised objections to this interpretation and he out-
lined them in his short 60-page book where he engaged in an in-depth 
analysis of verse 59 of Sura An-Nisa (Th e Women) which is the basis 
for the notion of Ulil-Amri.48 Basing his ideas on the analysis of 
Mohammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida, he showed how, in his opinion, 
the use of the term to refer to Sukarno constituted a corruption of the 
sacred text.49 Did Moenwar Chalil consider, when writing this disquisi-
tion, that he was exercising his right to perform ijtihad ? It is diffi  cult 
to say with any certainty that he did, not only because we have no 
clear indication on his part,50 but also because it was not particularly 
unusual to engage in this sort of analysis—as the ulamas of Nahdlatul 
Ulama had just demonstrated in their controversial interpretation of 
the Koran.
 Although the references by Masyumi to the thinkers and doctrine 
of the reformist movement show that the party clearly identifi ed itself 
47 Before the 1960s, the theological debates within Indonesian Islam, though they 
were often virulent, were not generally very detailed. Th e main reasons for this 
can be found in Saleh, Modern Trends in Islamic Th eological Discourses in 20th 
Century Indonesia, pp. 6 ff .
48 Koran (IV, 59).
49 Moenawar Chalil, Ulil-Amri, Solo, AB Sitti Sjamsijah, 1958.
50 Th oha Hamim, “Moenawar Chalil’s Reformist Th ought: A Study of an Indone-
sian Religious Scholar (1908–1961)”, PhD thesis, McGill University, 1996.
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with this movement, it was never completely comfortable with this 
identifi cation. Masyumi leaders seemed loath to defi ne themselves as 
representatives of a modernist movement—kaum muda—in opposition 
to a traditionalist movement—kaum tua. Th is was not a sign of hypoc-
risy or a rejection of the modernist movement but rather a consequence 
of one of the fundamental contradictions of the party. Although Mas-
yumi was founded mainly on modernist principles and was dominated 
by representatives of modernism from its outset in 1945, and even 
more so after Nahdlatul Ulama broke away from the party in 1952, it 
always saw itself as the mouthpiece for all Indonesian Muslims. Indeed 
it should be noted that after the breakaway of NU, a few small tradi-
tionalist organisations remained within the party’s ranks. If Masyumi 
were to display too close an adherence to the modernist movement, 
it would risk cutting itself off  from millions of Muslims who were 
attached to the Shafi ’i tradition. During the general election campaign 
of 1955, the leaders of the party did their utmost to adopt a very 
broad-minded approach to questions of religion, so, for example, the 
religious council of the party (Madjelis Sjuro) adopted a fatwa at the 
time recognising the validity of schools of jurisprudence (madhhab).
 Given this desire for inclusiveness which pervaded the party, the 
article written by Jusuf Wibisono, one of the party’s leaders, in April 
1954, in which he outlined his personal convictions concerning the 
role of Islam, stands out as something of an anomaly. In this article, 
he was responding to three criticisms commonly made of the party’s 
ideology, one of which consisted in claiming that religion could not 
be the basis on which to build a state. In his response to this point, 
Wibisono clearly aligned himself with modernist organisations:
Th e public probably knows that there are today in the Muslim 
world two branches: the orthodox one and the modernist one. Th e 
diff erence between these two branches hangs on the fact that the 
orthodox branch maintains that contemporary generations are not 
entitled to carry out new interpretations of the Koran. Tradition-
alists think, in fact, that we have become too removed from the 
great ulama who lived in the fi rst three centuries following the 
Hijra, that is to say about ten centuries ago. Th ey consider that 
contemporary generations can only obey the principles defi ned by 
those great ulama.
If the Muslim world is led by a group of Muslims like the tradi-
tionalists, I do not think it will be possible to establish a modern 
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state based on the principles of Islam. Obliging Muslims to submit 
to the teachings of ulama from the past, no matter how great those 
ulama were, amounts to denying their freedom and closing their 
minds. However, a few years ago, there appeared an important 
thinker, Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani, who founded a reform movement 
(a renaissance movement) in Islam. He held that in order to move 
forward one had to return to the Koran. Th is reformist branch 
gradually spread, moving on to India and eventually to Indonesia. 
In my opinion, it is this modernist branch that allows us to hope 
that Islam will be capable of becoming the cornerstone of a state 
which is not opposed to but rather in tune with the progress of 
our times. Masyumi is a part of this movement which the West 
has named ‘modernist’, and it unites Muslim leaders who consider 
that each generation is entitled to interpret the Koran directly ac-
cording to the needs of the day. If this approach is not followed, 
then it will undoubtedly be impossible for Islam to be the basis on 
which a modern state can be established.51
Although this article summarises many of the arguments familiar to 
the leaders of the party, it constitutes nonetheless a singular exception. 
For reasons mentioned earlier, no offi  cial party document or, to the 
best of our knowledge, no speech given by a high-ranking party offi  cial 
stated so explicitly the importance of the modernist legacy to Masyumi. 
Th e reluctance to recognise this obvious link adds no doubt to the ori-
ginality of the Masyumi position within Muslim reformism and, as we 
will see later, allows us to shed light on some of the political stances 
it adopted.
Learning from the West
As with other parts of the world, the emergence of Indonesian re-
formism was largely a reaction to the challenges which arose from 
Western colonisation. Th e responsibility of the Dutch in this emer-
gence of a desire for change was quite complex, however, and they 
were far more than simply an anti-model which jolted national pride 
awake. By participating in what Robert Van Nie called “the general 
tendency of the development of an Indonesian elite”, that is to say the 
transformation “from a traditional, cosmologically oriented hereditary 
51 Jusuf Wibisono, “Ideologi Politik Masjumi”, Hikmah, 3 and 10 April 1954.
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elite to a modern welfare-state oriented education-based elite”, the colo-
nial authorities contributed signifi cantly to the formation of an ideal 
breeding ground for the inception of Islamic nationalism.52
 Th is contradiction, which is inherent in all forms of modern 
colonisation and which contrasts with the Colbertist mercantilism prac-
tised by the French East-India Company, was of course not specifi c 
to Indonesia. By promoting progress throughout the colonised world, 
Westerners willingly sowed the seeds for the destruction of a system 
which they had hoped to perpetuate. Masyumi was indebted to the 
West in two signifi cant respects which are intimately linked, namely for 
the education received by its leaders and the importance of references 
to the West in their writings.
Th e Ethical Policy Generation
Th e senior members of Masyumi, those who developed and defended 
the party’s policies within the party’s executive committee and in parlia-
ment, were for the most part the products of an educational system 
which had been put in place by the Dutch colonial power as part of 
its “ethical policy”. After the abuses of power carried out during the 
“system of forced cultivation”, which were denounced by Multatuli in 
his novel, Max Havelaar, the government of the Netherlands recognised 
that its duty as a colonial power was not only to promote the infra-
structural improvement and economic development of their territories, 
but also to better indigenous people’s lives socially and culturally.
 Between the beginning of the century and the 1930s, the colonial 
government progressively put in place a complete educational pro-
gramme, going from primary school to third-level education, which 
was open to the indigenous population. However, Indonesians only 
progressively entered this educational system. In the early years of the 
century, a little less than 3,000 of them were attending primary schools 
(Holland Inlander School, HIS) and only 25 were attending secondary 
school (Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs, MULO, the lower half of 
secondary school; and Algemene Middelbare School, AMS, the upper 
half ). In 1928, there were 75,000 indigenous children enrolled in the 
primary system and 6,500 in the secondary; on the eve of the Japanese 
52 Robert Van Niel, Th e Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (Th e Hague and 
Bandung: W. Van Hoeve Ltd, 1960), pp. 1–2.
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invasion, nearly 90,000 were attending a HIS, 8,000 were enrolled 
in a MULO and 1,800 were going to an AMS, as against 5,700 
Europeans.53 Access to Dutch higher education in Indonesia, which 
consisted mainly of law schools, medical schools and institutes of tech-
nology, was even more restrictive for Indonesians. In 1920, only 20 
managed to obtain a university diploma, and in 1930 there were barely 
160; by the beginning of the Second World War, their number had 
risen to 200.54
 Th e future leaders of Masyumi made up a fair proportion of the 
happy few who benefi tted from a Western education. Of the 57 party 
representatives elected to parliament in 1955, which is the largest sta-
tistical sample available to us, 32, that is to say more than half, had 
received at the very least their primary education in the Dutch system 
(HIS). Of these 32, 26 had continued their studies in the Dutch sys-
tem up until secondary school (MULO and AMS) and 12 of them 
had received third-level diplomas from Dutch institutions. Six of them 
had pursued legal studies, three had been to medical school, two had 
obtained diplomas from the School of Public Administration and one 
had graduated from veterinary school. Of these 12 third-level graduates, 
only one, Soekiman, had pursued his studies in the Netherlands.55
 Th e Dutch curriculum was in fact not the only one in Indonesia 
which allowed students access to a “Western-style” education. Most of 
the 25 deputies who had not been educated in the Dutch system had 
attended schools run by reformist associations (Al Irshad, Muham-
madiyah and Persatuan Islam), whose programmes were not entirely 
dedicated to religion but devoted a signifi cant amount of time to the 
teaching of classical subjects. Th is openness to the Western system of 
education was, of course, typical of modernist organisations. Modernist 
schools did not have a monopoly over the education received by 
Masyumi leaders, however. When Anwar Haryono, for example, after 
having attended both Dutch schools and an institution run by Muham-
madiyah, decided to become a santri, he chose to prepare himself 
53 George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 31. In 1939, the Indonesian population 
represented 60 million inhabitants of which 240,000 were Europeans.
54 Ibid., p. 32.
55 Parlaugan (Press-Offi  cer Parlement), Hasil Rakjat Memilih, Tokoh-Tokoh Parle-
men di Republik Indonesia (Jakarta: C.V. GITA, 1956).
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for this in the famous pesantren of Tebuireng, birthplace of the tradi-
tionalist movement, Nahdlatul Ulama. At that time, the school had 
a reputation even in modernist circles, for being intellectually open-
minded. Wahid Hasjim, son of the school’s founder, had even carried 
out some reforms which meant that 70% of teaching time was devoted 
to general (i.e. non-religious) subjects.56 It can safely be said, then, 
that the 22 Masyumist deputies who were trained in the Islamic sec-
ondary level educational institutions also received their fair share of 
Western ideas and values (the three others make no mention of any 
schooling). Indeed, it should be pointed out that the two curriculums 
were by no means mutually exclusive, as almost half of the deputies 
who had come out of the Dutch education system had at one stage 
or another in their schooling attended a religious institution. Th e 
other deputies owed their knowledge of Islam to evening classes which 
they were given from an ulama, although, generally, only those who 
had attended the most prestigious kiyai mentioned it in their offi  cial 
biography.57
 If we move on to look at the upper echelons of the party, we see 
that the imprint of the Dutch education system is even more signifi -
cant on them. Of the 15 members of the party’s executive committee 
elected in 1954, only two (Taufi qurrahman and Fakih Usman) had 
received their education exclusively from religious schools. Five of 
them had received secondary school diplomas from Dutch schools 
(Mohammad Natsir, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Mohammad Sardjan, 
Nj. Sunarjo Mangunpuspito and Nj. Zahra Hafni Abuhanifah), while 
the remaining eight had received third-level education. Of the latter, 
fi ve had graduated from the Rechts-Hogeschool, where as well as 
courses in law it was also possible to study economics and sociology 
(Kasman Singodimedjo, Mohamad Roem, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 
Jusuf Wibisono and Boerhanoeddin Harahap), two had been to medi-
cal school, known as STOVIA (Soekiman and Abu Hanifah) while Isa 
Anshary indicated in his biography that he had studied economics and 
political science in Bandung though he never really specifi ed which 
institution he had attended.
56 Lukman Hakiem, Perjalan mencari keadilan dan persatuan. Biografi  Dr Anwar 
Harjono, S.H. (Jakarta: Media Da’wah, 1993), p. 34 ff .
57 A deputy from Central Sumatra, Dr. H. Ali Akbar, indicated, for example, that 
he had followed the teachings of Sjech Muhammad Djamil Djambek, one of the 
most renowned reformist ulamas of the Minang region.
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 As public opinion regarded this type of education as very presti-
gious, the leaders of Masyumi often drew attention to it, sometimes to 
the detriment of the religious education they may have received, either 
from schools run by Islamic organisations or informally from ulamas. 
In the biographies of Masyumi leaders published by Abadi in the 
months running up to the 1955 general election, only four of them 
(Isa Anshary, Nj Sunarjo Mangunpuspito, K.H. Taufi qurrahman and 
Fakih Usman) mentioned it, despite the fact that all of them had re-
ceived a religious education of some description. For their generation, 
an Islamic education had become less important, not just because less 
time was devoted to it in schools, but also because it held less weight 
in public perception. It seemed to the party’s candidates that it was 
more benefi cial in the eyes of the voter to be a past-pupil of a Dutch 
secondary school or university than to have followed courses in a 
Muhammadiyah school or in a pesantren in the Minangkabau region.
 In order to understand the importance of a Western-style educa-
tion for those who took over the leadership of the party at the end of 
the 1940s, it needs to be examined in the context of the broader trans-
formation of a social category which was the crucible of Indonesian 
nationalism: the middle class. George McTurnan Kahin has shown how 
the business community became a minority within the middle class in 
the last decades of Dutch colonialism, compared with civil servants, 
private sector employees and teachers. Th e latter two categories owed 
their success to a Western-style education, whereas Islamic education 
still fi gured prominently for those amongst the business community.58 
Th e men who came to occupy the highest echelons of the party during 
the 1950s were typical, then, of the sociological transformation which 
the Muslim reformist movement had undergone. Where the reformist 
leaders of Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah in the previous generation 
had come mainly from the business community and had received, for 
the most part, an exclusively religious education, Masyumi’s leaders, 
thanks to their education in the Dutch system, worked in the intellec-
tual professions until their election to parliament at least. Looking at 
the 57 Masyumi parliamentarians, we can see that 21 of them were 
civil servants, 17 were teachers, fi ve of them were journalists and four 
were members of one of the liberal professions. Only nine of them 
were members of the business community, i.e. slightly more than 15 
58 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 29.
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per cent (one of the deputies, a woman, did not give a profession).59 
Amongst the leadership of the party, only Jusuf Wibisono and Kasman 
Singodimedjo had experience in the business world as employees of 
Dutch fi rms.
 Th e Western culture with which the future Masyumi leadership 
were imbued, left a profound infl uence on them, and this is evidenced 
in the system of references that they gradually established in their 
writings.
References to the West
Th e intellectual infl uence of Western culture appears in various forms 
in the Masyumi leaders’ ideas. First of all, they were intellectually 
drawn to the issues raised by European history and American history 
and often referred to them in their writings. Second, and perhaps most 
strikingly, Western thinkers, in the eyes of Masyumi writers, were seen 
to lend more credibility to their arguments. References to the West 
were not, then, simply negative ones used to score political points by 
attacking the representatives of western culture. Although it should be 
said that there were occurrences of this during the formative years of 
the nationalist movement, such as when Mohammad Natsir crossed 
swords in the 1930s with a Dutch pastor in the AIT newspaper. In 
this heated exchange, Natsir, naturally, adopted a position contrary to 
his opponent’s system of references; 60 but after the struggle for inde-
pendence, we begin to see in these references the signs of the intellec-
tual debt owed to the West by Masyumi’s theorists.
 Th e political considerations elaborated by Masyumi’s theorists be-
longed, for the most part, to the tradition of Western thought. Indeed, 
their writings and speeches leave a European historian with the un-
canny feeling of being on very familiar ground. Allusions to the West, 
whether to its culture or to its important historical fi gures, are far more 
frequent than references to Islam or Indonesia’s past. If we look at clas-
sical antiquity to begin with, little mention is made of Ancient Greece 
and Rome, and although the early Greek philosophers were highly 
59 Parlaungan, Hasil Rakjat Memilih, Tokoh-Tokoh Parlemen di republik Indonesia 
(Jakarta: C.V. GITA, 1956).
60 Ajip Rosidi, Mohammad Natsir, sebuah biografi  (Jakarta: PT Girimukti Pusaka, 
1990), pp. 42–3.
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respected—Kasman said that “Socrates, even for Muslim philosophers, 
will remain famous until the end of time”—their writings were only 
rarely analysed.61 Moving on to the Christian era, two periods were 
seen by the party’s thinkers as examples to be avoided when establishing 
an Islamic state: fi rst, the Middle Ages which were seen as a period of 
total political domination by the Catholic church but also the 17th and 
18th centuries, described as a period of absolute monarchy in Europe. 
Isa Anshary, for example, did not want “a state led by a supreme leader 
who embodied both political and religious authority, like what we saw 
in the Middle Ages when the Catholic Church commanded and op-
pressed mankind (both physically and morally) with a philosophy 
known as Universalism.”  62
 Logically enough, Enlightenment ideas were celebrated by Mas-
yumi writers, such as Soedjino Hardjosoediro, who off ered readers of 
the Hikmah newspaper a detailed analysis of the “trias politica ” theory. 
In it, he underlined the importance of contributions made to this 
theory by Montesquieu and John Locke, and explained why a strict 
separation of powers was vital in a democracy.63 However, if the party’s 
theorists joined with the philosophers of the 18th century in con-
demning absolutism and the concentration of power in one branch of 
government, part of the Enlightenment legacy was nonetheless rejected. 
Th is is where the diff erence between Masyumi and nationalists, who 
were religiously neutral, became apparent:
We need to understand that as the colonial mindset shaped and 
left its mark on half of our intellectuals, there has appeared in the 
struggle for independence a principle which holds that religion 
and politics must be separated. [Th is doctrine can be explained by] 
the spirit of individualism which was advocated enthusiastically by 
some seventeenth and eighteenth century experts in social sciences, 
the most famous of whom is J.J. Rousseau.64
 Th e West’s political theories and historical experiences at that 
time inspired and illustrated most of the Masyumi leadership’s political 
ideas. Isa Anshary’s analysis of the French revolutionary experience led 
61 Kasman Singodimejo, Renungan dari Tahanan, p. 142.
62 Anshary, Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, p. 216.
63 Hikmah, 27 March, 3 and 10 April 1954.
64 Anshary, Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, p. 91.
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him to conclude that a political revolution without a social revolution 
would necessarily be vain.65 Such considerations clearly showed the 
proximity between Masyumi’s theoretical framework. Indeed, one of 
Masyumi’s dilemmas was how to distance itself from Marxism, an 
ideology which of course the party had to spurn because of its impiety. 
Marxism and its Leninist and Stalinist off shoots held a real fascination 
for the Masyumi leadership, and they undoubtedly knew those politi-
cal theories better than any other. Jusuf Wibisono, quoting Jules Mon-
nerot, stated that communism was similar to a religion; 66 Isa Anshary 
devoted long sections of his book, Philosophy of Islamic Struggle, to 
considerations on Marxistiche Historische materialische Weltanschauung 
and Marxistische Staatsfi lisofi e, which he often supplemented with long 
quotations in German.67 Communism was condemned, alongside fas-
cism and Nazism, in a long list of models which were the antithesis of 
an Islamic state. Anshary denounced regimes
in which all authority is held by one man, who is of a superior 
race, a supreme leader, before whom the people are answerable 
instead of the contrary, like the fascism of Mussolini and Hitler 
who both idolized the Führerprinzip, or a totalitarian government 
led by one man, a proletariat dictator from the Bolshevik move-
ment, which is founded upon the philosophy of dialectical mate-
rialism and implemented through communism or Leninism.68
However, Masyumi’s leaders observed various Marxist movements 
closely, and also identifi ed more positive models there. At the beginning 
of the 1960s, Kasman Singidimedjo made an appeal to his supporters 
from his prison cell to adopt a “progressivist-revolutionary” attitude in 
line with that exemplifi ed by Rosa Luxemburg:
65 “Katja suram dari Revolusi Perantjis”, ibid., pp. 137 ff .
66 Hikmah, 3 April 1954.
67 Anshary, Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, pp. 90, 198–200. It is legitimate to won-
der to what extent Indonesian readers understood these long quotations, whose 
origin, moreover, was rarely specifi ed. One of the longest of these was an extract 
from “a book by Marx and Engels”, no further details being given. It was taken 
from the magazine Ilmu Masyjarakjat and illustrates the importance of the role 
played by periodicals in allowing access to original works which were otherwise 
diffi  cult to come by.
68 Anshary, Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, p. 216.
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In the fi nal analysis, we must accomplish the duty which Islam im-
poses on us to struggle until we manage, in accordance with Rosa 
Luxemburg’s theory of spontaneous organisation (which is consis-
tent with being a progressivist revolutionary), to overcome more 
rapidly the previous dispensation which was willingly organized and 
then purposely neglected by Dutch colonisation and imperialism 
in Indonesia. We should read the Koran, verse 70 of the Sura Al 
Baqarah, which forbids us from being conservative.69
 Th e recent history of North America and Western bloc countries 
also gave Masyumi thinkers examples to follow in their policies. Th e 
question of the nation-state when it was addressed was almost always 
preceded by a reminder of Renan’s defi nition. Th e author of “What is 
a nation?” off ered a tailor-made conceptual framework for contempo-
rary Indonesia where the interests and aspirations of diff erent ethnic 
groups posed a potential threat to its stability. Th e American and 
European experiences in establishing constitutions were often used to 
provide a legal framework for the party’s considerations on Indonesia’s 
future constitution.70 Moreover, Western states were often used as 
examples when trying to avoid any demonisation of the question of 
an Islamic state; those who had founded their institutions on religion 
were also shown to be paragons of democratic values. Mohammad 
Natsir, for instance, in a famous speech made in Karachi in April 1952 
declared that:
We should be careful to pay attention to a misinterpretation by the 
West which leads to Islamic states like Pakistan, who are founded 
on religious principles and recognize Islam as the state religion, 
being suspected of wanting to become theocratic states. Unfortu-
nately, we do not really know what exactly this term ‘theocracy’ 
signifi es, beyond the fact that it must be rejected.
Many Americans, and by that I mean North Americans, consider 
their people and their country to be Christian. Th e late president, 
69 Kasman Singodimejo, Renungan dari Tahanan, p. 55. Koran (II, 87).
70 See, for example, Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, “Indonesia Berparlement”, a series 
of articles which appeared in the weekly magazine Adil and reproduced in 
Wawasan Politik Seorang Muslim Patriot. Kumpulan Karangan (Jakarta: YP2LPM, 
1984), p. 40. Th e edition of Hikmah which appeared on 19 November 1955, 
just before the elections for the Constituent Assembly, also proposed a special 
report on the history of the American and French constitutions.
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Franklin Delano Roosevelt, was clearly Christian and rarely forgot 
to mention the Christian religion in his appeals to the nations of 
the world during the Second World War. Th e English too are un-
mistakably a Christian people with a state religion. Th ey have a 
king who is the head and the defender of the Anglican faith and 
numerous national events include religious ceremonies. Likewise, 
the Dutch are a Christian people whose constitution stipulates that 
the sovereign has to be a Protestant. All these states, as well as 
the other Christian countries of Europe, including even France, 
although it does not clearly recognize the place of religion in the 
state, have always given their support to Christian missionary acti-
vities outside of Europe, whether in Asia, Africa or Australia, parti-
cularly in colonised or semi-colonised countries.71
 Another striking feature of the West’s infl uence on the ideas of 
Masyumi’s leaders is the role played by American and European authors 
in lending credibility to the party’s message. In this regard, references 
to the West revealed a mindset which was eager to convince its public 
but also no doubt somewhat prone to an inferiority complex. State-
ments about the benefi ts of Islam for public life, the greatness of 
Muslim civilisation or the importance of a revered expounder of Islam 
only seemed to have currency insofar as they had been recognised by 
a member of the Western intellectual community. Mohammad Natsir, 
when praising al-Ghazali, referred to the English scholar, Dr. Zwene 
who, curiously enough, ranked the Muslim philosopher as the “fourth 
most important person in the history of Islam”.72 Jusuf Wibisono, 
who was keen to rid Islam of its image as a misogynistic religion, 
quoted Gustave Le Bon, a sociologist and psychologist who had said 
in a book entitled Th e Civilisation of the Arabs that Islam was the fi rst 
religion to recognise the status of women.73 Finally, the writings of the 
important Islamicists of the day, H.A.R. Gibb, Nothrop Sterling and 
Lothrop Stoddard, who all taught in prestigious universities in England 
and America, were often quoted to support an observation or an 
interpretation.
71 Mohammad Natsir, “Sumbangan Islam bagi perdamaian dunia” (Islam’s Con-
tribution to the Pacifi cation of the World), in Capita Selecta, vol. 2, pp. 61–80.
72 “Behind Mohammad, Al Buchari and Al Asj’ari” Natsir, Capita Selecta, vol. 1, 
p. 23.
73 Hikmah, 3 April 1954.
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 If we were to look, then, only at the education and writings of 
the party leaders, Masyumi’s Western heritage would seem to be essen-
tial. Th e same could no doubt be said to be true of the intermediary 
echelons of the party, the local party heads, members of the petite 
bourgeoisie working in administrative jobs or owners of small businesses. 
Th ese were the main readers of the periodicals and books published by 
the national leaders. Th e same does not hold, however, if we go further 
down the pyramid and look at the grassroots activists and particularly 
at the party’s electorate. What resonance could the references which we 
have just mentioned have for people who were illiterate or had no ac-
cess to a Western-style education? Th ey no doubt provoked confl icting 
reactions of fascination and aversion: fascination on the one hand for 
the technical superiority observed during the colonial period and which 
continued after decolonisation with the importation of certain con-
sumer goods, but aversion also to a civilisation judged to be corruptive 
and domineering. Such contradictory sentiments could be reconciled 
eff ortlessly by the theorists of the party, but from the beginning of 
the 1950s, they undoubtedly contributed to the disenchantment with 
Masyumi amongst the broader Muslim electorate when the promised 
benefi ts of a western-style system of government failed to materialise.
A Lasting Tradition of Unity and Discord
When it was founded in 1945, Masyumi saw itself as a political focal 
point for various strands within the umma. It was also the heir to 
an age-old dialectical tension between unity and division which had 
heretofore shaped the troubled history of Indonesian Islam. All those 
who played a role of any importance in the foundation of the party 
brought with them, in some way or other, the legacy of existing or 
defunct organisations which they had been or still were members of.
 Th e birth of an Islamic political movement within Indonesia was 
intimately linked to the propagation of reformist ideas across the 
country. Th e theme of renewal and the adoption of Western methods 
of organisation, both of which typifi ed modernism, provided the groups 
which formed at the beginning of the 20th century with the motiva-
tion, the critical framework and the organisational structures necessary 
for their fl edgling struggle. For these groups, however, the original 
impetus of the reformist movement, which had led to an awakening 
within part of the Muslim community, arose initially from the desire to 
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protect a certain number of established interests. Th e reformist move-
ment was limited initially to a few specifi c social groups—members of 
the Arab community and batik traders—before gradually developing 
its support base to encompass the whole of Indonesian society. It thus 
grew from defending the interests of a community to participating in 
the nationalist struggle. Its fi rst political activity was motivated by its 
observations of the West’s political and economic hegemony but also 
by the increasing domination of Western religions. Since the beginning 
of the 20th century, Christian missionaries had begun to reach out to 
the abangan population on Java with a certain degree of success, and 
this success was attributed, by some, to the paralysis within Islam and 
to the subverting of its practices.
 Th e fi rst signs of the reformist movement appeared in the 
Hadhrami community which was composed of Arabs or descendants 
of Arabs from Hadramout living in Indonesia. Th is community, which 
was well-structured and relatively affl  uent, had maintained close links 
with its native region and kept itself informed of the various move-
ments which were developing in the Middle East. In 1901, some 
members of the community founded the Djamiat Chair (“Charitable 
Society”), which was a conservative association whose goal was to edu-
cate the children of the Arab community. Th e movement remained 
relatively small-scale until a split in 1915 leading to the emergence of 
a more progressivist organisation, Al-Irsyad, which played a signifi cant 
role in the diff usion of modernist ideas throughout Indonesia.74
 Th e second Muslim organisation to be established took the form 
of a trade association set up by batik traders. At the beginning of the 
second decade of the 20th century, the Dutch administration progres-
sively loosened the strict control it had maintained up until then over 
74 For more on the birth of Al-Irsyad, as well as the religious education in Mecca 
received by its founder, the Soudanese Ahmad Surkati and the dispute over the 
sayyid which was behind the creation of the new organisation, see Ahmed Ibrahim 
Abu Shouk, “An Arabic Manuscript on the Life and Career of Ahmad Luhammad 
Sûrkatî and His Irshâdî Disciples in Java”, in Transcending Borders: Arabs, Politics, 
Trade and Islam in Southeast Asia, ed. Huub de Jonge and Nico Kaptein (Leiden: 
KITLV Press, 2002), pp. 203–17. For an overall view of how the political mobi-
lisation within the Hadrami community was transformed, see Natalie Mobini-
Kesheh, Th e Hadrami Awakening: Community and Identity in the Netherlands 
East Indies, 1900–1942 (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 
1999).
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Chinese activity in Indonesia. As a result, Peranakan traders, who were 
of Chinese origin, were entitled to travel, trade and invest much more 
freely than they had been able to previously. Th is led to much stiff er 
competition for the indigenous bourgeoisie around Surakata and Yogya-
karta, notably in the batik trade.75 In 1911, Muslim traders, in an at-
tempt to defend their interests, founded a mutual assistance association 
in Solo known as the Rekso Roemekso. Th is organisation, which had 
no legal status and had been threatened with a ban by the authorities 
after its implication in anti-Chinese riots, changed dramatically in 1912 
when, upon the initiative of its leader, Hadji Samanhoedi, it registered 
itself offi  cially as an organisation and changed its name to Sarekat Islam 
(Muslim Union).76 Th e reasons for the founding of this new association 
were more sociological in nature than religious. Sarekat Islam was much 
more concerned with defending and protecting the interests of Muslims 
as a social group than with working to restore Islam’s place in Indone-
sian society, and indeed Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, who was in charge 
of running the association for more than 20 years, was not himself a 
religious fi gure. For a time, Tjokroaminoto was likened to the Ratu 
Adil, the just king of Javanese folklore, and he was never presented as 
a particularly pious Muslim. In fact, he drew his political inspiration 
more from socialism than from Islam.77 Th e spectacular development 
of Sarekat Islam during the fi rst 10 years of its existence relied largely 
on the Marxist networks which sought to involve the movement in 
radical and revolutionary activities. At the same time, however, the 
growing infl uence of Muhammadiyah within the organisation led to 
the emergence of a powerful anti-communist branch.
 Th e third important pillar of Indonesian reformism, Muham-
madiyah, was created in 1912. Its founder, Ahmad Dahlan, was a 
licensed member of the Islamic clergy who had spent years in Mecca 
75 Takashi Siraishi, An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912–1926 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 37–9.
76 It is commonly known as the Sarekat Dagang Islam (Union of Muslim 
Traders), however, as it appeared, initially, as the local branch of an organisation 
with the same name founded in Bogor in 1909. Ibid., pp. 42–3.
77 Th e place occupied by Islam in the SI’s political programme, defi ned at its 
1917 congress, was very limited. It stipulated that “the state and the government 
should not be infl uenced by the interference of one religion, but should place 
itself above all religions.” Noer, Th e Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 
p. 127.
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and whose father was a religious offi  cial of the Yogyakarta Kauman.78 
He adopted the reformist philosophy and participated actively in the 
organisations which were the precursors to the nationalist movement 
of the 1930s and 40s, namely Djamiat Chair, Boedi Oetomo and 
Sarekat Islam. Muhammadiyah’s objectives were above all educational 
and social; it considerably extended the reach of reformism amongst 
the Indonesian public through its networks of mosques and schools 
but also thanks to the work of a charitable committee, a women’s orga-
nisation and scout groups.79 It was not involved directly in politics, but 
many of its members were active within Sarekat Islam (SI) and, in 
1920, the link between the two organisations was made offi  cial. At that 
point, Muhammadiyah became the religious arm of SI and strengthened 
the anti-communist branch within it. 
 Th e driving force behind this merger was Agus Salim. He had 
formerly been a translator in the Dutch East Indies consulate in Jeddah 
and upon his return to Indonesia, he was charged by the Dutch authori-
ties with the surveillance of Sarekat Islam. He had been a confi rmed 
member of the reformist movement since 1915 and so he quickly 
abandoned his mission and was soon made second-in-command to 
Tjokroaminoto.80 He was respected for his religious knowledge and 
was opposed to any attempt at organising a revolution. At the 1921 
congress, he contributed to SI’s defi nitive break with its Marxist wing, 
which meant that the former “red” sections of SI (SI Merah) were left 
with no other option but to join the newly-created Communist Party.81
 It is important to mention also the foundation at this time of 
another organisation which was to play an important role in the his-
tory of Indonesian Islam: Persatuan Islam (Unity of Islam, also known 
78 Th e Kauman was originally the district inhabited by the religious offi  cials of 
the sultanate. For further examination of Dahlan’s role in the transformation of 
the Kauman, see Marcel Bonneff , “Le kauman de Yogyakarta. Des fonctionnaires 
religieux convertis au réformisme et à l’esprit d’entreprise”, Archipel 30 (1985).
79 For concrete examples of the activities organised by this reformist organisation, 
see Mitsu Nakaruma, Th e Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the 
Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada 
University Press, 1983).
80 Noer, Th e Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, p. 124.
81 Th e work of reference on the birth and development of Indonesian communism 
remains. Ruth McVey, Th e Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1965), p. 510.
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as Persis), which was created in Bandung in 1923. Th is organisation 
was founded in West Java by the descendants of families who had 
originated from Sumatra—mainly from the Minangkabau region—and 
had emigrated in search of new trading opportunities. One of the 
main fi gures of the movement, Hadji Zamzam, had studied for three 
years in Mecca and was close to Ahmad Surkati, the founder of the 
Al Irshad movement, the forerunner of radical reformism in Indonesia. 
Th e most prominent member of Persis, however, was Ahmad Hassan 
(often called Hassan Bandung) who was born in Singapore to a Tamil 
father and a Javanese mother. He joined the movement in 1924 and 
rapidly rose to become its leader. Under his leadership, Persis enjoyed 
a considerable degree of infl uence within the Indonesian public. Th e 
organisation was only composed of a few hundred members, which 
meant that it did not experience any of the organisational problems 
and internal crises which hampered Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah 
and Al Irshad (the latter, for example, was involved in a long drawn-
out dispute with Djamiat Chair concerning the status of Indonesians 
of Arab origin). It was therefore able to devote all its time and energy 
to religious questions. Th rough the work it carried out in the fi elds of 
translation and education, but above all through the infl uence of its 
periodical, Pembela Islam, Persis played a central role in the religious 
debates of the 1920s and 1930s.82
 Th e beginning of the 1920s marked the apogee of the Muslim 
reformist movement. It was freed from its bonds with communism 
and had set down fi rm roots throughout the country, both through 
a religious and social care organisation (Muhammadiyah) and through 
a political organisation (Sarekat Islam). It had a clear identity and 
counted hundreds of thousands of Muslims amongst its ranks. Th e 
creation in 1925, on the joint initiative of Sarekat Islam and Muham-
madiyah, of an organisation of young Muslims, the Jong Islamieten 
Bond (JIB), confi rmed the bright prospects which lay ahead for the re-
formist movement.83 On this point at least, the collaboration between 
the two big reformist movements proved to be fruitful. Th e JIB consti-
tuted a veritable breeding ground for the future leadership of Masyumi, 
82 See Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia, 
Chapters 4 to 7.
83 On the birth of this organisation which emerged from the split within Jong 
Java, see Van Niel, Th e Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite, p. 168.
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but as we will see later, the golden age of cooperation between Muham-
madiyah and SI was short-lived. Th is was partly due to the fact that 
the Dutch, through a series of skilful political manoeuvres, eventually 
forced Islamic organisations into making painful choices.
 Th e Netherlands’ policy with regard to Islam was, for almost 40 
years, heavily infl uenced by the analysis of Snouck Hurgronje. Snouck, 
who was a professor at the University of Leiden and also a consultant 
for the Offi  ce of Indigenous Aff airs in the Ministry of the Colonies, 
managed to ease the fears of his fellow-Dutchmen towards Indonesian 
Muslims and initiate a new policy towards Islam. On his advice, the 
colonial administration authorised and even encouraged Muslim initia-
tives as long as they were limited to social and religious fi elds. Any 
political manifestations of Islam, however, were kept on a tight rein.84 
Th is subtle distinction established by the Dutch colonial authorities 
helped drive a wedge between Muhammadiyah and SI and put an 
end to their collaboration. In 1923, Sarekat Islam, which had just 
changed its name to Partai Sarekat Islam, adopted a policy known 
as Hijira (Hijra), which Agus Salim compared to Gandhi’s policy of 
non-cooperation.85 It involved each of the party members refusing any 
collaboration with the Dutch. Despite the fact that Muhammadiyah 
disapproved of this policy of opposition to the colonial administration, 
from whom it received a signifi cant amount of subsidies for its schools, 
Tjokroaminoto refused to compromise on this issue. Muhammadiyah’s 
position convinced him of the necessity to persuade his party to adopt 
a measure forbidding joint membership of the two organisations, which 
he succeeded in doing in 1927. At the same time as this split began to 
appear within the reformist movement, the appearance of two formi-
dable rival organisations succeeded in putting an end to the hegemonic 
position held by Sarekat Islam as the main political representative of 
Indonesian Muslims.
 Th e fi rst of these two opponents emerged from a desire amongst 
the representatives of a traditionalist Islam (kuam tua) to form their 
84 Certain movements were invited to participate in the Volksraad—the consulta-
tive assembly set up by the Dutch—but the most active members were exiled, in 
particular Muhammadiyah members from the Minangkabau region. Noer, Th e 
Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, p. 108.
85 To be understood here in its original meaning of a rupture with the colonial 
government. Ibid., p. 159.
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own movement. Since the beginning of the century, two major points 
of discord had appeared between reformists and traditionalists. First 
of all, the reformists, by advocating ijtihad, refused to recognise any 
particular value in the interpretations proposed by the Shafi ’i school of 
jurisprudence; secondly, two religious rites which traditionalists were 
particularly attached to attracted the ire of reformists, namely prayers 
for the dead (tahlilan) and the cult of saints (ziarah). Despite these 
diff erences, in the fi rst two decades of the century, there existed a 
certain amount of collaboration between the two branches of Islam. 
As we saw earlier, traditionalists who were part of the Shafi ’i schools of 
jurisprudence in Indonesia had not been spared by the winds of refor-
mism which had swept through Indonesian Islam. Th e traditionalists 
who advocated a return to the orthodoxy of the madhhab were in 
reality adopting a similar approach to their reformist opponents, and 
some traditionalists even joined reformist groups. Several representatives 
of the traditionalist kaum tua branch, for example, participated in the 
foundation of Persatuan Islam. Th is, of course, was several years before 
Persatuan Islam became the defender of kaum muda, the modernist 
branch of Islam.86 Another example is that of Kyai Abdul Wahab 
Hasbullah, who was one of the linchpins of the traditionalist move-
ment but also participated in the Sarekat Islam group.87 His work in 
the traditionalist movement drew him closer to Kyai Hasjim As’j’ari, 
the heir of a prestigious family of ulamas and the founder of the 
Tebuireng Pesantren in the East Javanese region of Jombang which 
became a focal point for the traditionalist revival.
 Th ese “pioneers of tradition” agreed with modernists on the neces-
sity to reform the curriculum of Koranic schools in order to introduce 
western subjects.88 Th ey often read the same newspapers and had the 
same opinion on the necessity to open up to the modern world.89 
86 It was not until 1926 that the traditionalist representatives left Persis to found 
their own organisation, which was later to be integrated into NU. Federspiel, 
Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia, p. 14.
87 On the role played by Kyai Wahab, see Feillard, Islam et armée dans l’Indonésie 
contemporaine, pp. 24 ff .
88 Th e eff orts made in this regard by Kyai Hasjim Asjari, who introduced the 
teaching of general subjects into his pesantren in 1929 can be likened to Moham-
mad Natsir’s endeavours at the time within Persatuan Islam.
89 Aboebakar, Sejarah Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, Panitya Buku Peringatan alm. 
K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim (Jakarta, 1957), pp. 152 ff .
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However, as the years went by and the number of reformist organisa-
tions grew, the traditionalists began to feel less and less at home in 
them. Th e malaise, which had remained in the background for a long 
time but fi nally came to the fore with the question of the Caliphate, 
was fuelled by two factors: the ongoing transformation of Sarekat Islam 
into the political branch of Muhammadiyah and the questioning of 
the authority of traditionalist ulamas by the modernists, who judged 
them to be too out of date (kolot). Th e fi rst Al-Islam congress, held 
in 1922 in Cirebon, was the scene of violent confrontations on this 
issue between representatives of kaum tua and kaum muda.90 At the 
second congress held in Garut in 1924, only the modernist movement 
was represented,91 and in January 1926 when it was decided to send 
two Indonesian representatives to the World Pan-Islamic Congress to 
be held in Mecca in June of that year, it was again two modernists, 
Tjokroaminoto and K.H. Mansur, who were chosen.92 For the tradi-
tionalist branch, it was essential to be able to defend its religious prac-
tices which had been called into question by the Wahhabi purists. 
Th ey therefore decided to create a Committee for the Reconquering 
of Hijaz (Komite Merembuk Hijaz) which was to represent the tradi-
tionalist branch before King Ibn Saud. To help in this task, an orga-
nisation was set up a few days later, called “the Revival of the Ulama” 
(Nahdlatul Ulama), which offi  cialised the split between the two 
branches of Islam.
 At the same time as Islam’s political unity fell apart, the identifi -
cation of nationalism with Islam, which Sarekat Islam had managed 
to embody, also ended, with the establishment of a powerful secular 
nationalist branch. With the exception of the Marxist movement which 
had fallen into disarray since the attempted insurrection in 1926, 
several organisations contributed to the emergence of a political move-
ment no longer bound by references to Islam. Th e Taman Siswa orga-
nisation, for example, founded in Yogyakarta in 1921 by Ki Hadjar 
90 Greg Fealy, “Ulama dan Politics in Indonesia: A History of Nahdlatul Ulama, 
1952–1967”, PhD thesis, Monash University, 1998, p. 29.
91 Van Niel, Th e Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite, p. 209.
92 Th e Indonesian Al-Islam Kongres joined the World Islamic Congress and 
became its East Indies section (MAIHS). A permanent secretariat was established 
in Surabaya under Agus Salim. Alexandre Von Arx, “L’évolution politique en 
Indonésie de 1900 à 1942”, PhD thesis, Fribourg University, Artigianelli-Monza, 
Fribourg, 1949, p. 182.
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Dewantoro, developed a network of schools which promoted an edu-
cation system blending aspects of Javanese and Western culture. Th ese 
schools became the crucible for many of the Indonesian nationalist 
leaders. But the organisation which played the biggest part in the 
birth of this secular movement was Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indo-
nesian Union).
 Initially merely a students’ organisation (known as the Indies 
Association) composed of Indonesians studying in the Netherlands, 
Perhimpunan Indonesia’s development as a nationalist movement was 
the unintentional outcome of the colonial government’s ethical policy. 
Th e colonial authorities had created a system of scholarships which 
allowed the brightest Indonesian pupils to pursue their studies in the 
metropolis; the aim of this project was to create an indigenous elite, 
which they naturally hoped would be favourable to Dutch interests. 
However, this generous policy however quickly backfi red. Perhimpunan 
Indonesia, as it became known after its transformation into a nation-
alist organisation in 1922, was an anti-colonial organisation, and it 
fully exploited its network of former scholarship pupils, who had 
now returned to their home country, in an attempt to build a pro-
independence party for the Dutch East Indies.93 Th ese eff orts came 
to fruition in 1927 with the birth of the National Indonesian Party 
(Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI). Th e new party came rapidly under 
the control of the charismatic personality of a young engineer educated 
in Bandung: Sukarno. Th e fi rst version of the PNI had a short and 
turbulent exitence. By 1930, it was outlawed and saw its members dis-
perse into several small parties (Partai Rakyat Indonesia, Partindo and 
Klub Pendidikan, for example). Despite the break-up of the party, 
Sukarno already exercised at this time considerable infl uence over 
Indonesian political life. In the hope of bringing about a future inde-
pendent Indonesia made up of non-Muslims as well as Muslims, he 
wished to limit Islam to the private sphere and so became the mouth-
piece for a secular conception of the state and the champion of an 
Indonesian form of Kemalism, though in a less anti-religious form than 
the original version. Th rough the epic debates he held with Ahmad 
Hassan and Mohammad Natsir (at that time Hassan’s brilliant right-
hand man within Persis), he obliged the supporters of a political role 
93 Van Niel, Th e Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite, pp. 119–22.
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for Islam to clarify their vision for the future.94 Th ough he was not able 
to shake Ahmad Hassan’s belief in his own radicalism, he undoubtedly 
contributed to Natsir’s conversion to a certain form of realism, the 
extent of which could be seen later in the 1950s when Natsir became 
prime minister.
 Th e emergence of new organisations onto the Indonesian political 
landscape was not the only reason for the reformist movement’s decline 
in power. During the 1930s, while a new generation of nationalist 
leaders was forming in the organisations which had sprouted from the 
PNI after it was banned, political Islam was continuing to splinter, 
riven by confl icting egos and disagreements on which strategy to 
follow.95 In 1933, Soekiman was expelled from Sarekat Islam following 
a dispute with Tjokroaminto, one of its leaders.96 Th ose within SI who 
disapproved of this decision created a committee called the Persatuan 
Islam Indonesia and, along with the PSII Merdeka from Yogyakarta, 
created a new party: the Partai Islam Indonesia (PARTII). Although 
this new party received a favourable reception in many parts of Java, it 
eventually waned and disappeared in the years following its foundation. 
Its leaders, who were close to important fi gures in Muhammadiyah, 
notably its president, K.H. Mas Mansur, had suggested that Sarekat 
Islam should consider changing their hijra policy and no longer view 
it as an immutable principle which could not be adapted to particular 
events and circumstances. Th ey also asked SI to limit themselves to 
politics and to leave social care and educational projects under the 
responsibility of the organisations which had been created for this pur-
pose. It was as a result of SI’s refusal of these requests that Partai 
Islam Indonesia (PII) was founded in 1937. While all this was going 
on, the dispute within SI concerning what attitude to adopt towards 
94 See, in particular, his “Surat-surat Islam dari Endeh” in Dibawah Bendera 
Revolusi, vol. 1 (Jakarta, 1964), pp. 325–47.
95 In the following years, it was the PNI rather than SI which led Indonesian 
rural unrest. Th is consolidated its role in the struggle against colonial domina-
tion. Harry J. Benda, Th e Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the 
Japanese Occupation 1942–1945 (Th e Hague and Bandung: W. Van Hoeve Ltd, 
1958), p. 55.
96 Soekiman publicly denounced the embezzlement carried out by SI leaders 
within Persatuan Pegawai Pegadaian Hindia (the East Indies Union of Employees 
of the Pious Mounts). Noer, Th e Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 
p. 155. Accusations of fi nancial misdealings had already been made against Tjokro-
aminoto during the fi rst decade of the century.
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the colonial authorities had become even more rancorous after Tjokro-
aminoto’s death, with the new leadership’s opposition to any form of 
cooperation leading Agus Salim to found a rival organisation, Barisan 
Penjadar PSII (Awareness Front of the PSII).97
 As the 1930s came to a close, the Islamic political movement, led 
by the reformists, now had to reconcile itself to the fact that it was no 
longer the only component of the nationalist movement. They were 
now forced to come to a consensus with traditionalists before being 
able to speak on behalf of Indonesian Muslims, and so in 1937 they 
joined with the traditionalists in a Supreme Council of the Muslims of 
Indonesia (Madjlis Islam A’la Indonesia, MIAI). They also participated 
alongside nationalists in two organisations created in 1939: the Political 
Federation of Indonesia (Gabungan Politik Indonesia, GAPI) and the 
Council of the Indonesian People (Madjlis Rakjat Indonesia, MRI) 
which was composed of the GAPI, the MIAI and the Federation of 
Government Workers (the PVPN).
 This historic alliance between the different strands of Indonesian 
nationalism in which the Islamic branch had managed—with some 
difficulty—to find its place did not survive the debates provoked by 
the question of how to react to the Japanese threat, however. The 
fragile alliance fell apart at the beginning of 1942 when the Indonesian 
nationalists, without consulting the representatives of the Islamic move-
ments, spoke out on behalf of the MRI to support the Dutch in the 
war against Japan.
 Masyumi, which brought together in 1945 all the Islamic organi-
sations in Indonesia, inherited the complex history of these movements 
which we have just sketched. The party carried with it the umma’s 
hopes for unity, and it often made reference to the 12 Islamic Con-
gresses (Al-Islam first, and then Konggres Muslimin Indonesia) which 
had been held in Indonesia between 1921 and 1941. The commemo-
rations of these congresses during the 1950s provided Masyumi’s news-
papers and magazines with opportunities to make stirring appeals for 
unity.98 However, the legacy of the interwar years for the party also 
included an extraordinary propensity for in-fighting amongst the repre-
sentatives of the Muslim community. This characteristic of Indonesian 
Islamic identity was less celebrated, but it was no doubt the one which 
97 Ibid., p. 163.
98 See, for example, Suara Partai Masjumi, February 1951.
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left the greatest mark on Masyumi. Th e end of the 1920s saw the 
appearance within the Muslim community of a culture in which power 
tended to split into little baronies. Th is could be the result either of 
the ambition of a charismatic leader, geographic or social diff erences 
within the Muslim community, or sometimes because of diff erences in 
worship practices. Masyumi bore the scars of this culture of divisiveness 
which was responsible for the schisms of 1947 (the revival of the Partai 
Sarekat Islam Indonesia) and 1952 (the departure of Nahdlatul Ulama).
 Another legacy of the 1920s and 30s for the party was the orga-
nisational networks which had been established at that time. Th e future 
Masyumi leaders had, for the most part, earned their political spurs in 
the 1920s and 30s in the organisations which we have just mentioned. 
Within the Masyumi party, wings formed which refl ected the organi-
sations they had previously belonged to and which they generally 
remained faithful to. Th e changes in the composition of the party 
leadership over the years were an accurate refl ection of the evolution in 
the balance of power between these diff erent groups.99 At its founda-
tion in 1945, the party executive refl ected Masyumi’s aspiration to 
bring together the diff erent Muslim organisations but also revealed 
their respective political infl uences. Composed of a Party Leadership 
Council (Dewan Pimpian) and of a Religious Council (Madjelis Sjuro, 
which literally means Consultative Council), the partly leadership was 
mainly composed of former members of PSII (Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, 
Harsono Tjokroaminoto and Anwar Tjokroaminoto); and also of those 
who had joined it after breaking away from both PII (Soekiman, Wali 
al-Fatah, Mr A. Kasmat and M. Natsir) and from Gerakan Penjadar 
(H.A. Salim and Mohamad Roem). Behind PSII came Muhammadiyah, 
which had eight representatives on the committee (Prawoto Mangku-
sasmito, Mawardi, Faried Ma’ruf, Junus Anis, Faqih Usman, Dr. Sjam-
suddin, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Kasman Singodimedjo and K.H.A. 
Wahab), twice as many as Nahdlatul Ulama which only had four 
seats (K.H.A. Dahlan, K.H. Fathurrahman, Hasjim As’jari and K.H.A. 
Wahid Hasjim). Th ree small local organisations accounted for the 
remaining seats: the Perikatan Umat Islam (PUI) from Majalengka, 
a small traditionalist organisation represented by K.H. Abdul Halim; 
the Persatuan Umat Islam Indonesia from Sukabumi, represented by 
99 Although the members of the Party’s executive committee were elected by the 
congress, they were not considered as representatives of their original organisations.
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K.H. Sanusi; and the Madjedis Islam Tinggi (MIT) from Sumatra, 
represented by Sjech M. Djamil Djambek.
 10 years later, the political diversity of Masyumi had noticeably 
diminished. It had become the descendant of a much more coherent 
political movement made up of activists from Jong Islamieten Bond 
(JIB), Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam’s splinter groups. Of the 57 
Masyumi deputies elected to Parliament, only one of them said that he 
had been a member of Sarekat Islam. However, 15 deputies had come 
from its splinter groups, namely Gerakan Penjadar and Partai Islam 
Indonesia, and they were often members of Muhammadiyah as well. 
12 deputies stated that they had been members of JIB. Th e break with 
PSII in 1947 was essentially along the lines of the divisions which 
aff ected PSII’s illustrious forerunner Sarekat Islam in the 1930s. In 
other words, those who had been loyal during the war to H.O.S. 
Tjokroaminoto and to his brother, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, transferred 
their loyalty to Harsono Tjokroaminoto, the son of Sarekat Islam’s 
founder. Conversely, those activists who had split from SI and joined 
breakaway groups such as Gerakan Penjadar (PII) refused to join PSII 
in 1947 and remained members of Masyumi. Th e same loyalty could 
be seen amongst the traditionalists in the party, as only two Masyumi 
deputies declared that they were members of Nahdlatul Ulama. As for 
the other organisations mentioned in deputies’ biographies, they attest 
to the party’s implantation on a local level (Persuatan Islam Cirebon, 
Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh and Al-Jamiyatul Wasilyah from North 
Sumatra, for example).100
 If we move on to look at the executive committee of the party in 
the early 1950s, we can identify a small coterie of leaders, united by 
links that had been created in the 1930s. Jong Islamieten Bond, espe-
cially its Bandung branch, had a signifi cant role to play in creating 
the bonds that existed between this little group of individuals. All of 
them were born between 1904 and 1910, and took their fi rst steps in 
the political arena under the benevolent eyes of the elder members of 
Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah.
 Mohammad Natsir, who was the most prominent member of the 
party leadership from 1949 onwards, was born in Alahan Panjang in 
West Sumatra in 1908. Having completed his fi rst year of studies in 
Padang in his home province, he settled in Bandung in 1927 to attend 
100 Parlaungan, Hasil Rakjat Memilih, Tokoh-Tokoh Parlemen di republik Indonesia.
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classes given in a Dutch secondary school (AMS). At that time, he 
joined JIB, and in 1929, became head of its local branch. Th anks to 
his position in JIB, he came in contact with Haji Agus Salim, who is 
often considered to be the spiritual mentor to the young generation 
of modernists which Natsir was part of.101 More importantly, he also 
became close, at that time, to other activists within JIB who, 20 years 
later, were to become his right-hand men within the Masyumi leader-
ship, namely Kasman Singodimedjo, Mohamad Roem and Jusuf Wibi-
sono. Th ese early days earned the future leader of Masyumi a solid 
reputation as something of an expert on religion. Disconcerted by the 
lack of interest shown by other students in Islam, he organised a series 
of classes and lectures to remedy this situation.102
 Jusuf Wibisono, who was one year younger than Natsir, attended 
the same school, and he soon joined the Bandung branch of JIB. He 
subsequently moved to Batavia in order to pursue third-level studies 
at the Higher School of Law (Rechts Hooge School) and became the 
leader of JIB’s branch there. In Batavia, he met Mohamad Roem (born 
in 1908) and Kasman Singodimedjo, who at that time was the national 
president of JIB.103 Following a disagreement concerning the best stra-
tegy for the organisation to follow, Wibisono and Roem decided in 1934 
to create a new organisation, the Studenten Islam Studie-club, whose 
101 On this period, see in particular, Yusril Ihza, “Combining Activism and Intel-
lectualism: Th e Biography of Mohammad Natsir”, Studia Islamika 2, 1 (1995) 
and Aboebakar, Sejarah Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, pp. 217–20. Th e dates used 
by the latter are sometimes far-fetched, however.
102 Ajip Rosidi, Moh. Natsir sebuah biografi  (Jakarta: Pt Girimukti Pasaka, 1990), 
pp. 51–4.
103 Kasman, according to his father, was born in 1904, but most documents re-
lating to him mention 1908 as his date of birth. Th e explanation for this is rather 
comical: given the lack of a reliable civil register, it was common at the time to 
allow a child to register for school when he was able to pass his right hand over 
his head and touch his left ear. When Kasman was a boy, his younger brother was 
already at school while he himself was still unable to register. When he was fi nally 
accepted, he decided to move his date of birth back four years, so embarrassed 
was he to be behind his brother. Panitia peringatan 75 tahun, Kasman, Hidup itu 
berjuang, Kasman Singodimedjo 75 tahun (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1982), p. 4. 
Mohammed Roem, Kasman Singodimedjo and Jusuf Wibisono had already be-
come friends a few years previously when attending medical school (STOVIA) 
together. Wibisono was later obliged to abandon his studies after a medical visit 
declared him unfi t.
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objectives were close to JIB’s but who only admitted students, unlike 
JIB which also admitted secondary school pupils. Th e new organisa-
tion’s newspaper, which was fi rst called Orgaan van de Studenten Islam 
Studie-Club before changing its name to Moslims Reveil—though it 
continued to be written in Dutch—was an effi  cient means of dissemi-
nating the Muslim nationalist movement’s ideas amongst students.104 
Th e organisation was joined in 1938 by Boerhanoeddin Harahap—
born in 1917 and appointed to the Masyumi executive committee in 
1952—who became its secretary during his studies in the Rechts Hooge 
School after having been a JIB activist while studying in Yogyakarta.105 
One of the few Masyumi leaders to have been a member neither of 
JIB, the Studie-Club nor PII was Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. Born in 
1911 in the region of Banten, his education followed a very classical 
path—he attended an AMS in Bandung before entering the BHS in 
Batavia in 1939—which brought him rapidly into contact with his 
future political allies. However, the fi rst organisation he joined, the 
Unitas Studiosorum Indonesiensis (USI), was non-political. It had been 
set up with the help of the Dutch authorities with the aim of thwarting 
the infl uence of student nationalist movements.106
 At the same time, in Medan a second group of modernist intel-
lectuals emerged which, unlike Natsir and Isa Anshary, had not moved 
to Java. Th ey were led mainly by Z.A. Ahmad, Yunan Nasution and 
Abu Hanifah, who all later became members of Masyumi’s leadership 
council in the 1950s, as well as by HAMKA, who was part of the 
Muhammadiyah leadership and later a Masyumi deputy in 1955. 
Although this small group of intellectuals came to prominence in parti-
cular for their considerable publishing output, which we mentioned 
earlier, they were also active politically. Th ey were initially members 
104 Soebagio I.N., Jusuf Wibisono. Karang di Tengah Gelombang (Jakarta: Gunung 
Agung, 1980), pp. 27–8.
105 Busjairi Badruzzaman, Boerhanoeddin Harahap Pilar Demokrasi (Jakarta: Bulan 
Bintang, 1982), pp. 12–3.
106 See Benedict R. O’G Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation 
and Resistance, 1944–1946 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 439. 
Sjafruddin’s biography published by Abadi a few weeks before the 1955 elections 
says nothing about his involvement in this organisation, while the one published 
by Ajip Rosidi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Islam sebagai pedoman hidup. Kumpulan 
karangan terpilih disunting oleh Ajip Rosidi, vol. 1 (Jakarta: Idayu, 1986), p. 8, 
mentions nothing of the links between USI and the colonial administration.
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of Permi, and when it was outlawed in 1933, most of them joined 
Soekiman and Natsir in PII,107 and indeed Z.A. Ahmad became head 
of PII in Sumatra.108
 Th e contacts made before the outbreak of the war by the future 
Masyumi leadership were not exclusively in Muslim modernist circles. 
Th e enthusiasm typical of many young people’s political activism added 
to the very wide range of organisations that sprang up during the 
1920s and 30s, and meant that the wide-ranging nationalist movement 
contained many diff erent and sometimes tortuous political itineraries. 
Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, who was president of Masyumi between 1945 
and 1951, started out in politics as a secular nationalist. Born in 1898 
in Sewu, near Sukarta in Central Java, he came from a family that 
worked in the retail business and was close to organisations which 
were the forerunners of the Javanese nationalist movement. His brother 
Satiman Wirjosandjojo was one of the founding members of Tri Koro 
Dharmo (Th ree Noble Goals), the youth organisation within Budi 
Utomo, which, three years after its foundation, changed its name to 
Jong Java in 1915.109 As a young man, Soekiman, who graduated from 
medical school (STOVIA) in 1922, went on to study in the Nether-
lands where he became actively involved in Perhimpunan Indonesia. 
He became president of the organisation in 1925 thanks to the sup-
port of Mohammad Hatta, the future vice president of the Republic 
of Indonesia.110 Shortly after that, he returned to Indonesia and conti-
nued his political activity there in the ranks of PSII. As we do not have 
a detailed biography of Soekiman, it is unfortunately diffi  cult to ex-
plain this change in political orientation, but it shows that there was a 
certain amount of interplay between the diff erent strands within Indo-
nesian nationalism.111 Indeed, Soekiman maintained excellent relations 
107 In 1930, the modernist organisation, Sumatra Th awalib, founded by HAMKA’s 
father, broadened its activities beyond its traditional fi eld of education and be-
came involved in the political domain. It later became Persatuan Muslimin Indo-
nesia (Indonesian Muslim Union, PMI), and in 1932 took the name of Permi.
108 Soebagijo I.N., Riwayat Hidup dan Perjuangan H. Zainal Abidin Ahmad (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Antara, 1985).
109 Van Niel, Th e Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite, p. 169.
110 C.L.M. Penders, ed., Mohammad Hatta, Indonesian Patriot: Memoirs (Singa-
pore: Gunung Agung, 1991), p. 95.
111 Th e only book to be published on Soekiman that we are aware of is a collec-
tion of his political writings, which contains no biographical details.
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with secular nationalists, and in 1932, it was to Mohammad Hatta 
that he gave the job of editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper which he 
had just launched, Utusan Indonesia (“the Indonesian Messenger”).112
 Another political career illustrating the ties that were forged out-
side of Islamic circles is that of Isa Anshary. Isa was head of Masyumi 
in West Java before becoming a member of the executive committee of 
the party in 1954. He was considered a radical, and was very hostile to 
the nationalist secularist movement. From 1953, he repeatedly launched 
stinging attacks on Sukarno, despite the fact that the president had in 
fact been Isa’s fi rst political mentor.113 Isa came from Sungai Batang in 
Central Sumatra and arrived in Bandung in 1932 at the age of 16. It 
was at this time that he became fascinated with the ideas put forward 
by Sukarno and he even went so far as to spend a whole night in a 
conference hall so as to be able to listen to one of Sukarno’s speeches.114 
Th is revelation convinced Isa to abandon his initial project, which was 
to pursue his studies in Yogyakarta, and to take up a political career 
instead. He signed up for Partindo, lying about his age to do so, and 
threw himself into political activism. At the same time, he became one 
of the leaders of the Bandung branch of the Persatuan Pemuda Rakjat 
Indonesia (Popular Union of Indonesian Youth), a radical revolutionary 
organisation. Unlike Soekiman, the circumstances of Anshary’s conver-
sion to Islamic nationalism are well-documented. It was a conversion 
which further demonstrated the links that existed between the diff erent 
strands within nationalism, although those very strands were later to 
fall out over various issues. Alongside his involvement in Partindo, 
Anshary was also taking part in religion classes organised by Perstuan 
Islam. He gradually became more involved in the Muslim movement 
and took over the leadership of the Preparatory Committee of Permi’s 
Bandung Branch (Panitia Persiapan Permi Tjabang Bandung). Th e 
Sumatran party at that time considered establishing itself in Java, but it 
eventually abandoned the idea following an agreement with Partindo’s 
leadership. Th e two parties realised that they had common goals and 
decided not to compete against each other. After the break-up of 
Partindo in 1934, Anshary restricted his political activity to Islamic 
112 Penders, ed., Mohammad Hatta, Indonesian Patriot: Memoirs, pp. 139–40.
113 See infra, chapter 4.
114 He did so in order to avoid the police stopping him from getting into the 
conference hall; at that time, political rallies were forbidden for those under 18. 
Aboebakar, Sejarah Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, p. 220.
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organisations, becoming a member fi rst of Muhammadiyah and then 
of Perstuan Islam. It was at this time that his political career became 
linked to Natsir’s, whom he was very close to, and when Natsir later 
became chairman of the Bandung branch of the Partai Islam Indonesia, 
Isa became its secretary.115
 Th e creation of a multi-party system at the end of 1945 as well as 
subsequent political events meant that political careers, which had up 
until then evolved in a relatively erratic fashion, became a lot more pre-
dictable. After independence, it became a lot rarer for political fi gures 
or activists to move from secular nationalism to Islamic nationalism. 
Th e pursuit of power and the prospect of elections led the two sides to 
develop opposing policies despite the fact that their electoral bases often 
came from more or less the same sociological class. Th e paths followed 
over the years by Mohammad Hatta and Soekiman Wirjosandjojo show 
how fi ne the boundary was between the two movements. Although the 
two men were very close and shared the same opinions at university, 
by 1945 they symbolised two very diff erent visions for society. Th eir 
policies were not as far apart as their spirited clashes might lead one 
to believe however, and indeed, during the 1950s and the fi rst years of 
the New Order, their paths were to join again.116
Masyumi—A Japanese Invention?
Although the Japanese occupation of Indonesia only lasted three years, 
from March 1942 to August 1945, it constitutes an essential stage in 
the emergence of Masyumi. During this period, the Japanese military 
government tried to harness Islam to serve their war policy. Th is policy 
was known as “the Asian Co-prosperity Sphere”, but it was not imple-
mented consistently, sometimes carried out in earnest and other times 
half-heartedly. It gave birth in November 1943 to a fi rst version of 
Masyumi: the Consultative Counsel of Indonesian Muslims (Madjlis 
Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia). It is not as easy as it might appear to deter-
mine the extent of this organisation’s infl uence on the Muslim party of 
the same name founded in November 1945. Th e composition of the 
Japanese version of Masyumi can probably explain the way positions 
115 Ibid., p. 221.
116 Cf. infra, Epilogue, and Deliar Noer, Mohammad Hatta, biografi  politik (Jakarta: 
LP3ES, 1990), pp. 463–4.
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of responsibility in the new Masyumi were distributed between, on the 
one hand, ulamas who were at the head of important Muslim orga-
nisations (such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama) and on the 
other, politicians who had come from Sarekat Islam. Th e former had 
been in charge of the Japanese Masyumi and so remained somewhat 
in the background when the party was founded, whereas the latter had 
been less involved in collaboration with the Japanese and so took over 
most of the party’s executive positions.
 It was in the middle of the 1920s that the Japanese came into 
contact with Islam, and soon afterwards they chose it to be one of 
the main pillars of their regional policy. Th ey sent students to Egypt 
to become trained in the art of Muslim propaganda, and in 1939, 
Tokyo hosted a pan-Islamic conference in which MIAI participated. In 
the months leading up to the Japanese invasion, clandestine networks 
were established in Indonesia, which contributed to the success of the 
landing of troops in at least two regions of Sumatra.117 Once these 
troops had a foothold in the country, they attempted to harness the 
support of Muslim organisations in order to curry favour with the 
local population.
 Th e initial measures taken by the occupier, however, indicated a 
refusal to allow Islam any form of political expression. Only two orga-
nisations—PSII and PII—were offi  cially abolished, in March 1942,118 
but the Japanese military authorities also set up at this time their own 
system for controlling Islam. Th is was composed essentially of two 
organisations: a Preparatory Committee for the Unity of the Muslim 
Community (Persiapan Persatuan Ummat Islam), led by Abikusno 
Tjokrosujoso, a former president of PSII and a brother of H.O.S. 
Tjokroaminoto; and an Offi  ce of Religious Aff airs (Shumubu), which 
was fi rst of all led by a Japanese offi  cial until August 1944, when a 
traditionalist leader, K. Hasjim Asj’ari, took over. As the Japanese occu-
pier wanted to be able to avail of a mass movement which would reach 
all Muslims, they allowed MIAI to be revived in September 1942. 
Th e organisation was given an important role to play in the “Triple A 
Movement”—“Japan leader of Asia, Japan protector of Asia and Japan 
light of Asia.”
117 Benda, Th e Crescent and the Rising Sun, pp. 103–7.
118 Th e other political parties were not directly banned, but as all political activity 
was now outlawed, they were eff ectively muzzled.
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 Th is recognition of Islam’s prominence in the country did not, 
however, fulfi l the hopes which had initially been raised on both sides. 
Th e Indonesians quickly realised that the occupiers’ goodwill was 
nothing more than a carefully planned attempt to use Muslim organi-
sations for their own ends, that is to say the enhancement of Japan’s 
military operation. Th e ulamas cooperated tentatively at fi rst, but this 
cooperation was rapidly jeopardised by a series of Japanese blunders. 
Th e ceremony of sakeirei imposed by the Japanese was particularly hard 
for religious dignitaries to accept. Th is ceremony was a reverence for 
the emperor performed facing the direction of Tokyo and so was off en-
sive to Muslims because of its similarity with rukun salat, the Muslim 
prayer performed facing Mecca. Indeed, two members of Nahdlatul 
Ulama’s leadership, Hasjim Asj’ari and Kiai Mahfudz, spent several 
months in prison for refusing to perform this reverence. In addition to 
this problem, it seemed that the Japanese authorities were beginning 
to lose control of MIAI, which was dominated by former members 
of PSII. Th e organisation had put in place, since January 1943, a vast 
programme to help people in need, which was fi nanced by a centralised 
system of almsgiving (zakat). Th e system, known as Bait al-Mal, quickly 
became successful. It soon extended to 35 regencies in Java and was in 
danger of competing with the Offi  ce of Religious Aff airs that had been 
set up by the Japanese to control Islam at a local level. It was for this 
reason that the military authorities intervened to shut down the opera-
tion only a few months after the project had been launched.119
 Realising the failure of their “Muslim operation”, the Japanese 
authorities then turned their hopes and attention to the nationalist camp 
which they had, up until then, been marginalised. In March 1943, 
they created the Putera (Pusat Tenaga Rakjat, meaning Organisation for 
the People’s Power), which gathered under one umbrella all the poli-
tical and social care associations of Java and Madura and was charged 
with the task of preparing Indonesia for independence. Th e new orga-
nisation had a collegial leadership, known as the empat seangkai (four-
in-one-bundle), refl ecting the new balance of power which the Japanese 
wanted to impose. Of the four members of the new organisation’s 
leadership, there was only one representative of political Islam, K.H. 
Mansur, who was one of Muhammadiyah’s leaders, compared to three 
119 Benda, Th e Crescent and the Rising Sun, pp. 145–7.
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nationalist leaders, Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta and Ki Hadjar Dewan-
toro. A few months later, the Putera was allowed to set up its own 
militia, the Volunteer Army for the Defence of the Nation (Soekarela 
Tentara Pembela Tanah Air, PETA).
 However, by the end of 1943, the shortcomings of this new dis-
pensation were already beginning to show. Realising that the Putera 
was achieving more for the nationalist movement than for the Japanese 
war eff ort, the military authorities decided to close it down.120 At the 
same time, they once again turned to the Muslim community, though 
this time they looked to the rural Muslim dignitaries to help them 
thwart the ambitions of both the urban Islamists and the secular 
nationalists who had let them down in the past. In November 1943, 
the Japanese founded the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims 
(Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia, Masyumi) and by so doing rid 
themselves of MIAI which was dominated by former members of PSII, 
who had by this time started to adopt an anti-Japanese tone. For the 
Japanese, then, Masyumi was a fresh attempt to manipulate the Indo-
nesian Muslim community to their own advantage. Two types of 
members could join the new organisation: fi rstly, Muslim associations 
who had been accorded a legal status by the military government, and 
secondly, authorised kiais and ulamas whose authorisation, naturally 
enough, had been given by the Offi  ce of Religious Aff airs. Th e issue of 
the voting rights which these religious fi gures would receive was not 
clearly dealt with in the organisation’s statutes, however.121 Two orga-
nisations were to dominate Masyumi: Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul 
Ulama, which were the only two organisations to obtain the necessary 
legal status when Masyumi was founded. Th ey were joined later by two 
smaller traditionalist organisations, Persatoean Oemmat Islam Indonesia 
(the Union of the Indonesian Ummah) led by K. Ahmad Sanusi, and 
Perikatan Oemmat Islam (the Association of the Ummah) led by K.H. 
Abdul Halim in Cirebon.122 By favouring relations with non-political 
associations and prominent local fi gures, the Japanese wanted to defuse 
120 It was replaced in March 1944 by Perhimpunan Kebaktian Rakyat (the 
People’s Loyalty Association), better known under its Japanese name of Djawa 
Hokokai.
121 Benda, Th e Crescent and the Rising Sun, p. 151.
122 Two associations which included in their statutes the goals of the Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere.
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any potential local rebellions which Islamic movements could become 
a focal point for. Th is unoffi  cial role given to Masyumi became ap-
parent in the early months of 1944 when the occupying authorities 
increased their requisition of rice from peasants. In February, a rebel-
lion broke out against this decision in the village of Singaparna, near 
Tasikmalaya in the Priangan regency. It was led by Kiai Zainal 
Mustapha, a prominent religious leader in the region and a member 
of Nahdlatul Ulama. Following repression of the uprising by the police 
force, several Masyumi emissaries were sent to the region to explain to 
the local population that their former kiai had lost his senses and had 
strayed from the true path of Islam.123
 Up until February 1945, Masyumi benefi tted from the Japanese 
authorities’ urgent desire to limit the infl uence of nationalists by pro-
moting a countervailing force within the Islamic community. In January 
1944, for example, a new organisation, Djawa Hokokai, was created 
to replace Putera, which meant that the nationalist organisation was 
no longer the exclusive representative of the Indonesian people. Djawa 
Hokokai was a vast movement which included nationalists as well as 
numerous organisations controlled by the occupier. At the same time, 
Masyumi was given every means necessary to extend its infl uence 
throughout the country. While MIAI had never been able to spread 
its organisational network beyond its headquarters in Jakarta, the new 
Muslim organisation received the authorisation to create branches at 
every administrative level, from regency to village. It was even allowed 
to establish itself in the neighbourhood associations (tonari gumi ) which 
had been created two years earlier by the Japanese. Th is enabled local 
Islamic brigades (barisan pekerja) close to Masyumi to infi ltrate these 
structures, and meant that at least one person in each tonari gumi was 
a member of these brigades. Finally, in December 1944, in reaction 
to the creation in September of that year of the Barisan Pelopor (the 
Pioneer Corps), which was run entirely by nationalist members of the 
civilian population, the Japanese announced the creation of an army 
of Muslim volunteers: Hizboellah (the Army of Allah). Th ey were 
intended to be the reserve army of the PETA but in fact became Mas-
yumi’s army. Th e organisation was charged with setting up Hizboellah’s 
central command and regional delegations as well as the provision of 
equipment for its troops. Th e militia’s recruits, after three months of 
123 Ibid., p. 160.
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training, were then supposed to train the students of Koranic schools 
themselves.124
 Th e promise of Indonesian independence in “the near future”, 
made during a speech given by the Japanese prime minister, Koiso, on 
7 September 1944, marked the end of this subtle policy of manipu-
lating the balance of power between Muslims and nationalists, and also 
announced a swing in favour of the latter. Six months later in March 
1945, the composition of the Investigation Committee for the Indepen-
dence of Indonesia (Badan Penjelidik Kemerdekaan Indonesia, BPKI), 
nominated by the Japanese, confi rmed this new balance of power. Of 
the 63 members initially nominated, only 10 could be considered part 
of the Islamist movement, and most of these lacked the political and 
administrative skills necessary to be able to contribute meaningfully to 
the debates.125
 Although Masyumi was not in principle supposed to have a poli-
tical dimension, the role given by the Japanese to some important 
Muslim fi gures within the country’s institutions in the months leading 
up to September 1944, and most importantly the role it played in 
villages, meant that it had become a highly political organisation. In 
the space of a little over a year, Masyumi had achieved what no other 
Muslim organisation had before. It had built a network throughout the 
country, recruited a militia of considerable size and, above all, it now 
benefi tted from a notoriety which could rival that of the nationalist 
leaders, Sukarno and Hatta.126 Th is was the part of the Japanese orga-
nisation’s legacy which the founding members of the party wished to 
keep when they decided in November 1945, after a diffi  cult and pro-
tracted debate, to retain the name Masyumi.127 Th ey took some time 
to decide the matter at their inaugural congress as they knew that the 
Japanese legacy was also associated with collaboration with the enemy 
which, during the fi rst months of the country’s independence, recalled 
some embarrassing memories for the party. Apart from a few rare 
124 Ibid., p. 280n27.
125 Benedict R. O’G Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics under the Japa-
nese Occupation: 1944–1945, Interim Reports Series (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1961), p. 21.
126 In order to obtain the authorisations necessary to organise any gathering, 
almost all religious meetings from the end of 1943 took place under the aegis of 
Masyumi. Aboebakar, Sejarah Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, p. 334.
127 See infra Chapter 2.
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hostile actions towards the occupier, Mayumi otherwise scrupulously 
performed the role of propagandist for Japanese imperialism. In Octo-
ber 1944, for example, Masyumi adopted a series of resolutions on the 
future of Indonesia, the fi rst of which concerned the “recognition of 
the role played by the commander of the Japanese army in the future 
independence of Indonesia.” Th e party called on people, in their reso-
lution, to “mobilise further still the combined forces of the Indonesian 
umma so as to precipitate fi nal victory and to combat the manoeuvres 
and off ensives carried out by the enemy who wishes to prevent the 
independence of Indonesia and the liberation of Islam.” It also invited 
all Muslims to “fi ght nobly together side by side with the Japanese, 
in the path ordained by Allah, to destroy the cruel enemy.” 128 In the 
same vein, the party’s offi  cial newspaper, Suara Muslimin Indonesia, up 
until the spring of 1945, published the death count of the “enemy 
soldiers” (serdadu musuh) killed in battle in the Pacifi c Islands.129
 Did this collaboration with the Japanese weigh on the party 
members’ minds when they came to make their choice for party leader-
ship in November 1945? Th e answer appears to be no, as there were 
no real purges within the party after the Japanese occupation. In fact, 
four of the fi ve most important leaders of Japanese Masyumi—K.H. 
Hasjim Asj’ari, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim and 
K.H. Abdul Wahab—were given positions in the upper echelons of 
the party. Th e only one not to appear in the party’s new leadership 
structure was K.H. Mas Mansur, one of the most collaborationist of 
the religious dignitaries. He was arrested by the allies at the end of 
the war and was initially in danger of facing trial before fi nally being 
released. His health deteriorated considerably during his time in prison 
and he died in April 1946, only a few months after his release.130 Mas 
Mansur’s absence from the party’s leadership can no doubt be attributed 
to his poor health, however, and not to his collaborationist activity. 
It should be noted, though, that the four party leaders mentioned all 
sat on the religious council (Majelis Syuro) and not on the executive 
committee of the party. Th is may have been a choice on their part: 
it is possible that as religious dignitaries, they preferred to contribute 
128 Aboebakar, Sejarah Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, pp. 340–1.
129 See, for example, Suara Muslimin Indonesia, 21 March 1945.
130 Soebagijo I.N., K.H. Mas Mansur. Pembaharu Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: 
Gunung Agung, 1982), pp. 123–4.
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to the party through their religious knowledge. However, it can legiti-
mately be argued that their place in the new composition of the party 
leadership was due in part to their involvement with the Japanese. 
Th ose who were elected to the executive committee had managed to 
distance themselves from the occupier, and so were a more suitable 
choice to represent the party on the political battlefi eld of the new 
Republic.131 It is true to say that none of them had rebelled openly 
against the occupier and indeed most of them had been given positions 
of responsibility by the Japanese authorities. Soekiman, for example, 
represented Yogyakarta within the Putera, Jusuf Wibisono was a prose-
cutor for cases concerning commercial law and Natsir was in charge 
of an education programme in Bandung. However, these positions of 
responsibility were less important and did not greatly compromise their 
integrity; in fact, they even allowed them, at times, to disseminate ideas 
which were hostile to the Japanese. Th e courses organised by Natsir, for 
instance, gave him the opportunity to organise, along with Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara, a chain of spiritual resistance to Japanese propaganda.132 
In the case of Isa Anshary, who had been appointed secretary of MIAI 
for the residency of Priangan, he actually spent a month in prison, 
no doubt because of his action within Angkatan Muda Indonesia, an 
organisation which promoted the independence of Indonesia.133
 Most members of Masyumi’s new executive committee came from 
the group of urban Muslims who had headed MIAI and who, as a 
consequence, had been courted by the Japanese as part of their policy 
regarding Islam.134 However, as we have already seen, the creation of 
131 It should not be forgotten that the Americans, encouraged by the Dutch 
government, were wary of Sukarno and Hatta, who were accused of collaborating 
with the Japanese. Th is led Sukarno and Hatta to appoint Sjahrir, the main oppo-
nent of the Japanese occupation, as prime minister.
132 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 113. Kahin, however, does 
not cite any source to substantiate this affi  rmation. Deliar Noer, “Masjumi: Its 
Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia”, Master thesis, Cornell 
University, 1960, p. 28, uses testimony from Persatuan Islam’s leaders in 1956 
to explain that the education programmes organised by the ulama in Bandung 
“may have been directed against the Japanese occupation policy, prompted by 
Mohammad Natsir, who was in charge of the local education programmes.”
133 Aboebakar, Sejarah Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, pp. 221–3.
134 Soekiman, Harsono Tjokroaminoto and Wondoamiseno were members of the 
MIAI leadership put in place by the Japanese in September 1942. Benda, Th e 
Crescent and the Rising Sun, p. 113 ff .
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Masyumi in November 1943 was precisely what marked the end of 
Japanese collaboration with MIAI and the beginning of a new policy 
oriented more towards rural Muslim leaders. With the advent of Indo-
nesian independence, these rural ulamas, took a back seat—perhaps 
because they were obliged to do so—and it was thus the group linked 
to MIAI who came to the fore again. Abu Hanifah’s career is a perfect 
illustration of this reversal of fortune. As a member of MIAI who was 
also involved in the Bait al-Mal project, he was given no offi  cial posi-
tion within the Japanese Masyumi.135 In May 1945, he launched an 
appeal in Soeara Muslimin Indonesia inviting the Masyumi leadership 
to free itself from Japanese control and to create a new organisation 
which would bring the Muslim community together.136 In November 
1945, his fortunes changed radically when he became a member of the 
executive committee of the new Masyumi party.
 Th e period of Japanese occupation had, on the whole, two major 
consequences on the place occupied by Islam in Indonesian society. 
As a result of the successive policy U-turns by the Japanese occupying 
force, both the supporters and the opponents of political Islam bene-
fi tted from a signifi cant increase in their potential scope for political 
action. Th ey now had at their disposal nationwide vehicles for their 
propaganda and, as result, the notoriety of Islamic and nationalist 
organisations spread throughout the country. However, at the same 
time, the Japanese manipulation of the balance of power within poli-
tical Islam, through its control over both Masyumi and the BPKI, 
benefi tted religious dignitaries without much experience of political 
battle. Th is was done at the expense of the pre-war leaders of mod-
ernist organisations (Sarekat Islam, PII, Permi, Barisan Penjadar and 
Jong Islamieten Bond) and it led, as a result, to a favourable balance 
of power for secular nationalists in their post-war struggle with poli-
tical Islam.
 Although Masyumi originated at a time of a radical break with 
the past—the “Physical Revolution” of the Indonesian people against 
the return of the Dutch—it nonetheless bore the marks of the colonial 
period. Its future leaders identifi ed strongly with the vast movement 
of renewal which, from the end of the 19th century, had spread to 
135 Ibid., p. 259n76.
136 Soeara Muslimin Indonesia, 10 May 1945, quoted in Benda, Th e Crescent and 
the Rising Sun, p. 287n68.
Chap1 (1-60).indd   59 8/14/15   5:36:30 PM
60 Islam and Politics in Indonesia
all corners of the Muslim world, and they looked to Western culture 
for solutions to their questionings about Muslim identity. Within the 
Masyumi leadership, a small group of individuals stood out who shared 
certain common traits. Th ey were products of the education system 
put in place by the Dutch, often came from Sumatra, and they crossed 
swords with the previous generation of leaders within Sarekat Islam 
who were markedly Javanese in origin. Th ey were also part of a tradi-
tion which favoured an attitude of openness to the rest of the world, 
and forged for themselves a political culture which was a mixture of 
Western references and Muslim values. As members of the Masyumi 
leadership in the early 1950s, they were the inspiration behind some 
of the most original pages of its history.
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It took Masyumi almost four years to build a coherent political posi-tion, between its foundation in November 1945 and the party con-
gress in December 1949, which saw the young generation, led by 
Mohammad Natsir, take over the party leadership. It was caught be-
tween two opposing forces: a tendency towards unity, which had arisen
both from the struggle against the Dutch colonial power and from the 
party’s goal of unifying the whole Muslim community, but also a pro-
pensity for division which came from Masyumi’s need to carve out a 
place for itself on the country’s fraught political landscape. It appeared 
during this period to be Janus-faced. On the one hand, a revolutionary 
organisation built on a sometimes intransigent spirit of nationalism, 
whose leaders fl irted at times with the limits of the law; on the other, 
a party of government that produced some of the architects of the new 
Republic whose painstaking work led to the country’s recognition by 
the international community.
Th e Summer of 1945—From an Islamic State to an 
“Islamisable” State
Th e refusal by the Japanese authorities to support the creation of an 
Islamic state in Indonesia meant that the representatives of the Muslim 
community had to try to convince their fellow countrymen of its 
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necessity. Over the course of a number of successive forums held be-
tween April and August 1945, representatives of various political forces 
drew up the institutional framework for an independent Indonesia. 
Th e Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence 
(Badan Penjelidik Usaha-Usaha Kemerdekaan Indonesia, BPUKI) was 
at the forefront of these endeavours, holding two sessions: one from 
29 May to 2 June, and another from 10 July to 17 July. It was made 
up of 62 Indonesian members as well as eight special members who 
were Japanese, one of whom was a committee vice-chairman, and it 
was overwhelmingly dominated by the supporters of a secular state led 
by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta.1 Although there were few represen-
tatives of political Islam—only 16 members in all 2—they nonetheless 
succeeded in putting the question of an Islamic state at the top of the 
agenda. Th e choice between an Islamic state and a secular state was at 
the forefront of the committee’s debates. However, the tenor of these 
debates is known to us only through the accounts given in later years 
by some of its participants, the most comprehensive of which was pro-
vided by Muhammad Yamin, one of the main nationalist ideologists.3
Pancasila — Sukarno’s Challenge to Political Islam
On the eve of independence, the leaders of the Muslim community 
were in a peculiar situation. Th e vast majority of them considered 
1 Th e chairman of this committee was Dr. Radjiman Wediodiningrat, one of the 
founders of the Javanese nationalist movement Budi Utomo in 1908.
2 Taking into account not only those who had been appointed by the Japanese 
to represent the Muslim community, but also the members on the committee 
who systematically supported their proposals. Th e latter group was composed of 
Abikusno (PSII), K.H. Ahmad Sanoesi (POII Sukabumi), K.H.A. Halim (POI 
Madjalengka), Ki Bagoes Hadikoesomo (Muhammadijah), K.H. Masjkoer (N.O), 
K.H.M. Mansoer (Muhammadijah), R. Rooslan Wongsokoesoemo (ancien Parindra 
puis Masjumi), R. Sjamsoeddin (Parindra puis Masjumi), Soekiman (Masjumi), K. 
Wahid Hasjim (NU), Mme Sunarjo Mangunpuspito (Masjumi), A.R. Baswedan 
(Partai Arab Indonesia), Abdul Rahim Pratalykrama and Kijahi Abdoel Fattah. 
Th ese last two fi gures supported the demands made by the Islamic movement 
despite the fact that they were not recognised fi gures within it. H. Agus Salim, 
on the other hand, who was a respected fi gure within Sarekat Islam, more often 
than not distanced himself from Islamic demands. Deliar Noer, “Masjumi: Its 
Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia”, Master thesis, Cornell 
University, 1960, p. 31.
3 Muhammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, 3 vols. 
(Jakarta, 1959–60).
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Islam and nationalism to be inseparable. Islam had been the source of 
their involvement in the struggle for an independent Indonesia, and 
so they considered that the new state they were about to build should 
serve their religion. Th e question of the new state’s constitution did 
not appear to them to be open to political debate; they saw instead 
a preordained answer dictated by their faith. Th e rhetoric used by 
the nationalist secularists during the summer of 1945 was particularly 
skilful, then, for the way in which it gradually centred the debate 
around the question of what type of institutions should be established 
in the new Indonesian state, while at the same time preserving their 
own credentials as good Muslims. In the absence of any offi  cial records 
of the committee meetings, it is diffi  cult to assess with any precision 
the respective roles played by Muhammad Yamin and Sukarno in these 
delicate political manoeuvres.4 Both of them stated their desire that 
4 Assuming that Muhammad Yamin’s transcription in 1959 of the speech he 
gave on 29 May 1945 was exact (Naskah, I: 83–107), it could be considered as 
laying the foundations of what was to become the ideology of the Indonesian 
state, making him the true founder of Pancasila. Th is was confi rmed, moreover, 
by several former Masyumi fi gures in 1967. B.J. Boland, Th e Struggle of Islam in 
Modern Indonesia (Th e Hague: Martinus Nijhoff , 1982), p. 17. Boland, however, 
seems convinced that Yamin gives himself credit which he is not due. Four of 
the fi ve principles of Pancasila had already been formulated by Sukarno in July 
1933 during a conference organised by Partindo. H. Endang Saifuddin Anshary, 
Piagam Jakarta 22 juni 1945 dan sejarah konsensus nasional antara nasionalis 
islami dan nasionalis “secular” tentang dasar negara republik indonesia, 1945–1959 
(Bandung: Pustaka, 1983), p. 17.
  Another tendentious account of the birth of Pancasila is that given by Kyai 
Masykur, one of NU’s leaders. He described how in May 1945 when he was a 
captain in the Sabilillah militia, a meeting took place between Sukarno, Yamin, 
Wahid Hasjim, Kahar Muzakkir and himself in order to determine the principal 
components of the national ideology. Th is account was recorded by the Indonesia 
National Archive Services in an interview which took place on 1 October 1988 
and is transcribed by Andrée Feillard in his study of NU, Islam et armée dans 
l’Indonésie contemporaine: Les pionniers de la tradition, Cahier d’Archipel 28 (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1995), pp. 39–40. It tries to show how Islam’s representatives, and 
notably those belonging to NU, contributed equally, along with Sukarno and 
Yamin, to the emergence of the state ideology. Th is account by Kyai Masykur has 
never been corroborated by another source, however, and so needs to be treated 
with circumspection. It seems above all to refl ect the Muslim community’s change 
in attitude towards Pancasila which was now considered to be a permanent cor-
nerstone of national identity.
  It could be added that the desire of former Masyumi fi gures to attribute the 
conception of Pancasila to Yamin can be readily explained by their hope, in the 
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the future state be built upon religious foundations, but at the same 
time they proposed an institutional framework for this which would 
absolve them from having to make any practical commitments to back 
up these statements. Th e most developed presentation of this nationalist 
vision was delivered in a famous speech, later known as “the Birth of 
Pancasila ”, given by Sukarno on 1 June.5 Th is long speech, made the 
day before the end of the fi rst committee session, contained a vast 
array of references from Jaurès and Sun Yat-sen to Marhaen (a modest 
peasant who was not afraid to be enterprising, despite his poor back-
ground). In the course of his speech, Sukarno laid out “fi ve principles”
—Pancasila in Sanskrit—as the cornerstones of the new Indonesian 
state. Th ey were: nationalism (Kebangsaan); internationalism or human-
ism (Perikemanusiaan); democracy by consensus (Permyusawaratan); so-
cial prosperity (Kesejahteraan sosial ); and belief in one God (Ketuhanan 
yang Maha Esa). Two sections of the speech in particular, setting out 
the secularists’ ideas on the place that Islam would occupy in an 
independent Indonesia, were intended for the Muslim group in the 
committee.
 Th e announcement of the fi fth principle, “belief in one God”, 
was greeted with a sigh of relief by the Muslim representatives, as 
it ruled out the prospect of a completely secular state.6 Independent 
Indonesia would, then, as Muhammad Yamin had proposed a few days 
earlier, be religious (akan berketuhanan). However, Sukarno, explaining 
the nature of religion in the new state, said:
… every Indonesian wants to be able to worship his faith in his 
own way. Christians according to the commands of Jesus, Muslims 
according to the Prophet Mohammad’s, the Buddhists according 
to their Holy Books … It is within this fi fth principle, my friends, 
early days of the New Order, for an ideological reassessment of the regime. Given 
that President Sukarno still benefi tted at that time from a considerable amount 
of prestige, the fact that they were not attacking his legacy could only make it 
easier for this aspiration to be fulfi lled.
5 For a complete French translation and analysis of this speech as well as an 
examination of the extraordinary political destiny of what still remains today the 
offi  cial ideology of the Republic of Indonesia, see Marcel Bonneff  et al., Pancasila, 
trente années de débats politiques en Indonésie (Paris: Editions de la Maison des 
Sciences de l’Homme, 1980).
6 A few weeks later, “belief in one God” became the fi rst of Pancasila’s principles.
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that all religions which exist in Indonesia at the moment will be 
able to fi nd their place.7
 Islam, then, was simply referred to in the same vein as the coun-
try’s other religions. No recognition was given to a particular status 
which Muslims considered themselves entitled to, given their numerical 
superiority in the country. In the Sukarnist worldview, Islam was not a 
source of law, but rather a source of inspiration, a personal matter to 
be left to each individual’s conscience.
All of us, myself included, are Muslims. My practice of Islam, God 
forgive me, is far from being perfect, but, my friends, if you were 
to look into my heart and read my mind, you would fi nd nothing 
other than the heart of a Muslim. Bung Karno wishes to defend 
Islam through consensus and consultation … If we are truly a Mus-
lim people, let us do our best to ensure that the majority of the 
seats we are about to create will be fi lled by representatives of 
Islam. If the Indonesian population genuinely contains a majority of 
Muslims, and if Islam is to be a religion that is alive and well in 
our country, then we, its leaders, must capture the people’s imagi-
nation so that it sends the greatest number of Muslim representa-
tives possible to Parliament. Let us say that there are one hundred 
seats in Parliament, well then we must strive to ensure that sixty, 
seventy, eighty, ninety seats are occupied by Muslim fi gures. It will 
go without saying, then, that the laws voted by this assembly will 
be Muslim laws.8
Muslims still had a duty, an special duty even, to assist in the triumph 
of their religion’s values, but these values would be expressed in Parlia-
ment. Islamic values were not a given, they had to be fought for. 
Sukarno put his fi nger on one of the major contradictions in the 
Muslim community’s claim to be democratic. Rather than promising 
the unilateral creation of a state which recognised Islam as its corner-
stone, he preferred to guarantee the Muslim community the prospect of 
a fair chance of seeing their values prevail in Parliament, values which, 
as a wily political animal, he claimed to defend. Instead of an Islamic 
7 Bonneff  et al., Pancasila, trente années de débats politiques en Indonésie, p. 73.
8 Principles which were expounded as an explanation for the third tenet: con-
sensus (mufakat) and deliberations amongst representatives (permusyawaratan). 
Bonneff  et al., p. 70.
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state, Sukarno proposed an “Islamisable” state. His proposals, though, 
ran into the stubborn opposition of Islam’s representatives who, from 
the outset, refused to abandon the possibility of a special position 
for Islam in the new state. However, behind the twists and turns of 
this debate and the respective stances adopted during June 1945, one 
could detect at work the forces which led, in November, to the forma-
tion of Masyumi. Some members of the Muslim group, who were not 
only keenly aware of the balance of power within the country and the 
general mood in the international community but who also no doubt 
sincerely believed the secularist argument was sound, were already busy 
responding, on behalf of Islam, to the challenge laid down to them in 
Sukarno’s speech.
Th e Jakarta Charter — A Blueprint for Islamic Demands
Th e 62-member Committee adjourned on 2 June, with the question of 
the country’s future institutions still unresolved. Discussions continued, 
however, both within the sub-committee which had been charged with 
elaborating a programme for a constitution and within the Tyuo Sangi 
In (the Central Consultative Committee). Th e Tyuo Sangi In was 
created in 1943 by the Japanese to allow Indonesians to become in-
volved in government and some of its members also participated in 
the work of the BPUKI. In response to the signifi cant and persistent 
disagreements between nationalists and Islam’s representatives, all the 
members of the BPUKI who were still present in Jakarta met again to 
nominate a special committee of nine members who were given the 
task of drawing up a compromise solution to this thorny problem. Th e 
committee comprised four representatives from the Islamic movement 
(Haji Agus Salim, Kiai Wahid Hasjim, Abikusno and Abdul Kahar 
Muzzakir) and fi ve from the nationalist group (Sukarno, Mohammad 
Hatta, A.A. Maramis, Achmad Subardjo 9 and Muhammad Yamin), and 
it came up with a compromise on 22 June which Yamin subsequently 
9 Although he later became a member of Masyumi and represented the party at 
the cabinet table during Soekiman’s time as prime minister, Subardjo, who was 
close to Sukarno during the 1920s and 1930s, was unknown within the Muslim 
community in 1945 and could not be considered a representative of political 
Islam. Cf. Benedict O.G.M, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resis-
tance, 1944–1946 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 91–3.
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called “the Jakarta Charter” (Piagram Jakarta). Th is document was sup-
posed to be the preamble to the future constitution of an
Indonesian state which is a republic resting upon the people’s 
sovereignty and founded on the belief in God, with the obligation 
for adherents of the Islamic faith to abide by Islamic laws, in 
accordance with the principle of righteous and just humanity, the 
unity of Indonesia, and a democracy led by wise guidance through 
consultations, ensuring social justice for the whole Indonesian 
people.10
 Th e importance of this text which borrowed heavily from the 
principles announced by Sukarno on 1 June, lies in the assertion of 
a particular religious obligation for Indonesian citizens of the Muslim 
faith. Th ese “seven words”11 were the result of a compromise which 
had been reached by two of the Muslim representatives, Abikusno and 
Kahar Muzakkir, and the Christian nationalist, Maramis.12 In the ab-
sence of any specifi c detail on the nature of the duty owed by Muslims
—was it to be a legal duty or simply a moral one?—and given the 
vagueness surrounding the notion of Islamic laws, the practical impli-
cations of this principle for the country’s new institutions were entirely 
predicated on its interpretation and concrete application by those in 
power. Nonetheless, as soon as the second session of the BPUKI opened 
on 10 July,13 some nationalist representatives expressed their concerns, 
considering the charter to be a serious attack on the principle of a 
secular state by allowing a sort of “Islamic state within the state” to 
exist for an overwhelming majority of the population. Th ese concerns 
were exacerbated by the attitude among some of the Muslim represen-
tatives, who seemed to indicate that they now considered the Jakarta 
Charter as the starting point for a new series of negotiations.14 Wahid 
10 Th e complete text of the charter can be found in Boland, Th e Struggle of Islam 
in Modern Indonesia, p. 243.
11 In Indonesian, “dengan kewadjiban menjalankan sjari’at Islam bagi pemeluk-
pemeluknja” (“with the obligation for Muslims to follow Islamic law”).
12 Noer, “Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia”, 
p. 33.
13 Now composed of 68 members.
14 Agus Salim, however, refused to follow his fellow Muslims into this dangerous 
territory.
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Hasjim, supported by Soekiman, demanded that Islam be declared the 
state religion, and that there be an obligation for both the president 
and the vice president to be Muslim.15 Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, leader 
of Muhammadiyah, highlighted the potential diffi  culties for the country 
if two legal systems coexisted, and declared that it would be simpler if 
the duty to respect Islamic law was extended to the entire population.
 In response to the refusal by nationalists to make any new con-
cessions, the Muslim representatives adopted an unusual stance. In a 
motion tabled by Kahar Muzakkir, they declared that if the new state 
were not to be Islamic, then its institutions should contain no reference 
to religion at all. Sukarno considered that the disillusionment contained 
in this proposal clearly showed that the situation between Muslims and 
nationalists had become critical. Th us, on 16 July, at the opening of 
the day’s proceedings, he asked the nationalist group to agree to make 
a major sacrifi ce by accepting to include in the future Constitution 
not just the seven words of the Jakarta Charter, but also the obligation 
for the president to be Muslim. Th at evening, as the Committee for 
Preparatory Work fi nished what was to be their last day of discussions, 
it seemed to the Muslim representatives that they had got the upper 
hand. Th is impression, however, was short-lived. With defeat imminent, 
the Japanese high command in Saigon decided, on 7 August, to form 
an Indonesian Council which was supposed to take over the govern-
ment of the country from the Japanese armed forces. Chaired by 
Sukarno (Mohammad Hatta was vice-chairman) and composed of 
members from all of the country’s regions, the Preparatory Committee 
for the Independence of Indonesia (Panita Persiapan Kemerdekaan, 
PPKI) was named on 14 August. It comprised 21 members, but, much 
to the disappointment of the Muslim community, included only two 
of their representatives: Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and Wahid Hasjim, the 
leaders of the two main Islamic organisations, Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdlatul Ulama.
 On 17 August 1945, Sukarno and Hatta, under pressure from 
revolutionary youth groups, declared independence. Th e following day, 
the Preparatory Committee met again, now acting as a provisional 
constituent assembly and containing fi ve extra members. Th ese new 
15 Hasjim’s offi  cial biographer, H. Aboebakar (a civil servant in the Ministry of 
Religions) made no mention of his role in this debate. Sejarah hidup K.H.A.
Wahid Hasjim dan karangan tersiar (Jakarta: Panitia buku peringatan, 1957).
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members had been nominated by Sukarno, with only one of them be-
longing to the Islamic movement: Kasman Singodimedjo. He was com-
mander of the PETA garrison in Jakarta, and his nomination to the 
provisional constituent assembly was above all to ensure the support of 
the militia group he headed. Th e Preparatory Committee constituent 
assembly’s fi rst session fi nally got underway late, after two hours of 
frenzied chatter amongst the members, and an agreement was quickly 
reached on certain modifi cations to be made to the wording of the 
Constitution. Indonesia was to be founded on a belief in God, but the 
“seven words” which defi ned an obligation specifi c to Muslims were 
replaced 16 by a much more neutral expression concerning the single 
nature of the divine being, one of the elements of Pancasila—Yang 
Maha Esa. In addition, the obligation for the president to be Muslim 
was removed from Article 6, paragraph 1. Th us, in the space of a few 
hours and with the consent of its representatives, the Muslim commu-
nity saw all its political gains disappear.
 Th is sudden abandonment of a compromise that had been hard 
won by political Islam seems diffi  cult to fathom. To understand it, 
one needs to appreciate the feverish atmosphere that pervaded the 
Committee on that morning of 18 June. Th e previous day’s proclama-
tion of independence had dealt a blow to the Japanese occupier, who 
had promised on 24 June to give Indonesians their independence. 
With the imminent arrival of the Allied troops, it was obvious that 
Dutch soldiers would soon return to the country with the intention 
of restoring the Netherlands’ colonial authority there. Th e defi nition of 
Indonesia’s religious status was therefore no longer the theoretical ques-
tion it had been during the discussions in the Preparatory Committee 
in June. It was now an issue that had to be resolved quickly and that 
could have far-reaching consequences for Indonesia’s aspirations for 
independence. Th e day before, on 17 August, Mohammad Hatta had, 
at the request of Admiral Mayeda, received a visit from a Japanese 
naval offi  cer who alerted him to the violent opposition of the Christian 
community on the edges of the archipelago to the “seven words” of 
the Jakarta Charter:
Th ey recognise that this part of the sentence is not binding on them 
and concerns only Muslims. Nonetheless, the inclusion of such a 
16 In the preamble and in Article 29 concerning religion.
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statement as part of the foundation of the Constitution amounts 
to organising discrimination towards minority groups. If this 
‘discrimination’ is confi rmed, they would prefer to remain outside 
the Republic of Indonesia.17
 Th is threat of secession was raised by Sukarno and Hatta during 
their meeting with the representatives of Islam in the provisional con-
stituent assembly in the early hours of the morning of the 18th. It 
was, therefore, to ensure national unity that Wahid Hasjim,18 Ki Bagus 
Hadikusumo, Kasman Singodimedjo and Teuku Mohamad Hassan (a 
representative from Aceh)19 agreed to sacrifi ce the demands of their 
political group.20
 Th e history of the Jakarta Charter and of its “loss” (kehilangan) 
was a crucial moment for the Muslim cause in Indonesia and, in the 
years that followed, became a central theme of Masyumi’s political 
identity. Th e party made several calls for the Charter to be included in 
the Constitution, in particular during the debates which preceded the 
adoption of the Provisional Constitution in 1950 and also during the 
proceedings of the Constituent Assembly in Bandung between 1956 
and 1959. In addition, a number of party members or sympathisers 
17 Mohammad Hatta, Sekitar Proklamasi 17 août 1945 (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1970), 
p. 66, quoted by Anshary, Piagam Jakarta 22 juni 1945 dan sejarah konsensus na-
sional antara nasionalis islami dan nasionalis “secular” tentang dasar negara republik 
indonesia, 1945–1959, pp. 10–1.
18 Hasjim’s presence has been challenged by H. Endang Saifuddin Anshari (p. 48) 
who explains that he was in West Java at the time. Hatta (Boland, Th e Struggle of 
Islam in Modern Indonesia, p. 35), Kasman Singodimedjo and others confi rmed 
that he was indeed there. As Andrée Feillard has highlighted (Islam et armée dans 
l’Indonésie contemporaine, p. 42), had Wahid Hasjim been absent, none of the 
Islamist signatories of the Jakarta Charter would have approved its abandonment, 
as it would have discredited the legitimacy of the meeting on 18 August.
19 Th e region of Aceh is one of the cradles of Indonesian Islam and enjoyed 
a considerable amount of prestige within the Muslim community in Indonesia. 
Mohammad Hassan, then, was very ideally situated, despite his proximitiy to the 
secular nationalists, to convince the Muslim representatives to accept the with-
drawal of their demands. Indeed, Sukarno and Hatta are said to have charged him 
with this task. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, p. 87.
20 A few days later, when speaking at a conference organised by his organisation, 
Muhammadiyah, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo expressed his discontent concerning the 
outcome of the Preparatory Committee and pointed out that political Islam’s 
struggle was still in its infancy. Noer, “Masjumi: Its Organizazion, Ideology, and
Political Role in Indonesia”, p. 37.
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wrote studies on the Charter.21 Th ese studies focussed on two themes 
in particular: fi rst, they looked at the sacrifi ce made by the Muslim 
community as a foundational element of the Indonesian nation, with 
the insinuation that the latter owed a debt to the former. Th e second 
theme, linked to the fi rst, was the notion of Islamic patriotism which 
compared favourably with the patriotism of secular nationalists, who 
had allowed their actions to be dictated by the Japanese naval high 
command.
 Once the thorny question of Islam’s place in the new Indonesia 
had been dealt with, the promulgation of the Constitution was able to 
go ahead the same day without further ado. Sukarno and Hatta were 
elected president and vice president of the new Republic of Indonesia, 
and the country’s political landscape began to take shape amid its bud-
ding institutions.
Th e Foundation of Masyumi
On 29 August, the BPUKI was dissolved and replaced by a Central 
Indonesian National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, 
KNIP). In accordance with the presidential system then in place, a 
cabinet was formed on 4 September under Sukarno’s leadership. Poli-
tical Islam was relatively poorly represented in the new provisional 
institutions with the government comprising only two of its representa-
tives. Th ese were the former president of PSII, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, 
who was named minister for public works, and K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, 
who did not have a ministerial portfolio as such, but was in charge of 
religious aff airs. Of the 136 members of the KNIP, who were chosen 
by the president, only 15 could be considered to belong to political 
Islam.22 One of these, Kasman Singomdimedjo, was elected to chair 
21 Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Pertumbuhan Historis Rumus Dasar Negara dan Sebuah 
Proyeksi (Surabaya: Facta Documenta, 1966); Pancasila dan Sejarahnya (Jakarta: 
Lembaga Riset dan Perpustakaan, 1972); H. Endang Saifuddin Anshari, author 
of Piagam Jakarta 22 juin 1945, is himself a former offi  cial of Peladjar Islam 
Indonesia and the son of Isa Anshary, the very energetic “boss” of Masyumi in 
West Java.
22 Th ese were Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, Kasman Singodimedjo, Jusuf Wibisono, 
Dahlan Abdullah, Mohamad Roem, A.R. Baswedan, A. Bajasut, Harsono Tjokro-
aminoto, Mrs. Sunarjo Mangunpuspito, Wahid Hasjim, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, 
Zainul Arifi n, Hadji Agus Salim, Hadji Ahmad Sanusi and Anwar Tjokroaminoto.
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the assembly during its second session, which took place between 15 
and 17 October 1945. However, he was taken to task violently by one 
of the assembly members who accused him of authorising his troops 
to be disarmed by the Japanese when he was head of PETA in Jakarta, 
and had to resign. He was replaced by Sjahrir, president of the small 
Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) who was one of the few nationalist 
leaders not to have collaborated with the Japanese. For the representa-
tives of political Islam, such as Anwar Haryono who witnessed the 
ousting of Kasman, the election of Sjahrir confi rmed the victory of the 
“secular group”.23 During the same session, the KNIP was given real 
legislative power and decided to establish a Working Committee (Badan 
Pekerdja) composed of 15 members in order to help it with this task.24 
Two prominent fi gures of the resistance to the Japanese occupation, 
Sjahrir and Amir Sjarrifuddin, were elected chairman and vice-chairman 
respectively of this committee, and subsequently chose the 13 other 
committee members. Of these, there were only two representatives of 
political Islam (Wahid Hasjim and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara) but this 
fi gure increased to three (Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Mohammad Natsir 
and Jusuf Wibisono) when the committee was expanded to 17 mem-
bers, and their number increased to four when they were joined by 
Mohammad Zein Djambek in December 1945.
 Although political Islam was poorly represented within the 
country’s new institutions and its moral authority within the country 
had not been constitutionally recognised, it took its time before orga-
nising itself into a political force. Indeed, it did so reluctantly, due to 
its opposition to the creation of a party political system which it feared 
would bring an end to the spirit of national unity. Although their 
primary demand—recognition of Indonesia’s Islamic identity—had not 
been satisfi ed, the country’s Muslims hoped that they could still be 
considered as the religious conscience of the nation. Th e single-party 
presidential system established in the summer of 1945 was better suited 
to fulfi lling this aspiration, and indeed in the lead-up to the vote which 
23 “Kelompok Sekular” Lukman Hakiem, Perjalan mencari keadilan dan persatuan. 
Biografi  Dr Anwar Harjono, S.H. (Jakarta: Media Da’wah, 1993), p. 79.
24 Inspired by the example of Indian National Congress (George McTurnan Kahin, 
Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1952], p. 152), this committee was to meet at least every 10 days and the KNIP 
was to assemble at least once a year.
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was to give to the KNIP a legislative function and set up a multi-party 
political system, none of the Islamic members campaigned for these 
changes. Th ey could no doubt sense the danger, inherent in political 
battles with their relativist logic, that Islam would be reduced to being 
just another political doctrine, and so they only entered the political 
ring when events forced them to do so. Although the mutation of the 
Islamist movement into a political party was not desired by its mem-
bers, the groundwork for this transformation had nonetheless already 
been laid. It was the work of a small group of fi gures who, for the 
most part, belonged to the pre-war modernist Muslim organisations 
and to the Japanese Masyumi: Agus Salim, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, 
Abdul Wahid Hasjim, Mohammad Natsir, Mohammad Roem, Prawoto 
Mangkusasmito, Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, 
Mohammad Mawardi and Abu Hanifah.
 Th is generation of Muslim leaders remained uncertain for a long 
time, however, as to how and when they should enter the political fray, 
and so they initially focussed on creating a Muslim youth movement. 
Using the Islamic Higher School (Sekolah Islam Tinggi) as a platform 
for their ideas, they encouraged a group of students there to found the 
Movement of Young Muslims (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia, GPII) 
on 2 October 1945.25 Bringing together young Muslims who had 
attended both religious establishments ( pesantren) and non-religious 
schools, the GPII’s goals were to defend the Indonesian Republic and 
to spread Islam.26 Th e debate within the Islamist movement as to which 
type of organisation would be the most suitable vehicle (wadah) for their 
political message quickly led its leaders to the conclusion that the best 
solution was to transform the powerful Muslim organisation created by 
the Japanese, which still had most of its organisational infrastructure 
intact.27 It was with this in mind that they summoned the Congress of 
the Indonesian Umma (Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia) to Yogyakarta on 
7 and 8 November.
25 See Chapter 6 for the description of this organisation and its role in the emer-
gence of Masyumi.
26 “Mempertankan Negara Republik Indonesia”. “Menyiarkan Agama Islam”.
27 Mohammad Roem confi ded to Deliar Noer that in early September 1945, he 
pledged, along with Wahid Hasjim and Kahar Muzakkir, to revive the Japanese-
created Masyumi. Noer, “Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role 
in Indonesia”, p. 39.
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 Despite the great disorder that reigned in Java at that time, almost 
500 delegates from the principal Muslim organisations managed to 
make it to one of the last remaining cities in the hands of the repub-
lican government. After two days of debate, the Congress “representing 
the entire Indonesian Muslim community, which accounts for 65 mil-
lion souls” considered “that all forms of colonisation are cruel, violate 
human rights and are clearly forbidden (diharamkan) by Islam”; it fur-
ther stated that “in order to eliminate successive imperialist measures 
in Indonesia, all Muslims must, without fail, fi ght body and soul for 
the liberation of their country and of their religion” and decided “to 
adapt the organisation and the position of Masyumi, the Heart of the 
Unity of the Indonesian Umma, in order to mobilise and lead the 
struggle of the entire Indonesian umma”.28 
 Th e unity which the Congress called for was to be the unity of 
the entire nation. Th e gathering was opened by President Sukarno and 
closed by the Sultan of Yogyakarta. In the minds of the organisers, it 
was less about organising the creation of a new political organisation 
and more about making it known that there was a religious duty 
towards the nation. Th e fact that this mobilisation of the Muslim com-
munity took on the shape of a political party was merely the conse-
quence of the “regrettable” decision by the government to create a 
multi-party system. Soekiman, the fi rst president of Masyumi, reminded 
people of that when he presented the decisions of the Congress:
In such a critical moment, which required the people to unite body 
and soul, we regret the announcement by the government of its 
proposal to found parties, a move which will only lead to division 
amongst the people.29
By sacrifi cing their demands for the sake of the struggle to maintain 
independence, the representatives of the Muslim community had hoped 
that they were inaugurating a new period of political consensus and 
leaving party politics behind, an aspiration which still prevailed at the 
28 Resolutions from the Party Congress in November 1945. Pengoeroes Besar 
Partai Masjoemi, Masjoemi, Partai Politik Oemmat Islam Indonesia (Yogyakarta, 
1945), pp. 15–6.
29 Soekiman, “Kewadjiban Oemat Islam dewasa ini”; Pengoeroes Besar Partai 
Masjoemi, Masjoemi, Partai Politik Oemmat Islam Indonesia, p. 7.
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foundation of Masyumi. By a small majority, the Congress representa-
tives preferred a transformation ( penjelmaan, literally meaning “reincar-
nation”), of Madjelis Sjoero Moeslimin Indonesia over the proposal to 
found a Partai Rakjat Islam (Muslim People’s Party) made by a group 
of representatives who were fi rmly resolved to bring about the Muslim 
community’s entry into the political arena.30 Th e new organisation only 
adopted the acronym, Masjoemi,31 rather than the Japanese organisa-
tion’s full name, and it also added the subtitle, Partai Politik Oemmat 
Islam Indonesia (the Political Party of the Indonesian Muslim Com-
munity), to its name. Th eir choice may have been guided mainly by 
obvious strategic reasons, not least Masyumi’s organisational network 
which the new party would later avail of. Nonetheless, the path chosen 
by Islam’s representatives, one which left them open to accusations of 
collaboration which had also been aimed at certain members of the 
Muslim elite, revealed a certain circumspection towards the new poli-
tical dispensation. Th ere were other examples of this reticence towards 
entering the political arena, namely the fact that the Congress not only 
created a political party but also spawned a vast and complex web of 
social care organisations which revealed a vision of politics that was 
still very community-based.32
 Th e other theme, which was developed substantially in the docu-
ments produced by the Congress, was that of a holy war which was 
supposed to ensure Indonesia’s independence. Of the fi nal resolutions, 
the fi rst two dealt with this issue, while the creation of Masyumi was 
not mentioned until the third resolution. Th ese two resolutions called 
on Muslims to:
1. Reinforce the Muslim community’s preparation for the struggle in 
the path of Allah
2. Reinforce, by all the eff orts that Islam imposes, the troops for the 
 defence of Indonesia.33
30 Th e debate between the two sides was a lively one and the winning margin was 
only one vote (52 to 51).
31 Th is was the original spelling of the party at its foundation in 1945. See 
“Author’s Note”, this volume.
32 Cf. infra, Chapter 6.
33 Pengoeroes Besar Partai Masjoemi, Masjoemi, Partai Politik Oemmat Islam 
Indonesia.
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Shortly afterwards, these decisions gave birth to an organisation charged 
with mobilising all Muslims, Barisan Sabilillah, which was placed under 
the authority of Masyumi.34 Th e members of this militia integrated 
the army as Extraordinary Forces and, in theory, this group was a sort 
of civil defence force supposed to provide support for Hizboellah, the 
military organisation inherited from the original Masyumi and which 
became part of the overall structure created by the Congress. Th e reso-
lutions stated that “Hizboellah would be the only military organisation” 
and that “Gerakan Pemoeda Islam Indonesia [Indonesia’s Muslim Youth 
Movement] constituted the only avenue open to young Muslims’ poli-
tical struggle”.35
 Th e birth of the second Masyumi did not arise, then, from 
a specifi c political programme but rather emerged from a defensive 
community-based attitude which assimilated Islam’s followers and the 
new Republic’s citizens. It was only once the party entered the Indo-
nesian political fray that it began to evolve slowly towards becoming a 
party of government.
Political and Military Divisions within Indonesia
Th e day of Masyumi’s foundation, 7 November, was also the day when 
most of Indonesia’s other political organisations were created. Th ese 
organisations had three distinct sources of inspiration: nationalism, so-
cialism and Islam, whose sole national representative until 1947 would 
be Masyumi. Th e Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) at its creation bene-
fi tted from the prestige associated with the pre-war nationalist move-
ment and the notoriety of its illustrious predecessors with the same 
name. Even though it had no direct link with either the organisation 
founded by Sukarno in 1927 or with the state party, born just after 
independence, which controlled the single-party system (before being 
replaced by the KNIP), the PNI remained for the vast majority of the 
population the president’s party. Likewise, on the left of the political 
spectrum, the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), led by Mohammed 
Yussuf, had no close affi  liation with its predecessors from the colonial 
34 “Barisan Sabilillah” literally means “forces in the path of God”.
35 “Gerakan Pemoeda Islam Indonesia, Anggaran Dasar”. Pengoeroes Besar Partai 
Masjoemi, Masjoemi, Partai Politik Oemmat Islam Indonesia, p. 23.
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period. Th ese included the Indonesian Communist Party founded in 
1920, an illegal PKI, created in 1935 after the almost complete disap-
pearance of its predecessor following the failed rebellion of 1927, and 
fi nally, the clandestine PKI created during the Japanese occupation. 
Most of the country’s Stalinists did not join the new PKI and instead 
became members of the Socialist Party, the Labour Party (Partai 
Buruh Indonesia) or the Pesindo militia.36 Finally, in December 1945, 
the merger of Amir Sjarrifuddin’s Partai Sosialis Indonesia and Sutan 
Sjahrir’s Partai Rakjat Sosialis gave birth to the Partai Sosialis. Although 
its electoral base was a lot smaller than its predecessors, it managed 
nonetheless to punch far above its weight politically thanks to its excel-
lent organisational capacity and the competence of its leaders. Apart 
from these four main political parties, a number of other smaller poli-
tical groups shared the often rather chaotic political landscape. Th ese 
included the Socialist People’s Party (Paras); a Protestant party, Parkindo, 
led by Leimena; and a Catholic party.
 Th ere gravitated around these organisations an array of armed 
forces, either left over from the Japanese era or newly created, which 
had not yet been integrated into the fl edgling national army. Most of 
these groups of young combatants, like Hizboellah and Barisan Sabilil-
lah which were controlled by Masyumi, supported a political party or 
movement. Barisan Pelonor, which had become Barisan Banteng (the 
Buff alo Legion), was close to the left wing of the PNI. It was based in 
Surakarta and gradually became exclusively controlled by Tan Malaka.37 
Laskar Rakjat (the People’s Militia), which was close to the Sultan of 
Yogyakarta, represented the right wing of the PNI, while the Pesindo 
militia (Indonesian Socialist Youth Movement) grouped together young 
Indonesians who supported Sjahrir. Th ese militia groups embodied the 
courage of the pemuda in their struggle against foreign armed forces 
and provided vital assistance to the political parties they were associated 
with. However, because they were often poorly armed and lacking in 
36 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 159.
37 Tan Malaka was one of the most prominent fi gures in Indonesian communism. 
He was a PKI offi  cial in the 1920s before becoming a Comintern representative 
for Southeast Asia. As a result of the 1926–27 revolts and the subsesquent crack-
down on communism, he had to fl ee his country. He returned in 1942 and lived 
through the war in complete anonymity, only returning to politics after indepen-
dence. See Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, pp. 269–95.
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discipline, they had, during the fi rst years of the new Republic, a de-
stabilising eff ect on politics. Th ey were gradually, but with some diffi  -
culty, integrated into the Indonesian army, bringing with them their 
partisan diff erences.38
 Th e struggle for Indonesian independence took place in such a 
heady atmosphere of extreme confusion that it is not easy to tease 
out the diff erent political identities it contained. Most of the country’s 
regions were isolated from one another and the fi ghting accentuated 
the administrative division established by the Japanese authorities.39
 Th is administrative chaos made it diffi  cult for information to be 
communicated, even within the regions controlled by the new Indo-
nesian government, making the political parties’ task all the more diffi  -
cult. In the case of Masyumi, these diffi  culties had a knock-on eff ect 
on the content of its offi  cial newspaper, Al-Djihad. As a result of the 
unreliability of the postal service, the newspaper abounded with prac-
tical information, such as notifi cations for meetings (sometimes con-
cerning only a few people). In these circumstances, proper political 
strategy was often replaced by one-upmanship, the exaggeration of 
minor events and occasional political bluster. Th roughout 1946, for 
example, Al-Djihad helped maintain an atmosphere of anxiety in the 
country to such an extent that one could have been forgiven for 
thinking that the Th ird World War was about to break out. Th e 
number of armed forces within the country was colossal, according to 
Abiksuno Tjokrosujoso, one of Masyumi’s vice presidents—no fewer 
than three million members of Hizboellah and two million members 
of Barisan Sabilillah—which seemed to presage a confrontation of 
apocalyptic proportions.40
38 Th e period of sacred union enjoyed by Indonesian youth groups during the 
struggle for and defence of independence did not last. Th e Youth Congress, which 
took place in Yogyakarta on 10 and 11 November 1945, led to the creation of the 
Pesindo which supported Amir and Sjahrir, thus offi  cialising the politicisation of 
the pemuda movement.
39 During this period, Sumatra came under the control of the Headquarters of the 
Seventh Area Army in Singapore which also controlled Malaysia. A special com-
mand was created for Java and Madura while Borneo and the East were placed 
under the authority of the Navy Headquarters for the Southern Seas in Makassar 
in Sulawesi.
40 Al-Djihad, 16 February 1946. According to Kahin, Hizboellah only made up 
between 20,000 and 25,000 combatants. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in 
Indonesia, p. 162.
Chap2 (61-118).indd   78 8/14/15   5:37:11 PM
Caught between Stability and Revolution 79
 Th e exact nature of the transformation that took place in the 
Indonesian population in the midst of such turmoil has been the source 
of much debate. For Benedict Anderson, the Indonesian National 
Revolution was never anything more than a political revolution, and 
“what it might have been can only be glimpsed in the short-lived, iso-
lated social revolutions in the provinces and in the memories of some 
of the survivors.” 41 Th is vision has been shared by Indonesian histo-
rians who focus mainly on the struggle for independence, but it has 
been qualifi ed, and in some cases contested, by Western writers. Peter 
Carey, for example, claims that “without a doubt, more Indonesians 
were killed or tortured at the hands of their fellow countrymen during 
these tragic months than were killed in the whole guerrilla struggle 
against the Dutch”.42
 Th e transformation of Masyumi from an inward-looking organisa-
tion into a political party did not happen uniformly across the country. 
Th e war of independence, which was beginning at that time, divided 
the country politically as well as militarily. In August 1945, the entire 
country became the theatre of operations for British and Australian 
forces, having previously played host to the Americans. Th e English 
landed in Jakarta at the end of September, and fi rst of all entered 
into dialogue with the new Republic’s authorities, thus awarding them 
de facto recognition. In response to the total refusal of the Dutch to 
enter into any discussions with the Sukarno government, which they 
considered to be a Japanese creation, the British facilitated the appoint-
ment of Sjahrir as prime minister on 13 November. Negotiations were 
then opened between the new prime minister and a Dutch representa-
tive, Van Mook. However, these discussions were rapidly broken off 
because of the Netherlands’ refusal to stop landing their troops in 
Indonesia. As a result, the confrontations between militia groups and 
Dutch and British forces, which had been intensifying up until that 
point, escalated further. In the following months, despite the fact that 
41 Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, p. 409.
42 In the most recent offi  cial version of Indonesian history, only a tiny footnote 
is devoted to the elimination from the country’s regions of both administrative 
structures and the elite groups who supported the Dutch. Marwati Djoened 
Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto, eds., Sejarah Nasional Indonesia, vol. 6 
(Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 2008). See Colin Wild and Peter Carey, eds., Born in Fire: 
Th e Indonesian Struggle for Independence, BBC Publications (Athens, OH: Ohio 
University Press, 1988), pp. xxii–xxiv.
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Dutch and English diplomats, under pressure from the United States, 
were attempting to fi nd a peaceful solution to the crisis, Dutch troops 
reoccupied Borneo, Sulawesi, the Maluku Islands and the Lesser Sunda 
Islands. Th ey renewed contacts with the traditional leaders of these 
regions, confi rmed the agreements made with them before the war 
and gradually swept aside the supporters of the new Republic. Faced 
with this fait accompli, the British fi nally agreed, on 15 July 1946, to 
hand over the entire Indonesian territory, apart from Java and Sumatra, 
to the Dutch military command. Th e former colonial power thus re-
claimed complete control over a signifi cant part of the country.
 Th e circumstances of the Masyumi leaders’ experience of the 
Revolution greatly infl uenced their political leanings. Th ree towns were 
particularly important in the history of the laborious emergence of 
Masyumi’s political identity. In Jakarta, which was occupied by the 
Allies from the end of September 1945, there were few opportunities 
for the pemuda to cause political wrangling or disorder. It was here 
that diplomacy was carried out, even after the departure of the govern-
ment in January 1946. For the political offi  cials who lived there, Jakarta 
was at the centre of international diplomatic proceedings, a place where 
realpolitik prevailed. Yogyakarta, on the other hand, was a bustling hub 
of militia activity where impending combat loomed, and it had been 
the spiritual home of the Indonesian National Revolution since August 
1945. It was militarily more secure than Jakarta and became the 
headquarters for the new Republic’s administration in January 1946. 
Surakarta, also known as Solo, which harboured an old rivalry with 
Yogyakarta, was the natural headquarters for the opponents to the 
Sjahrir government.43 It hosted meetings between some of Masyumi’s 
leaders and the leaders of Persatuan Perjuangan, the Struggle Union, 
which brought together the prime minister’s opponents. Between 
November 1945 and July 1947, the Muslim party, like many other 
political parties, hesitated—or rather, was divided—as to which path to 
follow between participation in government and opposition, between 
revolutionary idealism and diplomatic pragmatism. Th e causes of this 
“schizophrenia” have already been touched on earlier: it can be attri-
buted to the diff erent geographic origins of the party’s leaders but also 
43 In 1755, the Kingdom of Mataram split into two principalities: Yogyakarta and 
Surakarta.
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to their diff erent social milieus. Th e diff erent elective affi  nities between 
political fi gures also played a role, as can be seen in the friendship 
between Sukarno, Soekiman and Tan Malaka, on the one hand, and 
the close ties between Sjahrir, Natsir and Agus Salim, on the other. 
Th ese fi rst two years of the Revolution saw, then, the slow emergence 
of Masyumi as a party of government, which we will come back to 
later. It was, however, a mutation brought about by a small group 
within the party who had no means of communicating their message 
through propaganda or through spectacular accomplishments. Th e vast 
majority of the party faithful only gradually and reluctantly abandoned 
their revolutionary identity, under the guidance of Masyumi’s most 
senior leaders.
A Revolutionary Party in Opposition
Sjahrir’s First Cabinet: Th e Defi nition of Masyumi’s 
Political Line
Th e transformation of the political system into a multi-party one 
led rapidly to the formation of a parliamentary cabinet. Th e obvious 
choice to head the cabinet was Sutan Sjahrir, a vanguard member of 
the intransigent Indonesian resistance to the Japanese. He represented a 
more favourable alternative to the presidential cabinet, which had been 
criticised for containing ministers who had collaborated with the Japa-
nese. Th e fi rst Sjahrir government, which was formed on 14 November 
1945, was composed mainly of members of his own political party, the 
PSI. Sjahrir himself occupied the position of minister for foreign aff airs 
and also minister for home aff airs, as well as that of prime minister. 
Amir Sjarifuddin, the other powerful political fi gure in the cabinet and 
also a member of the PSI, was given two portfolios: the Ministry of 
Security and the Ministry of Information. All those who had collabo-
rated with the Japanese occupier were excluded from power, and only 
one Masyumi member, Rasjidi, was included in the cabinet.44 Although 
he did not initially have a portfolio, he was later put in charge of the 
new Ministry of Religions which was created when the government 
44 Rasjidi explained to me in March 1992 in Jakarta that he had never actually for-
mally joined Masyumi but was widely considered to be one of its representatives.
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moved to Yogyakarta in January 1946. Th e transfer of the government 
to Yogyakarta coincided with the nomination to cabinet of a second 
Masyumi member, Mohammad Natsir, who replaced Amir Sjarifuddin 
as minister for information. However, Rasjidi and Natsir’s decision to 
participate in government was a personal one rather than a party one. 
Th e Masyumi leadership, infl uenced by the revolutionary atmosphere 
that reigned in Yogyakarta, adopted a policy of systematic opposition 
to the new government. Th is position was illustrated in a document 
entitled Th e Masyumi Manifesto concerning the Change of the Cabinet 
of Ministers, outlining the party’s grievances with the new government, 
which was published shortly after the nomination of Sjahrir as prime 
minister.45 Th e manifesto drew attention to the fact that the Indonesian 
constitution was only a few months old (“a brief instant in relation to 
historical time which is measured in years and centuries”), stating that 
it had not been “created precipitously, particularly concerning its prin-
ciples” and that it had availed of “the past experiences of several famous 
countries across the world in relation to systems of government”. It 
went on to denounce the formation of a parliamentary cabinet as 
contrary to the provisions of the recently adopted constitution which 
provided for a presidential system that was much better adapted to 
the demands of the moment.46 Th e manifesto also hinted at a certain 
bitterness amongst the party leadership. Two of its members, Abikusno 
Tjokrosujoso and Wahid Hasjim, had been passed over for cabinet 
positions because of implied accusations of collaboration. Th e mani-
festo called this a “spurious pretext” given that “a large portion of 
the cabinet” was composed of “people who collaborated with both the 
Japanese and the Dutch.” Finally, it put forward another argument 
that was to be a recurring element of Masyumi’s opposition to Sjahrir, 
namely that it “was neither the place nor the time for the government 
to organise negotiations, particularly with the Dutch”.
 By the end of November 1945, then, the main points of Mas-
yumi’s political stance had been defi ned, and its leaders were to defend 
45 Manifest Masjoemi berhoeboeng dengan pergantian Dewan Kementerian, published 
by the party leadership alongside the congress resolutions voted on 7 and 8 No-
vember 1945.
46 “Th e only general obligation is unity and the rallying together of the forces of 
the Indonesian people, young and old of all groups, around a government for 
whom support is as widespread as possible, including all the revolutionary groups 
and movements (who are not opposed to the way of God)”. Ibid.
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them over the following two years. Th e party called for the reinstitu-
tion of a system of national government led by the president, an abso-
lute refusal to enter into negotiations with the Dutch unless they fi rst 
recognised Indonesian independence, and the removal of the tandem 
formed by Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin. Th is policy led Masyumi early 
in 1946 to join a coalition of opposition set up by Tan Malaka, one 
of the main fi gures of the Indonesian Marxist movement. Malaka had 
already approached Sjahrir in an attempt to convince him to make a 
move against Sukarno and Hatta, but during a tour of Java, Sjahrir had 
been able to gauge the level of support enjoyed by the president, and 
he declined this off er. Th is refusal, however, did not lead Tan Malaka 
to rally behind Sukarno. Having abandoned the idea of entering into 
direct confrontation with Sukarno and Hatta, he asked them to write 
a sort of “political testament” wherein he would be their successor in 
the event of their deaths. Th e two leaders agreed to his proposal but 
modifi ed its terms when they drafted the document, proposing instead 
a quadrumvirate representing the new Republic’s main political currents. 
Power was to be divided between Tan Malaka, representing the left’s 
Marxist wing; the socialist Sjahrir; Wongsonegoro who defended the 
interests of the aristocracy and the old line of state functionaries; and 
Iwa Kusumasumantri, political Islam’s representative.47 However, Tan 
Malaka, with the complicity of Subardjo, whom he had grown close 
to since the latter’s removal from government, fabricated a fake will 
in which Sukarno and Hatta designated him as the sole benefi ciary of 
their powers. He then travelled across Java brandishing this document 
and claiming that as Sukarno and Hatta had been imprisoned by the 
British, he was to inherit all their powers. Th is manoeuvre, which 
obliged Sukarno to leave the capital and go on a tour of the republican 
territories to deny the rumour, was, according to Kahin, one of the 
reasons for the government’s transfer to Yogyakarta.48
 A few weeks after the failure of his ruse, Tan Malaka created, on 
15 January 1946, Persatuan Perjuangan (Struggle Union), a coalition 
which was soon to contain 137 organisations and which received the 
support of General Sudirman, chief of staff  of the armed forces. Mas-
yumi, through its representative Wali al-Fatah, occupied a prominent 
47 Kusumasumantri was Subardjo’s candidate and was preferred over Soekiman, 
who was, at the time, in Central Java.
48 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 152.
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place in the new organisation’s governing body. Persatuan Perjuangan 
united the country’s opposition and it quickly adopted a programme 
entitled “the Seven Pillars of the Indonesian Revolution.” It called for 
negotiations on the basis of total independence, popular government, 
a citizen army, disarmament of the Japanese, confi scation of property 
held by Europeans and, fi nally, the requisition and management of 
plantations and factories. Th is programme was approved by the Working 
Committee in the KNIP, which called upon the people to adopt its 
objectives. During its fi rst party congress in Solo from 10 to 13 Feb-
ruary 1946, Masyumi adopted the main aspects of these demands, 
though no direct mention was made of Persatuan Perjuangan. It added 
a particular demand of its own concerning regions inhabited by a 
majority of Muslims, declaring its wish to see Muslims appointed as 
heads of local government there.49
 Th e conference in Solo established Masyumi as a party directly 
opposed to the cabinet. Most of the conference speeches developed 
the themes laid out a few months earlier in the Manifesto. Th ey also 
demonstrated a certain conviction that the leaders of political Islam 
had a greater natural legitimacy to lead the nation’s struggle for inde-
pendence than the government, which they judged to be unrepresenta-
tive of the people. Although the party never went as far as to call for 
open rebellion against Sjahrir’s cabinet, nor indeed for the withdrawal 
of the two Masyumi members from government, it constantly high-
lighted the legitimacy and reasonableness of their demands as those of 
the Muslim community, the overwhelmingly largest community in the 
country. Nonetheless, the insistence with which these demands were 
made did lead one to think that in the minds of at least a section of 
the Masyumi leadership, failure to meet these demands could open the 
door to much more radical means of political expression.50
Th e Second Sjahrir Cabinet —Th e Political Realignment 
of Masyumi towards the Centre Ground
Faced with such strong opposition to his cabinet, Sjahrir resigned on 
28 February 1946. Sukarno subsequently invited Persatuan Perjuangan 
49 Al-Djihad, 15 February 1946.
50 Abikoesno Tjokrosudjoso, for example, declared that “although Masyumi had 
fi ve million armed men behind it, it did not wish to abuse this power and so had 
called for a coalition cabinet in Parliament.” Al-Djihad, 16 February 1946.
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to form a new government, but when it proved unable to do so, he of-
fered the position of prime minister once again to Sjahrir. Shortly after 
his reappointment, a new cabinet was announced. It was a bit more 
diverse this time round and included Masyumi members. Mohammad 
Natsir kept his position as minister for information, Rasjidi offi  cially 
became minister for religions, while Arudji Kartawinata was named 
deputy minister for defence and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara became 
deputy minister for fi nance. Like in Sjahrir’s fi rst cabinet, these minis-
ters’ participation in the government was an individual decision rather 
than a party one. After 10 days of indecisiveness, the party leadership 
fi nally decided to adopt the same position as the Persatuan Perjuangan 
not to support the new government. However, no measures were taken 
to demand the Masyumi ministers to act in accordance with the party’s 
decision.
 On 17 March 1946, the government took fi rm action to provi-
sionally put an end to the machinations of Persatuan Perjuangan. 
During a rally organised in protest at the formation of the new Sjahrir 
cabinet, Tan Malaka and six members of the organisation’s leadership 
were arrested. Of these, two were members of Masyumi: Abikusno 
Tjokrosujoso and Wondoamiseno.51 Th e setback that this infl icted on 
the Persatuan Perjuangan leadership, particularly the arrest of Abikusno, 
led Masyumi to tone down its demands towards the government and 
realign itself politically towards the middle ground. On 11 May 1946, 
the Muslim party took part in the birth of a new organisation, named 
Konsentrasi Nasional (National Concentration), which for the most part 
took on board the policies of Persatuan Perjuangan, but did away 
with its systematic opposition to the government in favour of a more 
constructive form of criticism.52 It consisted of 31 political organisa-
tions, some of which were favourable towards Sjahrir, and was presided 
over by Sardjono, the new leader of the PKI.
 Masyumi’s participation in this new organisation did not signify, 
however, that it had now aligned itself politically with Sjahrir’s new 
cabinet. Th e Muslim party maintained close links with its former part-
ners in Pesatuan Perjuangan, and at the end of May, shortly after the 
51 Th ey were sent to the rally as observers, according to Kahin, Nationalism and 
Revolution in Indonesia, p. 178.
52 Th e somewhat ambiguous attitude of this new coalition has led George 
McTurnan Kahin (Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 183) to 
conclude that it was initiated by the government. Th is seems unlikely to me.
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foundation of National Concentration, it signed a “Joint Proclamation” 
(Maklumat Bersama) with the Indonesian Labour Party (Partai Buruh 
Indonesia) and the Indonesian Labour Front (Barisan Buruh Indonesia). 
Th is proclamation declared that the government’s diplomatic eff orts 
were at an impasse ( jalan buntu) because of the obvious desire on 
the part of the Dutch to restore their control over the country. It also 
called for the formation of a “government composed of representatives 
of all political parties, which is the only way to obtain the consensus 
necessary for the nation’s fi ghting power.” 53
 Th e bleak outlook described in the proclamation concerning the 
future prospects of negotiations with the Netherlands was to be con-
fi rmed in the following weeks. Th e Dutch elections of 17 May brought 
to power a coalition, led by the Catholic right wing, which was against 
making any concessions to the Republic’s government and who walked 
back on some of its predecessor’s promises. By the beginning of June 
1946, the negotiations had, unsurprisingly, reached an impasse, and 
towards the end of the month the political situation also worsened. 
On the 27th, a commando group led by General Sudarsono freed 
Tan Malaka and the other leaders of Persatuan Peerjuangan from their 
prison in Surakarta. Th e same evening, Prime Minister Sjahrir and 
several members of his inner circle were taken hostage. Th e goal of 
the operation was to force President Sukarno to replace the government 
with a supreme political council made up of 10 members and led by 
Tan Malaka, and also to hand over military power to General Sudirman 
(under the Constitution, the president was the commander-in-chief 
of the armed forces). Th e president reacted quickly to this attempt 
to destabilise him by declaring a state of siege. On 3 July, General 
Sudarsono and Muhammad Yamin went to meet Sukarno at the presi-
dential palace, but the president refused point blank to give in to their 
demands and had the two men arrested. Meanwhile, although senior 
military staff , in particular Sudirman, had refused to intervene in the 
situation, the Siliwangi Division, assisted by members of the Pesindo, 
occupied Madiun and Surakarta and marched on Yogyakarta to demand 
the liberation of the prime minister. Faced with the risk of a civil war, 
Sudirman fi nally allowed Sukarno to convince him to do something 
53 Al-Djihad, 28 May 1946.
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about the situation: he declared his support for Sjahrir and ordered the 
arrest of those responsible for the operation.54
 Th e ambivalence of Mayumi’s political stance was manifest in its 
attitude towards this attempted coup d’état. One of the vice-chairmen of 
its religious council was a member of the political council chaired by 
Tan Malaka,55 but confl icting testimony has been given concerning the 
position adopted by Masyumi’s president, Soekiman. He was among 
the political representatives who turned up at the presidential palace to 
demand the dissolution of Sjahrir’s cabinet, and he allegedly declared, 
according to one of the organisers of the operation, Muhammad Yamin, 
that by making these demands they were merely exercising their right to 
petition (implementasi hak petisi ).56 However, according to Hatta, who 
was also present at the meeting on 3 July, Soekiman had been duped 
into going to the presidential palace. General Sudarsono allegedly asked 
him to come along to listen to a presidential announcement of great 
importance, and then presented his attendance there as a sign of his 
support for the group’s demands. Soekiman, who had been waiting in 
an adjoining room, is said to have left the palace immediately once he 
had been informed by Hatta of Sudarsono’s real intentions.57
 Masyumi’s offi  cial reaction to these events was adopted on 7 July. 
Th e party’s communiqué reaffi  rmed their loyalty towards President 
Sukarno, but it nonetheless stopped short of formally denouncing the 
rebels’ actions. Condemning Sjahrir’s policies, it reiterated the party’s 
demands: the formation of a coalition government and the breaking 
off  of all negotiations with the Dutch. Above all, the party denounced 
the tendentious account of the events given by the government, which 
presented the operation as a plot designed to undermine the authority 
of the state, and called for all political prisoners, with the exception of 
spies, to be either released or given a speedy trial in accordance with 
the laws of the Republic.58
54 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 188–92. Curiously enough, 
Kahin gives the date of the attempted coup d’état as 2 July, when in fact it took 
place the following day.
55 Deliar Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafi ti, 
1987), p. 162.
56 Ibid., p. 161.
57 Mohammad Hatta, Indonesian Patriot: Memoirs (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 
1981), pp. 259–62.
58 Al-Djihad, 9 July 1946.
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Th e Th ird Sjahrir Cabinet: Masyumi’s Opposition to 
the Linggadjati Agreement
On 2 October 1946, the Republic’s institutions were back in proper 
functioning order with a presidential decree entrusting executive power 
to Sjahrir’s recently formed third cabinet. Th e new government was 
more diverse than its predecessors, and among it were eight Masyumi 
members or sympathisers. Mohamad Roem was named as minister 
for home aff airs, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was appointed minister for 
fi nance, Faturrachman was in charge of the Ministry of Religion, Natsir 
was deputy minister to A.R. Baswedan in the Ministry of Information, 
Jusuf Wibisono became deputy minister for prosperity, H. Agus Salim 
deputy minister for foreign aff airs,59 Harsono Tjokroaminoto deputy 
minister for defence, and fi nally K.H. Wahid Hasjim became a minister 
without portfolio.
 Although the Muslim party was very well-represented in cabinet, 
this did not prevent Masyumi from having another falling out with the 
government. On 24 November, having consulted with the representa-
tives of GPII, Muslimaat, the Hizboellah and Sabilillah militias as 
well as its main constituent organisations, the party leadership refused 
to support the agreement reached between the Republic of Indonesia 
and the Netherlands which had been signed on 17 October in the 
mountain health resort of Linggadjati, near Cirebon.60 Th e agreement 
provided for the immediate recognition by the Dutch of the de facto 
power of the Republic in Java and Sumatra, the creation by 1 January 
1949 of a federal democratic state, the United States of Indonesia, 
and fi nally the establishment of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union. 
Masyumi’s main reservation with the agreement was that it did not 
formally recognise Indonesian independence. Given that the Republic 
was considered to be legitimate only in Java and Sumatra, this implied 
that the resistance struggle on the other islands had to be abandoned. 
It was diffi  cult for them to accept that, especially since the Dutch, only 
a few weeks beforehand, had established, unilaterally and in violation 
59 Hadji Agus Salim was often named either as a Masyumi member or as a mem-
ber of PSII. He had been one of PSII’s leaders before the war and was very close 
to the modernists in Masyumi, but in actual fact he was a member of neither 
party after the war.
60 Al-Djihad, 27 October 1946.
Chap2 (61-118).indd   88 8/14/15   5:37:13 PM
Caught between Stability and Revolution 89
of previous agreements, the State of East Indonesia. On 12 December 
1946, on the initiative of Masyumi, a federation of all the organisa-
tions and militias opposed to the agreement was formed. It was sym-
bolically christened Benteng Republik (Republican Fortress) and it 
adopted precise organisational rules,61 and a four-point programme 
which aimed at:
… making the entire population aware of the necessity to refuse 
the Dutch-Indonesian agreement; demanding the formation of an 
assembly which had the confidence of all the people; preparing for 
the aftermath of the agreement’s rejection; demanding the imme-
diate commencement of trials for political prisoners with a view to 
the immediate release of those who were innocent.62
 It was in this context of violent opposition to the diplomatic 
policy of Sjahrir’s third cabinet that Sukarno decided to adjust the 
balance of power in favour of his prime minister. A presidential decree 
issued on 29 December 1946 increased the number of seats in the 
KNIP from 200 to 514. Of the 314 new members, only 93 held seats 
as representatives of a political party, the other 221 had been chosen 
as representatives either of the various interest groups such as peasants 
or industrial workers, or of regions outside Java. This new composition 
was at first refused by the KNIP’s Working Committee who saw in it 
a manoeuvre by Sukarno in favour of Sajap Kiri, a left-wing coalition 
which supported the prime minister.63 It was finally accepted on 5 
March 1947 after a forceful speech by Vice President Mohammad 
Hatta, who warned that both he and the president would resign if the 
new composition was not approved. Masyumi and the PNI left the 
plenary session in protest.64 The Muslim party, despite its number of 
representatives going from 35 to 65, suffered an overall loss of power.65
61 It contained an executive council, a political council and a defence council, and 
motions were to be carried by a qualified majority.
62 Al-Djihad, 13 December 1946.
63 Sajap Kiri, meaning “left wing”, was composed of the Socialist Party, the PKI, 
the Pesindo, the Partai Buruh and the Christian parties.
64 Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, p. 167.
65 This loss of power was somewhat attenuated by the fact that the new Working 
Committee comprised five Masyumi members (S.M. Kartosuwirjo, Mahmud L. 
Latjuba, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Mr Samsuddin and Mohammad Sardjan) as 
well as a representative of Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia, Abu Umar.
Chap2 (61-118).indd   89 8/19/15   12:35:55 PM
90 Islam and Politics in Indonesia
 During a plenary conference held by the party between 19 and 
20 March in Yogyakarta, Masyumi set out in a document entitled 
“Urgency Programme”, all its grievances and demands concerning the 
Sjahrir government. Th is relatively short text containing the resolutions 
made by the party was published shortly afterwards by the leadership, 
accompanied by a 40-page commentary, which mainly attempted to 
impugn the government’s legitimacy to rule. Th e principal demand 
made was for a democratic government, which was a direct response to 
the president’s new nominations. Masyumi called for the repeal of the 
government’s decree that applied the president’s decision and demanded 
the election, within four months, of an assembly based on genuine 
popular sovereignty.66 Th e commentary concerning the fi rst point im-
plicitly developed the notion, which we have already seen, that Indo-
nesia’s institutions lacked legitimacy.67 It affi  rmed that in a country 
under the control either of a single man—a raja, a king or a dictator
—or of a “little group of feudal aristocrats”, “the people were given no 
other choice but to follow the law without being able to participate in 
the elaboration of those laws or without being entitled to either control 
or oversee how the country was being run, and thus [they could] not 
feel responsible for the destiny of their country.” 68 Th e leadership sent 
out a warning to the government:
For this reason, when this government, which is not supported by 
the people, suff ers at some stage or other some ill fate, it will be 
overturned and destroyed by its own people because it is not a 
government in accordance with the wishes of the people, who for 
their part are convinced that all their misfortunes are due to the 
fact that it is governed arbitrarily.69
 While the nomination of deputies to the KNIP was justifi ed at 
the outset of the new Republic, in the eyes of the senior members of 
66 Pengoeroes Besar Masjoemi, Tafsir Urgentie Program. Kepoetoesan Konferensi 
kilat, tg. 19–20 mrt. 1947 di Djogjakarta, Articles Ia and Ib.
67 It is interesting to note that most of the party’s direct criticisms of and threats 
towards the government were contained in this offi  cial commentary (published 
with the approval of the party’s executive committee) and not in the Urgency 
Programme. It reveals the internal debates which were going on within the party 
on which opposition strategy to adopt towards the government.
68 Pengoeroes Besar Masjoemi, Tafsir Urgentie Program, pp. 4–5.
69 Ibid., p. 5.
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the Muslim party, they considered that the absence of elections and the 
expansion of the Assembly through nominations were “in persistent 
opposition to democratic principles”.70 According to them, the two 
arguments advanced by the “undemocratic” side, which were the illit-
eracy and the political immaturity of the people as well as the impossi-
bility of organising elections, did not stand up to analysis: “you cannot 
raise the spectre of the people’s lack of political intelligence, for there 
exists no country in the world where the entire population has this 
political intelligence”.71 Th e party recognised the logistical diffi  culties 
surrounding the organisation of an election, and pointed out that 
although it should in principle be a general election, it could, for the 
moment at least, be an indirect election. However, Masyumi demanded 
the establishment of an electoral college (one elector for every 250 citi-
zens) and objected to allowing parliamentary deputies to be appointed 
by the existing local and regional assemblies who, “for the most part, 
had not been democratically elected”.72
 Th e second point developed by the programme was a plea for the 
army to remain revolutionary. Th e resolutions concerning questions of 
national defence and the commentaries that accompanied them revealed 
the party’s apprehension about the government’s plan to professionalise 
the army. Th is plan was termed “rationalisation” and aimed at progres-
sively integrating militia groups into the regular army. Th e Masyumi 
position on this plan was based on two somewhat contradictory con-
cerns. Th e fi rst of these was a suspicion that the army would be poli-
ticised, and that this would be to the advantage of one of the factions 
within the army which supported the government. Th e party leadership 
demanded the dissolution of the “Inspection Offi  ces for the Armed 
Struggle” (Inspektorat-inspektorat Bureau Perdjoeangan), which they 
opposed as organisations that were “clearly acting as the zealots of a 
political party’s ideology”.73 Th e target of this attack was the PSI and 
particularly those members of it who were close to Amir Sjarifuddin, 
the minister for defence. Th ese inspection offi  ces were accused of 
having set up parallel military organisations that were controlled by the 
minister’s henchmen. All of Masyumi’s constituent organisations were 
70 Ibid., p. 6.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., p. 9.
73 Ibid., p. 3.
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therefore asked not to participate in any of these bodies’ activities. Th is 
boycott had already been voted by the Barisan Sabilillah during its 
conference on 13 and 14 April 1947, and the GPII refused to allow 
the Barisan Republik Muda and the Asrama Republik, both of which 
had been created by the Inspection Offi  ce, to join their organisation.74
 Masyumi was also opposed, however, to the creation of a profes-
sional army cut off  from its roots among the people. It laid heavy 
emphasis on the importance of the mobilisation of the people after 
the proclamation of independence, contrasting the heroic struggle of 
the masses “unparalleled in the entire history of Indonesia” with “the 
partisan politicians who arrived on the scene late in the day with the 
sole aim of leading and showing the way”.75 Th e mobilisation of the 
people had taken place from a very early stage, guaranteeing the army 
a place of precedence in revolutionary mythology. Th e armed struggle 
had revealed the people’s worth; they had
… found in it a new spirit, a heroic spirit which allowed them 
to defeat the Japanese army easily, to confront, with ease also, the 
English army … to contain and resist against the Dutch colonial 
military force, which is the size of an international army. […] It 
was neither diplomatic skill nor political perseverance nor the intel-
lectual experts nor the crafty politicians who won independence, but 
rather the heroes covered in blood.76
Maintaining popular militia groups also served the interests of national 
security, of course, which it would have been “reactionary and dan-
gerous” to weaken, given that a threat still existed: “the enemy of inde-
pendence […] has perhaps laid down his arms” but he “has not yet 
been destroyed”. Above all, the existence of this revolutionary army had 
a political justifi cation:
Th e militia groups constituted a guarantee of the people’s aspira-
tions, so that the government would maintain the confi dence of 
the Revolution; a guarantee which an offi  cial army, which would 
be completely under the control of the government and would thus 
become its instrument, could not provide.77
74 Ibid., p. 14.
75 Ibid., p. 12.
76 Ibid., p. 13.
77 Ibid., p. 20.
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 Th e same analysis of the Revolution can be found in the criti-
cisms which were outlined in the third resolution of the plenary con-
gress, entitled “In Response to the Linggadjati Document”. Masyumi 
challenged the government’s outlook for the future, which considered 
that the armed confl ict was fi nished and that a new stage of the Revo-
lution was about to begin. It criticized the Ministry of Information, 
despite the fact that it was run by Natsir, for having co-authored with 
the Dutch authorities a joint communiqué which expressed the hope 
“that between the Indonesian nation and the Dutch nation, a spirit of 
real comprehension would appear, and that feelings of bitterness and 
vengeance would be rejected”.78 Th e joint reduction in arms provided 
for in the Linggadjati Agreement left the Netherlands with a signifi cant 
strategic advantage, due to the superiority of their equipment, and, 
more importantly, sanctioned the Dutch occupation of part of the 
Republic’s territory. Th ese were all concessions that the Muslim party 
refused to endorse. Th e resolution referred to the fact that during the 
parliamentary session which ratifi ed the agreement, the party had clearly 
indicated that it would not consider itself bound by the agreement if 
it came to be signed.79 Naturally, the party called for the struggle to 
be continued and also to be broadened to include all areas of society:
Th e battlefi elds, which today contain more traps and dangers due to 
the coming into force of the agreement, have become more and more 
vast. Th ere is a military struggle, a political struggle, a social struggle, 
an economic struggle, a spiritual struggle (in the areas of religion, 
upbringing, education and science) and many others.80
Th e need to continue the struggle in all areas gave the authors of the 
commentaries on the Urgency Programme the opportunity to call to 
order party members participating in the government. Th e document 
also reveals certain disagreements within the party, which we will come 
back to later: “Masyumi has supported its leadership and called for 
greater respect for party discipline from some of its representatives 
who are part of the government, the KNIP and the parliamentary 
committees.” 81
78 Ibid., p. 23.
79 Ibid., p. 25.
80 Ibid., p. 27.
81 Ibid.
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 Th e last section of the Urgency Programme stipulated that the 
struggle against the occupied forces should not be confi ned to Java. 
Th e party leadership called on its members to “intensify their spiritual 
and material eff orts which will strengthen the union and the unity of 
all the regions of Indonesia which some today would like to like to see 
broken up”.82 Th ese eff orts, the commentary specifi ed, should notably 
take the form of infi ltration operations on Kalimantan, Sulawesi, the 
Maluku Islands and the Lesser Sunda Islands. In these regions, “small 
groups with money and a plan must provide, by peaceful means or 
otherwise, anything which could help those regional Muslim commu-
nities in their struggle.”
 Masyumi’s fi rm commitment to the continuation of an armed 
struggle against Holland heightened tensions further in the country. 
Under pressure from some sections of the Catholic party, as well as the 
conservative right, to be more intransigent towards the republicans, the 
Dutch government fi nalised, on 27 May 1947, the terms of an ulti-
matum which amounted to placing the Republic under Dutch federal 
control.83 Th e Sjahrir government was caught between a desire to resist 
Dutch pressure and an urge to nonetheless maintain dialogue with the 
former colonial power. Sjahrir was abandoned by his own majority 
coalition, Sajap Kiri, and resigned on 27 June.
Th e End of the Myth of Unity
Since the end of 1946, there had been increasing tensions within the 
Masyumi leadership. Although the party was somewhat compromised 
by the increasing number of “individual” participants in the govern-
ment, it continued to criticise the pursuance of negotiations with 
Holland, one of the main planks of the government’s policy. However, 
the prospect of entering government began to whet people’s appetites 
for power. Th e diff erent wings within the party, which up until now 
had been united around a clear policy and the simple watchwords 
dictated by the Revolution, began to assert themselves. Former leaders 
of Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia had for some time been convinced 
82 Resolution 4a of the Urgency Programme.
83 For further reading on these proposals and on the Dutch manœuvres in the 
spring of 1947, see Françoise Cayrac-Blanchard and Philippe Devillers, L’Asie du 
Sud-Est, coll. “L’Histoire du XXe Siècle”, vol. 1 (Paris: Sirey, 1970), pp. 330–1.
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that they had not been given the position they deserved within the 
party and they seized the opportunity off ered by the formation of a 
new government.
 Amir Sjarifuddin, who was appointed prime minister by the presi-
dent, was far more hostile towards Masyumi than Sjahrir had been. 
Th e former defence minister had not forgotten the virulent attacks on 
his defence policy made by the Muslim party. Politically, however, he 
could not do without the approval of the representatives of Islam, and 
so he looked favourably on the proposal made by Wondoamiseno and 
Arudji Kartawinata to reform PSII in exchange for seats at the cabinet 
table.84 Th e newly re-formed party received six seats in the cabinet, 
which was formed on 3 July 1947. Wondoamiseno was named minister 
for home aff airs, Sjahbudin Latif deputy minister for information, 
Arudji Kartawinata deputy minister of defence, Sukoso Wirjosaputro 
deputy minister for social aff airs, and H. Anwaruddin minister for 
religions.85 Feelings ran high in Masyumi after this. Th e re-emergence 
of the PSII had destroyed what, until then, was the almost sacred prin-
ciple of the Muslim community’s political unity. With Soekiman’s party 
no longer the sole representative of the umma, its position was clearly 
weakened. In the medium term, this no doubt encouraged the party 
to adopt a more realistic and less intransigent stance, but in the short 
term, it meant that Masyumi, for the fi rst time since the proclamation 
of independence, was simply another opposition party without any real 
leverage over the government.
 Th is latest discord between the Muslim party and the government 
was short-lived, however. Th e Indonesian government’s refusal to give 
in to Dutch demands led the Netherlands to launch their fi rst “police 
action” 86 against the Republic’s territories on the 21 July 1947. In less 
84 According to George McTurnan Kahin, the revival of PSII took place against 
the wishes of its former president Abikusno Tjokrosujoso who, at the time, was 
in prison for his involvement in the events which took place during the summer 
of 1946. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 210. Moreover, two 
other PSII leaders, Kartosuwirjo and Anwar Tjokroaminoto, also disapproved of 
this initiative. Kartosuwirjo refused the position of deputy minister for defence 
and both of them remained part of Masyumi’s executive committee. Susan Finch 
and Daniel Lev, Republic of Indonesia Cabinets, 1945–1965 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1965), p. 11; Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, p. 170.
85 It was K. Achmad Asj’ari, also a member of PSII, who had initially been nomi-
nated to this position but he was not able to leave Sumatra to take up offi  ce.
86 To use the term employed by the Dutch authorities.
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than two weeks, Dutch armoured columns, backed up by strong aerial 
support, made deep inroads into republican territory. Most of the 
towns and ports of East Java and West Java, as well as the richest areas 
of Sumatra, were occupied. For the most part, the Indonesian armed 
forces did not engage directly with the advancing forces, preferring 
instead to take refuge, according to a pre-established plan, in remote 
areas which were diffi  cult to access. However, the speed of the Dutch 
advancement prevented their adversaries from stowing away the planned 
amount of food and military equipment. Th e Dutch troops had 
managed to get their hands on most of the means of food production 
in republican territory and since the beginning of the blockade had cut 
off  production.
 Th is “fi rst Dutch aggression”, to employ the term used in Indo-
nesian historiography, can be considered a turning point in the consti-
tution of Masyumi’s political identity. Th e increased republican unity 
that it provoked helped the Muslim party to take a decisive step to-
wards committing itself to taking part in running the country’s aff airs. 
Th is gradual mutation from being a revolutionary party and an intran-
sigent advocate of total independence to becoming a party of govern-
ment had been prepared, as we will see, by a small group of men. It 
did not come about smoothly, however, and the party’s period in oppo-
sition left a permanent mark on the burgeoning political consciousness 
of the Muslim community. 
 Th e theme of the arithmetic legitimacy of an Islamic majority 
which trumped the government’s illegitimacy was a recurrent one in 
Masyumi’s propaganda. It no doubt contributed to the emergence of 
some of the arguments used to justify the rebellions carried out by 
Darul Islam and, to a certain extent, by the PRRI, the revolutionary 
government in Sumatra that certain Masyumi leaders were associated 
with from 1958 onwards. In short, at the same time as the conditions 
for Masyumi’s political success were appearing, the seeds of contestation 
which would lead to its downfall were being sown.
Th e Emergence of a Party of Government
Between autumn 1945 and summer 1947, Masyumi was more than 
just the revolutionary party and standard-bearer for unconditional inde-
pendence which we have just described. A few men, who were not yet 
very infl uential within the party, were already preparing it for govern-
ment. On the occasion of the transferral of the Republic’s capital from 
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Jakarta to Yogyakarta on 3 January 1946, Mohammad Natsir was ap-
pointed minister for information. He became a focal point for the poli-
tical forces within Masyumi which were prepared to support Sjahrir’s 
policies. A few weeks after Natsir’s appointment, one of his close allies, 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, secretary of the KNIP’s Working Committee, 
formulated their political credo:
Japanese fl attery has exaggerated the importance of semangat [enthu-
siasm] beyond all limits and has derided and aroused hatred for 
akal [reason] as though akal were simply a Western invention—an 
invention of the imperialists and capitalists, which has had an evil 
infl uence upon our people.87
According to Sjafruddin, this revolutionary spirit had led to the for-
mulation of unrealistic demands by otherwise well-intentioned young 
people. He recalled the examples provided by Lenin and Stalin (exam-
ples which no doubt were not chosen randomly), whom he described as 
“great realists, often attacked by their own less clear-sighted juniors”,88 
and denounced Indonesian socialists’ incomprehension of their own 
ideology. Th e popular enthusiasm that sent out young people armed 
only with bamboo spears to fi ght the allied forces with their fi rearms 
was, according to him, “stupid if not criminal”.89 He denounced the 
ignorance of a large part of the population concerning Indonesia’s mili-
tary and diplomatic weakness, and encouraged his fellow countrymen 
to support Sjahrir’s realpolitik. Th e infl uence of this small group of 
men grew rapidly in the months that followed. At the next cabinet 
reshuffl  e in March 1946, Natsir was joined in government by Sjafrud-
din Prawiranegara, Arudji Kartawinata and Agus Salim. Agus Salim, 
who was on the fringes of the Muslim party due to his falling out with 
Soekiman, was something of a spiritual mentor to the other two.90 
Shortly after the creation of the new government, Natsir was sent to 
Sumatra, which was in the throes of a social revolution, in order to 
87 Berita Indonesia, 5 February 1946. Quoted in Anderson, Java in a Time of Revo-
lution, p. 310n1.
88 According to Anderson’s reformulation of Sjafruddin’s terms. Anderson, Java in 
a Time of Revolution, p. 311.
89 Ibid.
90 Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, p. 59.
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re-establish the central government’s authority.91 His skill in managing 
this diffi  cult task led him to acquire, in the corridors of power, a new 
stature and allowed him to work at bringing his party and the govern-
ment closer together.
 Th e relationship between the Masyumi leadership and the govern-
ment was not devoid of ambiguity. Although the party was offi  cially in 
opposition, it tolerated, as we have already seen, the individual deci-
sions of some of its members to join Sjahrir’s cabinet. During the sum-
mer of 1946, however, there were increasing signs that the government 
and the party were fi nding more and more common ground. At the 
end of June, the Muslim party used its propaganda machine to help 
promote the sale of government bonds which the government had just 
launched.92 Th e abduction of the prime minister and the fallout from 
this event, which became known as “the Aff air of 3 July”, only gave 
rise to a minor disagreement between Masyumi and the government; 
later that year in the autumn, during discussions concerning the forma-
tion of a new cabinet, the Masyumi leadership submitted to Sjahrir a 
list of party fi gures likely to accept a seat in his cabinet, eight of whom 
ended up joining the government. Two of those eight members were 
close to Soekiman: Jusuf Wibisono and Wahid Hasjim, the leader of 
Nahdlatul Islam and president of Masyumi’s Majelis Sjuro.
 Th e signing of the Linggadjati Agreement put an end to this rap-
prochement and led to a direct clash between the party leadership and 
those party members who were part of the cabinet. Up until that point, 
in the various resolutions condemning Sjahrir’s policies, Masyumi had 
always limited itself to calling for the formation of a coalition govern-
ment. Before the Surakarta Conference on 4 and 5 December 1946, 
the resignation of Masyumi’s ministers had never been called for. On 
24 November, Mohamad Roem had made a speech on the radio in 
defence of the draft agreement that had just been signed. He asked 
the Masyumi leadership to defer any vote on the issue in order to 
give him the time to return to Yogyakarta and defend the government’s 
position before the party’s governing body. However, on his arrival in 
the Republic’s capital, he discovered that Masyumi had just announced 
its rejection of the Linggadjati compromise. In a letter to the leader-
ship, he denounced this decision which was taken without giving the 
91 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 180–2.
92 Al-Djihad, 21 June 1946.
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party members sitting in cabinet an opportunity to express themselves, 
and which was thus in complete contradiction with the principles 
of democracy and consultation (musjawarah) defended by the party.93 
On 4 and 5 December 1946, a joint congress organised by Masyumi 
and GPII in Surakarta confi rmed the rejection of the agreement. In a 
joint statement made by the two organisations, they declared that they 
“counted on the members of Masyumi sitting in the current cabinet 
to abide loyally by their party’s decision to reject the Dutch-Indonesian 
agreement”.94 On 28 December 1946, in response to this warning, 
the Masyumi ministers meeting in Purwokerto signed the following 
clarifi cation:
1. Th e current cabinet is a national cabinet and not a coalition cabi-
 net. Consequently, in accordance with parliamentary rules and 
political custom, it is not necessary for a party to decide what 
political position should be adopted by ministers who are its 
 members.
2. For this reason, the Masyumi ministers will settle directly with its 
leadership problems concerning the decisions taken in the Mas-
 yumi congress in Solo.95
 Th is dismissal of the party’s injunction was signed by all of the 
ministers concerned, and it is interesting in more than one respect. 
Firstly, it demonstrates the signatories’ capacity for independent 
thought; they were convinced of the legitimacy of their position even 
when faced with the opposition of their own party. Furthermore, and 
most signifi cantly, it reveals something very important about the poli-
tical culture of those concerned. Although they had only been ministers 
for a few months and despite the fact that the Republic was less than 
two years old, they referred nonetheless to “parliamentary rules” and 
to “political custom”. Th ey replied to the religiously inspired dictates 
of the party leadership by using references to what, in their eyes, was 
93 Noer, “Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia”, 
p. 99, Hakiem claims that Mohammad Roem was indeed present at the con-
ference: Hakiem, Perjalan mencari keadilan dan persatuan. Biografi  Dr Anwar 
Harjono, p. 100.
94 Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta, n.d., 
p. 166. Hakiem, Perjalan mencari keadilan dan persatuan. Biografi  Dr Anwar 
Harjono, p. 101.
95 Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, Daerah Istimewa Jogjakarta, p. 173.
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another norm, namely that of a parliamentary regime inspired by the 
West. It is here that we can see the fi rst signs of what was to charac-
terise Masyumi under Natsir’s leadership.
 Th e Dutch attack, in July 1947, against the Republic’s territories 
initially boosted political unity within the fl edgling state. Masyumi, 
which had up until that point been opposed to Amir Sjarifuddin’s 
government, agreed to join it and on 11 November 1947, a new cabi-
net was formed. Th e Muslim party was given a prominent place at the 
cabinet table, to the detriment mainly of PSII. Masyumi received fi ve 
cabinet seats on top of Agus Salim’s portfolio as minister for foreign 
aff airs. Samsuddin became the fi rst deputy prime minister, Kasman 
Singodimedjo was named deputy justice minister, Mohammed Roem 
became minister for home aff airs, K.H. Masjkur was appointed minister 
for religions, while Anwar Tjokroaminoto became a minister without 
portfolio. Th is participation in government, the fi rst to be really orga-
nised and assumed by the party, did not last long, however. Masyumi 
was opposed to the diplomatic concessions made by Amir Sjarifuddin, 
and withdrew its support for the government. On 16 January, on the 
eve of the signing of the Renville Agreement, its ministers resigned.96 
On 23 January 1948, in Yogyakarta, a demonstration led by Anwar 
Haryono of the GPII called for the resignation of the entire cabinet, 
which was duly announced that evening.97 Th is created a problematic 
situation, however, as any new cabinet would have to ensure the execu-
tion of an agreement that most political parties rejected.98 Th e solution 
to this problem came in the form of a presidential cabinet led by 
Mohammad Hatta and made up mainly of a PNI-Masyumi coalition. 
Masyumi members were given the Ministry of Home Aff airs (Soekiman 
Wirjosandjojo), the Ministry of Information (Mohammad Natsir), the 
Ministry of Prosperity (Sjafruddin Prawiranegara) and the Ministry 
of Religion (K.H. Masjkur), while H. Agus Salim remained minister 
for foreign aff airs. It was to this government that the arduous task of 
dealing with the crisis fell, one which would eventually lead the country 
towards internationally recognised independence.
96 H. Agus Salim, however, remained a cabinet member.
97 Hakiem, Perjalanan mencari keadilan dan persatuan. Biografi  Dr Anwar Haryono, 
p. 105.
98 Shortly beforehand, the PNI had also denounced the agreement and withdrawn 
its support from Amir Sjarifuddin’s government.
Chap2 (61-118).indd   100 8/14/15   5:37:15 PM
Caught between Stability and Revolution 101
 On 30 July 1947, India and Australia referred the Indonesian con-
fl ict to the UN Security Council. After a period of shuttle diplomacy, 
the Council decided to form a Good Offi  ces Committee which was 
to arrive in Indonesia at the end of October. Its members managed 
to convince the Republic that it had everything to win by transferring 
their struggle into the political fi eld. Th eir army’s military capacity was 
limited to guerrilla warfare, and economically the population could 
not put up with the hardships caused by the Dutch blockade for very 
much longer. In addition, it became easy for the former colonial 
authorities, in the areas where they had regained control, to present 
themselves as the solution to the problems they had created. On 17 and 
19 January 1948, the Renville Agreement was signed, which required 
both sides to respect a border known as the “Van Mook Line”,99 and 
which provided for the Republic to become one of the states of a future 
federal Indonesia. Th is agreement was more than favourable towards 
the Dutch and it triggered further machinations by them: in violation 
of the spirit, if not the letter, of the agreement, they encouraged the 
creation of new political entities, thus further weakening the infl uence 
of the Republic in the future federation. In January, the State of 
Madura was created, followed at the end of February by Pasundan, 
also known as the State of West Java. Finally, on 9 March 1948, Van 
Mook announced the establishment of an interim federal government 
which, in the absence of republican representatives, was entirely com-
posed of Dutch members, and which was to remain in place until the 
creation of the United States of Indonesia. As George Kahin wrote, 
it was “merely the old Netherlands Indies regime in new dress and 
was run by the personnel of the colonial regime with a few anti-
Republican Indonesians included to present a better façade.” 100
 In the summer of 1948, the operation, launched almost a year 
before by the Netherlands, seemed to be on course for success, while 
the future prospects of the Republic were looking increasingly bleak. 
Th e Dutch exploited the emerging Cold War climate in Europe and 
managed to obtain a certain amount of leniency from the United 
States. Th e Americans’ objections remained moderate, and much to the 
99 Named after the Lieutenant Governor General of the time. Th is line, drawn 
a few months earlier by the Dutch, gave them control over certain zones into 
which their troops had not yet entered.
100 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 245.
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republicans’ despair, they seemed ready to believe in the Dutch fi ction 
of a federal Indonesia. In the spring of 1948, the Netherlands received 
506 million dollars as part of the Marshall Plan, 84 million of which 
were to be used for the Dutch administration in Indonesia.101 Th e 
Republic was isolated on the international scene, economically stifl ed 
and hampered by a domestic situation that was worsening by the day. 
It only remained for the Dutch, then, to wait until it crumbled, and 
the last major obstacle to their return to the colony they had aban-
doned six years earlier would be removed.
Towards Political Coherence
Retrospectively, 1948 appears as the year when things became some-
what clearer, not just for Masyumi but for Indonesian political life in 
general. Up until that point, public debate was dominated by questions 
of diplomacy, creating a division in Indonesian politics between prag-
matists, who were convinced of the necessity to negotiate with the for-
mer colonial power, and idealists, who were opposed to any concession 
made concerning absolute independence. Th is division was itself mir-
rored within Masyumi. Th ree events, however, contributed to a pro-
found transformation of the Indonesian political landscape: the commu-
nist rebellion in Madiun, the emergence of Darul Islam and the second 
Dutch “police action”. Th e extent of the threat which the combination 
of these three crises posed to the young Republic favoured the ap-
pearance of a lasting consensus between the main Indonesian political 
parties by allowing the Republic’s opponents to be clearly identifi ed 
and subsequently marginalised. Th is consensus concerned not only the 
strategy to be adopted in countering the Dutch political manoeuvres, 
but also the rules necessary for the effi  cient running of political life.
Madiun or the Emergence of Anti-Communism
As a member of the Indonesian delegation, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara 
participated in the discussions in the Economic Council for Asia and 
the Far East (ECAFE) which were held in Manilla in 1947. His dis-
cussions with other delegates led him to understand that he and his 
Indonesian colleagues were perceived by many to be communist. He 
was bothered by this association and on his return to Indonesia, he 
101 Ibid., p. 254.
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started writing a booklet entitled Politik dan Demokrasi Kita (Our 
Politics and Democracy), which was published in mid-1948 and which 
clarifi ed the relationship between communism and Islam. In it, he 
recognised the disorderly nature of Indonesian politics, which had led 
Masyumi, for example, to collaborate with the Communist Party within 
Persatuan Perjuangan. He also argued for some party discipline to be 
imposed within political parties so that every party member might be 
completely in agreement with the party line. He acknowledged, more-
over, the necessity for a social doctrine:
Our National Revolution needs an ideology which can guarantee 
the realisation of social justice. However, I believe that Marxism 
cannot fulfi l that need; in addition, Marxism is contrary to the 
Constitution. Th e ideology which is suitable to our society is Reli-
gious Socialism, an ideology which is in harmony with the Consti-
tution. Religious Socialism does not abolish individualism, indi-
vidual initiative and individual responsibility.102
 Th e desire on the part of Masyumi’s leaders to distinguish them-
selves clearly from communism appeared during the course of 1947.103 
Up until that point, the actions of the PKI, which did not have any 
signifi cant political infl uence, had attracted very little of the party’s 
attention. In its accounts of communist meetings, Al-Djihad, one of 
Masyumi’s mouthpieces, never risked making negative comments.104 
However, in the spring of 1947, relations turned sour between GPII 
and the Marxist youth movements, testifying yet again to the vanguard 
role of the pemuda. In May, at the Second Council of the Youth Con-
gress of the Republic of Indonesia (Badan Kongres Pemuda Republik 
Indonesia, BKPRI), GPII denounced the domination of the Pesindo 
in the council, and announced that it was withdrawing from the orga-
nisation. In August, it—along with other youth organisations, namely 
Pemuda Demokrat and Pemuda Kristen—formed a Front Nasional 
Pemuda (FNP) that elected as its president Anwar Haryono, a party 
102 Quoted by Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 310. We will 
look at this notion of religious socialism later in Chapter 6.
103 Th e political divisions which existed during the fi rst months of the revolution 
can nonetheless be analysed from a religious perspective. Further reading on this 
topic can be found in Merle C. Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java, 
c. 1930 to the Present (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), pp. 69–79.
104 See, for example, Al-Djihad, 12 February 1946.
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offi  cial in GPII.105 Th is radicalisation of the opposition between com-
munists and non-communists was, naturally, not specifi c to Indonesia 
and was due, in large part, to the evolution of the international situa-
tion. Th e emergence of two blocs, encapsulated in the words of the 
Zhdanov Doctrine in autumn 1947, led to a number of schisms on 
the fringes of the communist bloc, which were similar to those taking 
place in Indonesia. Before the year was out, a powerful wing favourable 
to Moscow had formed within the Indonesian left, and within the 
Socialist Party diff erences of opinion were deepening. Amir Sjarifuddin 
aligned his position increasingly with Moscow’s, and he persuaded Sajap 
Kiri to adopt a position of systematic opposition to Hatta’s govern-
ment. Th is led Sjahrir’s supporters to withdraw from the Partai Sosialis 
and Sajap Kiri and to found, on 13 February 1948, their own party, 
the Partai Sosialis Indonesia, which supported Hatta’s cabinet. Shortly 
after 26 February, Sajap Kiri became the Front Demokrasi Rakjat 
(FDR), whose main bastions of support were the army (especially the 
auxiliary forces of the TNI-Masjarakat), and the large trade union 
federation, SOBSI. Benefi tting from the Dutch blockade, which pre-
vented the exchange of books and newspapers with the outside world, 
communist publications, no doubt heavily subsidised by Moscow, were 
able to spread their ideas and allow them take a foothold in the towns 
within the narrow area of republican territory.106 To counter the 
growing infl uence of these political forces close to Moscow, the govern-
ment released the leaders of Persatuan Perjuangan, who immediately 
created the Gerakan Revolusi Rakjat (GRR) under the leadership of 
Tan Malaka. Th is new organisation was hostile to the FDR, and Hatta 
backed its programme, declaring it to be “a national programme of 
resistance and union”. In addition, the cabinet initiated a rationalisation 
programme for the army which gradually removed its auxiliary units, 
thus depriving the FDR of its armed wing.
 In one sense, this policy served the interests of Masyumi, who had 
for several months denounced the systematic infi ltration of the armed 
forces carried out by Amir Sjarifuddin’s supporters. At the same time, 
however, the Muslim party feared that its own militia would come 
under threat. At its third party congress held in the Javanese town 
105 Hakiem, Perjalan mencari keadilan dan persatuan. Biografi  Dr Anwar Harjono, 
pp. 109–10.
106 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 253.
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of Madiun from 27 to 31 March, it adopted a resolution asking the 
government to recognise the legality of the Hizboellah and Sabilillah 
militia groups.107 In August 1948, Musso, one of communism’s presti-
gious leaders, returned from Prague and took over the leadership of 
the PKI. Under his leadership, the Proletarian Party, Murba, and Amir 
Sjarifuddin’s Socialist Party decided to join with the Communist Party, 
thus ensuring it the control of the FDR, which subsequently became 
known as the PKI-Musso.108 During the summer of 1948, there was 
an increasing number of clashes between the military wings of diff erent 
factions, and then at the beginning of September, large-scale confron-
tations took place between, on the one hand, FDR troops—namely 
the Pesindo and AMRI 109—and on the other, pro-government armed 
forces—in particular the Barisan Banteng militia controlled by Tan 
Malaka and the Siliwangi Division. In Surakarta, the pro-government 
forces began to gain the upper hand, and the communist troops were 
ejected from the town on 17 September. Th is setback, according to 
Kahin, was no doubt what encouraged certain militia commanders to 
take action without deferring to the PKI’s leaders, and to undertake 
on 18 December the military phase of a plan which had already been 
hatched within the FDR in June, consisting in taking control of 
Madiun.110
 On 20 September, a revolutionary government with Amir Sjari-
fuddin at its head was formed in Madiun. However, the rebellion was 
ill-prepared and did not win over the popular support it had hoped for. 
By 30 September, forces loyal to the government, notably the Siliwangi 
Division which distinguished itself during the fi ghting, had regained 
control of the city. Abandoning Madiun, the rebel forces hoped to fi nd 
refuge in the surrounding mountains where they would be able to wait 
for the next Dutch attack which, they felt, was imminent. As they were 
fl eeing Madiun, pursued by government forces, they executed numerous 
government offi  cials, symbols of the administration they despised, and 
Masyumi members in particular were victims of these attacks.111 On 
107 Madiun Congress Resolutions in Aboebakar, Sejarah hidup K.H.A. Wahid 
Hasjim dan karangan tersiar, pp. 364–5.
108 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 281.
109 Angkatan Muda Republik Indonesia, Young Generation of the Republic of 
Indonesia.
110 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 290.
111 Ibid., p. 300.
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7 December 1948, the military staff  of the TNI announced the end 
of the rebellion; the death of its leaders, in particular Musso and Amir 
Sjarifuddin, meant that the Indonesian communist movement was to 
remain rudderless for the foreseeable future.
 Th e Madiun uprising was a traumatic episode in the Republic’s 
history which gave rise to a virulent form of anti-communism amongst 
the leaders of political Islam. Th roughout the period of liberal demo-
cracy, it was referred to constantly in their speeches and was an essen-
tial element in the party’s pro-coalition policy.112
Darul Islam—Th e Temptation of Radicalism
While the communist groups’ growing opposition to the government 
contributed to Masyumi’s rapprochement with the coalition in power, 
112 Even if some sections of the communist movement did not take part in the 
uprising, the FDR branches in Sumatra and Bantam, for example, remained loyal 
to the government. Ibid., p. 300.
Plate 2.1   “Remember Madiun” (Hikmah, 17 September 1955).
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the emergence of a radical Islamic movement in West Java also obliged 
it to break with the populist intransigence which had heretofore in-
spired much of its policy. In accordance with the Renville Agreement 
signed in January 1948, republican forces, including militia groups, 
were to withdraw from the territory controlled by the Dutch, situated 
to the west of the “Van Mook Line”. Close to 4,000 men refused to 
comply with this directive, most of whom were members of Hizboellah 
and Sabilillah hailing from villages in the region. Th ese combatants 
had taken up arms to defend their land and their religion, and at each 
break in hostilities, they returned to their homes. It was thus very diffi  -
cult for them to leave their families and to abandon a struggle for the 
sake of political considerations, when up until that point, their struggle 
had been successful. One of Masyumi’s founders, Kartosuwirjo, held a 
certain sway over the youth organisations in West Java.113 In the years 
leading up to the war, he used the “Suff a Institute” in Garut to instil 
dozens of young people with an anti-Dutch, and indeed an anti-West, 
attitude.114 Within Masyumi, Kartosuwirjo had been one of those who 
adopted a hard-line stance towards the Dutch. His disappointment 
with what he saw as his party’s lack of fi rmness towards the Sjahrir 
government led him to distance himself from it somewhat and give up 
his seat on the party’s executive committee. He remained, however, its 
representative in West Java, and in 1947, he had refused to participate 
in the reconstruction of PSII, explaining that he “still felt a sense 
of duty towards Masyumi”.115 It was on behalf of Masyumi that he 
founded, in November 1947, two new organisations: the Defence 
Council of the Islamic Community (Dewan Pertahanan Ummat Islam) 
in Garut, and the Council of the Indonesian Islamic Community 
(Majelis Ummat Islam Indonesia) in Tasikmalaya.
 After the signing of the Renville Agreement, however, a split with 
Masyumi became inevitable. Although the Muslim party was opposed 
113 Sekarmaji Marjan Kartosuwiryo was born in 1905 in East Java. His family 
belonged to what in the early 20th century was called the “low-priyayi ” class and 
he was himself educated in the Dutch school system, at least until his expulsion 
from Surabaya medical school in 1927. On his life and political activity before 
the outbreak of the rebellion, see Chiara Formichi, Islam and the Making of the 
Nation: Kartosuwiryo and Political Islam in 20th Century Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV 
Press, 2012), pp. 15–77.
114 Noer, Th e Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1942, pp. 148–9.
115 Cees Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam (Th e Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff , 1981), p. 83.
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to the solution envisaged by the agreement, it had gradually become 
one of the parties of government and, as such, it had to bear respon-
sibility for the agreement’s execution. In March 1948, Kartosuwirjo 
organised a gathering of all the Hizboellah militia regiments in the re-
gion of Priangan in West Java during which the participants denounced 
the “suicidal” policy of the republican government and, disregarding 
the orders they had received from their military command, decided 
to continue their combat against Dutch troops. An organisation was 
created under the leadership of Kartosuwirjo called Darul Islam (the 
Abode of Islam). It did not initially assert itself as an opponent to 
the republican government, but in December 1948, following the 
“second police action”, when the Siliwanggi Division was forced to 
retreat to West Java, the republican armed forces were not very well 
received and clashed with Darul Islam troops. After the signing of the 
Roem-Van Royen Agreement, the situation rapidly worsened, and on 7 
August 1949, having deemed that the Republic had capitulated to the 
former colonial power, Kartosuwirjo declared an Indonesian Islamic State 
(Negara Islam Indonesia).
 Although Darul Islam did not have any offi  cial ties with Masyumi, 
it did make use of the Muslim party’s local organisational structures, 
and also adopted many of the themes the Muslim party had developed 
up until 1948, namely the question of a holy war and the ruling elite’s 
illegitimacy to govern.116 Th e new organisation’s rebellion against the 
government’s legitimacy forced the party to distance itself more and 
more from Darul Islam’s radical policies and simplistic rallying cries 
and thus contributed to the political realignment of the party towards 
the centre ground.
Th e Emergence of a Generation of Statesmen and the 
Advent of Independence
Th e failure of the communist rebellion in Madiun put paid to Dutch 
speculation about the republican government’s collapse, and also re-
moved their trump card for maintaining the support, or at least the 
goodwill, of the Americans. Th e Dutch were keen to put an end to 
the republican government rapidly, and so they issued a new set of de-
mands. On 19 December 1948, following the refusal of the Republic, 
116 On the question of the links between Darul Islam and Masyumi, see infra, 
Chapter 3.
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which comprised 40% of Indonesia’s population, to enter into the 
federation on the same basis as the 15 states controlled by the Nether-
lands, Dutch troops initiated their second “police action” and took over 
Yogyakarta. Th e majority of the cabinet were captured and deported to 
Bangka. Th e Dutch took control of the entire Javanese part of the re-
publican territory and also launched an off ensive against the Sumatran 
regions controlled by the government. Despite the resounding success 
of these initial military operations, this manoeuvre was to be the swan-
song of the Dutch colonial presence in Indonesia. Firstly, the Dutch 
troops encountered much stronger military resistance from the Indo-
nesians than expected. Although they had taken the republican leaders 
by surprise, their off ensives did not succeed in disorganising the 
Republic’s army completely. Th e Siliwangi Division, for example, in its 
retreat from Central Java to West Java, infl icted heavy losses on Dutch 
troops. In January 1949, the 145,000 Dutch soldiers stationed in the 
country were on the defensive in Java and Sumatra; in March, republi-
can troops regained control of a large part of Yogyakarta. In addition, 
Dutch machinations had attracted a considerable amount of disap-
proval from the international community. At the end of January 1949, 
Amsterdam was forced to consent to reopen negotiations with republi-
can representatives, having come under pressure both from the United 
Nations Security Council, which passed a resolution calling for such a 
course of action, and the United States, which threatened to suspend 
Marshall Aid. Above all, the political and military brutality of the 
Netherlands had the eff ect of awakening a deep nationalist sentiment 
throughout Indonesia, and in particular in the areas where the former 
colonial power felt sure it was in control. Some of the governments 
which controlled the “negara ”, such as Adil Puradiredja’s government 
in Pasundan and Anak Agung’s in East Indonesia, resigned in protest, 
sensing that their fellow countrymen’s sympathies lay very much with 
the Republic. Th is “about-turn in the federalists’ mindset” 117 destroyed 
the infl uence which the Dutch, through a system combining a subtle 
mix of genuine paternalism and a much more prosaic form of impe-
rialism, had managed to regain in the country. Th e Netherlands’ new 
colonial policy, which was summed up in Kahin’s words as: “(1) a new 
and elaborate formula of indirect rule wherein the ultimate Dutch con-
trol was much more skilfully camoufl aged than previously; (2) more 
117 Cayrac-Blanchard and Devillers, L’Asie du Sud-Est, p. 338.
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Indonesians holding middle and upper administrative posts and having 
in a few of the constituent states a small measure of governmental ini-
tiative subject to supervision and control from Batavia; (3) more Dutch 
military and police power standing in the back of this structure; and 
(4) more Indonesian nationalists in jail” 118 began to show its limitations.
 Th is dramatic fi nal phase of the struggle for independence con-
fi rmed the stature of a small group of leaders within Masyumi (parti-
cularly Natsir, Roem and Sjafruddin) as statesmen, and placed them 
in the inside track for future promotion to positions of government 
responsibility. A few weeks before the “second police action”, Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara, minister for fi nance in Hatta’s government, left for 
Bukittinggi, the republican capital of Sumatra. When he learned of the 
fall of Yogyakarta and the arrest of the government, he formed and led 
an Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah 
Darurat Republik Indonesia, PDRI), which for seven months ensured 
the continuous existence of the Indonesian state.119 Th is preservation 
of a republican government through a provisional cabinet based in 
West Sumatra and pursued by Dutch troops left a lasting impression 
on the public consciousness.120 Bolstered by the prestige it had gained 
from having avoided capture by the Dutch, thanks to the loyal support 
of the local population, it was with a certain reluctance that the PDRI 
handed back its power to the newly released government on 13 July 
1949. Although Sjafruddin denied contesting the legitimacy of the 
reinstalled government, he publicly expressed his disappointment with 
the Roem-Van Royen Agreement. According to him, “its contents were 
118 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 351.
119 According to Kahin in Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 394, Hatta 
was worried about possible Dutch manœuvres, and so before leaving for Sumatra 
he handed over to Sjafruddin an authorisation to take control of the government 
if ever he or Sukarno were prevented from exercising their offi  ce. In his diff erent 
writings about this period, Sjafruddin does not mention this authorisation and, 
according to Noer (Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, p. 188), he never even received 
the message which the government sent him after the capture of Yogyakarta 
enjoining him to continue the struggle. Mohammad Roem, in his memoirs, gives 
the same version of events. Diplomasi ujung tombak perjuangan RI (Jakarta: Pt 
Gramedia, 1989), p. 60.
120 Th is memory was reawakened a little over 10 years later when the same 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara led the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, PRRI) in the same re-
gion against the government in Jakarta. See infra, Chapter 4.
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too weak and didn’t refl ect the strength of the PDRI struggle, because 
we really were far stronger than people on Bangka (where Sukarno and 
Hatta were held by the Dutch) suspected.” 121
 In response to Sjafruddin’s misgivings and in order to convince 
the leaders of the PDRI to return to Yogyakarta, Mohammad Hatta 
sent Mohammad Natsir to Sumatra at the beginning of July 1949. 
Natsir’s delegation met the PDRI in the village of Padang Japang 
where they had taken refuge. Following “marathon negotiations” (secara 
marathon), Natsir managed to convince his friend to hand executive 
power back to the government in Yogyakarta. Although Natsir himself 
was opposed to the agreement with the Dutch, he defended it in a 
speech made to the local population. He said that the compromise, 
though unsatisfactory, was merely a necessary step towards a united 
and sovereign Indonesia, explaining to his fellow countrymen that they 
should not “feel ashamed when looking at the map” (“jangan kita 
berkecil hati melihat kaart ”). Responding to Natsir’s speech, Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara echoed the disappointment of the local population but 
agreed, however, in the name of national unity, to respect the commit-
ments that had already been made:
We are convinced, and we repeat here that the president and the 
vice president are our leaders, that they are sure that we will obey 
them like a child obeys his parents. However, what surprises us is 
why the president and the vice president made such a decision  [to 
sign this agreement with the Dutch]? Earlier, Bung Natsir explained 
that the government of the Republic had returned to Yogyakarta, 
but who then actually fought the battle? Was it the men who re-
mained inactive in Yogya, or was it us, who were pursued over hill 
and vale? What is to happen now to the leaders who are happily 
enjoying cheese and butter and other pleasant foods in Bangka? 
Th at is the question that comes to mind. I am not opposed to 
the whole world knowing about Roem, but what is important is 
to know if all the aspects of the agreement were really considered, 
before it was signed. Th e agreement has not yet been ratifi ed by the 
government, the cabinet and the Parliament, and yet the president 
and vice president have already given guarantees to the Dutch. In 
such cases, we must remember the necessity to obey our leaders. 
121 “Emergency Government, an interview with Syafruddin Prawiranegara”, in 
Born in Fire, ed. Wild and Carey, p. 195.
Chap2 (61-118).indd   111 8/14/15   5:37:19 PM
112 Islam and Politics in Indonesia
Let us not create a split because we are unhappy with the agree-
ment, but let us rather make sure that we remain united both 
internally and externally … If we are to be destroyed, better it were 
together, if we sink, we will do so together, though I am convinced 
that if we remain united, we will not founder.122
Mohammad Natsir’s role in this aff air no doubt contributed to his star 
rising both on the national political scene and within his own party. 
Even though the minister for information had himself resigned from 
the delegation led by Roem in protest over the concessions made in 
the agreement, the fact that he managed to convince one of his close 
allies to accept it illustrated the discipline and the legalism which typi-
fi ed the future head of Masyumi.
 Th e third party fi gure to distinguish himself during this critical 
period, Minister for Home Aff airs Mohamad Roem, did so as the head 
of the delegation that entered into negotiations with representatives 
of the Dutch government on 14 April 1949, under the aegis of the 
United Nations Commission for Indonesia. Th e talks concluded on 
7 May 1949 with the signing of what was called the Roem-Van Royen 
Agreement. It provided, as a pre-condition for the Republic’s entry into 
the United States of Indonesia, that the republican government would 
be released and reinstated in Yogyakarta with a view to preparing 
roundtable talks in the Hague, which would prepare the transfer of 
sovereignty. Despite open hostility to the agreement amongst certain 
senior Masyumi party fi gures, the fact that it was one of its own 
members who had led this fi nal round of shuttle diplomacy convinced 
the party that the compromise obtained was the best possible one 
available, and this contributed to their acceptance of it, after a long 
and arduous debate.123
 Th e prominence of the roles played by this triumvirate of Mas-
yumi leaders—one of them saved the Republic, one led the diplomatic 
122 Quoted by Lukman Harun, “Hari-Hari Terakhir PDRI. Beberapa Catatan”, in 
Pak Natsir 80 Tahun. Buku Pertama. Pandangan dan Penilaian Generasi Muda, ed. 
H. Endang Sajifuddin Anshari and Amin Rais (Jakarta: Media Da’wah, 1988), 
pp. 10–1.
123 Deliar Noer draws this conclusion from the numerous interviews he was able 
to carry out with Masyumi leaders in Java and Sumatra between 1955 and 1958. 
Noer, “Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia”, 
p. 125.
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battle, while the third enabled the fi rst two to get on—had two major 
consequences on the Muslim party. Th e fi rst of these was to allow this 
trio to enhance their stature within the party. Up until that point, they 
had been the low-key advocates of a policy that was more in tune with 
certain political realities. Th ey now, however, became for the general 
Muslim populace the prestigious representatives of a generation who 
had just demonstrated in spectacular fashion their ability, in the face 
of adversity, to take charge of the country’s destiny, and so naturally 
the party’s destiny also. Secondly, the deeds of these three senior party 
fi gures gave Masyumi a clear advantage in the race for power that had 
just begun, now that a sovereign state had become a very real prospect.
 On 23 August, a conference opened in the Hague under the aus-
pices of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, which brought 
together delegations from the Netherlands, the Republic and the Fed-
eral Consultative Assembly (Bijeenkomst voor Federal Overleg, BFO). 
At the end of two months of negotiations, an agreement was signed 
on 2 November 1949 providing for a complete transfer of sovereignty 
to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, which would be 
composed of the Republic and the 15 political entities created by the 
Dutch. Two major concessions by the republican delegates had allowed 
the agreement to be concluded. First, the new Republic would assume 
most of the debts incurred by the former Dutch East Indies, and fur-
thermore, Dutch New Guinea was to remain under the control of the 
Netherlands pending new negotiations. In accordance with the agree-
ment, Dutch sovereignty was transferred to the Republic of the United 
States of Indonesia on 27 December 1949. Th e two legislative cham-
bers of the new federal state had just elected Sukarno as president and 
approved the formation of a new cabinet led by Mohammad Hatta. 
Th e new government, which was composed in total of fi ve federalists 
and 11 republicans, included four members of Masyumi, making it the 
main government party.124
 Th e new cabinet was not answerable to the parliament, and so, 
in theory, it was destined to last until the election of a new assembly. 
Masyumi had full confi dence in Mohammad Hatta, and so was pre-
pared to accept this temporary state of aff airs. However, it intended to 
124 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was minister for fi nance, Abu Hanifah minister for 
education, Wahid Hasjim minister for religions and Mohammad Roem minister 
of state.
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tackle without delay the task of transforming Indonesian political life. 
Th e party’s fourth congress, which took place in Yogyakarta between 
15 and 19 December, was to pave the way for its undertakings in the 
newly independent country. Th e decisions of the congress covered three 
aspects of the country’s future reorganisation, namely its institutional, 
political and social reconstruction. Apart from those decisions, an out-
line programme was drawn up dealing with economic and social issues, 
and an appeal was made to hold discussions with the Darul Islam 
movement, both of which will be examined later on.
 Th e fi rst part of the “Urgency Programme” adopted by the party 
insisted on the necessity to establish a new consensus on what form the 
new Indonesian state would take. Masyumi set out
… to examine the content of the Constitution of the RUSI and to 
prepare a new constitution, in accordance with the people’s aspirations 
which will be made clear by the Constituent Assembly … due to be 
established over the course of 1950.125
Th us, without rejecting the current Constitution outright or coming out 
in favour of a unitary or federal model for the new state, Masyumi 
indicated that it considered the institutional situation merely as an 
intermediary stage at that point. In addition to calling for immediate 
general elections, it also demanded the “organisation, as soon as pos-
sible, of referendums that would determine the status of the member 
states and of the regions” of the Republic of the United States of 
Indonesia.
 Th e second theme which the delegates at the congress focussed 
on was the rebuilding of a society that had been deeply aff ected by 
four years of confl ict. Th ey were particularly concerned about the fate 
of members of the militia groups controlled by Masyumi. Masyumi 
decided to dissolve its armed groups in accordance with Presidential 
Decree Number 3 of 1947, which banned any armed forces besides 
the National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI). In reality, a 
part of the Hizboellah and Sabilillah had already been integrated into 
the TNI. In his commentary on the resolutions made at the congress, 
Mohammad Natsir drew attention to the necessity to strive for the 
social “rehabilitation” of those who now found themselves unemployed. 
For the new chairman of the executive board of Masyumi, all the 
125 Urgency Programme 1949, Section I, article B1.
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party’s eff orts should be focussed on making every individual respon-
sible as part of the democratisation of Indonesia’s unstable society 
(masyarakat yang goyang):
If we were to content ourselves with waiting for government 
measures, if we were merely spectators … it would be proof that 
we were not aware of our status as citizens of an independent 
country. I have high hopes, then, my brothers, that we, members of 
Masyumi and leaders of the most important group in Indonesian 
society, will be able to focus the people’s attention and lead their 
eff orts in the areas mentioned above.126
 Th e ambition was a lofty one but on a par with the infl uence 
which the party’s leaders considered they held in Indonesian society. In 
short, it consisted of anticipating government plans, such as the recon-
struction of housing or the regeneration of the country’s agricultural 
sector, which would require long periods before being implemented. 
Such an undertaking required a reorganisation of Masyumi, which 
was the third objective established by the congress. Th e second police 
action carried out by the Dutch authorities had severely weakened the 
party’s organisational network. With the Revolution now fi nished, it 
was necessary also to adapt its organisational structure and to regain 
control over the party machinery, which in many regions was operating 
completely independently. In order to allow the new leadership to 
concentrate entirely on this task, it was decided that the party head 
could not participate in government.127 Finally, the congress decided to 
transfer the party headquarters from Yogyakarta to the new capital of 
the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, Jakarta.
 Masyumi’s demands concerning the holding of referendums in 
the diff erent federal states, was soon to become a moot issue. Scarcely 
six weeks after the transfer of sovereignty, the Republic of the United 
States of Indonesia began to disintegrate. In less than eight months, the 
entire edifi ce which the Dutch had patiently constructed in order to 
maintain their infl uence in the country had collapsed. Th e process was 
hastened by the prestige which the Republic benefi tted from among 
126 Berita Partai Masjumi, February 1950.
127 Noer, “Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia”, 
p. 213. Th is decision is contained, however, neither in the congress resolutions 
nor in the reports on the congress which I was able to consult.
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the population of the other states in the federation as well as the ma-
noeuvres attempted by certain federalist leaders, such as the attempted 
coup d’état by Captain Westerling in which Sultan Hamid II of West 
Borneo was involved. By 10 February, the State of South Sumatra had 
dissolved itself, and it was soon to be followed by others. Th e Christian 
community in the Maluku Islands, who had long provided signifi cant 
numbers of soldiers to the Dutch army, created the Republic of South 
Maluku, which was also swept aside. In the east of the country, how-
ever, it took longer to overcome the resistance of former federalists, 
now turned separatists. Th e fi nal stage came on 19 May 1950, with 
the signing of an agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the 
State of East Indonesia, designed to create a unitary state.128 For two 
months, delegates from the RUSI’s representative chamber and from 
the KNIP gathered to draw up the provisional constitution of the uni-
tary state, pending elections to be held at a later date. After ratifi cation 
by the chambers of both states, it was promulgated on 15 August 1950, 
and two days later on 17 August, the anniversary of the proclamation 
of independence, the Republic of Indonesia was offi  cially born.
 At its foundation in November 1945, Masyumi had a simple pro-
gramme that appealed to a large audience. It was easy to recognise its 
followers; they included those who did not diff erentiate their identity 
as citizens from their identity as Muslims and who thus saw the strug-
gle for independence as a religious duty. However, between the ideal 
of Masyumi’s objectives and the reality of its actions, a contradiction 
was soon to appear which would plague the party in the early years of 
its existence.
 Th e supporters of the Marxist wing had at their disposal a clearly 
identifi ed ideological corpus, and those who aligned themselves with 
128 Masyumi activists like to highlight the role played by Mohammad Natsir in 
the fi nalisation of this agreement. At the end of April, he presented a proposal 
entitled Mosi Integral, which would allow a resolution of the thorny issue of 
whether East Indonesia should be incorporated into the Republic or whether both 
states should disappear and be replaced by the RIS. Th is simple issue, which 
touched on both sides’ sensitivities, has received very little attention from English-
speaking historians—notably George McTurnan Kahin—but is nonetheless some-
times presented as one of the major episodes in the history of the Indonesian 
state. See in particular Anwar Harjono, ed., Pemikiran dan perjuangan Mohammad 
Natsir (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1996), p. 160, notably Yusril Ihrza Mahendra’s 
prologue.
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Moscow also received clear guidelines. Th e supporters of secular na-
tionalism had their guide in the person of Sukarno. Th e Muslims, on 
the other hand, had neither a clearly defi ned doctrine nor an uncon-
tested leader. Some found both of these by rowing in behind Karto-
suwirjo, but others were aware of the gap between the simplicity of 
a demand for an Islamic state and the complexity of actually accom-
plishing it. In the second half of the 1940s, this dilemma resulted in 
the participation of the Masyumi leadership in motley coalitions assem-
bling momentarily over the course of the negotiations with forces op-
posed to the former colonial power.
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 It was only in reaction to events that Masyumi eventually decided 
to choose the tortuous path which would lead it from a religious ideal 
to a political programme. Darul Islam and Kartosuwirjo showed that a 
radical political message would lead to an impasse ending in secession, 
thus converting most party members to a more moderate position, 
while the events of 1948 in Madiun helped to forge their aversion to 
communism.







The period from September 1950 to April 1957 was Indonesia’s only experience of parliamentary democracy in its history prior to 
the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998. During this period, six diff erent 
governments held power, but despite the remarkable similarity between 
the diff erent parties’ programmes (with the exception of the commu-
nists and the dissident Muslims), none of them enjoyed the time and 
stability necessary to implement meaningful reforms.1 All were in favour 
of promoting a mixed economy based on cooperatives which were 
partially exposed to market forces as well as a Western-style republican 
model of government. However, as they had never really been schooled 
by their colonial masters in the art of democracy, the elite group placed 
at the head of their country following the Revolution put in place a 
parliamentary system which was not really suited to Indonesian realities. 
Th e notion of a majority and an opposition inherent in Western insti-
tutions were transferred en bloc to an Indonesian system where au-
thority and social harmony were traditionally the prevailing values, 
illustrated by a system of long consultations (musjawarah) designed to 
arrive at a consensus (mufakat) which would be acceptable to all.2
1 Detailed information on the composition of Indonesian governments from 1945 
to 1965 can be found in Susan Finch and Daniel Lev, Republic of Indonesia 
Cabinets, 1945–1965 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965).
2 Françoise Cayrac-Blanchard and Philippe Devillers, L’Asie du Sud-est, coll. 
L’Histoire du XXe Siècle, vol. 1 (Paris: Sirey, 1970), p. 342.
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 During this period, Masyumi was the main party of government. 
Of the fi ve governments formed in the Provisional Assembly between 
September 1950 and March 1956, three were led by Masyumi members
—Natsir, Seokiman and Harahap, with a fourth one also jointly led by 
a party member, Wilopo. Th e chronic instability of the coalition govern-
ments and the fragmentation of Indonesian party politics forced the 
party to take sides for or against various political forces, thus obliging 
it to clarify further its political identity.
Masyumi — A Participant in and a Fierce Opponent 
of “Partocracy”
Although it was hastily drafted and supposed to be replaced within a 
few months, the Provisional Constitution of August 1950 remained in 
force until 1959, when the 1945 text was restored. Th e centrepiece 
of the institutions established by the 1950 Constitution was the uni-
cameral parliament which, pending elections, was to be composed of 
Plate 3.1   Th e “oriental” transferring the contents of the “problem container” 
into a “synthesising machine” turned to “Western speed”, which transforms them 
into laws, ordinances and motions ( Abadi, 20 December 1952).
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representatives from the assemblies of the two states which had just 
merged: the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of the United 
States of Indonesia.3 Th e cabinet, which was accountable before the 
Provisional Assembly, had at its disposal a wide range of powers, nota-
bly the power to issue emergency decrees which would be valid as long 
as Parliament did not expressly voice its opposition to them. Th e presi-
dent, on the other hand, held relatively limited powers: all his decrees 
had to be countersigned by the relevant minister.
 From the outset, the 1950 document had two key fl aws: it pro-
vided no solutions in the event of repeated ministerial crises and it 
established a form of presidential offi  ce which was ill-fi tted for its in-
cumbent, Sukarno, who held a considerable degree of political power. 
Th e only mechanism provided by the Constitution for breaking insti-
tutional gridlock was Article 84, which authorised the president to 
dissolve the Assembly on condition that new elections would be orga-
nised within 30 days. Th is clause was interpreted such that a dissolu-
tion of Parliament would only be possible if an election could be held 
in the month that followed. In a country whose fi rst general election 
took fi ve years to organise, such a provision remained a dead letter. 
Th e authors of the Constitution, including a number of Masyumi 
members, showed, not for the last time, their penchant for being ex-
cessively optimistic.4
 Th e other source of the new state’s institutional imbalance was 
the lack of presidential power provided for by the 1950 Constitution. 
A whole section of the political class, led within Masyumi by Moham-
mad Natsir, intended to limit Sukarno to a narrow interpretation of his 
constitutional authority.5 During his time as prime minister between 
3 Th e Republic was to have 46 deputies in the KNIP and 13 in the High Council, 
while the Republic of the United States of Indonesia obtained 147 members in 
the People’s Representative Council (Bijeenkomst voor Federal Overleg, BFO) 
and 31 in the Senate. Th e entire Provisional Assembly therefore had a total of 
237 seats.
4 Burhanuddin Harahap made a similar observation in 1954 when he was head 
of the Masyumi group in Parliament: “at that time [in 1950] we tackled [those 
problems] with a sense of optimism, perhaps excessively so.” “Parlemen dan 
Kabinet,” in Muktamar Masjumi ke VII di Surabaja, 23–27 desember 1954, Panitya 
Mukatamar Masjumi VII, 1954.
5 Pending the establishment of a real presidential regime in which the head of 
state would be accountable to Parliament. Masyumi had been calling for such a 
regime since 1949.
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September 1950 and April 1951, the president of the Muslim party 
reminded Sukarno on several occasions that it was the government, ac-
countable before the Parliament, that was responsible for making policy 
decisions for the country; this attitude earned Natsir longstanding 
resentment from the head of state. Soekiman, who succeeded Natsir as 
prime minister but was his predecessor as head of the party, adopted a 
much more compliant attitude, however. He maintained that the presi-
dent should not limit himself to his constitutional role, thus allowing 
Sukarno the political room to manoeuvre in accordance with his ambi-
tions. Th is diff erence in interpretation by two important party fi gures 
was due in large part to their respective personal relationships with 
Sukarno before the outbreak of the Second World War.6 It was a dif-
ference which, during the 1950s, was to weigh considerably on the 
division between their respective factions within Masyumi.
Th e Splintering of Political Forces and Governmental 
Instability
Th e Indonesian political landscape was made up of almost 40 political 
parties. In August 1950, 16 of them were able to constitute parliamen-
tary groups within the Assembly appointed by the president.7 Th e 
parties were organised along three diff erent lines: religion, nationalism 
and Marxism.
 Th e revival of the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia in April 1947 
seemed to have put an end to Masyumi’s hegemony over political 
Islam. However, the newly re-established party became discredited 
after the support provided by its president, Wondoamiseno, for Amir 
Sjarifuddin during the Madiun rebellion, never managed to regain a 
prominent position on the political landscape. Th e PSII held eight 
seats in Parliament while Masyumi, on the strength of their signifi cant 
contribution during the closing stages of the Revolution, established it-
self as the strongest political party in the new regime with 50 deputies. 
Th e Christian parties in the Assembly—Partai Katolik with nine seats 
and the Protestant Parkindo (the Christian Indonesian Party) with fi ve 
seats—enjoyed a disproportionate amount of political infl uence given 
the number of Indonesian Christians they represented: in total, only 
6 Cf. Supra, Chapter 1.
7 In 1954, the number rose to 17.
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three million Protestants and one million Catholics. Th is was due in 
part to the presence of a Christian majority in some of the country’s 
outlying regions, which gave their representatives an essential role in 
the preservation of Indonesian unity, but also to the over-representation 
of Catholics and Protestants in the army and civil service.8
 Political nationalism was mainly represented by the Partai Nasional 
Indonesia (PNI) with 41 seats. Heir to the great pre-war nationalist 
tradition and to the state party created after the proclamation of inde-
pendence, it benefi tted from a misconception in public opinion which 
led it to be considered as President Sukarno’s party. Its members were 
mainly recruited from national and regional civil servants, and it ad-
vocated a sort of proletarian nationalism called Marhaenism, claiming 
to defend the interests of the ordinary man. Th e party was very badly 
organised, and several wings had developed within it because of per-
sonality clashes between individuals. Th ese divisions had given rise to 
several dissident organisations, including the Greater Indonesia Unity 
Party (Partai Persatuan Indonesia Raja, PIR) with 18 seats in the 
Assembly, and the National People’s Party (Partai Rakjat Nasional, 
PRN) with six seats.
 On the Marxist side of the political spectrum, the events in 
Madiun had led to a reorganisation marked by the marginalisation 
of those who were close to Moscow. Th e Democratic People’s Front 
(Front Demokrasi Rakjat, FDR) was dissolved and the PKI, although 
it was not dissolved, went through a protracted slump and was never 
allowed to participate in government. In the months following the 
Madiun rebellion, it faced competition with the arrival of a new move-
ment also claiming to be Marxist-Leninist, the Proletarian Party (Partai 
Murba). Th e announcement of this new party’s foundation was made 
on 3 October 1949 by the main constituent organisations of the 
People’s Revolutionary Movement, the organisation founded by Tan 
Malaka, who had died in February 1949. Th is new organisation based 
on “religion, nationalism and socialism” diff erentiated itself from the 
PKI by declaring that the interests of Indonesia should come before 
the interests of the Soviet Union, and it accused the PKI of being 
infi ltrated by Dutch agents. Th e Partai Murba only counted four seats 
in Parliament, but had numerous sympathisers amongst the PNI and 
8 Herbert Feith, Th e Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 145.
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the PSI. Th e Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI), which held 15 seats in the 
Assembly, also claimed to be a Marxist party. However, its president, 
Sjahrir, was convinced that the Marxist doctrine of class struggle could 
not be applied to Indonesia given the social conditions present in the 
country, and so he did not try to turn his party into a mass movement 
by attracting those who were disenchanted with the PKI. He busied 
himself with building a party of well-trained individuals who were 
convinced of the dangers of communist totalitarianism and were capa-
ble of fostering in the general public political critical faculties and an 
ability to think independently. Th e calibre of the PSI’s leaders allowed 
the party to play a prominent role on the Indonesian political scene; 
meanwhile, its political rival, Amir Sjarifuddin’s Partai Sosialis, with 
only two seats, now merely constituted a grouplet in Parliament.
 Th e dispersal of parliamentary seats across the Indonesian political 
landscape was a legacy of the revolutionary period. In the absence of 
elections since 1945, successive Indonesian governments had followed 
a certain principle which consisted in allowing a political movement 
deemed to be any way signifi cant a place at the cabinet table. Th e 
formation in 1950 of the new Provisional Assembly which included 
representatives from both the Republic and the federal state inherited 
from the Dutch added to this confusion, with the addition of two 
new parliamentary groups, SKI and Fraksi Demokrat, and the almost 
twofold increase of independent representatives from 13 to 25. Th is 
multiplication of the number of parties was not only recognised but 
even encouraged—the composition of parliamentary committees and 
various government bodies, as well as the legislative councils formed 
in the provinces, regencies and municipalities, was to be established on 
the basis of one representative per party. Th e unstable political coali-
tions which marked the beginnings of the unitary state increased the 
infl uence of the party executive committees over the government’s 
actions. Consequently, the decisions taken during cabinet meetings 
were often limited to those which had already been approved in the 
meetings of party leaders beforehand.9 All fi ve governments formed 
according to the balance of power in the Provisional Assembly refl ected 
this fragmentation of political power, and this can be seen clearly when 
comparing the distribution of seats in the Assembly with the number 
9 Herbert Feith, Th e Wilopo Cabinet, 1952–1953: A Turning Point in Post-Revolu-
tionary Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 202.
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of places at the cabinet table. Of the 16 parliamentary groups formed 
in 1950 (including the independent deputies), 13 obtained positions in 
government.10 Th e two largest parties in the Assembly, and so the two 
parties most able to bring a certain amount of institutional stability, 
were slightly under-represented, which benefi tted the smaller groupings 
who were thus able to bring all their political infl uence to bear on the 
government of the country.
 Masyumi was, naturally, strongly critical of this state of aff airs as 
they were convinced that they were one of the few political groups in 
the country to have a broad electoral base. In February 1952, an edito-
rial in Abadi highlighted the limits of the debate which opposed the 
supporters of a “business cabinet” (zaken kabinet), on the one hand 
composed of experts supposed to be independent of their political par-
ties, and the advocates of a “coalition government” (kabinet koalisi ), on 
the other.11 Th e Muslim daily newspaper explained that these notions 
corresponded to political realities in European democracies, but could 
not be applied to Indonesia where the party structure was still “unclear” 
(katjau balau) and where the Parliament was far from being representa-
tive. In November 1954, Boerhanoeddin Harahap developed this thesis 
further in an article which was included in the preparatory documents 
for the seventh Masyumi congress. In it, he lamented the splintering 
of the parliamentary groupings, which weakened the executive, and he 
denounced the presence in Parliament of groups whose existence was 
based on “neither a party nor any other mass organisation”.12 However, 
apart from proposing the rapid organisation of elections, Masyumi 
never put forward a concrete solution to the problems it lamented. It 
rejected, for example, an original proposal made by Mukarto, one of 
the formateurs named after the fall of Wilopo’s cabinet, which consisted 
of obliging the government to take decisions based on a majority, with 
minority factions forbidden from withdrawing their ministers from 
government.13
10 Nahdlatul Ulama’s parliamentary group was only created in April 1952, fol-
lowing the formation of the party.
11 “Kabinet Apa? ” (Which Cabinet?), Abadi, 27 February 1952.
12 He no doubt had in mind Parindra and Fraksi Demokrat. Burhanuddin 
Harahap, “Parlemen dan Kabinet”, Muktamar Masjumi ke VII di Surabaja, 23–27 
desember 1954, 1 December 1954.
13 Abadi, 29 June 1953.
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Th e Weakness of Indonesian Democracy’s Cultural and 
Social Foundations
To understand the chronic ministerial instability of the day, one needs 
to look beyond the country’s political and institutional system and 
examine Indonesian political culture in its entirety. First of all, the fact 
that political leaders came from a relatively select milieu posed a prob-
lem. Unlike the West or Japan, there did not exist in 1950s Indonesia 
a bourgeoisie, i.e., a class involved in business who had the means to 
exert infl uence on government policy. Only a tiny minority of those 
who held a seat in cabinet (three in total, between 1945 and 1955) 
had a background in trade. Most public representatives had been 
government employees in the Dutch East Indies, but had generally 
worked as engineers in technical departments, or as doctors or teachers 
rather than in general administration departments. Th e remaining poli-
ticians were journalists, teachers in private schools or members of the 
liberal professions.14 Th is governing elite was a very uniform category: 
14 Malcom R. Willison, “Leaders of Revolution: Th e Social Origins of the Repub-
lican Cabinets Members in Indonesia 1945–55”, MA Th esis, Cornell University, 
1958. Quoted in Feith, Th e Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 
p. 101.
Plate 3.2   Th e Government Parties in Indonesia 1950–56 (by percentage of 
ministerial positions).
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its members had received the same type of education and had been 
involved in similar political causes in their youth during the colonial 
period; they lived in the same neighbourhoods, met one another very 
often and often married within their closed circle. Certain relation-
ships, as we shall see later in the case of Masyumi, transcended political 
divides in a most surprising fashion.
 Beyond this little core of Indonesia’s elite, which all too often 
operated in a vacuum, a politically aware audience began to appear, 
which we could defi ne as the newspaper-reading public. Given that 
each copy of a daily newspaper was read by three people on average, 
this politically literate audience was estimated to stand at around 1.5 
million, making up three per cent of the country’s adult population.15 
However, this educated social group which had direct access to infor-
mation remained too modest in size to be able to set up the kind 
of representative bodies which its Western counterparts could. Most 
people’s understanding of politics, therefore, came through charismatic 
leaders whose sphere of political infl uence was generally confi ned to a 
regional level. Th is situation was encapsulated in the dichotomy estab-
lished by Herbert Feith between, on the one hand, a qualifi ed and uni-
form elite without any real support in society (“administrators”), and on 
the other, popular political fi gures who had no governmental respon-
sibility (“solidarity makers”).16 It contributed to a large extent to the 
frailty of successive governments and to the discrediting of the young 
parliamentary democracy in the eyes of the Indonesian population.
 Th eir ability to provide access to positions of power meant that 
the political parties had an essential role to play in social mobility. 
Ministerial positions were of course enormously prestigious, and the 
system also extended to civil service positions and even to the world of 
15 At the end of 1950, the diff usion of daily newspapers stood at 499,150. 
338,300 of these were made up of publications written in Indonesian (167 dif-
ferent newspapers in total), 87,200 were published in Dutch (totalling 11 publi-
cations) and 73,600 were in Chinese (with 15 diff erent daily newspapers). Th eir 
content was largely given over to political issues. Jayasan Lembaga Pres dan 
Pendapat Umum, Almanak Pers Indonesia 1954–1955 (Djakarta: JLPPU, 1955), 
p. 36.
16 Feith, Th e Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 113 ff . Feith 
highlights the fact that unlike in India, the members of the Indonesian executive 
at the beginning of the 1950s—almost all of whom were “administrators”—only 
represented a small section of the political elite. Most of the “solidarity makers” 
were to be found outside the government.
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business. At the highest levels of government and in the civil service, 
belonging to a political party could enable you to obtain houses, holi-
days and business opportunities, and at lower levels in society it was 
the best way to guarantee you a job. Almost all civil servants were 
members of a party and even when they were not formally registered 
with any particular organisation, they were almost always attached 
to a powerful clique who helped them to guarantee a future career.17 
Masyumi was no exception to this rule. Th e nominations handed out 
to party members were of course never published in the pro-Masyumi 
press, but the extent of this “partocratic” system could be seen in the 
articles written during the Ali government protesting at the removal of 
its members from important positions.18
 In this context, it is easy to see how political parties found it dif-
fi cult to explain to their supporters what role they played during their 
time in opposition. After 1950, once independence had been achieved 
and the exercise of governmental power had completely regained its 
prestige, opponents to this power now went from being intransigent 
revolutionaries to becoming obstacles to the national unity necessary 
for the reconstruction of the country. Th e parties outside of govern-
ment now had to justify their existence in a political system where 
legitimacy was traditionally considered to lie only with those who held 
power. It was to this task that the Masyumi leadership turned its eff orts 
between August 1953 and August 1955 when the government led by 
Ali Sastroamidjojo kept them out of offi  ce for the fi rst time since 
1945.19 A few days after the formation of the Sastroamidjojo cabinet, 
17 Th e fi rst three governments of the unitary republic benefi tted nonetheless from 
a small core of senior civil servants. Of the 18 departmental secretaries (or their 
equivalents), all but three of them had already occupied their positions before 
August 1950. Th is changed with the arrival of the Ali government in August 
1953, however, when six of the secretaries were replaced in favour of government 
party candidates. Feith, Th e Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 
p. 367.
18 When Masyumi found itself in opposition, its head of the West Java branch, 
Isa Anshary, complained that “democracy has changed, it has become partocracy” 
(Abadi, 30 December 1953). Th e Masyumi newspaper listed on 2 February 1954 
all of the civil servants close to Masyumi “who were being evicted”.
19 For an analysis of the Muslim perspective on being in the opposition, the 
reader should refer to Luthfi  Assyaukanie, Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 74–6, which off ers, 
in particular, an interesting study of the writings of Zainal Abidin Ahmad.
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Natsir launched an appeal to the entire “Masyumi family” which 
affi  rmed that being in opposition was an integral part of both demo-
cracy and Islam.20 His message was a simple one: Masyumi’s situation 
was a normal one, as being in opposition was “a role and a duty whose 
foundations can be located in the teachings of Islam”; 21 an opposition 
party was not a “quantie negligeable [sic] which you can ignore because 
it does not sit in government.” 22 In the weeks following this declara-
tion, the party organised visits by its leaders to diff erent provinces in 
the country in an attempt to spell out this message.23 Despite their 
best eff orts, the public at large still misunderstood the status of an 
opposition party, as if, as a despondent Sjafruddin Prawiranegara noted 
in November 1953, “the goal of being in opposition was to bring 
down the government or to hinder it and so prevent it from achieving 
its goals.” 24
 Th is misapprehension of an opposition party’s role was also com-
mon in the corridors of power, and Masyumi’s press did not hesitate 
to let it be known when the party was a victim of this attitude. In 
September 1953, for example, four daily newspapers deemed hostile to 
the government—Abadi, Sumber, Pedoman and Indonesia Raya—were 
banned from prisons.25 Even more surprising was the decision by the 
public prosecutor in January 1954 to question Jusuf Wibisono for 
two hours after he had declared that certain members of the govern-
ment did not possess the abilities necessary to overcome the diffi  culties 
which the country was going through.26 Th ese violations of the free-
dom of expression, which the party’s newspapers created a huge furore 
20 Keluarga Masyumi was the expression used to refer to the entire collection of 
the party’s satellite organisations.
21 Speech by Mohammad Natsir, 6 August 1953, Dewan Pimpinan Masjumi 
Wilayah Sumatera Utara, Dasar-Dasar Perdjuangan Partai Politik Islam Indonesia 
Masjumi (Medan, 1954), pp. 100–3.
22 Masjumi bukan “quantie negligeable” jang dapat disampingkan Perdjuangan 
Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masjumi (Medan, 1954), pp. 100–3.
22 “Masjumi bukan begitu sadja jika ia tidak duduk dalam pemerintah”, Abadi, 15 
August 1953.
23 See, for example, the account of the trip made by Mohamad Roem and Zainal 
Abidin Ahmad to Western Sumatra, Abadi, 14 and 27 August, 1953.
24 “Seolah-olah tudjuan opposisi ialah menggulingkan pemerintah atau merintangi 
dan menghalangi keberhasilan pemerintahan”, Abadi, 16 November 1953.
25 Th e SOB camps (Staats van Oorlog Beleg, meaning state of emergency and war).
26 Abadi, 6 January 1954.
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over, did not stop the party from providing fi rm opposition to the 
Ali government, using means such as the boycotting of parliamentary 
sessions 27 and the moving of no-confi dence motions.28 It was nonethe-
less with great relief that Masyumi returned to government in August 
1955. With the general election approaching (it was set to take place 
in September), it became vitally important to regain once again the 
political legitimacy mentioned above.29
Masyumi: Its “Friends and Enemies” 30
Th e Highs and Lows of the Party’s Cooperation with the 
Nationalists
As the two largest political parties in Parliament, the PNI and Masyumi 
appeared to be the two natural pillars upon which the unstable insti-
tutional edifi ce established by the 1950 Constitution could repose. 
However, the distribution of political power between the various parties 
in the Provisional Assembly meant that not only would their alliance 
not permit them to obtain the majority required to govern, but in 
addition, as the Natsir and Sastroamidjojo cabinets demonstrated, an 
agreement between the two parties was not a sine qua non for the 
formation of a government. Th e two parties agreed to temporarily put 
to one side their main bone of contention, pending the election of a 
Constituent Assembly which, in theory, would settle defi nitively the 
27 In particular, in July 1955, during the debates on the ratifi cation of the proto-
col to dissolve the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, despite the fact that the Round 
Table Conference Agreement establishing this union had been signed by the 
previous government, which Masyumi had participated in. Abadi, 6 July 1955, 
cf. infra, Chapter 3 “Foreign Policy”.
28 In April 1955 against the minister for justice, Djody Gondokusomo, accused 
of having received money from a Chinese person in exchange for a naturalisation 
certifi cate. A motion of no confi dence in the government had already been moved 
in December 1954.
29 To such an extent that during the election campaign, several of the PNI’s 
regional fi gures, now in opposition, declared that their party was still in power. 
Herbert Feith, Th e Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 
1957), p. 14.
30 From the Indonesian “Lawan den kawan”, the title of a section in the weekly 
publication, Hikmah, devoted to diff erent political movements in Indonesia and 
throughout the world.
Chap3 (119-201).indd   130 8/14/15   5:38:03 PM
Confronting Reality 131
question of what sort of state, secular or Muslim, the new Republic 
should have. A certain number of disagreements remained between the 
two parties, however, which could be observed at the formation of each 
new government, when the possibility of a coalition between Masyumi 
and the PNI inevitably arose.31 More often than not, the two sides 
came to the conclusion that these diff erences of opinion, whether they 
were on the date of future elections, the question of the Netherlands-
Indonesian Union, or the opening of an embassy in Moscow, concerned 
questions of form as opposed to questions of principle. Th ere was no 
single issue which constituted, in itself, an insurmountable obstacle to 
cooperation between the two sides.32
 However, the distribution of ministerial portfolios, which was 
both a cause and a consequence of ministerial instability, seemed to be 
a constant source of discord between the parties. Following a procedure 
which gradually became an established ritual, the formation of a gov-
ernment began with a consultation between the leaders of the various 
political parties. An overview of the problems of the day was chaired 
by President Sukarno or, in his absence, by Vice President Hatta. At 
the end of this fi rst stage, the president designated a formateur charged 
with submitting a proposal for a new government to him. It was only 
at this point that negotiations between the parties really began. Th e 
talks which preceded the formation of the fi ve governments linked to 
the Provisional Assembly always examined fi rst of all the possibility 
of a coalition between Masyumi and the PNI. Once the items on the 
programme for government were fi nalised, the focus then turned to 
the thorny issue of ministerial portfolios. Th ere was generally a broad 
consensus on the number of government positions to be given to the 
two largest parties in the Assembly, with each party generally receiving 
four or fi ve cabinet seats. Th e main stumbling blocks were, fi rst of all, 
the allocation of the more prestigious ministries, and second, the speci-
fi c candidates put forward for each position. Th e most sought-after 
positions, apart from that of prime minister of course, were minister 
for home aff airs (it was he who nominated the regions’ governors and 
most senior civil servants—positions of great importance in light of the 
31 See, for example, Abadi, 25 February 1952, two days after the break-up of the 
Soekiman government.
32 See the editorial in Abadi published on 4 March 1953, “Th e Co-operation be-
tween Masyumi and the PNI”.
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upcoming general election) minister for defence; minister for economics 
(who was in charge of the country’s lucrative import licences); and the 
minister for education (which Masyumi wanted so as to promote its 
religious policy, a move which the PNI attempted to prevent).
 An examination of the prolonged negotiations which preceded 
the formation of the Soekiman government reveals another element 
which is important in the understanding of the relations between the 
two parties, namely the existence within each party of factions with 
diff ering opinions about entering into coalition with their main rival. 
On 26 March 1951, the day after the resignation of the Natsir govern-
ment, Sukarno designated a member of the PNI, Sartono, as formateur. 
Sartono spent 18 days trying to fi nd an agreement with the Masyumi 
leadership, but contrary to a parliamentary convention which they were 
themselves to invoke at a later date, they demanded to be given the 
position of prime minister and proposed Natsir as a candidate to suc-
ceed himself.33 A compromise was fi nally reached, but only after 
Sukarno had named two new formateurs, the president of the PNI, 
Sidik Djojosukarto, and the president of Masyumi’s leadership council, 
Soekiman. Th ey managed to strike an agreement, and the PNI agreed 
to allow Masyumi to occupy the role of prime minister, on condition 
that Natsir should not be reappointed to the position. Within Mas-
yumi, there existed two groups, which we will examine further at a 
later stage, opposing the “young generation” led by Natsir and the “old 
generation” who supported Soekiman and who, like him, had main-
tained a certain proximity with the secular nationalist group which had 
developed during the pre-war years as a result of their common strug-
gle for independence.34 Th e PNI, on the other hand, had been domi-
nated since its party congress in May 1950 by a group led by Sidik 
Djojosukarto composed of revolutionary leaders who were fi ercely 
opposed to the pragmatic policies which Hatta had proposed. Th eir 
33 Th ere was an unwritten rule that the prime minister should come from the 
same party as the formateur. In the negotiations which fi nally led to the forma-
tion of the Ali cabinet, for example, Burhanuddin Harahap occupied, for a time, 
the role of formateur. When the PNI called for the position of prime minister to 
be given to one of its members, objections were raised in Abadi (18 July 1953).
34 Th is generation gap was not only a question of age. Jusuf Wibisono, who was 
a loyal supporter of Soekiman’s, was born in the same year as Natsir. Th e dif-
ference between the two was more a question of sensibilities: the “older genera-
tion” continued to be guided by the principle of national unity irrespective of 
religious diff erences.
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form of nationalism was intransigent and it was impossible for them 
to get along with Natsir. Th ey did manage to cooperate, however, 
with Soekiman. Th e other important group within the PNI was led 
by Sartono and Surwirjo, who recognised the capabilities of those in 
Natsir’s inner circle.35
 Th e existence of these diff erent groups within the two main parties 
could facilitate the creation of coalitions by allowing their diff erences to 
be put to one side, but at the same time they could also weaken those 
very same governments. On 26 April 1951, on the eve of the announce-
ment of Soekiman’s new cabinet, the tensions within Masyumi were 
clear to see: the executive committee, at a meeting chaired by Natsir, 
refused to approve Soekiman’s nomination as prime minister.36 Th e 
offi  cial reason for this decision was that Soekiman had only been in-
vested by the party to be formateur, but this should not let us be dis-
tracted from the real issue. What Natsir wanted to punish Soekiman’s 
supporters for was a recently signed agreement with the PNI and, 
more importantly, their lack of support when he was prime minister. 
Despite statements to the contrary by the diff erent protagonists, this 
was a serious crisis for the party.37 It was only after three weeks of 
prevarication that Masyumi decided, on 19 May, “to give a chance to 
the Soekiman cabinet to implement its programme”.38 Naturally, this 
crisis did not augur well for the new government, and throughout its 
time in offi  ce support from Masyumi was never forthright with the 
party’s executive committee threatening to withdraw its support on 
several occasions. In the end, it was their refusal to sanction Subardjo’s 
risky foreign policy, coupled with a similar refusal shortly afterwards 
by the PNI, which fi nally led to the resignation of the government on 
23 February 1952.39
35 For more on these, and other factions within the PNI, see Feith, Th e Decline 
of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, pp. 139–42. Feith includes the fi rst 
group in his group of “solidarity makers” and the second one in his group of 
“administrators” (supra. p. 127).
36 Muhammad Asyari, “Th e Rise of Masjumi Party in Indonesia and the Role of 
the Ulama in Its Early Development, 1945–1952”, MA Th esis, McGill University, 
1976, pp. 114–5.
37 In Abadi on 28 April 1951, Natsir wrote that he was convinced of the stability 
of Masyumi’s unity.
38 “Kesempatan kepada Kabinet Soekiman untuk melaksanakan programnya”, 
Abadi, 21 May 1951.
39 Cf. infra pp. 186–8.
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 Having successfully toppled the Natsir and Soekiman governments, 
the rival wings within the Muslim party handed the job of taking 
down the Wilopo cabinet over to their nationalist allies. After Soekiman’s 
resignation, the president entrusted the task of drawing up a new 
government to two formateurs : Sidik Djojosukarto from the PNI and 
Prawoto Mangkusasmito from Masyumi. It was an undertaking, how-
ever, which was doomed to failure given the open hostility between 
the PNI’s president and the Natsir wing of Masyumi to which Prawoto 
belonged. Th e two men managed to draw up a programme for govern-
ment, but they could not agree on the distribution of ministerial port-
folios. Sidik notably refused to accept the army’s preferred candidate for 
the position of minster for defence: the Sultan of Yogyakarta, who was 
backed by Prawoto.40 On 19 March 1952, they handed in their resig-
nation letters to the president, who subsequently designated Prawoto 
once again as a formateur, but this time Wilopo, representing the PNI, 
was named as the other half of the tandem. Wilopo, who was close to 
Natsir, was a lot more fl exible in his dealings with Masyumi, and on 
3 April a government was formed. Wilopo was named the head of the 
executive, while Prawoto was appointed deputy prime minister. How-
ever, the PNI now took up the mantle worn previously by Masyumi, 
and its attitude towards the government was one of barely concealed 
opposition, despite the fact that it was led by one of its own members. 
At the beginning of June 1953, after an announcement by the leader-
ship of the nationalist party that it would vote in favour of a motion of 
no confi dence tabled by a member of Sarekat Tani Indonesia, a party 
close to the PKI, the Wilopo government resigned before the vote even 
took place.
 Th ree factors led to the instability of governments built on an 
alliance between the PNI and Masyumi: policy diff erences, disagree-
ments over ministerial appointments and the role played by party 
factions, with the latter being the most preponderant. Certain analysts 
have laid great emphasis on the PNI’s alleged fear of Masyumi’s Islamic 
ideology based on a belief that Darul Islam was an illegal branch of 
the party.41 Th is reading of the situation has been largely confounded 
by the examination of the diff erent phases of negotiation between the 
40 Deliar Noer, Partai Islam di pentas nasional (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafi ti, 
1987), pp. 260–1.
41 Feith, Th e Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p. 97.
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two parties, which shows that such considerations never constituted 
for the PNI an obstacle to collaboration with Masyumi. Th e two sides 
always managed to come to an agreement on a programme for govern-
ment, and there was a general consensus within both parties that the 
important question of Islam’s role in the state could only be resolved 
by an elected assembly. However, during the transition period which 
we are concerned with here, however, cracks began to appear in Indo-
nesian politics, which had up until that point been papered over by the 
need for unity imposed by the revolutionary period. As a result, a large 
amount of political energy was taken up with the necessary reorganisa-
tion of the country’s parties. It is in this context that one needs to look 
at the skilful manoeuvring involved in the distribution of ministerial 
portfolios, with every political movement wanting to use them to gain 
some political advantage over their rivals. 
 Although the clashes between Natsir’s wing and Soekiman’s group 
weakened the party’s position as well as the governments it headed, 
these disagreements, which the party’s leadership always made a point 
of minimising, were invariably patched up. However, another storm 
was brewing within Masyumi in the shape of Nahdlatul Ulama, a large 
traditionalist Muslim organisation which was one of Masyumi’s consti-
tuent groups and whose leaders had already been complaining for a 
number of years about its position within the party. Th e formation of 
the Wilopo cabinet brought about NU’s break from the party, and the 
Ali government led to its entry onto the Indonesian political landscape.
Masyumi and Its “Muslim Brothers” 42
Before the revival of Nahdlatul Ulama as a political party in 1952, 
Masyumi held, to all intents and purposes, a monopoly over the repre-
sentation of Indonesian Muslims. Th e two other existing Muslim par-
ties were not able to provide a credible alternative to the role it played 
on the political scene. Perti possessed no representative in Parliament 
and the PSII had never managed to regain its prestige and recover its 
pre-war organisational network. Th e Masyumi leadership’s conviction 
that they were the only ones to possess the ability, and perhaps also 
42 We will only look here at the circumstances of the schism which took place in 
1952. Analysis of the deeper reasons for this split can be found in Chapter 6.
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the legitimacy to govern meant that they received the news of NU’s 
decision with a certain amount of insouciance. Th e revival of Nahdlatul 
Ulama was announced at the beginning of April 1952, the day after 
the formation of the Wilopo government. It was confi rmed by the orga-
nisation of the party’s fi rst congress, which opened a few weeks later 
in Palembang. By a very large majority (61 votes to 11), Nahdlatul 
Ulama decided to establish itself as an independent party and invited 
Masyumi to form an alliance with it within a federation.43 Th e Mas-
yumi leadership did not seem to measure the signifi cance of this event, 
treating the traditionalists’ decision with disdain and scepticism. In the 
eyes of Masyumi’s leaders, NU had painted itself into a corner over 
the previous few months by laying down a set of demands during the 
protracted negotiations which had preceded the formation of the new 
government. Early in the negotiations, on 15 March, K.H. Abdul Wahb 
Hasbullah, the Rais Am of NU,44 had informed the PNI’s formateur, 
Wilopo, that he wished to see Soekiman reappointed as prime minister, 
with, by his side in cabinet, Abu Hanifah as minister for foreign aff airs, 
Zainal Arifi n as minister for defence and Wahid Hasjim as minister for 
religions.45 Th e request concerning the Ministry of Religions became, 
on 20 March, a demand: if it was not given to NU, the organisation 
would leave Masyumi. Muhammadiyah, through one of its senior 
leaders, HAMKA, protested vociferously against this manoeuvre, which 
he judged to be contrary to party procedure.46 He also referred to the 
fact that questions concerning the composition of a new government 
came within the remit of Masyumi’s central executive and not of its 
constituent organisations. Th e reformist organisation wanted its own 
candidate, Faqih Usman, to get the position, which it had only ever 
occupied once,47 and it was eventually he who was appointed, following 
an internal vote organised to choose which party member would get 
the portfolio.
43 Hikmah, 10 May 1952.
44 Th e Rais Am, also known as the Rois Aam, is the title of the highest offi  ce 
within Nahdlatul Ulama. He is the president of the Supreme Council, also known 
as Syuriah, which runs the organisation and lays out its general policy.
45 Th ese last two were members of NU.
46 Membership of Masyumi was made of individuals, known as ordinary mem-
bers, but also religious organisations. Th e traditionalist Nadhlatul Ulama and the 
modernist Muhammadiyah were by far the biggest religious groups in the party.
47 By H. Rasjadi in the second Sjahrir government in 1946.
Chap3 (119-201).indd   136 8/14/15   5:38:04 PM
Confronting Reality 137
 Although the position of minister for religions was a relatively 
minor one, ranked 16th overall in the cabinet hierarchy, it was of 
capital importance to the large Muslim organisations. Occupying this 
position not only meant that an organisation could weigh upon govern-
ment policy, but also, more importantly, it allowed them to assign 
people to a signifi cant number of positions. Th ey could appoint 
teachers, administrative offi  cers for mosques, as well as religious judges, 
which enabled whatever organisation that occupied the ministry to 
reward part of its support base and also to spread its doctrine, be it 
traditionalist or modernist, throughout Indonesia. In the eyes of the 
modernist members of the Masyumi leadership, NU, by addressing its 
demands directly to the formateur, had violated the procedures in place 
and furthermore, its decision to found its own party had broken the 
unity of the umma, and had done so for base political motives.48 Th ey 
reacted scornfully to the traditionalists’ decision and refused to even 
debate NU’s invitation to Masyumi to become a federation.49 One of 
the few reactions by the Masyumi leadership to the foundation of NU 
came from Prawoto Mangkusasmito, who described, in a declaration 
to the press, what he considered would be the sombre political destiny 
which now awaited NU following its departure from Masyumi:
If one accepts the point of view which maintains that Masyumi is 
a right-wing party, then all the objective evidence which we have 
at our disposal today indicates that NU will be an extreme right-
wing party. History has taught us a lesson, however, which is that 
it is the nature of extremist parties, on the left or on the right, to 
always be in opposition, and so if ever they take over the reins of 
power, the government will gradually adopt a dictatorial system.50
Th ese comments are worthy of our attention not only for the fact 
that they contain an unprecedented admission that Masyumi was a 
right-wing party, but also because they reveal the bitterness of modernist 
leaders as well as their scornful attitude towards the ulama whenever 
these religious legal scholars became involved in secular issues. 
48 See Mohammad Natsir’s editorial in Hikmak, 16 April 1952.
49 “Riwajat singkat partai Nahdlatul-Ulama”, in Kementerian Penerangan, Kepar-
taian dan Parlementaria Indonesia (Jakarta, 1954), p. 413.
50 Hikmah, 10 May 1952.
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 However, this appraisal of the threat posed by NU was soon 
shown to be fl awed and the modernists were shortly to pay the poli-
tical price for it. Th e other Muslim parties, who had up until that 
point been marginalised, could now join with Nahdlatul Ulama and 
constitute a fairly signifi cant political force.51 Th is is what they duly 
did, creating the League of Muslims a few months after the foundation 
of the traditionalist party.52 Th is structure was loose enough to be able 
to preserve each of the three parties’ desire to remain independent, but 
owing to a lack of unity, it never managed to become a serious long-
term rival to Masyumi. However, it did rapidly present itself to the 
PNI leadership who were tired of having to fi nd an agreement with 
Masyumi in an eff ort to guarantee to the public its Muslim credentials. 
After the fall of the Wilopo cabinet, on 3 June 1953, the usual long-
drawn-out negotiations between the PNI and Masyumi started once 
again. Having received assurances from NU that it would not take part 
in any government which excluded the Muslim party from the cabinet 
table, Masyumi’s leaders refused to back down from certain positions 
they had adopted,53 notably refusing to accept certain candidates for 
ministerial positions whom they suspected of having Marxist leanings.54 
On 1 August, when the Ali cabinet was formed, it contained no Mas-
yumi member and fi ve members of the League of Muslims.55
 Th e modernist party was, in equal measure, surprised and disap-
pointed by this move. NU’s split had heretofore not worried it unduly, 
but it now revealed its devastating eff ects as Masyumi was no longer 
the vital Muslim pillar of political stability, and found itself relegated 
to the opposition benches. A few days later, Abadi devoted its editorial 
to the new coalition, and behind the high-fl own rhetoric of its decla-
rations, which were somewhat contemptuous of its new political 
51 NU had seven deputies in Parliament: Zainul Arifi n, A.A. Achsien, K.H.A. Wahab, 
K.H. Ilyas, A.S. Bachmid, Idham Chalid and K.H. Adnan.
52 Liga Muslimin Indonesia.
53 Deliar Noer, “Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indo-
nesia”, Master thesis, Cornell University, 1960, pp. 299–300.
54 In particular, Ong Eng Die, the PNI’s candidate for fi nance minister, and 
Arudji Kartawinatat, the PSII’s candidate for defence minister.
55 For NU: Zainul Arifi n (second deputy prime minister), K.H. Masjkur (minis-
ter for religions) and Mohammad Hanafi ah (minister for agriculture); for the 
PSII: Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (minister for communications) and Subidjo (social 
aff airs). Perti only entered government in November, when Sirjajuddin Abbas 
replaced Subidjo.
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opponent, Masyumi’s justifi ed concern was plain to see.56 Its status 
was changing from being the political incarnation of Islam within the 
state’s institutions to becoming a simple Muslim party amongst others.
Masyumi is not a political party in the common sense of the 
term, it is a political movement supported by a large majority of 
the Indonesian people. Ninety percent of the population is Muslim, 
and so the Ali government will be faced with an opposition which 
includes not only Masyumi but also the Indonesian people, who 
hold the Muslim religion in very high regard. In exchange for 
giving NU and PSII fi ve cabinet seats (of which only two are im-
portant), the Ali government has received in Parliament only seven 
votes from NU and four from PSII. Th is support does not hold 
much weight in society. Without wishing to denigrate the infl uence 
of NU and PSII, we think that Wongsonegoro [the formateur] has 
not only pulled the wool over his own eyes, but has also pulled the 
wool over the eyes of the country’s Islamic community as well. It 
will not be long before the Islamic community asks NU and PSII 
why they preferred, for the sake of secondary seats in cabinet, to 
cooperate with non-Muslim parties rather than with Masyumi. We 
hope that they will get a sincere and appropriate answer to this 
question. If not, they [NU] will have to face not only the opposi-
tion of Masyumi, but also the opposition of the entire Muslim 
community.
 Th e surprising longevity of the Ali government, in power for 
almost two years, condemned Masyumi to a long period of exile in 
opposition. Th ey responded to the legitimacy of their Islamic rivals 
by portraying themselves as the champions of Islamic unity. A few 
weeks before the formation of the Ali cabinet, the modernist party 
had already tried to gain the upper hand over its rivals. In the fi rst 
months of 1953, ulamas close to Masyumi attempted to set up a new 
body grouping together all Muslim organisations. A gathering of all the 
ulamas of Indonesia was held at the beginning of March 1953 on the 
initiative of an organisation known as the Front of Muslim Preachers 
of Medan (Front Muballigh Islam di Medan). Its goal was to try to 
56 Published on 7 August 1953, almost one week after the formation of the gov-
ernment, it was clearly not an ill-tempered reaction, but rather an interpretation 
of events which had no doubt been discussed at length by the newspaper’s 
management.
Chap3 (119-201).indd   139 8/14/15   5:38:04 PM
140 Islam and Politics in Indonesia
solve the thorny issue of the unity of the umma. To this end, it was 
proposed to unite the two existing federations: the Committee of the 
Indonesian Muslim Congress (Badan Kongres Muslimin Indonesia 
BKMI) and the League of Muslims, in a vast organisation called the 
Front for the Combat and Defence of Islam (Front Perdjoangan dan 
Pertahanan Islam). Th is initiative, which was strongly supported by 
Masyumi,57 failed when the League of Muslims refused to participate in 
it, fearing, with some justifi cation, that their voice would be drowned 
out in an organisation dominated by Masyumi.58
 After the formation of Ali’s cabinet, calls for unity became in-
creasingly insistent, though they generally came from Masyumi’s con-
stituent organisations, or even from its readership, rather than its 
leadership.59 Th ese appeals were relayed by the party’s press, and indeed 
hardly a week went by without Abadi or Hikmah devoting an article 
to it or publishing a letter about it. Th is abundance of pleas gave the 
impression that there was a strong degree of pressure coming from the 
party’s grassroots. Most declarations called on NU and the PSII to with-
draw from Ali’s cabinet, for the all-important sake of unity amongst 
Islam’s political representatives. Th ey were advised not to content them-
selves with listing the advantages which their participation in govern-
ment bestowed upon them, such as “important positions” or “special 
[import] licences”, but to take stock also of the “losses” and “aff ronts” 
suff ered by the Muslim community.60 Based on the notion that unity 
was a divine command, these pleas sometimes used methods which 
were slightly unorthodox but capable of capturing the public imagina-
tion. On 22 August 1954, for example, Little Aisyah, a nine-year-old 
mystic who toured Java for several months delivering inspired sermons 
57 See Mohammad Saleh Suaidy’s declaration of support for the new organisation 
in Abadi, 28 February 1953.
58 Abadi, 25 February 1953.
59 In an article published in Hikmah on 26 September 1953, HAMKA explained 
that in numerous towns across the country, organisations calling for the Muslim 
community to unite were springing up. In Medan, the Islamic Preachers Front 
(Front Mubaligh Islam), in Jakarta the Contact Committee for Muslim Organisa-
tions (Badan Kontak Organisasi Islam) and in Yogyakarta the Union of Action 
of the Umma (Kesatuan Aksi Ummat Islam). See also the call for unity made by 
the leadership of Badan Serun Islam, Abadi, 12 November 1953.
60 See, for example, the editorial published in Abadi on 8 September 1954, about 
the NU congress which was just about to open.
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to enthralled audiences, devoted part of her address to the issue, en-
couraging harmony and cooperation between the three Muslim parties.61
 Th e deleterious atmosphere which marked the fi nal months of the 
Ali government fi nally put an end to the collaboration between the 
PNI and the parties of the League of Muslims. Already weakened by 
the increasing number of hostile declarations by the nationalist camp,62 
government cohesion did not survive the rebellion of a part of the 
army chiefs of staff  which took place during the months of May and 
June in protest against new nominations to the army which the cabi-
net had tried to impose. On 20 July, Nahdlatul Ulama declared that 
it wished to see the cabinet resign, and a mere three days later the 
government fell. Th e approaching elections had precipitated its collapse; 
the diff erent leaders of the various Muslim parties could no longer 
turn a deaf ear to the calls for unity coming from their electoral base. 
On 15 June, a declaration of unity was signed by Mohammad Natsir 
for Masyumi, Arudji Kartawinata for the PSII, K.H. Dahlan for NU 
and H. Rusli Abdulwahid for Perti.63 Formed on 11 August 1955, 
the Boerhanoeddin government marked a moment of reconciliation 
between the diff erent Muslim parties. Masyumi held three ministries 
in the new government while Nahdlatul Ulama and the PSII obtained 
two portfolios each. Th e greatest task facing the new government was 
the organisation of elections for the Constituent Assembly and the 
Parliament which were to take place in September and December 1955. 
In the run-up to the elections, no serious attempt was made to agree on 
an electoral alliance between the Muslim parties, and indeed Masyumi 
itself, despite the lip service it paid to the necessity for unity between 
61 Abadi, 23 August 1954. Th e importance which Masyumi’s press placed on such 
accounts seems quite surprising, given that the modernists, who at that point 
comprised a signifi cant majority of the party, were generally quite sceptical to-
wards any reports of paranormal phenomena.
62 In September 1953, Kartawinata, the president of a small nationalist organisa-
tion PERMAI, allegedly said that the Prophet was a liar and the Koran empty of 
meaning. Th ese reports caused outrage in the Muslim community. Th e head of 
Masyumi’s branch in West Java, Isa Anshary, asked for an enquiry to be opened 
( Abadi, 18 November 1953). In January 1954, a huge demonstration was orga-
nised in Makassar by PSII ( Abadi, 5 January 1954). Th ere were other similar 
controversies, one of which involved the leader of a local PNI branch, a certain 
Hardi ( Abadi, 2 February 1954).
63 Abadi, 16 June 1955.
Chap3 (119-201).indd   141 8/14/15   5:38:05 PM
142 Islam and Politics in Indonesia
the parties, was not particularly keen on the idea, convinced that 
it would win single-handedly. Th e election campaign did not really 
threaten the government’s cohesion, but once the campaign had ended, 
however, the fi rst signs of tension between the parties soon appeared. 
In early December, NU and the PSII aired their misgivings in relation 
to the government’s policy on negotiations with the Netherlands. Un-
willing to share the responsibility for these talks, they refused to parti-
cipate in the delegation sent to Geneva.64 Following Boerhanoeddin 
Harahap’s decision to continue the negotiations, they withdrew their 
ministers from cabinet and called on the government to resign.65
 Th e inability of the Muslim parties to unite their eff orts within 
the same government was a good illustration of the volatile nature of 
the young Republic’s provisional institutions. Diff erences in approach 
to the various challenges the successive governments had to face un-
questionably existed, on questions such as diplomatic or domestic 
policy, for example. Nevertheless, these diff erences, much like the dis-
agreements between Masyumi and the PNI, were ones of form rather 
than of substance. NU and Masyumi’s respective programmes show no 
fundamental diff erence between the two parties at this stage in their 
history. Th e prospect of an Islamic state was at this point too remote 
to create a clash over what exact Muslim doctrine it would be founded 
on. Th e dispute between NU and Masyumi was above all a question 
of power and personalities, much like the older quarrel between the 
PSII and Masyumi, which opposed the two parties despite the fact 
that they were both part of the modernist movement. If the PSII and 
NU left Masyumi in 1947 and 1952 respectively, it was because their 
leaders felt hampered by the party and poorly represented in its ruling 
body, but, above all, because the period lent itself to launching new 
political ventures. Th e successive ministerial crises constituted for every 
political party, irrespective of size, an opportunity to be grasped,66 and 
in the absence of a reliable means for accurately predicting the outcome 
of a nationwide vote, the prospect of a general election allowed all 
64 Abadi, 7 December 1955.
65 Th e PSII on 18 January and NU on 19 January ( Abadi, 19 and 20 January 
1956). Th e Harahap government fi nally resigned on 3 March.
66 It is signifi cant that the two major splits within Masyumi (the PSII in 1947 
and NU in 1952) took place during negotiations for the formation of a new 
government.
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parties to nurture wild dreams of electoral success. To achieve this, 
it was essential for parties, fi rst of all, to make themselves known to 
the general public; following that, the next step was to diff erentiate 
themselves from rivals who had turned down coalition alliances, thus 
opening the door to ministerial offi  ce for a few months, which would 
pave the way for electoral success. It was precisely because Masyumi 
was unable to fulfi l this role for the diff erent branches of Islam and 
provide them with positions of power that PSII and NU broke away. 
Th e same interpretation of events was voiced by HAMKA, a member 
of the party’s executive committee, who formulated it in the shape of 
a self-assessment of the party in September 1953.67
 Once it had regained its independence, NU’s great strength was 
to be able to collaborate with left-wing parties on the Indonesian poli-
tical landscape and more importantly with the president. By doing 
this, they were able to outfl ank Masyumi, whose certainty about their 
own policies meant that they were less inclined to make concessions. 
Sukarno, who desired to go beyond the bounds of the limited institu-
tional role given to him by the 1950 Constitution, benefi tted from the 
support of the traditionalist party. In April 1954, a congress of ulamas 
close to NU gathered in Ciapanas in West Java, on the initiative of 
the minister for religions, K.H. Masjkur. It awarded the president the 
title of Ulil-Amri (meaning “those who are in command”), which gave 
Sukarno legitimacy as the Muslim leader of a country which did not 
fulfi l all the criteria of an Islamic state. Although this move was no 
doubt motivated by considerations concerning Islamic law,68 in the 
context of the time it took on an important political dimension. It 
provoked reactions of indignation from Masyumi leaders as well as 
from the ulamas who had refused to participate in the congress.69 In 
67 “One of the points of contention within Masyumi which explains the depar-
ture of NU, the PSII and Perti (H. Siradjuddin Abbas [leader of Perti] was one 
of the founding members of Masyumi) was the fact that there was not yet any 
concrete guarantee of power-sharing.” Hikmah, 26 September 1953.
68 According to Islamic law, sharia courts needed to be designated offi  cially by 
the authorities who had replaced the Dutch. Andrée Feillard, Islam et armée dans 
l’Indonésie contemporaine: Les pionniers de la tradition, Cahier d’Archipel 28 (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1995), p. 47.
69 An editorial published in Abadi on 13 March 1954 contested the legitimacy of 
the conference, citing the names of several ulamas who had refused to attend it.
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response to these objections, a senior civil servant in the Ministry of 
Religions explained that the decision concerned not only the president 
but also the Republic’s institutions, and that it would have no conse-
quence on the president’s power, which was in any case very limited 
by the Constitution.70 Th e alliances between NU and left-wing parties, 
on the other hand, were a diff erent issue. Th e modernist party could 
not really speak out against these as long as they only involved the 
PNI, but when the spectre arose of an unacceptably indulgent attitude 
on the part of NU towards the PKI, relations between the two Muslim 
parties became much more rancorous. 
 During the Ali government, NU leaders had made declarations 
concerning the attitude to adopt towards communism, which were, to 
say the least, contradictory. Part of the leadership adopted an attitude 
identical to that of Masyumi, consistently denouncing the danger 
which communism represented for Indonesia in general and for Islam 
in particular. K.H. Abdul Wahab Hasbullah, the rais am of Nahdlatul 
Ulama, was amongst those opposed to communism, and in a declara-
tion made on 16 December 1954, he argued that there was a great 
danger that the communists would come to power in Indonesia, which 
would lead to a severe restriction of Muslims’ room for manoeuvre. He 
added that his organisation had “for some time” (semenjak dulu) been 
favourable towards banning the PKI.71 A few weeks later, the vice-
president of NU’s leadership, K.H. Dahlan, declared in Abadi, that his 
party considered communism as “infi del” (kafi r ) and that during the 
Palembang congress, a resolution was voted banning party members 
who were not versed (awam) in communism’s doctrines from reading 
books on the subject.72 Another anti-communist crusader was Imron 
Rosjadi, the president of NU’s youth movement, Anshor, who regularly 
denounced the threats made by the PKI towards Masyumi. In an inter-
view given to the daily newspaper Keng Po in June 1955, he promised 
that the members of his organisation would not for a moment hesitate 
to come to Masyumi’s help if the PKI carried out these threats.73 Later 
in 1960 when Masyumi was outlawed, Imron Rosjadi was one of the 
few NU fi gures to come to its defence.
70 Abadi, 10 March 1954.
71 Abadi, 17 December 1954.
72 Abadi, 17 December 1954.
73 A declaration which Abadi lost no time in publishing on 21 June 1955.
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 However, much to Masyumi’s concern, Nahdlatul Ulama’s call for 
toughness towards the PKI was not unanimous. NU’s participation in 
Ali’s cabinet, which was supported by the PKI, was severely criticised.74 
What was more worrying still for the Masyumi leadership was the fact 
that certain fi gures within NU went as far as to evoke the possibility 
of cooperating with the communists. On 24 October 1954, the leader 
of the NU parliamentary group, A.S. Bachmid, declared that the im-
portance which the PKI had acquired under the Ali government was 
greatly exaggerated, adding that the PKI was perfectly entitled to sup-
port the government if it wished to do so. For him, the cooperation 
between NU and the PKI was founded on a “common understanding 
of desired goals”.75 In January 1955, Nahdlatul Ulama’s leader in East 
Java, Murtadji Bisri, adopted a similar stance, declaring in Keng Po that 
he did not agree with the dichotomy generally put forward between 
Islamic law and communism. According to him, such an attitude was 
in danger of leading to a clash which would be damaging for the unity 
of the country. Here again, much ado was made of this declaration and 
it provoked horrifi ed reactions in the Masyumi press.76
 NU was not the only Islamic party Masyumi clashed with over 
the issue of cooperation with the communists. During the Ali govern-
ment, the PSII also revealed an attitude of openness towards the PKI—
in December 1954, PSII’s president, Arudji Kartawinata even went so 
far as to affi  rm that the alliance of nationalists, communists and Islam 
in Indonesia “was based on obvious reasons”.77 Th is stance earned him 
a sharp rebuke from Isa Anshary who, in a speech given in Palembang, 
regretted that PSII had abandoned the founding values of its pre-war 
predecessor.78
74 See, for example, Hikmah’s editorial of 10 April 1954, criticising the Ali govern-
ment, and by extension NU, for having “given to the PKI an opportunity to 
spread propaganda in favour of its campaign for the creation of a ‘Popular Re-
public of Indonesia’, akin to Moscow and Bejing.”
75 Abadi, 25 October 1954.
76 See Abadi, 10 January 1955. Masyumi’s press also echoed concerns voiced by 
NU fi gures worried about the rapprochement with the communists. Hikmah, 29 
January 1955.
77 “… berdasarkan kenjataan2”, Abadi, 6 December 1954.
78 Ibid. In 1923, Sarekat Islam suddenly split from the Marxist movements which 
it had previously been quite close to.
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 Masyumi’s intransigent anti-communism constituted one of the 
party’s essential traits in the political battle that pitted it against its 
Muslim rivals. In their desire to be seen as the representatives of the 
entire Muslim community, its leaders avoided engaging in debates with 
their opponents in the PSII, NU and Perti on the topic of religious 
doctrine. By exploiting the ambivalent attitude of these three rivals 
towards the PKI, however, it became easy for them to claim to be the 
only party capable of building a solid rampart against communism.
Plate 3.3   Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo torn between his two wives, the 
PKI and Nahdlatul Ulama ( Abadi, 21 January 1955).
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Intimate Enemies
Up until 1950, the Indonesian Communist Party, which had very 
nearly been banned following the Madiun rebellion, existed both clan-
destinely and offi  cially. An illegal PKI pulled the strings of the legal 
version of the party and also secretly controlled two puppet political 
parties: the Indonesian Labour Party (Partai Buruh Indonesia) and what 
was left of Amir Sjarifuddin’s party, the Socialist Party (Partai Soisalis). 
In January 1951, a group within the PKI led by three young party 
fi gures, D.N. Aidit, M.H. Lukman and Njoto, took over the party’s 
politburo. Th ese three men remained at the head of the party until 
1965 and they changed party policy to promote the development of 
both mass membership of the party and strategic alliances with other 
anti-imperialist political movements.79 From 1951, the party, whose 
membership until that point had only amounted to a couple of thou-
sand, grew rapidly, and this became a real source of concern for Mas-
yumi. Despite the fact that strikes were illegal, a signifi cant number 
of them took place between January and August 1951, bringing the 
country to a halt. Th ere were reports of the existence of pro-communist 
armed groups in the mountainous areas of Central Java.80 Following an 
armed attack in the port of Tandjung Priok in Jakarta, the Soekiman 
government, claiming that there was a plot to undermine national 
security, suddenly ordered the arrest of several thousand communist 
activists. Th e inability to produce suffi  cient evidence meant that the 
majority of those arrested were soon released, but the PKI remained a 
semi-clandestine party for several months afterwards and the incident 
embittered the rivalry between the Communist Party and Masyumi. 
During this forced exile from the political landscape, the communist 
leadership came to an awareness of the necessity to create an alliance 
with the country’s progressivist forces, which would be able to protect 
them against the attacks of their main enemies, Masyumi and the PSI.81 
Th e PNI, President Sukarno and, to a lesser extent NU, soon appeared 
to them as possible allies in this enterprise. In order to counter the 
accusations of atheism that were aimed at the party, and which could 
79 Françoise Cayrac-Blanchard, Le parti communiste indonésien (Paris: Armand 
Colin, 1973), pp. 59–62.
80 Cayrac-Blanchard and Devillers, L’Asie du Sud-est, p. 345.
81 Cayrac-Blanchard, Le parti communiste indonésien, p. 104.
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constitute a stumbling block for the creation of such an alliance, the 
PKI strived to present the image of a party which was tolerant towards 
religions. D.N. Aidit, for example, declared that Indonesia should be 
“a garden where all religions and all political convictions would live in 
harmony and struggle together to crush imperialism.” 82
 Masyumi’s anti-communist propaganda consisted in presenting 
what it considered to be the real face of communism. Th e party leaders 
unrelentingly called on people to return to the very sources of their 
political enemies’ doctrine. Natsir recalled Lenin’s teachings concerning 
the elimination of the Revolution’s opponents.83 In a speech made in 
Tandjung Priok in March 1954, Jusuf Wibisono referred to what he 
had experienced in a trip to Moscow to “the centre of communism”, 
which led him to the conclusion that a compromise between religion 
and communism was impossible.84 Masyumi’s leaders also warned their 
fellow countrymen about the PKI’s proposal to replace the reference to 
a single God in Pancasila with a simple affi  rmation of a principle of 
religious freedom, which would be the fi rst step in a programme aimed 
at establishing a “freedom of anti-religious propaganda”.85
 Th e Masyumi leaders’ attacks on the PKI were not confi ned to 
the question of religion, however. At a rally in Yogyakarta in July 1954, 
Jusuf Wibisono was also eager to convince his audience of the “dicta-
torial character” of the Soviet regime. He denounced the repression of 
any opposition to the regime and the lack of a free press, which was 
refl ected in the fact that Isvestia and Pravda were the only newspapers.86 
Having convinced the Indonesian public of the dangers of the Soviet 
system, Masyumi went on to explain why it appealed to the PKI. Th e 
Muslim party needed to show that behind the old tune which the 
Indonesian communists banged out about off ering an original path for 
82 Ibid., p. 121. As a sign of his sincerity, Aidit explained that for the Muslim 
feast day Lebaran, which marks the end of Ramadan, communist leaders would 
visit Muslim authorities, adding that he personally spent Christmas in the com-
pany of Protestants.
83 Abadi, 1 March 1952.
84 Abadi, 30 March 1954.
85 See the declarations made by the Co-ordination Committee for Muslim Orga-
nisations (Badan Koordinasi Organisasi Islam, BKOI), close to Masyumi. Abadi, 
18 January 1955.
86 Abadi, 6 July 1954.
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their country to follow, the face of totalitarianism lurked menacingly.87 
One of the most commonly used arguments was to refer to the por-
traits of international communist fi gures which could be seen at PKI 
rallies. During a Masyumi rally in Jember on 21 July 1954, for exam-
ple, Muchtar Chazaly, addressing the audience directly, asked them: 
87 On 10 November 1955, Abadi published the declarations made by D.N. Aidit, 
stating that the PKI did not want the Republic of the Proclomation (Republik 
Proklomasi ) to be transformed into an Islamic state or a state of Darul Islam 
(Negara Islam atau Negara Darul Islam), and that he had no intention either of 
declaring a communist state (Negara kommunis). Th e newspaper added: “it is the 
same old tune played by communist leaders, but the people know exactly what 
the PKI wants in reality.”
Plate 3.4   Th e PKI separating the principle of a unique God from the rest of 
Pancasila (Hikmah, 26 June 1954).
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“Is there anybody here who has a portrait of Eisenhower?” to which 
the “tens of thousands of people present” all replied in the negative. 
Chazaly logically concluded that Masyumi was not an American agent 
“as the communists claim”. Th e PKI, on the other hand, who often 
installed “portraits of foreign communist leaders, such as Malenkov, 
Mao Tse Tsung and others” was in the pocket of “foreign countries”.88
 Th e confrontations between the two parties sometimes went fur-
ther than the usual polemics. From 1954, the Masyumi press regularly 
reported on violent clashes, and one of the most enlightening of these 
happened on 28 April 1954, at a PKI rally held in Malang which 
was also attended by Masyumi supporters.89 In front of the rostrum 
from which the PKI’s fi rst secretary made his speech, a banner was 
unrolled which read: “Woe upon the terrorist-bandits of the BKOOI 
and Masyumi.” 90 According to the account given of D.N. Aidit’s speech 
in Abadi, he explained that the PKI was anti-capitalist and anti-
imperialist, and also refuted any accusations presenting him as anti-
religious. He declared, on the contrary, that it was Masyumi who was 
harming religion:
Th e Prophet was not a man whose ideas were like Masyumi’s, his 
Islam was better than Masyumi’s Islam. To vote for Masyumi is to 
wish for the world to go to hell. To join Masyumi is haram, whereas 
to join the PKI is halal.
 Th is was a direct provocation and all hell broke loose in the 
audience. Neither the organisers of the rally nor the police force were 
able to restore order. One part of the audience shouted: “Lies! Not 
true! Remember Madiun!” Th e rostrum which Aidit was standing on 
was surrounded, but “representatives of Islam” intervened at this point, 
notably Hasan Aidid, the PKI president’s namesake who was in charge 
of the Surabaya branch of Masyumi. Th ey attempted to calm every-
body down, but the crowd demanded that D.N. Aidit withdraw his 
statement, which he fi nally did, returning to the rostrum to say:
88 Abadi, 22 July 1954.
89 Abadi, 30 April 1954. An account of this incident was also included in an 
opuscule published by the Organisation for the Defenders of Islam. Organisasi 
Pembela Islam, Peristiwa rapat P.K.I. di Malang, 28 maret 1954 (Malang, 1954).
90 “Kutuk teroor-perampok Masjumi-BKOI.” A photo of the banner was published 
by Abadi on 17 May 1954.
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If there are people among you who feel off ended by what I said, 
I apologize to them, but I want to say that the PKI is not anti-
religious.
Tempers in the room fl ared again, with cries of “Lies! It’s not true!” 
Aidit apologised a second time and a third, but the audience then 
demanded that the portraits of Marx, Engels and Aidit which were 
hanging proudly over the rostrum be replaced by those of Sukarno and 
Hatta. Th e hammer and sickle emblem was also taken off  the wall, and 
it was only thanks to a police escort that Aidit was fi nally able to leave 
the venue.
 Th is was Masyumi’s version of events, and naturally enough the 
PKI’s version was much diff erent. In a statement made on 30 May 
1954, D.N. Aidit declared that he had been the victim of an attempted 
assassination during the rally “the fi rst time [this had happened] in 
Indonesian politics.” Th e fi rst secretary of the Communist Party ac-
cused “a group of agitators led by Hasan Aidid of the Surabaya branch 
of Masyumi”.91 Far from being isolated cases, these clashes between 
91 A declaration published in Organisasi Pembela Islam, Peristiwa rapat P.K.I. di 
Malang.
Plate 3.5   Homage given to Malenkov and Mao (Hikmah, 10 April 1954).
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communists and Masyumi during political rallies maintained a climate 
of violence which was exacerbated by the regular publication of two 
types of rumours: one concerning blasphemous acts and another about 
communist threats towards Muslim fi gures.92 Th e cases deemed to be 
the most serious were the insults to religious symbols. On 22 April 
1955, for example, Abadi reported that on 27 March of that year a 
group of Muslim scouts from the village of Sutomujo, in the district of 
Tuban, were given a page of the Koran by an ice-cream street vendor 
bearing the emblem of the PKI and the inscription “Masyumi is a 
dog”.93 Th e Muslim daily was a bit sceptical about the veracity of 
these events and so remained prudent in its treatment of them, merely 
echoing the emotional reactions the aff air provoked in the Muslim 
circles in the region. Concerning threats made against Masyumi, the 
party’s press often incriminated the communists whenever its members 
were beaten up by unknown individuals.94 On 11 April 1954, Abadi 
even drew attention to a report by the leadership of the Union of 
Indonesian Muslim War Veterans (Persatuan Bekas Pedjuang Islam 
Indonesia) confi rming the existence of a secret instruction by the PKI 
ordering its members to “keep an eye on and eliminate” (mengawasi 
dan membasmi ) the leaders of Masyumi.
 Nonetheless, numerous fi gures of the Mulim party, both locally 
and nationally, endeavoured to minimise the risk of direct confronta-
tions between their supporters and those of the PKI. Th ey made a 
clear distinction between an ideological battle and their struggle against 
communists, and often maintained cordial relations with their counter-
parts in the PKI. In Bandung, one of the local party fi gures, Umar 
Suriatmadja, regularly invited members of the local branch of the PKI 
92 On 22 July 1954, Abadi reported on a meeting held by the PKI in the village 
of Balung Kidul in Jember, which was “overrun by crowds”. A member of the 
audience asked one of the speakers why the portrait of the president but not 
of the vice president appeared behind the stage and was told by the communist 
offi  cials that Sukarno was a friend of the PKI, whereas Mohammad Hatta was 
not “because his character is not good” (“karena pribadinya tidak baik”). As had 
happened many times before, the crowd fl ared up, shouted, “Lies! Lies!”, and 
attempted to climb onto the rostrum. Once again, the PKI offi  cials owed their 
safety to the intervention of a group of young Muslims and, according to the 
newspaper, “no incident took place.”
93 “Masjumi seperti Asu”.
94 Th is was the case, for example, when Udin Sjamsuddin, the president of the 
Masyumi branch in North Sumatra, was assaulted. Abadi, 1 March 1955.
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to family events and religious events, and indeed he was often invited 
to their houses in return.95 Multiple testimonies have also shown that 
it was not unusual for Natsir himself to have tea at the Assembly’s 
cafeteria in the company of D.N. Aidit.96 On several occasions, these 
leaders intervened to avoid clashes between their supporters spilling 
over into violence. In June 1955, for example, a Masyumi member in 
Badung was found dead in suspicious circumstances, and the rumour 
quickly spread that he had died following an assault by communist 
sympathisers. In response to the seriousness of the accusations, the PKI 
sent a delegation to meet with Rusjad Nurdin and Umar Suriatmadja, 
the Masyumi leaders in West Java and Bandung, respectively. Th e pre-
liminary enquiries, and particularly the autopsy report, established that 
the victim’s death was not due to an assault, which led Umar Suriat-
madja to express his astonishment that such a rumour had appeared 
in the press. He reminded Abadi’s readers that in Islam it was a very 
serious off ence to falsely accuse somebody without foundation.97
 Th is desire for a more moderate approach can no doubt explain 
the lukewarm reception given to Isa Anshary’s Anti-communist Front. 
Founded in September 1954 by the turbulent president of the West 
Java branch of Masyumi, this group aimed, according to its propo-
nents, at thwarting the PKI’s eff orts to create a Democratic Popular 
Front (Front Demokrasi Rakjat).98 However, during the national tour 
which he undertook to develop his organisation, Isa Anshary met with 
wariness from Masyumi leaders. In Palembang on 4 December, he 
announced his intention to form a local branch of the Anti-communist 
Front, but the president of the South Sumatra section of Masyumi, 
Djadil Abdullah, politely refused his invitation to join. He explained 
that the local leadership had not yet discussed the question and that Isa 
Anshary’s initiative was primarily a regional one.99 Similar misgivings 
were advanced by the national leadership of the party. In November, 
the ulamas of Persis 100 announced their support for the Anti-communist 
95 Interview with Umar Suriatmadja, Bandung, September 1955.
96 A. Lukman’s interview with Mohammad Natsir in 1988, in Moch. Lukman 
Fatahullah Rais, ed., Mohammad Natsir Pemandu Ummat (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 
1989).
97 Abadi, 21 June 1955.
98 Abadi, 14 September 1954.
99 Abadi, 6 December 1954.
100 Persatuan Islam was a radical reformist organisation which was very infl uential 
in West Java. Isa Anshary was its spiritual guide.
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Front and adopted an intransigent position towards the wayward 
Muslims “in a party in opposition to the laws of Islam”, who, if they 
persisted would have to be considered as apostates (murtad ) and could 
not be buried or honoured religiously.101 In response, Masyumi’s reli-
gious council (the Madjelis Sjuro) adopted a more moderate stance, 
merely remarking that communism was, according to Islam, an atheist 
(kufur) doctrine and that those who adhered to it knowingly were 
infi dels (kafi r). Mohammad Natsir, for his part, declared that although 
many Masyumi members had joined the Anti-communist Front, the 
party had no links with it.102
 Between 1950 and 1956, Masyumi’s political infl uence progres-
sively waned. In 1949, it was considered to be the largest political orga-
nisation in the country and was an essential pillar of all coalition gov-
ernments, but clouds began to appear on the horizon after Natsir and 
his inner circle took over the reins of the party in 1950. In response to 
the new leadership’s policies, the PNI, NU, PSII and the PKI gradually 
sketched the outlines of an informal alliance which united around the 
fi gure of Sukarno. Natsir and his allies at the head of Masyumi could 
now only count on the support of three political parties—Sjahrir’s PSI 
and the two Christian parties, Parkindo and Partai Katholik—which, 
though prestigious, were modest in size. Th is position was shown to be 
a very fragile one, given the serious crises which successive Indonesian 
governments had to overcome during this period.
Islamic Rebellions—Masyumi and Its Wayward 
Brothers
Between 1950 and 1956, fi ve of the country’s regions were the scenes 
of major rebellions inspired by Islam. Th ese uprisings were the after-
shocks of the period known as the Physical Revolution and constituted 
the main concern of the fi ve successive governments in power during 
the period. Before 1957, national political leaders were united in a 
common cause to fi ght against these rebellions, and even if they did 
not always agree on the methods to be adopted, they managed to 
prevent the insurrections from posing any real threat to the Republic’s 
101 Abadi, 12 November 1954. Th e ulamas were quoting verse 11 of the Koran to 
support their decision.
102 Abadi, 30 December 1954.
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territorial integrity. Subsequently, however, movements which associated 
themselves with Darul Islam rediscovered a regionalist dimension which 
had previously been toned down for the benefi t of the ideal of an 
Islamic state, and began to participate in a motley coalition opposed 
to President Sukarno’s Guided Democracy. With support now coming 
from part of the political classes, including certain Masyumi leaders, 
this coalition planned to extend its political struggle beyond the capital 
to the whole of Indonesia. Masyumi was involved in the rebellions 
which took place between 1950 and 1956 in two diff erent respects. 
On the one hand, some of its local branches which identifi ed with the 
party’s revolutionary heritage took part in the rebellions, and so left 
the party as a whole open to criticism and also to clampdowns by the 
government. However, at the same time, as one of the main parties of 
government, Masyumi also attempted—both through negotiation and 
repression—to guide their wayward brothers back to the right path, 
and away from the “shortcut” they had taken which turned out in fact 
to be a dead end.103
Revolutionary Movements Hostile to Any Diplomatic 
Concession
Th roughout the 1950s, West Java, which was the cradle of the Darul 
Islam movement in Indonesia, remained the epicentre of the struggle 
between republican troops and supporters of an Islamic state. Th e split 
between the movement led by Kartosuwirjo and the Republic was a 
progressive one. Each diplomatic agreement with the Dutch gave those 
in favour of an insurrection against the Republic a new pretext to lay 
another stepping stone towards that goal, and fi nally, on 7 August 1949 
in the village of Cisampang, an Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam 
Indonesia) was proclaimed.104 Despite the eff orts of the republican 
103 “We see some of our own members, who fought in the Revolution choosing 
a shortcut ( jalan pendek) in the desire to reach the summit quickly.” Speech by 
Mohammad Natsir made in Medan on 2 September 1953, and published the next 
day in Abadi.
104 Kartosuwirjo had been forced to leave his headquarters in Mont Sawal, which 
he considered to be his Mecca, and fl ed to Cisampang, which he rechristened 
Medina. A visit to Mont Sawal for Darul Islam’s combatants was the equivalent 
of the Hijra, the pilgrimage to Mecca. Cees Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner 
of Islam (Th e Hague: Martinus Nijhoff , 1981), p. 92.
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army, Darul Islam managed throughout the fi rst half of the fi fties to 
reinforce its infl uence and its military capacity. At its height, around 
1957, the rebellion was able to mobilise almost 13,000 men and had 
at its disposal 3,000 fi rearms, including machine guns and mortars.105 
At this point, its troops controlled large zones in the counties of Tasik-
malaya, Ciamis and Garut, as well as the region around Cianjur, and 
from their hiding places in the mountains they frequently launched 
attacks on the nearby villages.
 In the region of Central Java, three guerrilla movements claiming 
to belong to Darul Islam were active during the 1950s. Although they 
maintained some contact with the rebels in West Java, they neither 
managed to join forces with them nor to develop their military capa-
bility. As a result, republican army operations rapidly reduced their 
number to a few groups of armed pillagers who were more concerned 
about their own survival than about the creation of an Islamic state.106
 In South Sulawesi, the militia groups who had fought against the 
Dutch, assisted by former soldiers of the KNIL (the Royal Army of 
the Dutch East Indies), had grouped together and joined the Union of 
South Sulawesi Guerrillas (Kesatuan Gerilya Sulawesi Selatan, KGSS). 
In 1950, after talks with the government, their demand to be integrated 
en masse into the republican army was refused by the government.107 
Th e offi  cer in charge of the negotiations, the former guerrilla coordi-
nator for all of East Indonesia, Abdul Kahar Muzakkar, was outraged 
by the government’s attitude and resigned. Although he was at the 
head of the KGSS, an organisation containing 15,000 men which was 
now banned, he continued to help the republican troops in their battle 
against the KNIL’s last remaining revolutionary units. However, at the 
beginning of August, a republican unit killed two leading guerrilla 
105 Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, p. 102.
106 Amir Fatah’s mujahideen, K.H. Machfudz’s Army of Umma (Angkatan Umat 
Islam) and the Hizbullah troops battalion 426. See Van Dijk, Rebellion under the 
Banner of Islam, p. 127–56. Some of these insurgents had rebelled because of the 
social revolution which had aff ected the regions of Brebes, Tegal and Permalang 
during the fi rst months of independence. Anton Lucas, “Th e Tiga Daerah Aff air: 
Social Revolution or Rebellion?”, in Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolu-
tion, Unity from Diversity, ed. Audrey Kahin (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 1985).
107 Th e combatants wished to create a brigade within the army in memory of 
Hasanuddin, the Sultan of Goa, who in the 17th century had briefl y succeeded 
in resisting the Dutch invasion. Ibid., p. 169.
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fi gures during a meeting which had been planned in advance, and this 
military blunder marked the beginning of a real rebellion against the 
Republic. Th e incident reinforced the population’s sympathy towards 
the rebels, and the confl ict rapidly took on an ethnic dimension.108 
Despite eff orts by the army and attempts to reconcile the two sides, the 
Indonesian authorities were not able to stamp out to the rebellion.109 
Meanwhile, Kahar Muzakkar had made contact with Kartosuwirjo, and 
on 20 January 1952, he offi  cially accepted command of the Indonesian 
Islamic Army (Tentara Islam Indonesia) for South Sulawesi. In August 
1953, Muzzakar proclaimed Sulawesi a part of the Indonesian Islamic 
Republican State (Negara Republik Islam Indonesia), and on 1 January 
1955, Kartosuwirjo named him deputy minister of defence.110
 In Kalimantan, located in the Indonesian part of Borneo, the 
rebellion against the republican government broke out, like in Sulawesi, 
when the creation of the unitary state was announced in 1950. How-
ever, it never had the same scope as the uprisings organised by the 
other organisations affi  liated to Darul Islam, and although it certainly 
mobilised several thousand men, they never had more than a few dozen 
fi rearms between them. Th e main zone aff ected by this rebellion was 
the county of Hulusungai; the provincial capital, Banjarmasin, on the 
other hand, was only occasionally threatened by rebel attacks.111 Th e 
rebellion was led by Ibnu Hadjar, a former offi  cer of the Marine Fourth 
Division (the Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia Divisi IV, otherwise 
108 Barbara Harvey, “Tradition, Islam and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950–1965”, 
PhD Th esis, Cornell University, 1974, p. 227.
109 As the authorities were aware that the South Sulawesi guerrillas, who requested 
to be given an important role in the military organisation of the region, were 
a lot better organised than those in West Java, they fi nally agreed to create a 
Hasanuddin Brigade. However, on the morning of 17 August 1951, the date 
planned for the offi  cial inauguration of the brigade, the government offi  cials 
found the camp deserted. Th e former guerrillas had retreated to the jungle, 
bringing with them the money and the 5,000 uniforms they had just been given. 
Kahar Muzakkar justifi ed this decision by explaining that the army had not 
respected the unwritten clauses of the agreement, namely the release of their men 
from prison and the transferral of the offi  cers involved in the Udjung Pandang 
incident. Hikmah, 22 September 1951.
110 Kahar Muzakkar did not use the offi  cial name given to the state founded by 
Kartosuwirjo, which was called Negara Islam Indonesia. Abadi, 8 August 1953.
111 Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, p. 218.
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known as ALRI Div IV), which for four years had successfully tor-
mented the Dutch troops and which often received support from those 
amongst the population who were unhappy with the new republican 
order. After re-establishing their control in the region, the Jakartan 
authorities had undoubtedly upset the fragile social and economic equi-
librium established by ALRI Div IV under which the local population 
had prospered for four years. During that time, the local farmers were 
cut off  from the country’s cities, and as a result, organised themselves 
into cooperatives. Th ey managed to completely control the means of 
production and channels of distribution of rubber, but when commu-
nication with the rest of the country was re-established, retailers from 
the cities were able to regain control over the rubber trade.112 
 Ibnu Hadjar did not rally behind Darul Islam until the end of 
1954, when Kartosuwirjo off ered him a seat in the government of the 
Islamic State of Indonesia. Given the modest size of the Kalimantan 
guerrilla, Ibnu Hadjar only received a secondary position in cabinet, 
that of menteri Negara, which literally means minister of state, but 
which in reality meant that he was a minister without a portfolio. 
However, he was named commander of the Islamic Indonesian Army 
in Kalimantan. Th is integration into the Darul Islam movement, how-
ever, amounted to nothing more than an Islamisation of Ibnu Hadjar’s 
political rhetoric. He took on the title of Ulil Amri, the “Authority” of 
the Islamic kingdom, and he had a new Indonesian national anthem 
composed, but he carried out no substantial reforms in the territory he 
controlled.
 Th e rebellion in Aceh, a region in the very north of Sumatra, 
broke out in 1953. It was the result of a complex mix of social, reli-
gious and political demands, and it came to an end in 1959 once the 
rebels’ main demand—the creation of an autonomous province—was 
satisfi ed. Following the proclamation of independence, the republican 
government, in Aceh as elsewhere, looked for the most experienced 
people to be its representatives. It was therefore logical for it to confi de 
most of the young administration’s responsibilities to the uléëbalang, the 
traditional elite, just as the Dutch and Japanese had done previously.113 
112 Ibid., p. 250.
113 Th e uléëbalang generally held the titles of Teuku, while the ulama held that of 
Teungku ; ibid., p. 270.
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Between December 1945 and January 1946, they had to face violent 
opposition in the shape of a “social revolution” which was led by the 
region’s ulama and resulted in many of this elite being killed. Th e 
surviving uléëbalang had to give up their hereditary rights, and were 
removed from the positions they had occupied within the republican 
administration. 
 Th is outburst of violence was in fact part of an older confl ict 
between traditional and religious elites. Since 1939, the religious elites 
had been part of the Union of Ulama of Aceh (Persatuan Ulama-Ulama 
Seluruh Atjeh), and one of its founders, Teungku Daud Beureu’eh, had 
established himself as the region’s strong man in the fi ve years that 
followed the proclamation of independence. During that period, Aceh 
found itself in a situation of de facto autonomy, and after the elimi-
nation of the uléëbalang, Daud Beureu’eh took the rank of military 
governor, a position which was offi  cially confi rmed in May 1949 by 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara’s emergency government (PDRI). Prawira-
negara, who was named deputy prime minister with authority over 
the question of Sumatra after the republican government was released, 
divided North Sumatra into two provinces and established Daud 
Beureu’eh as governor of Aceh in December 1949. 
 When the unitary Republic of Indonesia was created, however, this 
new administrative division was abandoned, much to the disappoint-
ment of the local population. Subsequently, tensions continued to grow 
in the area and in September 1953, Daud Beureu’eh and his allies, 
faced with the threat of being arrested, took to the nearby mountains. 
Th e former governor saw his rebellion as part of a struggle in the name 
of Islam, but although contacts were made with Kartosuwirjo’s govern-
ment, the Aceh branch of Darul Islam never considered becoming 
part of the Islamic State of Indonesia.114 Th e government’s successive 
clampdowns in response to this rebellion were not really eff ective. Far 
from weakening Darul Islam’s troops, the army’s off ensives reinforced 
the local population’s support, something which the chiefs of military 
staff  themselves recognised in 1956. After much hesitation, Ali Sastro-
amidjojo’s second cabinet adopted the measures which had previously 
been initiated by Boerhanoeddin Harahap, and a law was passed in 
December 1956 which established Aceh as an autonomous province, 
114 On the role of the uléëbalang, who were theoretically the offi  cers of the sultan 
but who in actual fact were local potentates, see James Siegel, Th e Rope of God 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 10 ff .
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with A. Hasjami, one of the senior fi gures of pre-war PUSA, as its fi rst 
governor.115
 Th e rebellions linked to Darul Islam were principally motivated by 
regionalist demands. Th ese were often accompanied by a social dimen-
sion which can be explained by the proximity between the traditional 
regional elites and the republican government. With the exception of 
Aceh, religious considerations appeared as a secondary factor in the out-
break of rebellions. Th e reference to an Islamic state may have allowed 
the movement to organise itself on a national level, but it never de-
veloped into anything more than a shared opposition to the republican 
state, and the Negara Islam Indonesia never constituted a serious alter-
native to the regime in Jakarta.
“Masyumi  =  DI”? Th e Responsibility of Masyumi 
in the Islamic Rebellions
Masyumi’s political opponents regularly drew attention to the rebellions 
organised by Darul Islam, which for many years became a burden for 
the party and tarnished its reputation. Th e PKI’s propaganda machine 
constantly harped on about Masyumi’s supposed involvement in these 
Islamic revolutionary movements, and it was popularised by the slogan 
“Masyumi  =  DI”, which rang out at political rallies. Th is association was 
not just confi ned to communist circles, and indeed General Suharto 
used it in 1969 as an argument to reject the plea made by Masyumi’s 
former leaders for their party’s revival.116 Between these accusations 
and the blatant insincerity of certain Masyumi fi gures concerning their 
complicity with the insurgents, it is diffi  cult to determine the extent of 
the party’s involvement in these rebellions. Th ere was no doubt a link 
between certain regional party structures and the rebellions, but at the 
same time, the party never refused to condemn the insurgents’ actions. 
It should also be remembered that the backdrop to this turbulent 
period was made up of a poisonous combination of rumours, secret 
emissaries and arbitrary arrests.
 A study of the senior fi gures and combatants belonging to Darul 
Islam in Indonesia reveals undeniable links between the insurgent 
115 At the same time, a former head of the Islamic guerrilla received the military 
command of the region of Aceh. Discussions then took place with the political 
representatives of Darul Islam. Th ey were about to reach an agreement when the 
PRRI-Permesta revolt broke out.
116 Cf. Infra, Epilogue.
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organisations and Masyumi. Of the seven movements who claimed to 
belong to DI, four of them drew a signifi cant portion of their sup-
porters from Masyumi or from its militia group, Hizboellah.
 Kartosuwirjo, for example, had been one of Masyumi’s founders at 
the congress in November 1945. He was a member of the party leader-
ship and was named as one of the fi ve Masyumi representatives on the 
KNIP’s executive committee during its fi fth session held in Malang 
between February and March 1947.117 In addition, he showed his 
attachment to Masyumi in July 1947 when Amir Sjarifuddin’s cabinet 
was formed: as a former leader of the PSII, which had been reformed 
in order to participate in the government, he was off ered the post of 
second deputy minister for defence, but refused because, as he wrote 
at the time, given that he was not yet involved in the PSII, he “still 
[felt] obliged towards Masyumi”.118 It was also in the name of Masyumi 
that in November 1947 he set up in Garut and in Tasikmalaya, in 
West Java, two organisations to help the Muslim community.119 When 
Kartosuwirjo chose the path of secession in February 1948, it was 
completely logical for him to suspend, with the agreement of the 
local leaders of GPII, Hizboellah and Sabilillah, Masyumi’s activities 
in West Java.120 In this region, the party’s organisational infrastructure 
117 Th e records of the congress, however, do not attribute any offi  cial position 
to him within the party, contrary to what Pinardi claimed (Sekarmadji Maridjan 
Kartosuwirjo [Jakarta: Aryaguna, 1964], p. 31). Quoted by Van Dijk, Rebellion 
under the Banner of Islam, p. 81. He presented Kartosuwirjo as the fi rst secretary 
of the party, a position occupied in fact by Harsono Tjokroaminoto Pinardi 
(Soesoenan Poetjoek Pimpinan Partai “Masjoemi”, in Pengoeroes Besar Partai 
Masjoemi, Masjoemi, Partai Politik Oemmat Islam Indonesia [Jogjakarta, 1945], 
p. 3).
118 Quoted in Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, p. 83.
119 See supra. Chapter 2.
120 Th ere is a lot of uncertainty surrounding this question. Th e debates between 
ulamas which took place at the congress in December 1949 shed a diff erent light. 
It was said that the Masyumi branch and its constituent organisations in West 
Java decided to break up in order to better fi ght against the Dutch. During these 
debates, allusion was also made to an organisation called Darussalam which was 
said to have fought, with the help of the Dutch, against the Darul Islam move-
ment. Did this organisation have links with Masyumi? Th e participants in the 
debate remained silent on that question, and highlighted the deep state of confu-
sion which reigned in the region at that time. Badan Usaha dan Penerbitan Mus-
limin Indonesia, Kongres Muslimin Indonesia, 20–29 Desember 1949 di Jogjakarta 
(undated), pp. 50–2.
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was undoubtedly at the origin of the rebellion and Masyumi’s national 
leadership took many months before fi nally managing to reorganise a 
regional branch under the direction of Isa Anshary, one of the leaders 
of Persis.
 In Aceh, a comparable situation existed. PUSA was one of the 
constituent organisations of Masyumi and the party’s regional head was 
none other than Daud Beureu’eh. In fact, one of the reasons he insti-
gated a rebellion was Masyumi’s removal from government. Th e re-
placement of the Wilopo cabinet—within which the modernist party 
exercised considerable infl uence—by the Ali cabinet, which did not 
contain a single Masyumi member but enjoyed support from the PKI, 
was interpreted in Aceh as a sign that the central government had fallen 
into the hands of Islam’s enemies. Despite the undeniable involvement 
of Masyumi’s regional branch in the rebellion, which was exploited by 
its political opponents, the national leaders of the party strenuously 
denied any accusation of the party’s complicity. Kasman Singodimedjo, 
for example, in an analysis of the events in Aceh given in October 
1953, while recognising the involvement of numerous members of his 
party in the events, explained that the problem was to know if they did 
so as members of Masyumi or for other reasons. He was also angered 
at the fact that, for most commentators, the person in charge of the 
revolution was Daud Beureu’eh “the member of Masyumi”, and not 
Daud Beureu’eh “the former governor of the province of Aceh.” 121
 Th e involvement of Masyumi appears to be less direct in the 
three rebellions in Central Java. Two of those rebellions—the one led 
by Amir Fatah and the one instigated by the Diponegoro division—
originated in the former units of the Hizboellah.122 However, the third
—Angkatan Umat Islam—had no direct link with the party. Unlike in 
Aceh and West Java, the Masyumi leadership managed to protect the 
party’s organisational structure in this region from the contagion of 
revolutionary Islam, thus depriving the rebels of both the logistical and 
popular support which they would soon be badly in need of.
121 Kasman forgot to mention, however, that Daud Beureu’eh had been appointed 
to this position by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, a member of the Masyumi leadership.
122 Amir Fatah claimed to be the president of the Central Masyumi Defence 
Council (Dewan Pembelaan Masjumi Pusat); Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner 
of Islam, p. 138. Th is position was in fact occupied by Wahid Hasjim, Al-Djihad, 
12 October 1946. Amir Fatah’s usurpation of this title was interesting insofar as 
it shows how the party, even when it was under fi re, remained an indispensable 
means of gaining credibility within the Muslim community.
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 In Sulawesi, as in Kalimantan, the rebels for the most part origi-
nated from various guerrilla groups unhappy with the future prospects 
off ered to them by the government of the unitary state. Although 
they had sometimes been part of Islamic movements in their youth, 
(Kahar Muzakkar, for example, had been a pre-war member of Muham-
madiyah), their demands concerning Islam seemed secondary and they 
joined Kartosuwirjo’s Darul Islam more out of political opportunism 
than because of their Islamic convictions. Masyumi and its constituent 
organisations were in fact very thin on the ground in these regions 
before August 1950, and the groups which the party was closest to 
remained loyal to the Republic. In Kalimantan, for example, Hassan 
Basri, the founder and vice president of one of Masyumi’s constituent 
organisations, the Union of Indonesian Muslims (Serikat Muslimin 
Indonesia, SERMI), worked hand in hand with his virtual namesake, 
Hasan Basry, to stop the rebellion from spreading. Hassan Basri was 
subsequently named as Masyumi’s representative for South Kalimantan 
in the Parliament of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, 
and afterwards appointed to the unitary state’s Provisional Assembly.123
 It was for their alleged support for the movements of Darul Islam, 
as opposed to their actual participation in rebellions, that numerous 
members of Masyumi were pursued by the Indonesian army. As the 
elections of 1955 later showed, the regions in question were strong 
bastions of support for the party. Nonetheless, in most cases, the assis-
tance given locally to the rebels did not signify a complete adherence 
to the ideals of Darul Islam. During the fi ghting, numerous villages 
found themselves caught in a quandry, with each side suspecting vil-
lagers of supporting their opponents and punishing them accordingly.124 
An acronym was coined to describe these local populations who were 
obliged to keep both sides happy. Th ey became known as Kongres 
because they used to explain to Darul Islam that they supported it 
(menyokong), while assuring republican troops that everything was in 
order (beres).125
123 KH. Hasan Basri 70 Tahun (Jakarta: Media Da’wah, 1990), pp. 29–55.
124 In January 1953, for example, the KRYT burned down 50 houses in a village 
in South Kalimantan whose inhabitants had gone to see President Sukarno, on a 
trip to the region. Later the same day, more houses were burned down in the 
same village by the army in response to suspected support by villagers of the 
rebels. Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, p. 259.
125 Ibid., p. 105. Karl D. Jackson talks of gonta-ganti villages, meaning villages 
which alternated between the two sides. Th e inhabitants in these villages could 
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 In these villages, the government clamped down particularly on 
Masyumi members and local party leaders. Th e party’s press gave a 
faithful account of the considerable number of arrests which were 
made between 1951 and 1953 at all levels of the party. In June 1951, 
for example, in Bondosowo, a locality near Surabaya, 600 members of 
the local Masyumi branch were arrested and put in prison.126 Most 
of the time, however, only the party’s senior fi gures were targeted. In 
August of the same year, during the large wave of repression which 
followed the breakdown in negotiations in West Java, several members 
of Masyumi’s regional membership were arrested, including Isa Anshary, 
head of the party in West Java.127 A few days later, K.A. Hassan, the 
president of Persis and part of Natsir’s inner circle, was also placed 
in custody.128
 Th e region of Sukabumi was particularly aff ected by the govern-
ment’s campaign of repression. Military police arrested the local head 
of the party in July 1953; he was arrested again in June 1955, this 
time along with several other of the local branch’s senior fi gures.129 
In most cases, these arrests took place without any offi  cial reason and 
the people concerned were released again a few days later after ques-
tioning.130 In some cases, however, detention periods could last longer, 
and the party responded by forming a “Committee for the Defence of 
attend the rallies organised by Darul Islam as diligently as they attended those 
organised by the republican authorities. He also explains that the local popula-
tion’s political loyalty was very fi ckle; they supported Masyumi at the beginning 
of the 1950s before switching over to the PNI camp after the 1955 election, and 
then supporting NU in the mid-1960s. Kewibawaan traditional, Islam dan Pem-
berontakan, kasus Darul Islam Jawa Barat (A translation of Traditional Authority, 
Islam, and Rebellion published by the University of California Press in 1980) 
(Jakarta: Grafi ti, 1990), pp. 285–7.
126 Suara Partai Masjumi, 29 June 1951.
127 Berita Masjumi, 28 August 1951. Th e article recounting this event allows us 
to see a technique frequently used in the Masyumi press when it came to re-
porting on rebellions. Before mentioning the most plausible hypothesis—that 
Isa Anshary had been arrested for supporting Darul Islam—a highly improbable 
explanation was given of Isa Anshary’s alleged involvement in an attempted pro-
communist coup d’état. Such an idea is outrageous when you remember how 
virulently anti-communist he actually was.
128 Berita Masjumi, 31 August 1951.
129 Abadi, 28 July 1953 and 6 June 1955.
130 At the time, the Masyumi press claimed, disingenuously, not to know the 
reasons behind these arrests.
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Political Prisoners belonging to the Masyumi Family of Central Java” 
(Panitya Pembela Tahanan Politik Keluarga Masyumi Djawa Tengah). 
In December 1952, the committee thanked the command of the Dipo-
negoro Division in Semarang for releasing party members, and asked 
for the same clemency to be extended to the remaining prisoners based 
on the somewhat curious basis that with the election on the horizon, 
these prisoners, who were being held without trial, had to be given the 
opportunity to vote.131
 Most of those charged were not really complicit in the rebellion 
in the sense that they did not support the rebels’ struggle against the 
republican state. According to H. Marcoesyah, a former local party 
leader for the village of Banjarsai in West Java, the members of his 
branch did not contest the position of the central party leadership con-
demning the rebels’ machinations. Nonetheless, it was impossible for 
these party members to turn down off ers of help, in the form of food, 
money or medical treatment, to their family members who had joined 
the Indonesian Islamic Army.132
Masyumi’s Policy concerning Darul Islam
As of 1949, the party had to progressively clarify its position with re-
spect to the Darul Islam rebels, as it ran the risk otherwise of becoming 
associated with them. Masyumi was swift to issue a condemnation in 
principle of the rebels’ actions, but its message remained for a long 
time quite conciliatory, insisting on Islamic movements’ original mili-
tary goal, namely the fi ght against the Dutch. Although the party 
understood the rebel population’s discontent and shared some of their 
ideals, it nonetheless did not intend to sanction their methods. It was 
concerned about the possibility of a religious war breaking out in Indo-
nesia, and it presented itself as the architect of a “psychological solu-
tion”, as opposed to the “military solution” which a signifi cant portion 
of the Indonesian political class was calling for.
 Th e job of establishing an offi  cial party line on the question of 
Darul Islam fell to the fourth Masyumi congress, held in December 
1949 in Yogyakarta. Th anks to the reports of the meetings between 
ulama present at the congress, it is possible to get a fairly clear picture 
of the debates which preceded the adoption of the motion on DI. 
131 Berita Masjumi, 2 December 1952.
132 Interview with H. Marcoesyah, Banjarsari, September 1996.
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Several of those who spoke, notably Munawar Cholil, one of the 
most infl uential ulamas within Masyumi, emphasised the fact that there 
existed “several sorts of DI”. Some of these movements, it was said, 
were even “the work of the Dutch, created to achieve their policy 
aims”. For these religious fi gures, the complexity of the situation re-
quired one to avoid any rash condemnation and necessitated, above all, 
the organisation of an offi  cial fact-fi nding committee.133 Th e resolution 
on DI which was adopted by the congress refl ected these hesitations. 
It urged the government to create a commission of enquiry in order 
to explore all the available solutions, and also asked the authorities 
to off er “a real opportunity for the divine ideology and religion to 
develop in all levels of society”, and to avert “any measures which were 
likely to dishearten the Muslim community and to off end its religious 
sensibilities”.134 Th e resolution also condemned, for good measure, all 
attempts at secession in the country, although it only did so implicitly. 
It launched a warning, in terms that were as cautious as they were 
convoluted, about the dangers of the “direct path”, reminding the 
public that:
Whether in its domestic policy or its foreign policy, Masyumi re-
mains committed to the goals outlined in article two of its statute, 
namely to preserve the sovereignty of Indonesia which resulted 
from the Revolution of the Indonesian nation on 17 August 1945, 
and also to achieve the ideals of Islam on a national scale. [Th e 
Congress wishes] Masyumi in particular and the Indonesian umma 
in general to become more aware of the fact that the situation re-
quires this ideal to be accomplished by good deeds which need to 
be better organised and closer to the real goals [of the party].135
 In the weeks following this warning, Masyumi’s attitude towards 
Darul Islam in West Java remained conciliatory. In an article entitled 
“Concerning the Problem of Kartosuwirjo’s Darul Islam”, for example, 
Sjarif Usman reminded his readers that the rebel leader had proclaimed 
his Islamic state in a zone controlled by the Dutch and not in the Re-
public’s territory, and as such, was serving the interests of the nation.136 
133 Badan Usaha dan Penerbitan Muslimin Indonesia, Kongres Muslimin Indonesia, 
20–29 Desember 1949 di Jogjakarta, pp. 41–54.
134 Berita Partai Masjumi, February 1950.
135 Ibid.
136 “Sekitar soal Darul Islam-Kartosuwirjo”, Suara Partai Masjumi, April–May 
1950.
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Two months later, an article by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, “Th e Indo-
nesian State as a Darul Islam”, clearly showed that the language used 
had none of the infl ammatory rhetoric which it was later to acquire.137 
Without making any reference to the movement in West Java, the 
author expounded the benefi ts of this “Darul Islam”, but by doing 
so insinuated that Kartosuwirjo should not deter Muslims from their 
principal objective of establishing an “Abode of Islam”. It was only 
over the following months that the party’s position became clearer, no 
doubt in response to the growing dangers posed to it by any association 
with Darul Islam. As the idea of Darul Islam could now no longer be 
distinguished, in the eyes of the public, from the idea of a rebellion 
against the Republic, Masyumi thereafter refrained from mentioning 
it. Following the growing number of arrests made of its members, the 
party leadership intended to distance itself more clearly from the dissi-
dent groups. On 21 January 1951, it published a declaration which, 
through the rhetorical device of repetition, was intended to appear 
unequivocal:
1. Although Masyumi has, on several occasions, explained the dif-
 ference in political opinions between the Masyumi party and the 
Darul Islam movement, it seems that, for a number of people, 
 this diff erence of opinion is not clear enough.
2. Th is diff erence of opinion is not yet clear enough for, amongst 
others, the employees of our government, particularly low-ranking 
offi  cials.
3. Th erefore, the party leadership considers it necessary to publish a 
clarifi cation specifying the diff erences in political opinion between 
Masyumi and the Darul Islam movement.
4. Masyumi wishes to achieve its goals by following a path of parlia-
 mentary democracy, following a path which is in conformity with 
the Constitution and with the laws of the Republic of Indonesia.
5. With this declaration, we hope that the diff erence of opinion 
between Masyumi and the Darul Islam movement will be clearer 
in the public mind.138
137 “Negara Indonesia sebagai Darul Islam”, Suara Partai Masjumi, August–
September 1950.
138 Th is declaration was to be adopted again by the fi fth party congress in Feb-
ruary 1951, and could also be found in Berita Masjumi, 24 January 1952.
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 A year later, the warning addressed by Mohammad Natsir to the 
members of his party susceptible to being caught up in the revolu-
tionary wave was even stronger. He alerted his fellow countrymen to 
the dangers of various forms of “populism which strike in particular 
young minds and the most desperate among us”. He referred specifi -
cally to the attempts aimed at creating a “state within the state” under-
taken by “extremist movements, both left-wing and right-wing (Darul 
Islam in the region of Priangan and the Popular Republic of Indonesia 
[Republik Rakjat Indonesia] near Tjirebon).” 139 For the Masyumi 
president the discontent of a part of the people was understandable, 
but the party’s duty should be to “preserve the Republic of Indonesia, 
which is the fruit of our holy war” and to “enshrine the principles 
of Islam in the Constitution”. However, Natsir reminded his audience 
that this had to be done “by following the usual paths in a democratic 
country”, and that any other attitude would be considered irresponsible 
(“if the house which we have just built does not satisfy our wishes, 
are we going to burn it straight away?”), “suicidal” and “contrary to 
God’s design”.
 Th e party’s position towards Darul Islam remained the same 
subsequently. At the beginning of February 1952, one of Masyumi’s 
radical members, Isa Anshary, who was head of the party in West Java, 
joined in the chorus. He reminded Berita Masyumi ’s readers of Article 
Four of the party’s statutes, forbidding its members from becoming 
affi  liated to any other political organisation whatsoever, adding that 
“Darul Islam should not be an exception to that rule”.140 Once 
Masyumi’s ideological position had been clarifi ed, its leaders hammered 
home the message that it was now no longer possible to associate the 
party with Darul Islam, and endeavoured to provide their supporters 
with arguments proving this. Mohammad Natsir, for example, pointed 
out that Masyumi was banned in the regions controlled by Karto-
suwirjo, and criticised “those who wonder if the ultimate goals of 
Masyumi and DI are the same”. For him, such a question could “only 
be the fruit of an immature mind” or else was an instance of pure 
139 Berita Masjumi, 24 January 1952. Th e Popular Republic of Indonesia in the 
region of Cirebon was a small left-leaning movement led by Chaerul Saleh, one 
of Murba’s close allies. Th e scope of this movement cannot be compared to Darul 
Islam, however.
140 Berita Masjumi, 1 February 1952.
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provocation. He went on to remark that “nobody would dream of 
putting Stalinism and social democracy on the same level even though 
these movements are both founded on Marxism.” 141
 Th ese positions, which were adopted during the fi rst months of 
1952, remained the offi  cial party line over the following years. None-
theless, Masyumi always remained somewhat sympathetic towards 
Islamic insurgents. Although it denounced their actions, it recognised 
the cause of these revolts and therefore always pleaded for a political 
rather than a military solution.
Th e Solution for a “Military, Political and Sociological” 
Problem 142
Two important elements need to be kept in mind when considering 
Masyumi’s commitment to a peaceful solution. Th e fi rst one is that 
on several occasions, the party’s leaders, on behalf of the government, 
began attempts at reconciliation which, for the most part, failed. Th e 
second is that, as a result of these failures, the Muslim party became 
involved in a policy of secret negotiations on the fringes of the govern-
ment’s offi  cial manoeuvrings. Th e main consequence of these secret 
negotiations was to give credence to allegations of complicity between 
Masyumi and the rebels.
 In September 1949, Natsir was appointed to chair a commission 
designed to advise the Hatta government on the question of Darul 
Islam. However, he did not manage to establish contact with Kartosu-
wirjo. In December 1949, as we have already seen, the fourth Masyumi 
congress adopted a motion demanding the formation of a “Resolution 
Committee”. Th e government yielded to this demand, and one of the 
architects of the party’s initiative, Wali al-Fatah, was appointed by the 
Hatta government to head this body. A former senior member of 
Muhammadiyah and Masyumi, Wali had also been a companion of 
Kartosuwirjo in the PSII during the pre-war years. He managed to make 
contact with the rebels in May 1950, but subsequently disappeared 
141 Berita Masjumi, 6 February 1952.
142 “Guerrilla warfare is not only a military problem, it is also a political and psy-
chological one.” Mohammad Natsir’s inaugural address, Kementarian Penerangan 
R.I., Membangun diantagra tumpukan puing dan pertumbuhan. Keterangan Peme-
rintah diutjapkan oleh Perdana Menteri Mohammad Natsir dimuka sidang Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakjat Sementara, 10 oktober 1950 (Jakarta, 1950), p. 20.
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without trace for almost two months. He was not located again until 
mid-July following an attack by the republican army. According to his 
declarations, the commander of the Indonesian Islamic Army, Oni, 
refused to allow any meeting between him and Kartosuwirjo.143 Other 
accounts maintain that the leader of Darul Islam in West Java had 
hoped to meet an emissary who was higher up in government and 
had refused to meet Wali al-Fatah because he did not have the rank 
of Bupati.144 In reality, Kartosuwirjo demanded negotiations between 
governments, which meant that he wanted, prior to the beginning of 
talks, recognition for his Islamic State of Indonesia by the Republic. At 
the end of May 1950, Masyumi sent emissaries to K.H. Machfudz, the 
leader of Angkatan Umat Islam which was in rebellion in Central Java. 
However, despite the fact that one of these envoys was the minister for 
religions, K.H. Wahid Hasjim, Machfudz refused to receive them.
 With the nomination of Mohammad Natsir at the head of the 
fi rst government of the unitary Republic, talks began again.145 His 
programme for government planned to reintegrate guerrillas into civil 
society, but the gestures of appeasement made towards the diff erent 
rebellions in the Indonesian archipelago only brought limited results. 
It is true that in Aceh, Natsir managed to defuse the emerging confl ict. 
On 23 January 1951, he announced an agreement with PUSA which 
stipulated that the recent creation of the province of North Sumatra 
should not be considered a lasting obstacle to Aceh becoming a pro-
vince. Two days later, the government named a new governor for North 
Sumatra, Abdul Hakim, who was a member of Masyumi known for 
his sympathetic attitude towards Aceh’s claims for regional indepen-
dence. In Sulawesi and Kalimantan, however, the eff orts of the new 
prime minister turned out to be a lot less successful. Hasan Basry’s 
reconciliation mission with his former comrades in arms failed, and we 
have already seen what happened to the agreement made with Kahar 
Muzakkar providing for the integration of his troops into the new 
“Hasanuddin brigade”. Finally, concerning West Java, the prime minis-
ter announced that the combatants who surrendered between 28 No-
vember and 14 December would be able to join the armed forces or 
the police if they wished, provided they were able to pass the relevant 
143 Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, p. 114.
144 Noer, “Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia”, 
p. 111.
145 Natsir’s government lasted from September 1950 to April 1951.
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aptitude tests.146 Th e government furthermore committed to fi nding all 
members of the brigade new livelihoods. 
 In reality, these off ers of incorporation were largely illusory. Th e 
government had already prepared a rationalisation programme for the 
armed forces which was supposed to limit their number in the fol-
lowing months to 200,000 men.147 Th is implied, as Natsir himself 
revealed at the end of September 1950, the demobilisation of nearly 
80,000 soldiers. Although this policy of appeasement was a fi asco, it 
nevertheless avoided the government from fi nding itself in a political 
impasse. For the entire province of West Java, less than 1,200 people 
surrendered, carrying only 46 fi rearms.148 For the government, and 
especially for the army, it was only the number of arms surrendered 
that counted in this operation, and Natsir himself later recognised that 
his policy had been a failure. Commenting on the intention of the 
new government to follow a “tougher” line towards Darul Islam, he de-
clared that he was “part of those who prayed and hoped that ‘tougher’ 
will mean more successful.” 149
 Under pressure from the army and from his allies in the PNI, the 
new prime minister, Soekiman,150 was forced to give up his search for 
the political solution which his party demanded, launching the fi rst 
military operations in West Java in January 1951. In Java, the govern-
ment’s military operations were supported by militia groups close to 
left-wing parties such as the PKI, Murba and the PNI.151 On 29 
August 1951, the government gave fi ve weeks to the rebels in Sulawesi 
to surrender before authorising the army to launch its “Operation 
Merdeka”. At the same time, Hasan Basry took it upon himself to 
begin the crackdown on the rebellion in South Kalimantan. Th e deci-
sion to launch two simultaneous military operations, however, limited 
their eff ectiveness considerably, as the army was obliged to disperse 
146 Berita Masjumi, 12 January 1951.
147 Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, p. 110.
148 Ibid., p. 111.
149 “Saja masuk orang2 jang turut mendo’akan mudah2an ‘lebih tegas’ itu akan 
berarti lebih berhasil”, Berita Masjumi, 16 May 1951.
150 Th e Soekiman cabinet was in power from April 1951 until April 1952.
151 Masyumi Djawa Barat issued a declaration protesting against the creation of 
these volunteer groups, “some [of whom] were under the control of communists”. 
Th e numerous assassinations of ulamas and Muslim fi gures, which had taken place 
in several parts of West Java (Garut, Tasikmalaya, Ciamis), were also denounced. 
Abadi, 22 September 1953.
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its troops. Moreover, the army had underestimated the determination 
of the rebels, and so failed to gain a clear upper hand on either 
front. Nonetheless, successive governments continued a largely repressive 
policy for a further four years,152 and Masyumi denounced on numer-
ous occasions this “military-centred” (Tentara-centrische) approach to 
the problem.153 Th e party’s representatives were particularly critical of 
the lack of respect shown by the army towards places of worship. 
In February 1952, for example, Prawoto Mangkusasmito handed a 
letter of protest to the government on behalf of Masyumi. Th e docu-
ment stated that certain behaviours by republican soldiers often had 
the eff ect of increasing the Muslim community’s resentment. He men-
tioned the case of a village in Central Java, Kartirejo, whose mosque 
had been set on fi re by the army and he also reported an account 
which indicated that in the region of Surakarta, republican troops had 
entered the prayer hall accompanied by dogs and without taking their 
shoes off .154 In April 1954, Natsir off ered a very bleak assessment of 
the Ali government’s security policy. Given the sums of money invested 
by the government and the amount of rebel activity over the previous 
year, he came to the conclusion that this policy was both harmful and 
ineff ective.155
 One of the Masyumi leadership’s main worries was the prospect of 
these confl icts escalating into a religious war. If that were to happen, 
the party would have great diffi  culty dissuading its members from 
taking part in it and would fi nd itself even more exposed to machina-
tions by the army. Th eir warnings against the escalation of violence 
were addressed as much to the rebels as to the government. In a speech 
given by Natsir in Medan in December 1953, he denounced those who 
wanted to “turn everywhere into a place of holy war”.156 In February 
1954, Masyumi vigorously opposed a government plan to have the 
Acehnese rebels condemned by a fatwa issued by ulamas in the region. 
152 In Sulawesi, however, an off er of amnesty made by the government in March 
1952 was relatively successful and caused Kahar Muzakkar to lose some of his 
troops. Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, p. 195.
153 Th e expression was used by Natsir in an article entitled “Th e Current Impasse 
Requires a New Way” (Dajlan buntu sekarang memerlukan rintisan baru), Berita 
Masjumi, 28 September 1951.
154 Suara Partai Masjumi, 3 March 1952.
155 Hikmah, 28 August 1954.
156 Abadi, 2 December 1953.
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Th e president of Muhammadiyah, A.R. St. Mansur, set out in Abadi 
the reasons for his opposition to this plan.157 It was, according to him, 
vain to look to Islamic law for a solution to a problem whose origins 
were sociological, psychological and economic. He added that this ploy 
recalled the methods used by the Dutch and Japanese colonisers, which 
had caused a signifi cant section of the ulama to be held in disregard in 
the eyes of the people. Finally, he pointed out that such practices were 
in danger of creating a division in the country along religious lines, 
which would be a lot more harmful than any other type of division.
 Th e entire political class was concerned about the risk of these 
confl icts degenerating into a large-scale politico-religious confrontation. 
At the beginning of 1953, a very heated debate followed President Su-
karno’s speech in Amuntai, in which he warned that if an Islamic state 
was proclaimed, the country’s Christian regions would also secede.158 
In response to this speech and in the absence of any Masyumi repre-
sentatives in the Ali government, which had been formed in August 
1953, Daud Beureu’eh’s supporters became convinced of the necessity 
to begin their rebellion. At the same time, however, Sukarno’s words 
also gave free rein to the supporters of a more repressive policy.
 Th e formation of the government led by Boerhanoeddin Harahap, 
which was in offi  ce from August 1955 to March 1956, restored hope 
for those who backed a negotiated settlement. With the agreement of 
Vice President Hatta and Colonel Zulkifi  Lubis, the highly controver-
sial deputy chief of staff , the prime minister entered into low-key talks 
with the rebels of Aceh and West Java.159 Th e government, however, 
was too uneasy about this reconciliation policy for it to succeed, and 
as soon as the existence of these talks was uncovered, the authorities 
strenuously denied that any emissaries had been sent to meet with 
rebels. Th e rebels’ pre-condition for entering talks, though, was pre-
cisely their recognition by the government, if not as a state, then at 
least as a negotiating party. Th e second Ali government understood 
this point and in December 1956, it passed a law which accorded to 
Aceh the status of autonomous province and named a governor from 
157 Abadi, 24 February 1954.
158 See infra, Chapter 4.
159 Daud Beureu’eh’s son, Hasballah Daud, was sent to Aceh, and in February 
1952 in West Java, the army intercepted and passed on to the press letters signed 
by Harahap and Lubis, off ering Kartosuwirjo a ceasefi re. Van Dijk, Rebellion 
under the Banner of Islam, pp. 329–30.
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amongst the ranks of PUSA. Th is policy opened the way for a peaceful 
resolution of the confl ict in North Sumatra, an outcome which had for 
a time been delayed by the PRRI rebellion.160 
 In West Java, however, none of the government’s attempts at re-
conciliation were successful. Although the republican army managed, 
as of 1957, to isolate Darul Islam’s troops and contain them to certain 
mountainous areas, the rebels remained a real threat. Th e attempted 
kidnapping of Khrushchev in February 1960, during an offi  cial visit 
to Indonesia, illustrated this in spectacular style. On the road between 
Bogor and Bandung, the Soviet leader narrowly escaped capture by a 
Darul Islam commando.161 On 4 June 1962, Kartosuwirjo was fi nally 
caught, and shortly after his arrest, one of his sons “on behalf of the 
imam-president of the Islamic state” ordered his supporters to surren-
der. On 16 August, Kartosuwirjo was condemned to death and one 
month later was executed.
 Overall, Masyumi did not gain much political capital from its de-
mand for an “alternative path” (djalan lain) to the government’s policy 
towards Darul Islam.162 Others benefi tted politically from the peaceful 
resolution of the confl ict in Aceh and, to a lesser extent, in Kalimantan. 
In West Java, Kartosuwirjo’s intransigence and his submission in 1962 
justifi ed in retrospect the hawkish enthusiasm of those who opposed 
any concession. Th e party’s pacifi st manoeuvres, however, remained 
fruitless and they turned out to be disastrous for the party in the long 
run. Its eff orts to resolve the confl ict with Darul Islam were primarily 
focussed on their action in government or within Parliament; however, 
they also permitted a number of their party members to act as unoffi  -
cial negotiators who, though largely ineff ectual, gave credence in public 
opinion to the theory of collusion between Masyumi and the rebels. 
In 1953, two of those negotiators were prosecuted during a high-profi le 
court case which showed the ambiguity of the relations between Mas-
yumi and Darul Islam.
 Afandi Ridhwan, who was leader of GPII and a Masyumi repre-
sentative in West Java’s provincial assembly, as well as having been pres-
ent at the Masyumi congress in 1949, had been one of the initiators of 
the security resolution passed by the assembly. Th is document invited 
160 See infra, Chapter 4.
161 Van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam, p. 125.
162 “Djalan lain” was the usual expression used in writings by party members to 
signify a policy of reconciliation, as opposed to a policy of repression.
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the government to look for an alternative to a military solution to 
address the problem with DI. Afandi Ridhwan was also the spokesman 
of the Committee for the Destiny of the People (Komite Nasib Rakjat), 
an organisation which in its meetings with civil and military authori-
ties, argued for a more measured approach to the crisis. He was part 
of Natsir’s inner circle, and at the party congress of 1949 he did his 
utmost to bring about the implementation of the motion calling for 
a peaceful solution to the confl ict.163
 Having informed the military authorities and his colleagues in 
the provincial assembly, he took the initiative of making contact with 
Sanusi Partawidjaja, one of his former fellow party members in GPII 
who had become Kartosuwirjo’s main advisor.164 In January 1952, he 
went to the headquarters of Darul Islam in Cigadu near Cianjur where 
he attempted to convince the rebel movement to abandon their demand 
for recognition by the Republic, prior to negotiations, of the Islamic 
State of Indonesia, and advised them instead to look for this recogni-
tion from Saudi Arabia or from Pakistan. At his trial, Partawidjaja 
stated that this proposal had in fact been made in jest, but it was taken 
seriously both by the military authorities, who saw this as proof that 
he was an active supporter of Darul Islam, and by Kartosuwirjo, who 
tried unsuccessfully to make contact with foreign embassies.165
 Afandi Ridhwan managed, however, to obtain from Sanusi Parta-
widjaja a letter accepting negotiations in principle, on condition that 
the government gave a guarantee that the army would not interfere in 
them. He then went to Jakarta and handed the missive over to Deputy 
Prime Minister Prawoto Mangkusasmito’s assistants.166 Ridhwan, in his 
account of the events, was then given authorisation by Prawoto to 
continue his negotiations, and while waiting for a meeting with Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono IX, the minister for defence, in order to ensure 
his support, he was arrested and imprisoned at the end of May 1952. 
163 His wife had been one of Natsir’s pupils when he was a teacher in Persatuan 
Islam in Bandung. Interview with Afandi Ridhwan, Bandung, September 1996.
164 Ibid. Th e idea that the provincial assembly was aware of his actions seems to 
be corroborated by the motion of confi dence which it voted in favour of Aff andi 
in August 1952. Hikmah, 2 August 1952.
165 According to Feith, Darul Islam authorities also made contact with the Ameri-
can embassy which they hoped would provide them with help in the event of a 
Th ird World War breaking out. Feith, Th e Wilopo Cabinet, p. 98.
166 Prawoto Mangkusasmito, moreover, was a member of Masyumi.
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His trial began in Bandung on 26 February 1953 and lasted four 
months, during which Abadi gave a faithful account of the hearings. 
However, neither the newspaper nor the members of Masyumi’s leader-
ship risked commenting on this delicate aff air.167 Th e only one to speak 
publicly about the case was Kasman Singodmedjo, the second vice 
president of the party, who did so as the accused’s lawyer.
 Th e case was a very sensitive one. Th e prosecution’s main witness 
was Ijet Hidajat, a former “prefect” of the Islamic State of Indonesia 
who had been in custody since October 1952. At the hearing of 15 
March 1953, he explained that he had been removed from his position 
in 1950 for having refused to continue the armed struggle after the 
proclamation of the unitary state in August 1950. He claimed that 
Natsir subsequently confi ded him with a mission to negotiate with 
Darul Islam in order to “end the struggle between us and us”.168 Ac-
cording to Ijet, in 1952, Afandi Ridhwan allegedly gave information to 
the rebels about the positions of Colonel Kawilarang and Indonesian 
army units. Th is testimony, which Afandi refuted, led to him being 
sentenced to three and a half years in prison.169 It seems to me, though, 
that the evidence in this case was rather fl imsy. Th e witness himself 
admitted that he was no longer a member of Darul Islam at the time 
of the events. In that case, how could he have known the nature of 
the information communicated by Afandi Ridhwan to the rebels? Th e 
accused was clearly a victim of the change in strategy eff ectuated in the 
corridors of power in response to the rebellion which took place after 
the collapse of Natsir’s cabinet. He was no doubt also targeted by one 
of the sabotage operations which certain sections of the army were fond 
of carrying out during negotiations. Afandi Ridhwan’s greatest crime 
in this aff air was without doubt his naivety. Th e accusations brought 
against another member of the party, who was also put on trial a few 
weeks beforehand for collusion with DI, seemed a lot more credible.
 Achmad Buchari, who was vice president of GPII, was also ac-
cused of having facilitated contact between Kartosuwirjo’s movement 
167 On 2 March 1953, for example, Abadi indicated the presence of Isa Anshary, 
while on 16 March, it reported that Mohammad Natsir and Soekiman had “come 
expressly from Jakarta” to attend the hearings.
168 An account of the hearing reported in Abadi, 16 March 1953.
169 Abadi, 6 July 1953. On his release in January 1956, Aff andi Ridhwan returned 
to sit in the provincial assembly and became a Maysumi party offi  cial in West 
Java. Interview, September 1996.
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and Kahar Muzakkar in 1951.170 His trial saw all the main fi gures of 
the Movement of Young Muslims appear in the witness box and, like 
during Afandi’s trial, the benevolent presence of Mayumi’s senior fi gures 
could be seen in the courtroom.171 Without delving into the details of 
this highly complex case, we should note fi rst of all the strong desire on 
the part of the presiding judge to implicate Masyumi by highlighting 
the existing links between the party and GPII. Th e trial’s second 
hearing, held on 6 September 1953, was given over entirely to this 
question.172 Th e judge asked the accused on several occasions to clarify 
the nature of the links between the two organisations. Denying the 
obvious, the accused stated that GPII was an independent movement 
which cooperated with all political parties. He merely acknowledged 
“a few special links with Masyumi”, but nothing more.173 Second of all, 
it should be pointed out that Achmad Buchari, like Afandi Ridhwan, 
thought himself to be entrusted with a negotiation mission by the 
Indonesian state. Th is conviction was based on a meeting the president 
had accorded the GPII leadership in mid-1951 during which Sukarno 
is said to have shared with these young people—and this was con-
fi rmed by other senior fi gures in the organisation—his hope to see 
contacts established with Darul Islam.174 As the government, for poli-
tical reasons, was unable to do so, the president considered that it was 
up to Islamic organisations such as Masyumi and GPII to establish 
preliminary contacts. 
 At the end of the court proceedings, however, Achmad Buchari’s 
guilt seemed clearly established. He admitted to having conveyed a 
letter from Kartosuwirjo to Kahar Muzakkar; he explained that he had 
gone to Makassar solely on behalf of GPII, but rejected the claim that 
certain former rebels considered him a representative of Darul Islam. 
Achmad Buchari’s explanations seemed much more coherent and ap-
peared to make his involvement in the rebellion a lot more plausible 
than Afandi’s. How could the fact of having conveyed a message—no 
170 Abadi, 25 August 1953.
171 On 2 November 1953, Natsir and Mohamad Roem were present. Abadi, 3 
November 1953.
172 Abadi, 8 September 1953.
173 GPII was, however, Masyumi’s youth organisation. Cf. infra, Chapter 6.
174 Dahlan Lukman and Anwar Harjono attested to this. Abadi, 22 September 
1953.
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doubt a proposal made by Kartosuwirjo to Kahar Muzakkar planning 
to integrate Muzakkar’s troops into NII—from one rebel zone to 
another back his claim to have been in favour of a negotiated solution? 
At the end of his trial, Achmad Buchari, unsurprisingly, was sentenced 
to three years in prison.
 Th e involvement of certain Masyumi members in rebellions is 
certainly indisputable, but it took place in diff ering degrees, and does 
not, in my view, enable one to conclude that the party was collectively 
responsible. Th e revolutionary mentality of the second half of the 
1940s certainly inspired many advocates of this “direct path” towards 
an Islamic state, but from early 1950, the eff orts made by the party 
leadership to bring them back to the “democratic and parliamentary 
path” left little doubt that it in no way supported the rebels. Th e fact 
still remains, however, that by advocating a more “psychological” rather 
than a military solution, Masyumi left itself open to accusations of 
leniency towards Darul Islam. Th e participation of some of its mem-
bers in secret negotiations, and also the fact that certain leaders, such 
as Natsir, had been tempted at the beginning of the 1950s to use the 
rebellions as an argument for claiming a greater place for Islam, helped 
to cultivate this association between the two organisations.175 Finally, 
we should add that on the side of the army and the justice system, but 
also on the side of Darul Islam, there were many who had an interest 
in maintaining this belief in a collaboration.176
175 An association which is still maintained today by certain anachronisms such 
as referring to Masyumi’s stance during the debates in the Constituent Assembly 
(i.e. from 1958 to 1960) to explain certain party positions in the early 1950s. 
See, for example, Hendra Gunawan, M. Natsir dan Darul Islam. Studi Kasus Aceh 
dan Sulawesi Selatan, Tahun 1953–1958 (Jakarta: Media Da’wah, 2000), pp. 23–4.
176 Concerning Darul Islam’s desire to have its struggle recognised by Masyumi, 
one should cite as an example the letter from the Islamic Army of Indonesia’s 
command in the Cianjur region in West Java (TII Komandemen I Tjuempaka 
Tjiandjur) to Isa Anshary and Kasman Singodimedjo, thanking them for the 
speeches they made during a Masyumi rally in Cianjur in November 1954. Th e 
letter explained that the two Masyumi members’ reading of the situation was 
interpreted as a sign of support for the Islamic Army who were being pursued by 
“the army of infi dels, otherwise known as the communist Republic of Indonesia” 
(Tentara Kafi r alias Tentara Republik Indonesia Komunis). Th e Masyumi offi  cial in 
Cianjur who received this letter pointed out that the party leadership in Cianjur 
did not wish for an agreement with or promotion of “external groups”, who, 
moreover, were illegal. Abadi, 3 January 1955.
Chap3 (119-201).indd   179 8/14/15   5:38:14 PM
180 Islam and Politics in Indonesia
 Th e involvement of Masyumi’s local branches was extremely vari-
able, then, depending on the region, but it does appear in retrospect 
that their participation was a necessary condition in order for the 
rebellions to achieve some degree of success. It is nonetheless diffi  cult 
to conclude that the party was directly or in some general way respon-
sible for sparking these insurrections. Th e fact that certain guerrillas 
fought in the name of the same Islamic ideal which Masyumi had de-
fi ned in the early years of the Revolution apportioned upon the party 
a certain degree of moral responsibility. From the beginning of 1950, 
however, the message addressed by the central leadership to those party 
members tempted to join the rebellion seemed suffi  ciently clear for 
those who were prepared to listen. Moreover, as Cees Van Dijk has 
shown, the demand for an Islamic state was only one aspect of a more 
widespread malaise prevalent in numerous regions of the Indonesian 
archipelago at the end of the Physical Revolution. Th is malaise was 
linked both to a sense of resentment towards the growing infl uence of 
the republican army, which relegated the country’s irregular troops to 
a secondary position, and to the increasing control which the central 
government was exerting over the provinces after several years of con-
siderable regional autonomy.
A Pragmatic Foreign Policy which was Open to 
the West
Five years after the proclamation of independence, the recognition of 
Indonesia as an independent state became complete with its admission 
to the United Nations in September 1950. Apart from the thorny issue 
of its relations with its former colonial master, which had become deeply 
embittered due to the West Irian question, foreign policy did not con-
stitute an important topic of public debate. Most parties agreed on 
the principle of a certain degree of neutrality, although Masyumi and 
the other parties abandoned this term because of its somewhat passive 
connotation:
By calling its policy free, the government wishes to follow a con-
crete path, so that Indonesia may be able to help humanity, in 
a positive manner, to achieve its aspirations. If a neutral policy is 
understood as a negative policy, a refusal to get involved in a con-
fl ict on the basis that it will not infl uence our situation, and aff ect 
neither our destiny nor the world’s; if it is understood as remaining 
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in peace without doing anything to fi nd a solution, then it is not 
a policy of neutrality which we wish to pursue.177
Despite this consensus on the principle of neutrality, the country’s 
parties clashed on several occasions over the area of foreign policy. Th e 
positions adopted by Masyumi at this time revealed the outlines of 
an approach to international aff airs which was chiefl y pragmatic. Apart 
from an openly expressed concern for the problems of the Th ird World, 
its policy was above all very anti-communist, and though moderately 
pro-nationalist, it was in fact relatively unconcerned with religious 
considerations.
 Th e fi rst diplomatic problem Masyumi had to confront involved 
the question of Western New Guinea. Th is region was the only part 
of the former Dutch East Indies not to have been integrated into the 
newly independent Indonesia, and according to the agreements which 
came out of the Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference, its future 
was to be determined, at the latest, by 27 December 1950. Th is dead-
line had passed without any sign of talks beginning between the Re-
public and the Netherlands. On 3 January 1951, Prime Minister Natsir 
declared before the Parliament that in light of this new situation, rela-
tions between the two countries had to be reconsidered, particularly 
the status of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union (DIU).178 Th is reaction 
was deemed by many to be too timorous, and in fact a motion put 
before Parliament by the PNI calling for the DIU to be dissolved and 
the Round Table Conference Agreement to be revoked almost succeeded 
in being voted.179 In response, Sukarno called for drastic measures 
against the Netherlands and declared his intention to announce them 
himself in an upcoming speech. Natsir responded to this by reminding 
the president that it was the constitutional role of the government and 
not the president to draw up policy. Th is fi rm reminder led to a de-
terioration of relations between the two men. 
177 Mohammad Natsir’s inaugural address. Kementarian Penerangan R.I., Mem-
bangun diantara tumpukan puing dan pertumbuhan. Keterangan Pemerintah di-
utjapkan oleh Perdana Menteri Mohammad Natsir dimuka sidang Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakjat Sementara, 10 oktober 1950 (Jakarta, 1950), p. 28.
178 Noer, “Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia”, 
p. 225.
179 66 votes to 63, on 10 January 1951.
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 For the Masyumi leadership, negotiations with the Netherlands 
had to be part of a diplomatic policy aimed at obtaining widespread 
international recognition for the Republic’s claim over West Irian.180 
To this end, it was important for Indonesia to present to the entire 
world an image of a responsible country, mindful of maintaining cor-
dial relations with other countries, including its former colonial mas-
ters. According to Masyumi, a converse policy, such as the hard line 
called for by the PNI and supported by Sukarno, was in danger of 
discrediting Indonesia on the international stage, and thus depriving it 
of the vital support it required to assert its rights with the United 
Nations.181 Th is point of view was echoed during Ali Sastroamidjo’s 
premiership on the occasion of the signature of a protocol providing 
for the dissolution of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.182 It was then 
made offi  cial in a resolution passed by the party congress in December 
1954, which stipulated that the struggle for the control of West Irian 
could not meet with success unless a policy was put in place which 
restored the international community’s confi dence in the Republic. 
Shortly afterwards, the main architect of Masyumi’s diplomatic policy, 
Mohamad Roem, denounced the radical attitude of the parties who 
supported Ali’s government and who were the reason why the Republic 
had lost the support of certain countries in the United Nations, nota-
bly Australia. He singled out for criticism the PKI’s proposal to expel 
Dutch nationals from Indonesia, and reminded the public that Dutch 
citizens, as long as they respected the laws of the state, should receive 
its protection. For Roem, a measure such as the one proposed by the 
PKI would be in total contradiction with the government’s demand for 
negotiations made before the international community.183
 It fi nally fell to Boerhanoeddin Harahap’s government to imple-
ment the diplomatic policy elaborated by Masyumi. As soon as the 
180 Th is was identifi ed by Masyumi’s programme of action as a “national 
requirement”.
181 For a complete account of each party’s doctrines concerning the question of 
West Irian, see Stéphane Dovert’s PhD thesis, “Le rattachement de la Nouvelle-
Guinée-Occidentale à l’ensemble politique indonésien; intégration ou colonisa-
tion?”, Institut d’études politiques de Paris, 1995, pp. 253–69.
182 Th e Sunario-Luns Protocol did not, however, solve the question of West Irian. 
Th e Dutch refused to broach the issue and the protocol was never ratifi ed by 
Indonesia. Natsir denounced this agreement as useless posturing which was harm-
ful for Indonesia’s image internationally. Abadi, 23 August 1954.
183 Abadi, 13 January 1955.
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new government had taken offi  ce, it endeavoured to regain the confi -
dence of Indonesia’s former allies, and to this eff ect a delegation was 
sent to Australia, headed by Mohamad Roem. Although Roem did not 
manage to obtain the complete support of their neighbours, the Aus-
tralian government did at least agree to no longer support the Dutch 
position.184 Th is diplomatic off ensive soon yielded further results: in 
December, the government managed to get the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly to pass a resolution on West Irian calling on the two 
parties to enter negotiations.185 A similar proposal presented by the Ali 
government had failed a few months earlier and so this proposal led 
the government to entertain hopes that an agreement might at last be 
reached.186 Negotiations came close to fi nding such an agreement at 
the end of December, but eventually failed because of an upsurge in 
nationalist sentiment in both countries.
 Masyumi’s anti-communism, which formed an integral part of 
its political identity, naturally played an important part in the elabora-
tion of its diplomatic policy. In 1949, the party’s political programme 
announced a general principle “of friendship with all nations, and 
particularly with those nations founded on democracy and a belief in 
God.” As communist countries corresponded to neither of these two 
criteria, friendly relations would be more diffi  cult to establish, and the 
party endeavoured to avoid any mutual recognition. In the name of 
neutrality, it never rejected the principle of establishing diplomatic rela-
tions with these countries, but it constantly looked for ways of pre-
venting that from happening. Th e possibility of Indonesia and the 
Soviet Union exchanging ambassadors was mooted for the fi rst time 
in September 1950, and in the inaugural address he gave upon taking 
offi  ce as prime minister, Mohammad Natsir saw no objection to it. 
However, he immediately added that “negotiations must still be orga-
nised between our two countries concerning technical matters.” 187 
184 Abadi, 23 October 1955.
185 Abadi, 19 December 1955.
186 Th e Masyumi leadership also saw the negotiations as a means for them to use 
their poor electoral results to their advantage. Th e Dutch government was no 
doubt aware that any future cabinet would be more hostile towards it, and so to 
refuse to make concessions now would expose Dutch economic interests in Indo-
nesia to unilateral decisions by a future Indonesian government.
187 Kementarian Penerangan R.I., Membangun diantagra tumpukan puing dan 
pertumbuhan, p. 30.
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His government as well as Soekiman’s never managed to resolve these 
“technical matters”. In response to this obvious policy of obstruction, 
those in favour of establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union decided to act. In April 1953, during the Wilopo premiership, 
a parliamentary deputy, Rondonuwu, tabled a motion in the Assembly 
to open an embassy in Moscow “before the year was out”. Masyumi, 
who had members in the Wilopo government, showed great unity of 
purpose in opposing this motion. Jusuf Wibisono explained, once again, 
that “it was not a question of principle but a question of time”.188 
He added, apparently oblivious to the contradiction in his argument, 
that establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR “would bring 
nothing to Indonesia” either economically or politically. He further 
claimed that the presence in Indonesia of Russian diplomats, “known 
for often operating outside of their diplomatic missions”, could be a 
source of a lot of trouble for the country. Th ese arguments, however, 
were not enough to convince a majority of the Parliament and the 
Rondonuwu motion was carried by 82 votes to 43.189 In response, 
Boerhanoeddin Harahap declared that his party would envisage with-
drawing its ministers from government if an embassy were to open 
in Moscow.190 Th is threat did not materialise, however, as Wilopo’s 
government resigned in June 1953, and despite the constant opposition 
of Masyumi’s deputies, an Indonesian embassy was fi nally opened in 
Moscow by the Ali cabinet in March 1954.191
 Although Masyumi had had a solid reputation since the revolu-
tionary period as being pro-American,192 there was never the same con-
sensus in the party regarding the question of relations with the United 
States as there was concerning its attitude towards communism. It was 
in fact a question which caused one of the most serious crises the 
party experienced during the 1950–56 period. In mid-August of 1951, 
the Soekiman government had sent its minister for foreign aff airs, 
Subardjo, to the San Francisco Conference where a peace treaty with 
188 Abadi, 9 February 1953. Th is position dates back to the sixth party congress 
in fact. Berita Masjumi, 8 September 1952.
189 Abadi, 10 April 1953.
190 Feith, Th e Wilopo Cabinet, 1952–1953, p. 173.
191 Feith, Th e Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p. 385.
192 For examples which led to this reputation, see Ann Swift, Th e Road to Madiun: 
Th e Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indo-
nesia Project, Monograph Series, 1989), pp. 16–7.
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Japan was supposed to be concluded. On this date, however, the coali-
tion parties who supported the government—mainly Masyumi and 
the PNI—could not agree on whether their countries’ participation in 
this agreement would be opportune or not.193 Within Masyumi, there 
was a particularly lively debate, and during the fi nal days before the 
signature of the treaty, from 4 to 6 September, the party leadership 
held meetings continually.194 
 Th e supporters of the treaty, who backed Prime Minister Soeki-
man, contended that it would contribute to stabilising the situation in 
the Pacifi c, and thus hinder the advance of communism. Faced with 
the impossibility of creating a third international power in Asia, they 
maintained that Indonesia should rally behind the West, whose demo-
cratic ideology was much closer to Pancasila and Islam than commu-
nism was. Soekiman explained that this rapprochement in no way 
signifi ed that the country was abandoning its independence in matters 
of foreign policy. Th e minister for fi nance, Jusuf Wibisono, added eco-
nomic motivations to the political arguments just mentioned. He em-
phasised certain advantages which the treaty gave to Indonesia, namely 
the payment by Japan of war damages as well as the limitation of both 
Japanese imports and Japanese fi shing in Indonesian territorial waters. 
Natsir’s entourage, who were opposed to the agreement, responded to 
these arguments point by point. For Mohamad Roem, the proposed 
document did not constitute a guarantee of stability in the region for 
the coming years. By prolonging the economic and military supervision 
of Western powers over Japan, it was in danger of provoking the Japa-
nese into a violent reaction. Instead of this multilateral agreement which 
placed Indonesia in the Western camp, Roem argued for the signature 
of a bilateral treaty with Japan. Th is solution would leave open the 
possibility of cooperating with India and Burma, two countries who 
had refused to send delegates to San Francisco. He also noted that the 
treaty was to give to Japan the clause of the most favoured nation, an 
advantage which Indonesia had refused to give to India a short time 
before. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara explained that Indonesia did not have 
to sign a treaty with the Japanese since it had never been at war with 
Japan. Th is did not stop him from claiming damages from Japan, 
193 Ibid., p. 193.
194 Th e most complete account of these debates can be found in Berita Masjumi, 
21 September 1951.
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however, as he maintained that their payment could be founded on 
Article 4 of the Round Table Conference Agreement which provided 
for the transfer of all rights and obligations from the Dutch East Indies 
to Indonesia.
 In the end, it was the prime minister’s supporters who prevailed.195 
On 6 September, Masyumi authorised the government to sign the San 
Francisco Treaty, but the aff air did not end there. During his stay in 
the United States, the minister for foreign aff airs, Subardjo—a very 
controversial fi gure within Masyumi—began discussions with Secretary 
of State Acheson, concerning American aid to Indonesia.196 When he 
returned to Jakarta, he pursued these negotiations with Ambassador 
Merle Cochran. Up until that point, the aid given to Indonesia by the 
United States was based on a simple agreement of economic and tech-
nical cooperation. In October 1950, Natsir’s government, mindful of 
containing American pressure on the country, turned down an off er 
of military help by the United States.197 Th e subject of the discussions 
between Subardjo and Cochran was a continuation of American assis-
tance in the form of fi nancial aid provided for in the Mutual Security 
Act (MSA) which Congress had just passed. In theory, the countries 
that benefi tted from fi nancial assistance had a choice of two options, 
provided for in Articles 511(a) and 511(b) of the MSA.198 Th e fi rst of 
these articles, 511(a), was the most restrictive on the benefi ciary state; 
it provided for the alignment of its defence policy with the United 
States. Th e second article, 511(b), only mentioned much vaguer obli-
gations, with the benefi ciary simply committing to joint eff orts at pro-
moting and maintaining peace and to take part in jointly defi ned 
actions to limit international tension. 
195 33 of the 61 members of the Leadership Council (Dewan Pimpinan) were present 
at the debate. 17 voted in favour, 14 voted against and two abstained. Ibid.
196 Achmad Subarjo was a close friend of Soekiman’s. He, like Soekiman, had be-
come an activist in Perhimpunan Indonesia during his studies in the Netherlands. 
After the declaration of independence, he had become involved in Tan Malaka’s 
attempted coup d’état on 3 July 1946. Subarjo was not known for his strong reli-
gious convictions and before his nomination as minister for foreign aff airs, he 
had not occupied any position of importance within Masyumi.
197 Feith, Th e Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p. 175.
198 For details on these articles, see Feith, Th e Decline of Constitutional Democracy 
in Indonesia, pp. 199–200. Th e text of the MSA was published by Abadi on 2 
February 1952.
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 On 5 January 1952, Subardjo signed an agreement based on 
Article 511(a). Th e signature of this protocol was initially kept secret, 
and when it was made public at the beginning of February, it sparked 
an outcry in political circles. Within Masyumi, Natsir’s supporters were 
extremely angry and their reaction led to the summoning of the party 
leadership to a meeting which was attended by Jusuf Wibisono and 
Soekiman, but not Subardjo. Soekiman, who was no doubt surprised 
by the virulence of this reaction, declared that he had not been kept 
informed of his foreign minister’s manoeuvres. At the end of the 
meeting, the party decided to “refuse to take any responsibility for this 
signature”, though it did not go so far as to withdraw its members 
from cabinet.” 199 On 21 February, Subardjo resigned, but most of the 
political parties continued to call for the resignation of the entire 
government,200 which duly took place two days later on the 23rd.
 Masyumi’s policy towards countries belonging to neither of the 
two international blocs followed two main principles: natural solidarity 
with other Muslim nations, and a circumspect neutrality towards any 
attempt at getting drawn into an alliance with one of the Cold War 
protagonists. Masyumi, who often received messages and delegations 
from Muslim countries, became the advocate of their causes before 
the Indonesian people. In May 1953, for example, a telegram from 
the Indonesian Union in Egypt (Persatuan Indonesia di Mesir) warned 
the party leadership of the nascent confl ict between Egypt and Great 
Britain concerning the Suez Canal. In response, Masyumi called on the 
Indonesian umma to vigorously support Egypt’s claims.201 When the 
Suez Crisis broke three years later, the Indonesian government, which 
Masyumi was a member of and which was being led for the second 
time by Ali Sastroamidjojo, immediately declared that the Egyptian 
people were within their rights. Natsir expressed his desire for an Indo-
nesian intervention in the confl ict, without actually specifying how this 
would happen.202 At the beginning of November 1956, the Union 
of Indonesian Muslim Workers (Sarekat Buruh Islam Indonesia, SBII) 
even suggested a worldwide strike to protest against the Anglo-French 
199 Berita Partai Masjumi, 21 February 1952.
200 Natsir himself declared that the government’s decision to remain in offi  ce “was 
incomprehensible”. Abadi, 22 February 1952.
201 Abadi, 30 June 1953.
202 Abadi, 9 August 1956.
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attack. Abadi noted that this was an extremely exceptional measure, 
as the union “was normally opposed to any political strikes”.203
 Palestinian Muslims also benefi tted from Masyumi’s support. In 
May and June 1954, three of their dignitaries went to Indonesia where 
they were invited to various religious ceremonies by Masyumi leaders 
who assured them of their support.204 Curiously enough, however, the 
Palestinian situation was never a topic which generated much real 
interest within the party. No proposal for concrete action was ever 
made and the party congress never passed a resolution in relation to it. 
Masyumi’s press published few articles on the Middle East, however, 
Abadi ’s readers were much better informed about the events of French 
political life, with most government resignations there making the 
front-page news.
 Th e Algerian question, on the other hand, was closely followed by 
the party. In December 1954, a resolution by the Seventh Masyumi 
Congress demanded that the United Nations take strict measures 
obliging France to recognise the independence of its three colonies in 
North Africa. In June 1956, Mohammad Natsir, in one of his speeches, 
drew a series of parallels between the Algerian nation’s struggle and the 
struggle which Indonesia had engaged in a few years previously. He 
proposed the organisation by Muslim countries of a new Afro-Asian 
conference entirely devoted to the Algerian question, and also asked 
the government to intervene in the United Nations in order to get a 
motion passed which would oblige France to begin negotiations geared 
at giving its colony independence.205 A few days later, Masyumi’s presi-
dent participated, as Indonesia’s representative, in the World Islamic 
Congress in Damas, which launched an appeal to break off  all relations 
with France.206
 References to Islam in Masyumi’s foreign policy never went be-
yond paying particular attention to other Muslim countries, which was 
essentially a rhetorical ploy on their part. Masyumi’s struggle was only 
a political one, and it never envisaged sending combatants or providing 
arms to its oppressed Muslim brothers abroad. Indeed, the Masyumi 
leaders’ criticism of contemporary Islamic states weakened the prospect 
203 Abadi, 5 November 1956.
204 Abadi, 24 May and 7 June 1954.
205 Abadi, 6 June 1956.
206 Abadi, 10 July 1957.
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of a “Muslim International” which might play a role on the interna-
tional stage.207 Th e idea of setting up an association uniting countries 
in favour of a neutral stance towards the two superpowers should in 
theory have appealed to the party leadership who, on several occasions, 
had made known their refusal to align themselves with either the USA 
or the USSR. Nonetheless, they were concerned that any such organi-
sation would become a neutral ally for the communist bloc, and so 
they greeted the Ali government’s decision to organise an Afro-Asian 
summit in Bandung with circumspection. Th e idea of such a confer-
ence, proposed by the Indonesian prime minister during a conference 
held in Colombo from the 28 April to 2 May 1954, did not receive a 
warm welcome from the party’s leaders. Th e party’s offi  cial reason for 
its lack of enthusiasm was its fear that China’s presence, along with the 
close relations between the Ali cabinet and the PKI, would lead the 
conference to merely condemn Western imperialism instead of adopting 
a more balanced and neutral position.208 But with the elections only a 
few months away, the party was also wary of the political capital which 
the prime minister’s party, the PNI, could gain from such an event. 
 A few incidental remarks were made about the summit by party 
members, but it was Rusjad Nurdin, the secretary of Masyumi for 
West Java, who developed the most complete commentary of the con-
ference’s resolutions in Abadi. Analysing one of the resolutions adopted 
which condemned colonisation in all its forms, he maintained that it 
was aimed in particular at communism, through the actions of the 
Soviet Union. As evidence for this claim, he cited the attendance at 
the conference of representatives of Muslim Turkestan and Buddhist 
Kalmuk, two minority groups who had suff ered oppression under Soviet 
rule. Th eir presence had angered the PKI, who accused Masyumi of 
collaborating with these representatives with a view to sabotaging the 
conference.209 
 Th e conference constituted an overwhelming success for the Ali 
government, and Masyumi’s unease with this could be seen clearly in 
the way the event was treated in Abadi. Th e Muslim daily devoted 
relatively few pages to the conference’s debates and resolutions,210 but 
207 See infra, Chapter 5.
208 See, for example, an interview with Mohamad Roem published by Abadi, 23 
December 1954.
209 Abadi, 28 April 1955.
210 Less than one ariticle per day and rarely on the front page.
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reported in great detail on the controversy which arose concerning 
the “Hospitality Committee”. As soon as the conference ended, the 
Masyumi deputy Nur el Ibrahimy took the government to task over 
this body, which was supposed to take care of the conference-goers’ 
“naughty needs” (kebutuhan jang nakal ).211 In response to the authori-
ties’ vigorous denials, Abadi, who gave over a large number of pages to 
this illustrious aff air, published an invitation card issued by the com-
mittee. It was a personal invitation—though the name of the lucky 
benefi ciary was hidden—written in English which read: “Give this 
ticket to the lady of your choice. If not ‘used’, please return it to the 
Hospitality Committee.” 212 In the following weeks, the pro-Masyumi 
press abounded with new accounts concerning such practices as well as 
a signifi cant number of condemnations by Islamic organisations. Th is 
allowed the party to detract from the government’s considerable success 
in organising the conference.
 Overall, the foreign policy pursued by Masyumi, both in govern-
ment and in opposition, confi rmed the strong infl uence of Western 
ideas on the party’s identity. Islam never appeared as the direct source 
of inspiration for specifi c party policies. Although the party’s unani-
mous condemnation of communism had a basis in religion, Masyumi’s 
evolution throughout the period 1945–49 showed that its anti-
communism was above all founded on a certain assessment of both the 
national and global balance of power; political ideology, and therefore 
Islam, were only referred to afterwards. What was most important for 
the Masyumi leadership was to keep this bond with the West which 
characterised their political culture. It was in the West that these men 
found the touchstone for their political identity, and although they paid 
lip-service to the idea of remaining neutral in the Cold War struggle 
which began at the end of the 1940s, they had clearly chosen their side. 
 Th ere was nonetheless a subtle distinction between open support 
towards the Western bloc and total alignment with an American posi-
tion which sometimes divided the party leadership. A certain number 
of grey areas surrounded the behaviour of the various protagonists in 
the MSA aff air. It would have been logical, for example, for Soekiman, 
who was at that time still close to Sukarno and who was more nation-
alistic than Natsir, to have argued within the party for a certain degree 
211 Abadi, 2 May 1955.
212 Abadi, 5 May 1955.
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of neutrality. Was his desire to tie Indonesia’s destiny to that of the 
United States, and more importantly, were the unusual manoeuvres of 
his minister for foreign aff airs, the result of some obscure American 
machinations? Shortly after the aff air, the possibility of such an intrigue 
was dealt with by the Indonesian press, but the evidence currently 
available does not allow us to affi  rm that it actually existed.213 Audrey 
and George Kahin, who studied the involvement of the United States 
in the revolt led by the PRRI, and who had access to declassifi ed CIA 
documents, mention the Americans’ goodwill towards the Masyumi 
leadership, but they do not reveal, for this period at least, any fi nancial 
assistance given by the United States to the modernist party.214
Economic Policy
Th e Challenges of Indonesia’s Economic Recovery
In 1950, Indonesia had two major challenges to tackle. First, it had to 
adapt to its new status as an independent state, which notably involved 
transforming an economy formerly reliant on the Dutch metropole 
and worldwide markets. Th e vast majority of the country’s economic 
wealth was in the hands of oligopolistic companies, most of which 
were Dutch, in control of plantation farms, the oil industry, maritime 
trade, the aviation industry, the banking sector, as well as foreign trade 
(approximately 60% of Indonesia’s trade with the Netherlands was 
carried out by fi ve Dutch companies). Domestic trade, on the other 
hand, was mainly controlled by companies belonging to the country’s 
Chinese minority.215 In addition, the country had to deal with the 
problems linked to the aftermath of almost ten years of confl ict. Th e 
rice harvest, for example, did not recover its 1938 yield levels until 
1952, and in the same year, industrial production only represented 
60% of a pre-war level which was already quite poor.216
213 See infra, Chapter 4.
214 Audrey Kahin and George McTurnan Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: Th e 
Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: Th e New Press, 
1995).
215 Estimated to be two per cent of the population.
216 For a complete picture of the country’s economic situation at the beginning of 
the 1950s, see “L’évolution économique de l’Indonésie”, in Notes et études docu-
mentaires, nos. 2014 and 2015 (Paris: La Documentation Française, May 1955).
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 Th e Indonesian parties did not possess the skills necessary to elabo-
rate credible economic planning policies. Masyumi, with two relatively 
reputable economists, Jusuf Wibisono and Sjaff ruddin Prawiranegara, 
both of whom served as minister for fi nance, was far from being the 
least qualifi ed in this area.217 Indeed, it was one of the few parties to 
have developed an economic programme which went beyond the asser-
tion of a few general claims. Like most of the other political parties, 
they advocated a pro-active policy based on a large degree of state 
intervention. Th e fi rst principle set out in the party’s 1949 programme 
was that of a “planned economy” (ekonomi terpimpin). Th is principle 
encapsulated planned economic production, limited and constructive 
competition between companies under the state’s supervision, the con-
trolling of prices and salaries and, fi nally, incentives for cooperatives 
aimed at promoting indigenous companies.218 At the Surabaya congress 
in 1954, Masyumi adopted an emergency economic and fi nancial pro-
gramme which, in order to attract foreign investors, was published in 
English as well as in Indonesian, and which constitutes the most com-
plete economic policy document to have been published by the party. 
It took up the principles which had already been laid down a few years 
earlier, and sketched out a path which the party thought would help 
Indonesia emerge from the economic doldrums which it depicted the 
country to be in.219
 Th e fi rst characteristic of Masyumi’s economic policy was the 
necessity for budgetary and economic rigour. For the party’s leaders, 
the spiralling increases in state spending constituted the principal cause 
of infl ation, Indonesia’s main economic woe. To remedy this situation, 
the party proposed focusing public policy eff orts on “the restoration of 
law and order, education and professional training as well as produc-
tive activities in areas of public benefi t (irrigation, electricity etc.)” .220 
217 Th e other Islamic parties were cruelly lacking in expertise in this area. Perti 
was mainly interested in questions of education, while NU made no eff ort to 
recruit economic specialists until after their electoral success in 1955. Amongst 
those whom NU enlisted to provide economic advice was Boerhanoeddin, minister 
for fi nance in Ali’s second government. Noer, Partai Islam di pentas nasional, 
p. 287.
218 Masyumi’s Programme for Action (II.1), 1949.
219 Masyumi had at this time been in opposition for almost a year.
220 Masjumi Congress at Surabaya in December 1954, Urgency Programme of the 
Masjumi, to Safeguard the Nation Economically and Financially (Jakarta, 1954), 
p. 37.
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Th is restriction of the state’s activities was supposed to allow a signifi -
cant reduction in the number of civil servants, but although it was 
advocated by the cabinets led by Hatta, Natsir, Soekiman and Wilopo, 
it was never really implemented.221 Th e army was the only state sector 
to experience a considerable drop in its numbers, with the ensuing 
problems mentioned earlier.
 Within the party, this policy of budgetary rigour was not always 
interpreted in the same manner. It provoked debates over the question 
of civil service pay but also the wider issue of how public money 
should be spent. Under the Natsir government, the fi nance minister 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara posed as the champion of a policy of fi nan-
cial rigour.222 Despite the enormous growth in state revenue due to 
the Korean War and the consequent rise in the price of raw materials, 
particularly tin and rubber, he distributed this fi nancial windfall with 
extreme parsimony, refusing both to raise civil servants’ salaries and to 
fi nance political patronage networks.223 As a result, Indonesia benefi tted 
from its only budgetary surplus of that period.224 However, this policy 
of budgetary rigour did not receive unanimous approval within the 
party, and the Soekiman government which succeeded Natsir’s cabinet 
had every intention of making use of the budgetary reserves accu-
mulated by their predecessors. Th e new minister for fi nance, Jusuf 
Wibisono, handed out generous pay increases to civil servants, notably 
through a modifi cation of how the Lebaran bonus was awarded.225 
He also instituted an informal system, which other governments also 
adopted, authorising banks controlled by the state to award generous 
221 During the Wilopo government, the number of civil servants was roughly the 
same as it had been four years previously (571,000). Feith, Th e Decline of Consti-
tutional Democracy in Indonesia, p. 302.
222 He was notably the architect of a comprehensive monetary reform—the 
money supply was almost halved—accompanied by a strong devaluation of the 
rupiah. On the extremely complex modalities of these reforms, see “L’évolution 
économique de l’Indonésie”, in Notes et études documentaires.
223 See Indonesia Dipersimpangan Djalan, written shortly afterwards.
224 1.2 million rupiah for 1951, despite the largesse of the Soekiman government, 
which came to power on 27 April 1951.
225 Previously, the government had merely given civil servants an advance at 
Lebaran (the end of Ramadan), which it recovered over the following months by 
docking it from their pay. Jusuf Wibisono transformed this advance into a simple 
bonus which would not have to be refunded. Moreover, the government reduced 
the tax rate for civil servants. “L’évolution économique de l’Indonésie”, Notes et 
études documentaires.
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credit conditions to companies run by members of the government 
parties.226 Th is spendthrift policy was sternly denounced in the Masyumi 
press by Sjafruddin Prawinaegara.227 Prawinaegara fi nally managed to 
impose his vision of monetary policy in the Urgency Programme which 
stated its desire to combat the “demon of infl ation”.228
 In other areas of economic policy, Masyumi did not identify itself 
with any particular school of thought. Nonetheless, the analysis of both 
its economic programmes and their implementation shows it to have 
been a party very much located on the supply-side spectrum of econo-
mic theories. Its main objective was to contribute to the improvement 
of productivity levels rather than to stimulate an increase in domestic 
demand. Economic growth, brought on largely by the Korean War, led 
to an improvement in exchange rates which brought about signifi cant 
salary rises: between 1939 and 1951, salaries (calculated in dollars) 
increased threefold.229 However, production per inhabitant remained 
well below its pre-war levels, and so the benefi t of these wage increases 
was lost in the resultant spiralling of infl ation.
 Th e country’s production capacity at the time depended mainly 
on a small industrial sector specialising in the transformation of agri-
cultural products. It consisted mainly of family fi rms, and successive 
governments worked towards encouraging it to develop further. In 
1949, the Hatta government established a programme incentivising the 
creation of cooperatives between small agricultural producers, most of 
whom were also engaged in small-scale industrial activity. Th ese pro-
grammes were continued and amplifi ed by Masyumi-led governments. 
In accordance with the programme set out in 1949 and taken up again 
in 1952, the Natsir government established the “Sumitro Plan”.230 Th e 
226 Herbert Feith, Th e Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p. 218. 
However, Feith points out a little later in the book (p. 296) that, unlike Iskaq, 
the minister for fi nance in the fi rst Ali government, Jusuf Wibisono did not dis-
criminate against any political party when distributing indirect fi nancial assistance, 
and even allowed the PKI to benefi t from it.
227 See, for example, Abadi, 2 July 1951.
228 Masjumi Congress at Surabaya in December 1954, Urgency Programme of the 
Masjumi, to Safeguard the Nation Economically and Financially, p. 12.
229 “L’évolution économique de l’Indonésie”, in Notes et études documentaries.
230 Th e name was taken from the minister for trade and industry, Sumitro 
Djojohadikusumo. He was a former trade attaché to Washington, a member of 
the PSI and a close supporter of Natsir and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. He was 
later called the “most brilliant economist of his generation”. Th e Suharto regime 
turned to him when it was in its dying days in April and May 1998.
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foundations for this plan were laid in October 1950 with the creation 
of a government body, the Cooperative Service (Jawatan Kooperasi), 
responsible for encouraging the creation of cooperatives in rural towns 
and providing small-scale agricultural producers with both technical 
advice and fi nancial assistance.
 Th e Sumitro Plan encountered a certain degree of success, helped 
no doubt by the fact that it was maintained under the Ali govern-
ment.231 Along with this policy of stimulating growth, Masyumi simul-
taneously endeavoured to limit payroll costs for businesses and to 
diminish the number of industrial disputes. In 1950, the government 
had to promulgate a law dating back to 1948 which established a 
40-hour working week and a seven-hour working day. Meanwhile, 
however, new laws promoting social justice through the provision of 
social security, old-age pensions and various other benefi ts, led to small 
and medium-sized enterprises incurring signifi cant social charges. Th e 
Masyumi leadership regularly declared itself in favour of many of these 
social gains, and indeed in September 1950, the Natsir government 
established a minimum wage for workers in the plantation sector. 
However, Masyumi’s position concerning questions of economic policy, 
as in many other areas, was governed by pragmatism. Th e seven-hour 
working day was often called into question,232 and the Masyumi leader-
ship often called on employees to moderate their demands for wage 
increases, reminding them that the eff ect of such increases would be 
cancelled out by their infl ationary impact.233
 In response to the confl icting demands which weighed upon it, 
the party managed at times to fi nd creative solutions. In an attempt 
to reconcile economic competitiveness with the need for social justice, 
for example, Masyumi proposed to create a system in which on top 
of a minimum wage paid by employers (upah kerja), the state would 
add a supplement (upah social ), which would allow employees a decent 
231 Between 1952 to 1954, the number of cooperative members rose from 1 mil-
lion to 1.4 million.
232 In October 1951, Natsir explained that “Our country will not fi nd a way out 
of its current diffi  culties by working only seven hours a day at a leisurely pace”. 
Berita Majumi, 3 October 1951. In April 1953, Jusuf Wibisono declared that 
the working day should be increased from seven to eight hours a day. Abadi, 1 
April 1953. However, these measures were extremely unpopular and were never 
implemented.
233 See, for example, Masyumi Congress at Surabaya in December 1954, Urgency 
Programme of the Masjumi, to Safeguard the Nation Economically and Financially.
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standard of living. Th is proposal, formulated in the 1949 Programme 
for Action, was never in fact put into action. In the area of industrial 
disputes, however, another original and pragmatic solution did manage 
to get implemented. In February 1951, in response to a series of strikes 
which had paralysed the country, the Natsir government issued a direc-
tive banning, on pain of being fi ned or imprisoned, all work stoppages 
in sectors which could be considered as essential, including transporta-
tion, banking and the oil industry.234 At the same time though, Natsir 
established, at both national and regional levels mediation committees 
tasked with holding negotiations between employers and employees. 
Th e government’s measures limiting strike action were criticised vehe-
mently by the opposition parties, who considered that they were in 
violation of the Constitution. Th ey nonetheless led to a signifi cant drop 
in the number of industrial disputes in 1952, including sectors where 
strikes were permitted.235
A National rather than Nationalistic Economy
Th e entire Indonesian political class agreed on the necessity for creating 
a genuinely national economy. Th is objective entailed both the elimi-
nation of the country’s dependence on exports and the transferral 
of foreign-owned companies to Indonesian ownership. Th ere was an 
overall consensus on the means needed to achieve the fi rst of these 
targets. Successive governments attempted, by means of taxes or import 
licences, to limit the importation of non-essential products.236 However, 
Masyumi spoke out strongly against the abuse of these measures by 
the fi rst Ali government. Th e minister for economic aff airs, Iskaq 
Tjokrohadisurjo (PNI), had established a system of awarding import-
export licences which favoured native Indonesians at the expense of 
foreigners but also Indonesian citizens of foreign extraction (the latter 
were, for the most part, of Chinese origin). Masyumi did not contest 
the principle of this policy, nor did it object to the xenophobia which 
234 Th e new directive was published by Suara Partai Masjumi, March–April 1951.
235 “L’évolution économique de l’Indonésie”, in Notes et études documentaires.
236 For example, the Wilopo government, in February 1952, imposed taxes as high 
as 200% on luxury products. Another type of measure used included limiting 
import companies’ working capital by requiring the upfront payment of up to 
75% of their imported goods and by forbidding banks from extending credit on 
the strength of those amounts.
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underpinned it. However, it did denounce the partisan favouritism and 
corruption which the awarding of these licences brought about, as well 
as the way in which they led to an unnecessary increase in the price of 
imported goods.237 Th e party also accused the government of having 
“failed to bring about the emergence of middle-class entrepreneurs who 
would be benefi cial to our society”, and also “having done little more 
than give birth to a group of fl unkies and Ali-Baba and Ali-William 
entrepreneurs.” 238
 From the late 1940s, another much more radical means was pro-
posed in order to allow native Indonesians to regain control of their 
country’s economy. Th is involved the nationalisation of large companies 
owned mainly by foreigners or by Indonesians of foreign extraction. 
Masyumi, contrary to what its political opponents claimed, was in 
fact very much in favour of this policy, but the party considered that 
it should be implemented progressively, and should protect both the 
country’s fi nances and its future prospects of attracting foreign capital 
investment. Consequently, the 1949 Programme for Action planned to 
nationalise, in order of priority, “the Central Bank, companies which 
played an essential role in the area of communications, public service 
corporations and mining companies”, with the proviso that this be 
carried out according to the “state of public fi nances and to general 
economic conditions”. Th e minister for fi nance in the Natsir govern-
ment, Sjafrudding Prawiranegara, for example, did not want to nation-
alise the Javasche Bank, as he believed that the Central Bank’s Indo-
nesian personnel did not have suffi  cient experience to run it properly. 
Jusuf Wibisono, who succeeded Prawiranegara as fi nance minister when 
Soekiman became prime minister, shared his predecessor’s point of 
view, but he considered that for symbolic reasons it was important 
to act. On 30 April 1951, three days after the new government took 
up offi  ce, the Javasche Bank was nationalised and became known as 
Bank Indonesia, with none other than Sjafruddin Prawiranegara as its 
governor.
237 A parliamentary report delivered one year later by the Finance Inspection 
Committee (Dewan Pengawas Keuangan) observed 633 cases of corruption. Noer, 
“Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology, and Political Role in Indonesia”, p. 314.
238 Th e terms “Ali-Baba” and “Ali-William” referred, respectively, to companies 
owned by Chinese or Dutch businessmen who used Indonesian fi gureheads. 
Masyumi Congress at Surabaya in December 1954, Urgency Programme of the 
Masjumi, to Safeguard the Nation Economically and Financially, p. 20.
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 During Wilopo’s premiership, two aff airs sparked off  a debate 
between the two main coalition partners, the PNI and Masyumi, over 
the issue of nationalisation. Th ese aff airs concerned the oilfi elds of 
North Sumatra and the restitution of an occupied tobacco plantation 
to its foreign owners. During the Dutch colonial period, signifi cant 
deposits of oil had been discovered in the north of the island of 
Sumatra and the concession to exploit these oilfi elds had been awarded 
to Bataafse Petroleum Maatshappij (BPM). Following the war, the 
exploitation of these reserves had been handed over to the company’s 
Indonesian employees, resulting in a substantial drop in oil yields to 
the extent that its income no longer even enabled it to pay its em-
ployees. Faced with the likelihood of bankruptcy, the Wilopo govern-
ment decided to hand its management and ownership back to the 
original concessionary company. However, this move was suspended 
when the PNI demanded, at its party conference in December 1952, 
that the oil deposits be nationalised, or at the very least that their 
exploitation be reserved for the government. Th ough it was in favour 
of nationalising the exploitation of all of the country’s underground 
resources in the long term, Masyumi was opposed to these demands, 
considering it necessary fi rst of all to acquire the necessary technical 
know-how to make the operation successful. Natsir reiterated this posi-
tion in December 1953 during a visit to Sumatra; the problem had 
still not been resolved at this stage and the government of the day, 
under Prime Minister Ali, despite a number of forceful declarations, 
had not yet found a solution to the technical problems attendant upon 
nationalisation. At one stage, the possibility of Japanese participation 
had even been evoked, drawing an ironic reaction from the president of 
Masyumi, who explained that his own party had often been criticised 
for kowtowing to foreign investors, but that in this instance the govern-
ment was planning to simply replace the Dutch with the Japanese.239 
In this aff air, Masyumi warned the government against adopting an 
overly nationalistic attitude which would run the risk of discrediting 
the country in the eyes of the international business world.240
 A few months later, the debate over nationalisation arose again 
with the Tandjung Morawa aff air. In East Sumatra, former tobacco 
239 Abadi, 7 December 1953.
240 An attitude described as “cowboyish” (bersifat cowboy-cowboyan) by Isa Anshary. 
Abadi, 2 February 1954.
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plantations had been illegally occupied since the war by families that 
had developed small subsistence farms there. Th e Indonesian authori-
ties wished to hand back at least a portion of these lands to the Dutch 
companies who still held the concessions for them. As with the aff air 
concerning the oil deposits, it was thought not only that this solution 
would allow a much more profi table exploitation of the plantations and 
therefore generate revenue for the government, but also that it would 
send out a positive message to potential foreign investors interested in 
Indonesia. 
 In July 1951, the Soekiman government succeeded in reaching 
a compromise agreement with the former concessionary company. 
According to the terms of this agreement, half of the plantation land—
130,000 hectares of the total 255,000—would be returned to its ori-
ginal owners, while the rest would be used to rehouse the 62,000 fami-
lies occupying the land illegally.241 Although the agreement was drawn 
up under Soekiman’s premiership, it fell to Wilopo’s government to 
implement it, and when the illegal occupants refused to leave the land, 
it was decided that they were to be removed by force. Tragedy struck, 
however, on 16 March 1953, when a group of Chinese and Indonesian 
peasants who were threatened with expulsion tried during a demonstra-
tion to seize the weapons belonging to a police station in Tandjong 
Morawa, a locality situated ten kilometres north of Medan. Th e police 
opened fi re on the demonstrators, killing fi ve people; a number of 
protestors were also arrested. Th e aff air provoked an outcry and soon 
had political repercussions. A PNI deputy Abdullah Jusuf was sent by 
his party to investigate the incident and his enquiries led him to con-
clude that the Masyumi governor of North Sumatra, Abdul Hakim, 
was responsible for the tragic events. Jusuf even accused him of having 
received signifi cant sums of money from the former concessionary 
companies.242 However, the conclusions reached both by representatives 
of the Home Aff airs Ministry and by a delegation of Masyumi parlia-
mentary deputies were quite diff erent. Th ey emphasised the role played 
by the local branch of the PKI as well as the presence in the area, at 
241 Feith, Th e Wilopo Cabinet, 1952–1953, p. 182. Th e agreement is examined 
in its entirety by Karl J. Pelzer, “Th e Agrarian Confl ict in East Sumatra”, Pacifi c 
Aff airs (June 1957).
242 For further reading on these accusations and Masyumi’s denial, see Abadi, 26 
May 1953.
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the time of the events, of a representative of the Chinese consulate 
based in Jakarta. In mid-May, Sidik Kertapati, a parliamentary repre-
sentative of the Union of Indonesian Peasants, SAKTI (Sarekat Tani 
Indonesia) tabled a motion of no confi dence in the minister for home 
aff airs, Masyumi’s Mohamad Roem, whom they held responsible for 
the crackdown on demonstrators. At this point, the PNI threatened to 
vote in favour of the motion and demanded, in exchange for their 
abstention, that Masyumi support the PNI’s candidate for the vacant 
position of minister for information.243 Th e Masyumi leadership de-
cided to reject this trade-off , 244 and on 3 June, before the motion had 
even been voted on, the Wilopo government tendered its resignation to 
the president.
 In its Urgency Programme drawn up in December 1954, Masyumi 
returned at some length to these questions. Th e programme denounced 
the “economic policies inspired by a mis-interpretation of nationalism” 
espoused by its opponents, and it underlined the disastrous economic 
eff ects of foreign capital fl ight.245 It explained in particular that nu-
merous plantations were not receiving the level of investment necessary 
for their survival because of concessionary companies’ fears of being 
expelled from the country. Th is situation was doubly regrettable as the 
revenue generated by a hectare of rice (2,000 Rp per year) was far 
below what could be generated by a hectare of sugar cane (28,000 Rp 
per year) or tobacco (37,000 Rp a year in East Sumatra). Th e pro-
gramme consequently advised the government “to look for technical 
and fi nancial assistance abroad, regardless of its ancestry, and also to 
mobilise both the entire work-force and all of the available capital in 
the country.” It also called on the plain common sense of their rural 
electors in an attempt to encourage them to overcome any reluctance 
towards such a programme:
If even a buff alo which we use to cultivate paddy fi elds needs to 
receive suffi  cient care and food for us to be sure of his services, will 
we abandon a human being whose assistance we require to further 
our own interests? 246
243 Abadi, 28 May 1953.
244 Abadi, 1 June 1953.
245 “Economic policy from Misinterpreted Nationalistic Viewpoint”, Masyumi 
Congress at Surabaya in December 1954, Urgency Programme of the Masyumi, to 
Safeguard the Nation Economically and Financially.
246 Ibid.
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Th ese concrete aspects of Masyumi’s economic policy, defended by the 
party both when in opposition and in government, constituted a re-
markable example of the hiatus—which we will further examine later
—that existed between the pragmatism of the actions proposed and 
implemented by the party and the idealism of the general theories de-
fended by its central fi gures.247
 Th e necessity of economic recovery and, more importantly, the 
instability of government coalitions did not allow it to implement the 
Islamic principles which it claimed to be the representative of. Th e 
chronic political instability of the young Republic was, at that time, 
attributed to the Provisional Assembly regime which had been in place 
since 1945, and which justifi ed the adoption of temporary solutions. 
With the organisation of legislative and constituent assembly elections 
planned for September and December 1955, Masyumi hoped to con-
solidate its policies in the subsequent years. Th e programme which it 
formulated for the election campaign was designed to allow it to ap-
peal to voters who were not advocates of political Islam, and thus to 
become the uncontested political heavyweight of the future Indonesian 
Parliament.
247 See infra, Chapter 6.
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The policies pursued by Masyumi in government were based above all on pragmatism, far removed from any form of doctrinal rigidity. 
Th ey showed no clear signs of the far-reaching programme for society 
which the 1955 election campaign allowed them to elaborate. Th e 
run-up to the elections constituted the culmination of a strategy which 
Mohammad Natsir and his supporters had patiently elaborated. Th is 
strategy possessed two complementary characteristics: a complete devo-
tion to Western-style democracy and a secularisation of the party’s 
programme. Masyumi was convinced that it could draw support from 
beyond the Muslim electorate, and endeavoured to present a tolerant 
image so as to avoid giving its nationalist opponents any ammunition 
to criticise the Islamic party. 
 Given the party’s electoral hopes, their poor performance in the 
polls was particularly disappointing. It led Masyumi to adopt two 
contradictory attitudes: it presented itself as the fi nal rampart against 
the threat posed to the country’s democratic institutions by President 
Sukarno, while at the same time in the Constituent Assembly it made 
hard-line demands for an Islamic state, which eventually contributed 
to the downfall of Indonesian democracy.
Th e 1955 Elections —Th e Broken Hope of Muslim 
Democracy
Th e National Assembly and Constituent Assembly elections which were 
held in September and December 1955 were the indirect cause of a 
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complete transformation of the Indonesian political system. Th e results, 
which were offi  cially announced in March and July 1956, constituted 
a major setback for parliamentary democracy. Although the elections 
had been postponed several times, there was widespread hope that they 
would produce a majority which would be both decisive and stable. 
Such hopes were dashed, however, and the political divisions which 
had appeared in November 1945, and which had paralysed public life 
for the following ten years, remained.
 Th e election results had several eff ects on Masyumi. Up until the 
elections, it was considered Indonesia’s foremost political party, but in 
their aftermath it was now simply one of four large political parties 
which could legitimately aspire to a role in government. As the main 
government party during the country’s parliamentary regime, Masyumi 
embodied its fi rm attachment to democratic principles, but also its sys-
temic failings.
Th e Election Campaign’s Illusions and Contradictions
Th e run-up to the elections changed the modus operandi of Indonesian 
political life profoundly. Firstly, it marked, symbolically, the end of a 
period, which had in fact concluded in 1949, during which political 
parties did not merely seek power but fought, above all, for the very 
survival of the Republic. Secondly, the campaign for votes obliged par-
ties to completely revise both how they were organised and how they 
operated. Up until that point, parties operated on a national level, and 
indeed, to be more precise, on a Jakartanese level. Th ey had very little 
real presence locally and their approach to local politics was generally 
dictated by considerations which only concerned the small political 
microcosm in the capital. 
 Parties concerned themselves with regional questions when the 
nomination of a governor, resident, or other local authority position 
had to be decided, leading to intense political battles. It had become 
customary to consider large areas of the country as spheres of infl uence 
belonging to a particular party, and, as a result, little eff ort was made 
locally to set up the political machinery capable of canvassing for votes 
(despite the fact that the majority of the country’s voters lived in its 
villages). Two political parties, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) 
and Masyumi, fell outside this general rule. Th e latter, unlike its op-
ponents, had inherited from the period of Japanese occupation an 
organisational structure which extended to village-level in a number 
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of regions.1 In addition to that, the party was composed not only of 
individual members but also of Muslim organisations, some of which, 
such as the Muhammadiyah, were present in a large number of the 
country’s villages.
 In order to coordinate its electioneering activities, Masyumi set up, 
alongside its governing body, an Election Action Committee (Komite 
Aksi Pemilhan Umum, KAPU). Th is committee had a hierarchical 
structure headed in Jakarta by Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, the party’s 
vice president. Most of the party’s campaign consisted in organising 
election rallies. It emphasised this mode of electioneering much more 
than its opponents, and diff erentiated itself from other parties by allo-
cating considerable sums of money to the purchase of cinematographic 
equipment, amplifi ers and video players, as well as to the creation of a 
campaign fi lm.2 
 Th is may partially explain the gap between the hopes entertained 
by the party during the campaign and the harsh reality of the election 
results. Th e large attendance levels at these large open-air election ral-
lies, during which the party’s local fi gures as well as its leadership took 
the stage, lulled the party’s leaders into overestimating its infl uence. 
Even in the smallest localities, the crowds attending these rallies could 
be counted in thousands, according to press accounts; 3 fi gures such as 
Isa Anshary, the head of the West Java branch, attracted very large 
numbers of people.4 However, the reasons people had for attending 
these mass meetings were not at all linked to any adherence to the 
party’s ideology. Villagers often either came out of curiosity, for the 
rally’s entertainment value or quite simply because it was a place to 
meet other people from their village. It was hardly surprising, then, that 
Isa Anshary, nicknamed “the little Napoleon of Masyumi”, attracted 
such large numbers. For somebody looking for entertainment, such a 
1 In certain villages, however, Masyumi branches became sections of Nahdlatul 
Ulama following the 1952 split.
2 Herbert Feith, Th e Indonesian Election of 1955 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1962), p. 21. Neither Abadi nor Hikmah mentioned anything about fi lms 
being projected during rallies, however.
3 At the rally organised during Roem’s visit to Gunung Kesari, Abadi reported 
that he spoke in front of 10,000 people who had come from the surrounding 
villages.
4 Soebagijo I.N., Jusuf Wibisono. Karang di Tengah Gelombang (Jakarta: Gunung 
Agung, 1980), p. 231.
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brilliant orator guaranteed them a good night out, even if they hap-
pened to be communist. 
 Another electioneering practice used by Masyumi during the cam-
paign consisted of simply adopting the ideas used by its arch political 
enemy, the PKI. For example, it copied a technique employed by its 
communist opponents which involved engraving on a considerable num-
ber of metal coins the party’s symbol—a crescent moon surmounted by 
a star—and distributing them to the public. Like other political parties, 
Masyumi had associated symbols with appealing allegorical interpreta-
tions designed to create a subliminal bond between voters and the 
party, which would have more sway over voters than speeches or rea-
soned arguments. In certain parts of Java, however, this plan backfi red, 
as throughout the campaign Masyumi’s opponents never lost an oppor-
tunity to remind people of a long-standing superstition which held that 
the association of the crescent moon with a star was a bad omen.5
 Masyumi’s campaign never gave rise to a clearly defi ned electoral 
strategy, and indeed Jusuf Wibisono criticised his fellow party leaders 
for this. According to him, the absence of a campaign ploy was due 
to their conviction that Masyumi was the largest political organisation 
in the country.6 One of the leadership’s main fears, however, and one 
which was common to the entire political class, was that certain sec-
tions of the electorate, most of whom had never voted before, would 
be intimidated by the complexity of the election and would therefore 
abandon the idea of voting. As a result, all the major parties organised 
simulated elections in the weeks leading up to the actual event, with 
the aim of showing voters how to recognise and punch the correct sym-
bol on their ballot paper. Th e Election Action Committee for Jakarta 
Raya, for example, organised at the end of January a preliminary ini-
tiation session “reserved for members of Masyumi, Muslimat and the 
party’s constituent organisations”.7
 Apart from this urgency to encourage people to vote, two other 
important ploys fi gured in the election campaign, which allowed us 
to see Masyumi’s political identity more clearly. Th e fi rst of these was 
designed to present the party as the natural choice for Muslim voters. 
5 Feith, Th e Indonesian Election of 1955, p. 17.
6 Soebagijo I.N., Jusuf  Wibisono. Karang di Tengah Gelombang, p. 240.
7 Abadi, 1 February 1955.
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Th e aim was to spread a twofold message within the Muslim commu-
nity which consisted fi rst of all in convincing balloters that voting in 
accordance with their faith was a religious obligation, and then per-
suading them that Masyumi was the party which would allow them to 
fulfi l this religious obligation. Th e party’s task was a complicated one, 
however, as it had to diff erentiate itself from its Muslim opponents 
(NU, PSII and Perti) without drawing attention to divisions within the 
Muslim community.8 Th e founding project of the party was to establish 
the political unity of the umma, and so, mention of the schisms which 
took place in 1947 and 1952 was to be avoided. Th e party line on 
this thorny issue was to adopt a conciliatory approach. Whenever the 
party’s divisions were brought up, they were blamed on the opponents 
of political Islam, notably the PNI which was implicitly accused of 
having infl uenced the breakaway of Nahdlatul Ulama.9 
 Another strategy adopted by Masyumi throughout the campaign 
was to present itself as the last bastion of Muslim solidarity which 
should allow “[us] to show [our] strength and thus to win the elec-
tions.” 10 Th is provoked virulent attacks from its Muslim opponents: the 
traditionalists of Nahdlatul Ulama in particular attempted to show that 
Masyumi did not defend the values of the ahla Sunnah wal-jamaah 
(the people of the tradition of Mohammad). Th ey claimed that 
Masyumi did not respect the authority of the ulamas, and they stig-
matised the party’s tolerance towards those who wore Western clothing 
during prayer.11 Masyumi’s leaders did not react to these accusations 
8 Certain Masyumi editorialists were extremely prudent concerning this question. 
For example, in Hikmah’s last edition before the elections (no. 39, published 24 
September 1955), its religious section naively explained that “the symbol of the 
crescent moon and the star, for example, is that of a Muslim party presenting 
candidates who you can vote for.” Th e party’s representatives did not always 
bother with such niceties, however; for example, one of Masyumi’s candidates for 
the parliamentary elections, Basri, explained to members of the Association of 
Muslim Students (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam) that three major political families 
were taking part in the election—communism, nationalism and Islam—and 
that the latter was “represented by Masyumi (Hikmah, no. 38, 17 September 
1955).
9 See, for example, the editorial in Hikmah, no. 27, 2 July 1955.
10 Ibid.
11 Gregory John Fealy, “Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A Political History of 
Nahdlatul Ulama, 1952–1967”, PhD diss., Monash University, 1998, Chapter 4, 
“Th e Quest for Power, 1953–1955”.
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and they never publicly criticised the other political parties who iden-
tifi ed themselves with Islam. Th e modernist party clearly wanted to 
place itself above any such quarrels and appear as the defender of the 
unity it had proclaimed.12
 Although Masyumi was the natural representative of Muslim 
values, its election campaign was practically void of any religious ref-
erences. Natsir’s party wished to reach out beyond the traditional elec-
torate of political Islam, which the party seemed to consider it had 
already won over, in order to embody the prospect of a peaceable 
Muslim democracy. To do this, it needed to shake off  the image of 
religious extremism which both its nationalist and communist oppo-
nents tried to associate it with. Masyumi had been regularly accused 
of threatening the country’s unity with radical Islamic demands since 
President Sukarno’s 1953 speech in Amuntai, but during the election 
campaign, it presented an image of openness. Th ere was no sign in the 
party’s press of “Masyumi’s clamorous campaign in favour of an Islamic 
State” which Goshal Balads spoke of.13 Th is important stage in the 
development of the party’s ideology will be examined later;14 we will 
limit ourselves here to looking at certain aspects which were directly 
linked to the election preparations. 
 Th e Masyumi leadership wanted above all to reassure the country’s 
non-Muslim community, and this preoccupation constituted a real 
leitmotiv in the party’s rhetoric. In June 1955, for example, when Natsir 
dealt with the issue of religion in a speech he gave in Manado, he 
emphasised Islam’s tolerance and invited Muslims to protect and sup-
port not only their religion but also that of other communities such as 
Christians.15 A month later, Mohamad Roem, on a visit to Bali, pointed 
out that “a state which is founded on Islam would not be the property 
of the Muslim community on the pretext that it made up almost eighty 
million people.” 16 In conjunction with this more religiously inclusive 
12 See, for example, the editorial in Hikmah, no. 27, 25 July 1955.
13 Goshal Baladas, Indonesian Politics 1955–1959: Th e Emergence of Guided Demo-
cracy (Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi, 1982), p. 47. Such a campaign would have been 
in total contradiction with the rapprochement between the PSI, Masyumi and 
the Christian parties which had followed the collapse of the Ali government and 
which Baladas himself looks at in detail (p. 30).
14 See infra. Chapter 5.
15 Hikmah, no. 29, 16 July 1955.
16 Hikmah, no. 32, 6 August 1955.
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tone, the party completed the process of removing from its political 
message any vocabulary which could be interpreted as aggressive, even 
though it ran the risk of losing a part of its Muslim identity by doing 
so. Th e term “Muslim state” (Negara Islam) was carefully avoided and 
no specifi c measure was mentioned concerning the Islamisation of the 
country’s institutions. In its edition published on 2 April 1955, Hikmah 
explained what would happen “if Masyumi inspired the government”. 
It maintained that if Masyumi was victorious in the elections for 
Parliament and the Constituent Assembly, “the legislative assembly 
would constitute a solid bulwark for a government formed and led 
by Masyumi” and in the new constitution “every article [would be] 
in accordance with the wishes of the Indonesian Muslim community.” 
Without clarifying the exact nature of these “wishes”, the magazine 
declared that “the fulfi lment of Islam’s teachings and Islam’s laws will 
become embodied without diffi  culty and the ideals of the Islamic Re-
public of Indonesia will be fulfi lled.” 17
 On top of the vagueness surrounding the party’s proposals con-
cerning religion, an eff ort was made in the lead-up to the election to 
secularise the party’s political programme. In the only real election pro-
gramme published by the party, no reference to Islam appeared; it pro-
posed 55 measures, most of which were drawn from motions adopted 
during previous party congresses. Th ough it did not contain many new 
ideas, it does enable us to identify the themes which were thought 
likely to appeal to Masyumi’s electorate as well as the degree of impor-
tance which the party accorded them.18 
 Th e programme began with a declaration of a few general prin-
ciples which constituted a sort of “Masyumi Pancasila ”, although this 
term was not actually used.19 Th e party’s main objective was to establish 
a “state where the rule of law would guarantee to all Indonesia’s inhabi-
tants, citizens as well as foreigners, the safety of their souls and of their 
goods.” 20 Other important goals were “the defence of the principles of 
deliberation and of democracy”, the “guarantee of religious freedom” 
and “of fundamental human rights”, with special emphasis put on 
“women’s rights which must be protected in the political, economic 
17 Ibid.
18 Published by Hikmah, no. 39, 24 September 1955.
19 For more on the attitude of Masyumi’s leaders towards the national ideology, 
see infra, Chapter 5.
20 Hikmah, no. 39, 24 September 1955.
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and social domains.” A series of socially responsible economic measures 
were also proposed, including the organisation of the production and 
distribution of goods according to a “plan” (rentjana) “aiming at the 
happiness of the greatest number”, “limited and constructive competi-
tion under the control of the state”, a ban on private monopolies, the 
nationalisation of essential economic sectors, but also rapid industriali-
sation and the setting up of various types of cooperatives in order to 
strengthen the country’s economy. In addition, there were nine pro-
posals concerning the country’s peasants. 
 A number of general principles accompanied by a series of con-
crete measures were set up to assert the importance of recognising and 
improving their status in society. Th e “system of large land ownership” 
( sistim tuan-tanah) was to be abolished along with the agrarian decrees 
which had been issued under colonial rule; the unfair charges which 
peasants had to pay were also to be abolished, and they were to be 
given land and assistance to help them organise themselves into co-
operatives. Th e same social importance was accorded to fi shermen, 
who were promised fi nancial assistance in order to improve their skills 
and modernise both their equipment and the fi shing ports they used. 
Regarding the middle class ( golongan middenstand ), Masyumi contented 
itself with promising them “the means to develop and strengthen their 
position within society”, without giving any details on how this would 
happen. Finally, it proposed to guarantee a decent existence to the 
country’s industrial workers, notably by establishing a “social wage” 
(upah social ) alongside a “work wage” (upah kerdjanja), as well as 
through the promise of enabling them to found a family and save for 
their old age. Th e party devoted its fi nal proposals to the weakest in 
society—the disabled, widows and orphans—who were to be given the 
right to a decent existence.
 Overall, then, the party’s election programme was prudent and 
reassuring on the question of the country’s institutions, and generous, 
often innovative even, on economic and social issues. However, very 
little was mentioned about how this programme would actually be 
implemented. Th e election manifesto put forward no plan to grant the 
state new resources for achieving these aims, and the only proposal 
made concerning fi scal policy consisted in systematically favouring 
direct over indirect taxation. 
 Although the party’s electoral strategy was never really clearly 
defi ned, it was obviously based on a very risky wager on behalf of its 
leaders. As they were convinced of having already won over most of 
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the Muslim activists’ votes, they contented themselves with reminding 
those same activists of their religious duty while at the same time pro-
claiming themselves to be the champions of unity. Th e party’s greatest 
hope, however, was that its election programme, which contained reli-
gious moral values but was devoid of any explicit reference to a speci-
fi cally Islamic political ideology, would appeal to voters far beyond 
the reaches of Islam. Such a strategy was riddled with contradictions, 
notably the fact that it called on people to vote out of a religious obli-
gation for a party whose programme had been emptied of references to 
Islam; it was to cost Masyumi dearly at the polls.
Th e Election Results—Th e Limits of the Modernist 
Infl uence on a National Level
On 29 September 1955, 37,875,299 Indonesians went to the polls, 
which constituted 87.65% of those registered to vote.21 Despite some 
voter intimidation in certain volatile parts of the country, the elections 
ran smoothly and the legitimacy of those elected to represent the 
people was never called into question.22 Masyumi’s poor showing was 
one of the election’s major surprises. With only 20.9% of the popular 
vote, the party was beaten into second place by the PNI who obtained 
22.3%, though both parties won 57 seats in the new Assembly. It was 
followed closely behind by its Muslim rival, Nahdlatul Ulama, who 
with 45 seats, won 18.4% of the popular vote and succeeded in de-
feating Masyumi comprehensively in East Java and Central Java. Th e 
party’s longstanding enemy, the PKI, ended up with 39 seats, winning 
21 Th e electoral law passed in November 1952 established for both the legislative 
and constituent elections a list system (though with the possibility for individual 
candidates to stand for election also) based on proportional representation and 
an electoral map carved up into regions. Th e country was divided into 15 elec-
toral districts, each containing a number of seats proportionate to the size of 
their population, with a minimum of three seats in Parliament and six in the 
Constituent Assembly. Any surplus seats for which the electoral threshold had 
not been obtained were divided within each region by agreement between the 
diff erent parties concerned; if such an agreement could not be reached, they were 
to be divided up by the central party authorities.
22 In certain parts of Aceh and West Java, for example, Darul Islam forces were 
alleged to have “encouraged” people to vote for Masyumi. Feith, Th e Indonesian 
Election of 1955, p. 45.
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16.4% of the vote. Th e two other parties claiming to represent Islam—
the PSII and Perti—won 12 seats overall, eight for the former and 
four for the latter, while the Christian parties received a total of 14 
seats: eight for Parkindo and six for the Partai Katolik. Th e election’s 
other big losers were the PSI, who only won fi ve seats, and the IPKI 
with four seats. Th e remaining 25 seats in the Assembly were divided 
amongst 15 other political parties.
 Th e election results showed Masyumi to be an “extra-Javanese” 
party representing the periphery of the country, in contrast to the 
trio of the PNI, NU and the PKI, who dominated the centre of the 
country.23 It also showed Masyumi’s overwhelming dominance over its 
three traditional bastions of power—Central Sumatra, South Sumatra 
and South Sulawesi—where it received more than 40% of the vote. 
However, the party could not transform the high concentration of its 
voters in certain provinces into Assembly seats due to the system of 
proportional representation used in the election. Th ere was a strong 
correlation, nonetheless, between Masyumi’s election score and the 
presence of a majority vote for Muslim parties. In fi ve of the six con-
stituencies where these parties won more than half of the vote, Mas-
yumi topped the poll. However, its poor showing of barely 10% in 
the sparsely populated regions of East Java and Central Java, where it 
lost heavily to Nahdlatul Ulama, contributed to its mediocre nation-
wide score.
 Within Masyumi, there was bitter disappointment with these re-
sults. Both the daily newspaper Abadi and the weekly magazine Hikmah 
tried for some weeks to mask this defeat by presenting the election re-
sults in a positive light. On several occasions, they published a map of 
Indonesia on which each of the 11 regions—out of a total of 15—in 
which the party topped the poll was represented with a fl ag carrying 
the party’s symbol; no detailed result was ever published by Masyumi’s 
press, however.24 
 Th e party’s dismay was palpable in the editorials published, but 
it nonetheless held out the hope of seeing this poor performance at 
23 More than half of Masyumi’s parliamentary representatives were elected outside 
Java. For NU, the proportion was 18%, for the PNI 21% and for the PKI 10%.
24 Abadi only gave the number of seats obtained by each party (2 March 1956), 
while Hikmah, for several weeks, limited itself to explaining that the exact elec-
tion results were still unknown.
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the polls turned around at the election for the Constituent Assembly 
in mid-December.25 Th e voter turnout on 15 December, at 87.77%, 
was just as high as for the election in September, and the results of the 
election proved another rude awakening for the party leaders. Masyumi 
received 100,000 fewer votes than in September. With 112 seats in the 
Constituent Assembly, the party was this time far behind the PNI who 
had won 600,000 votes more than in the previous election, leaving it 
with 119 seats. NU improved slightly on its previous score, winning 
91 seats. In total, the parties who identifi ed themselves as Islamic par-
ties counted 228 votes in the Assembly, constituting a little less than 
half the total number of seats and therefore far short of the two-thirds 
majority required to vote the adoption of a new constitution. Th is 
result was especially disappointing for Masyumi; apart from the PNI, 
25 An editorial in Hikmah (no. 40, 1 October 1955), carrying the headline “Th e 
Right Choice”, declared: “How we should pity the voter who chose the parties 
intending to weaken religion! … but those who voted wrongly on 27 September 
will have a chance to redeem themselves at the next election.”
Plate 4.1 “Masyumi is implanted throughout Indonesia. Its infl uence demon-
strates its victory” (Hikmah, 17 December 1955).
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the other parties which progressed the most between the two elections, 
were the PKI and the Murba Party. Both were extreme left-wing parties 
whose success sanctioned the failure of Masyumi’s campaign against 
the “enemies of God.” Th e party made no declaration and its press 
published no editorial in response to this second electoral defeat. It 
was only a few months later that Mohammad Natsir proposed to draw 
a certain number of conclusions from the party’s performance in the 
two elections.
Th e elections have blown away the smokescreen which previously 
clouded our vision of things. Up until that point, we, the Muslim 
community, had always considered ourselves to be largely in the 
majority. Some spoke of 80%, others of 90%. Th ese certainties 
led us to think that the elections would without doubt allow us to 
implement the ideals of Islam. It appears today however, that those 
who claim to belong to the Muslim community did not uniformly 
support the ideology of Islam. What this election has proved is that 
less than 50% of them supported faithfully the ideology of Islam.26
Nonetheless Natsir, alongside this clear-sighted analysis, also concluded 
that the election results could not be “measured in numbers”, and that 
“thanks to hard work based on total sincerity” Masyumi had obtained 
“a great victory at the elections”. He invited his supporters not to 
“mull over the defeat, but rather to endeavour to view the future in an 
even more positive light.” 27 Coming from a man who was normally a 
paragon of logic and coherence, the incoherence of his remarks clearly 
showed the party’s disarray in the aftermath of these long-awaited 
elections. 
 Th e party’s electoral failure penalised fi rst and foremost the strategy 
it had adopted over the previous number of years. Its leaders had long 
convinced themselves that Indonesians’ religious faith would carry great 
weight in their political decisions, and as a result, they mistook their 
real enemy by focussing most of their campaign on a crusade against 
the atheism embodied by the PKI. Th e eff ects of NU’s breakaway were 
also largely underestimated. It is true that only seven deputies had left 
the party in 1952 and that, despite these departures, Masyumi remained 
26 Abadi, 2 March 1956.
27 Ibid.
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the largest party in Parliament. In addition, the split had not brought 
about a splintering of the diff erent wings within the organisation. 
However, the emergence of a serious rival on the political scene put a 
defi nitive end to the aspirations of uniting political Islam which Mas-
yumi had embodied since 1945. Th e seven million votes obtained 
by NU robbed the party of the opportunity to totally dominate the 
Indonesian political landscape; Masyumi would have held more than 
40% of the vote in its pre-1952 confi guration. Th ey constituted, above 
all, the harshest of rejections for the party leadership. Th ese leaders 
had become obsessed with their internal politicking to such an extent 
that they became convinced that their importance within Masyumi’s 
governing bodies refl ected their infl uence within the Muslim commu-
nity. Nahdlatul Ulama’s remarkable performance in the elections proved, 
on the contrary, that the political weight of traditionalist Islam had not 
been greatly aff ected by its progressive exclusion from Islam’s centres 
of decision.
 Th e outcome of the elections severely damaged Masyumi’s future 
prospects. After the announcement of the results, the party’s sole aim 
now lay in preparing for the next election; however, the horizon looked 
fairly bleak. It had managed relatively well up until that point to 
ride the rocky course of political events; after the election, it became 
submerged by them. Th e party became increasingly marginalised as it 
came to be seen as the perfect embodiment of a parliamentary regime 
whose infl uence never actually went beyond the walls of the Assembly 
and existed only in the minds of a few leaders. It was not surprising, 
then, that some of its more energetic leaders responded by attempting 
to relaunch the party in the country’s peripheral regions.
Th e Contradictions of the Party’s Struggle for 
Democracy
With the elections of 1955, the division of the country’s democratic 
representatives into diff erent branches became irreversible, thus throwing 
the country into political deadlock because of their inability to govern 
together. Although the electorate were responsible for this situation, 
many amongst them blamed this situation on the newly weakened 
political class. Seizing on this ambient mindset, a radical change in the 
rules of the political game was advocated in some quarters by those 
who wanted to move political debate away from the parliamentary 
arena. In the “outer islands”—a term which was taken to refer to the 
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islands outside Java and Madura—a powerful popular movement, en-
couraged by military offi  cers who had gradually gained control over the 
local economic networks, had begun to make increasingly vociferous 
demands for a redistribution of power and wealth between the centre 
of the country and its periphery. At the same time, President Sukarno, 
taking advantage of the unrest caused by these demands, endeavoured 
to gather around him an increasingly divided nation. Although Mas-
yumi was very much opposed to the changes in the political system 
which the president’s aims implied, it nonetheless ended up uninten-
tionally promoting them. By refusing to moderate its stance in its 
dispute with the PNI, by launching a campaign for an Islamic state in 
the Constituent Assembly—despite its chances of success being mathe-
matically impossible—and by fanning the fl ames of regionalist discon-
tent, the party bore its fair share of responsibility for the country’s 
deteriorating situation.
Th e Resurgence of a Revolutionary Identity
Several weeks before the Harahap government left offi  ce, as the results 
of the legislative elections were gradually being made public, nego-
tiations began between the PNI, Masyumi and NU with a view to 
forming a coalition government.28 Because of its fi erce opposition to 
President Sukarno’s wish to see the PKI participate in government, 
Masyumi was not able to negotiate from a position of force.29 Th e 
party received fi ve portfolios in the new government which took offi  ce 
28 Mohammad Natsir explained at the beginning of February that the collabora-
tion between Masyumi, the PNI and NU was already underway, indicating a 
new state of mind following the elections. He claimed that instead of dealing 
with the symptoms of the country’s problems, as had previously been done, it 
would at last treat their causes. “Kerdjasama Masjumi-PNI-NU dapat ditjapai”, 
Abadi, 1 February 1956. See also NU’s declarations to the same eff ect, Abadi, 22 
February 1956.
29 Certain sections of the PNI at least did not rule out sharing the cabinet table 
with the PKI. Masyumi’s propaganda therefore attempted to put pressure on NU 
to avoid such a scenario, which would have marginalised Masyumi. On 3 March 
1956, the Contact Committee for Islamic Organisations (Badan Kontak Organi-
sasi Islam, BKOI) controlled by Masyumi declared that “it will be possible to 
achieve a serene political atmosphere only if Masyumi, the PNI and NU form 
the heart of [the government].” “Suasana politik jg tenang hanja dapat ditjapai, 
djika Masjumi, PNI, NU sebagai inti.” Abadi, 5 March 1956.
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on 26 March 1956. One of these was an honorary portfolio—that of 
vice-prime-minister, given to Mohamad Roem—and two others were 
secondary ministries—the Ministry of Communications was awarded 
to Suchjar Tedjasukmana and Ministry of Public Works was given to 
Ir Pangeran Noor—leaving them two important positions: the Ministry 
of Finance, headed by Jusuf Wibisono, and the Justice Ministry, held 
by Mr Muljatno.
 Th e second Sastroamidjojo government took offi  ce on the same 
day as the fi rst session of the new legislative assembly; the Constituent 
Assembly was not inaugurated until November. Th e new cabinet rapidly 
demonstrated that the elections had solved none of the country’s prob-
lems, and the three coalition partners, instead of searching for coopera-
tion, soon began to vie against one another. In an attempt to thwart 
the infl uence of the PNI in cabinet, the Masyumi leadership tried to 
establish an alliance between Muslim parties. After a few meetings, 
however, the party had to face the fact that such an enterprise would 
not succeed. By accepting not to speak out against the prime minister’s 
reassuring declarations on foreign policy, NU and the PSII confi rmed 
the new balance of power in place within the government.30 Faced with 
a PNI which benefi tted both from presidential support and a good 
relationship with the two other Muslim parties, Masyumi could now 
only rely on its own political strength.31
 Th is marginalisation of Mohammad Natsir’s party came at a time 
when the general political climate was becoming rapidly unstable. Th e 
second Ali government’s promise to fi ght against corruption, one of 
its main objectives, had become a dead letter. Th e former minister for 
economic aff airs during the fi rst Ali government, Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, 
who had masterminded a vast scheme of abuse of public offi  ce, re-
turned with impunity to Indonesia. Masyumi, who had been one of 
the biggest detractors of Tjokrohadisurjo’s methods, now abandoned 
its role of white knight; it even left the cabinet open to accusations of 
generalised corruption through the actions of one of its representatives 
in government, Jusuf Wibisono. In less than ten months, the minister 
30 Abadi, 24 October 1956.
31 Th e election of the speaker of the Constituent Assembly in late November 
1956 confi rmed this new balance of power. Th e PNI candidate beat Masyumi’s 
nominee thanks to the votes of NU and the PSII.
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for fi nance allocated some 325 million rupiahs (Rp) in credit to busi-
nesses close to the parties in power.32
 On 29 April, the Assembly had unanimously renewed their con-
fi dence in the Ali government, and so in the absence of an opposition 
force in Parliament, a group of offi  cers decided to take over the initia-
tive in the fi ght against corruption. On 13 August, on the orders 
of Colonel Kawilarang, commandant of West Java, the minister for 
foreign aff airs, Roeslan Abdulgani (PNI), was arrested. He was accused 
of being complicit in a corruption aff air involving the head of the 
National Printing Offi  ce, but following the intervention of the prime 
minister and Army Chief of Staff  Nasution, he was released a few 
hours later.33 Th e “13 August Aff air” constituted a turning point in 
the army’s political role. Up until then, it had contented itself with 
preventing civilian intervention in its internal aff airs, but faced with a 
political class unable to regain the confi dence of the people, it now 
posed itself as the guardian of the rule of law.
 Masyumi’s leaders, who could have benefi tted from this aff air, 
soon appeared out of their depth. Wary of poisoning their relations 
with the PNI, they initially came to the defence of the minister for 
foreign aff airs. Mohammad Natsir and the justice minister, Moljatno, 
claimed that a minister could not be placed under investigation with-
out the authorisation of the government and the president. Th ey pro-
posed the creation of a ministerial committee charged with deciding 
on the appropriateness of pressing charges.34 Th is proposal was fi nally 
accepted by the government, and on 29 August, a committee of fi ve 
ministers held a meeting chaired by Mohamad Roem. After two days 
32 Jusuf Wibisono made no mystery of these practices. When the governor of the 
Bank of Indonesia was to be appointed in July 1956, NU was in the position 
of arbitrator. In order to avoid it choosing a candidate close to the PNI, Jusuf 
busied himself with doing favours for businesses linked to NU, notably the C.V. 
Koernia company owned by the Rais Am of NU, Abdul Wahab Hasbullah. He 
thus obtained NU’s support for the appointment of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. 
Soebagijo I.N., Jusuf Wibisono. Karang di Tengah Gelombang, pp. 160–1. One 
of the few opponents to the second Ali government, the PSI member Hamid 
Algadri, called these practices the “Kuomintang phenomenon”. Feith, Th e Decline 
of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1962), p. 479.
33 Baladas, Indonesian Politics 1955–1959, pp. 54–5.
34 Abadi, 18 and 22 August 1956.
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of hearings, they produced a report clearing Roeslan Abdulgani of 
the charges brought against him, and so for the government and the 
Masyumi leadership the case was closed. On 1 September, Mohammad 
Natsir, presenting the committee’s conclusions, explained that justice 
had been done and that the public should be relieved.35 Th is interpre-
tation of the situation was cruelly belied in the following weeks, how-
ever, as it became clear that the gap between public opinion and the 
government was widening. Mochtar Lubris, in his newspaper Indonesia 
Raya, pursued his investigations and published several documents 
which were damning to the minister for foreign aff airs. In response 
to this press campaign, the government issued an executive order in 
mid-September banning the publication of “destructive and provocative 
news stories.” 36 Th e army, which Nasution had regained control over, 
seized this opportunity to launch a campaign of intimidation against 
certain journalists. Mochtar Lubis, who was arrested on 13 December 
1956, was the main victim of this campaign.
 Th e leadership of the party was bound to the government’s failed 
approach to the scandal, and they now found themselves in an awk-
ward position vis-à-vis the lower echelons of the party. By the end of 
August, party members were speaking out against the leniency shown 
to Roeslan Abdulgani.37 On 13 September, Mohammad Natsir had to 
respond to a declaration made by the leaders of the Sumatran branch 
of the party calling for the resignation of the Masyumi members 
of government. He initially refused to recognise the extent of their 
outrage, and merely considered it to be the result of local political 
considerations.38 However, as the controversy was amplifi ed by new 
revelations in the press, Natsir resolved on 11 December to ask on 
behalf of the party for the enquiry to be reopened.39 Th e government 
consequently handed the aff air over to the state prosecutor, who 
deemed a few days later that the case should go to trial. Th e Masyumi 
35 Abadi, 1 September 1956.
36 Baladas, Indonesian Politics 1955–1959, p. 55.
37 Th e Masyumi deputy, Sjarif Usman, became the spokesperson for those within 
the party who deplored the fact that the minister for foreign aff airs had been 
shown clemency while ordinary citizens involved in much less serious corruption 
aff airs were being held in jail without trial. Abadi, 1 September 1956.
38 Abadi, 13 September 1956.
39 Abadi, 12 December 1956.
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leadership then asked for the minister for foreign aff airs to resign, a 
request which was turned down by the PNI.
 Th e “wait and see” tactics used by the leadership in this aff air 
drew harsh criticism during the party’s seventh congress which was 
held in Bandung between 22 and 29 December 1956. Several delegates 
singled out in particular Mohamad Roem, who had chaired the com-
mittee which had cleared Roeslan Abdlugani, criticising him for not 
having attended the congress. Roem, who had stayed in Jakarta for 
health reasons, was accused of having shirked his responsibilities and 
of being “politically ill ”.40
 Natsir was obliged to speak out in favour of Roem and he no 
doubt paid the price for this subsequently. Th e attitude of the party’s 
grassroots towards its president during the “13 August Aff air” crystal-
lised their disapproval of the strategy he had been pursuing over the 
previous number of years. As a partner in government, Masyumi, in 
the same respect as the other coalition parties, became discredited in 
the eyes of the general public; therefore it was not in a position to 
present itself as a solution to the political quagmire the country found 
itself in. In addition, its reward for participating in government was a 
meagre one, as its marginalisation within cabinet meant that it bore 
little infl uence on government policy. Th e party’s rank and fi le, who 
for years had listened to triumphalist speeches announcing the party’s 
imminent electoral victory, now rediscovered the freedom of tone which 
they had lost since the years of the “Physical Revolution”. Th e edifi ce 
which Natsir had worked to build up—a pragmatic and disciplined 
party which had abandoned its incendiary revolutionary rhetoric—began 
to crumble, and the old demons which seemed to have been put 
to bed resurfaced again in Masyumi’s collective consciousness.
 In March 1956, during the national convention of Indonesian 
importers, Assaat, a former minister for home aff airs in Natsir’s gov-
ernment who did not belong to any political party, called on the 
government to adopt a policy favouring native Indonesians—known 
as pribumi—over citizens of Chinese origin. He accused the latter of 
controlling the country’s economic system and held them responsible 
for the diffi  culties which his fellow countrymen were encountering. 
40 According to Deliar Noer, invited by the congress’s Organisation Committee 
to attend the debates. Deliar Noer, “Masjumi: Its Organization, Ideology, and 
Political Role in Indonesia”, Master thesis, Cornell University, 1960, p. 369.
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Th is speech broke a taboo in Indonesian society; the country’s political 
fi gures had been concerned, since independence, with fostering national 
unity and had never dared to voice such ideas. A section of the popu-
lation rallied around Assaat’s ideas, and support committees were 
created in many places around the country. Th is anti-Chinese fervour 
was not limited to economic demands, and on several occasions it 
broke out into riots during which goods and property owned by the 
totok as well as the peranakan community were targeted as part of 
punitive expeditions.41 Over the following months, the movement’s 
demands extended to areas beyond the economy, and it grew in size to 
encompass not only the country’s trading classes but also certain sec-
tions of the army as well as a part of the political class.
 Masyumi was not immune to this phenomenon. It was tradition-
ally the party of the Muslim entrepreneurial class, and a number of 
party fi gures did not let the calls from the party’s grassroots fall on 
deaf ears. At the beginning of July 1956, for example, Dr. Ali Akbar, 
a member of the Masyumi leadership and the president of the Parlia-
mentary Commission on Education called for the establishment of 
quotas for Chinese schools. Th e reason for such a measure, according 
to him, was to oblige members of the Chinese community to allow the 
entire educational system to benefi t from their wealth.42 For the other 
members of the party leadership, Dr. Akbar’s comments were a source 
of embarrassment. 
 Th e demands of the Assaat movement blatantly contradicted the 
principle of economic non-discrimination which fi gured in the party’s 
programmes. Th e popularity of such demands with the party’s rank 
and fi le underlined a sociological disparity within Masyumi, namely the 
fact that the party’s national fi gures rarely came from Muslim business 
circles, which were much better represented in the party’s intermediate 
echelons.43 Th e few leadership members who were close to the business 
world operated at the upper end of that milieu where the Chinese were 
more often partners rather than competitors. One such party fi gure was 
41 Th e word “totok”, meaning “indigenous”, refers to foreigners born in their home 
country who had recently immigrated; the term “peranakan”, on the other hand, 
refers to the descendants of those immigrants. Both terms can be used to signify 
Europeans, Arabs and Indians, but unless otherwise specifi ed, they normally refer 
to the Chinese in Indonesia.
42 Abadi, 13 and 24 July 1956.
43 See supra, Chapter 1.
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Jusuf Wibisono. Having worked for a Dutch automobile import com-
pany from 1953 to 1954, he was approached by a Japanese chemical 
company to become the chairman of a bank they had just established. 
Despite opposition from Natsir, Jusuf accepted the job off er on con-
dition that his name would not appear on the company’s organigram. 
At the same time, two other companies had attempted to hire his 
services: the bookshop and publishing house Gunung Agung—which 
was owned by Tjio Wie Th ay, who later changed the company’s name 
to Mas Agung—and the P.T. Mustika Trading Company, an import-
export business which also had a Chinese chairman.44 Given his back-
ground, it is easy to imagine Jusuf Wibisono’s discomfort when, as 
minister for fi nance, he had to off er Mr Assat an audience. In order 
to justify his refusal of Assat’s proposals, he invoked the Constitution, 
explaining that any measure which was liable to distinguish between 
diff erent categories of citizens based on their origin was impossible.45
 Masyumi’s press, for its part, had obviously received guidelines 
requiring it to treat the Assaat aff air with moderation. Neither Abadi 
nor Hikmah joined in the virulent campaign led by Indonesia Raya. 
Abadi limited itself to reporting the main aspects of the controversy, 
without elaborating on them any further, while any references Hikmah 
made to the case were oblique and always carried a marked pedagogical 
tone. In an edition of Hikmah published on 2 June, for example, a 
copy of an article from a Chinese daily newspaper, Kuang Po, was pub-
lished. Th e article was preceded by some preliminary words of caution 
which reminded the “young generations as well as the older genera-
tions who have a short memory” of the prominent role played by cer-
tain members of the Chinese community in the nationalist movement. 
It consisted in a long letter written, at the request of the owner of 
Kuang Po, by A.R. Baswedan, a Masyumi member and a leading fi gure 
in the community of Indonesians of Arab descent. Th e letter was writ-
ten in answer to the following question: what were the reasons behind 
the success associated with the group of Indonesian citizens of Arab 
descent? Th eirs was a community which was clearly held in high regard 
within the Indonesian Muslim community, and they had plainly been 
spared from the discriminatory measures called for at the Importers 
Congress. By publishing A.R. Baswedan’s letter, Hikmah was reminding 
44 Soebagijo I.N., Jusuf Wibisono. Karang di Tengah Gelombang, pp. 134–41.
45 Ibid., pp. 157–8.
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its readers that the integration of non-native communities within the 
Republic of Indonesia was not only possible but also profi table, and 
that the example of the country’s Arab descendents should serve as a 
model for the Chinese community.46
 Due to the censorship exercised over the Masyumi press, it is dif-
fi cult to gauge the degree of involvement of the party’s grassroots 
in this anti-Chinese movement. It is nonetheless possible to surmise, 
given the sociological disparities, mentioned earlier, between the party’s 
leadership and its rank and fi le, that it was signifi cant and that it con-
stituted a further source of tension within the party. Th ere is no doubt 
that the small businessmen who were part of the pribumi community 
had at least two good reasons to be unhappy with the policies imple-
mented under the previous two governments by Masyumi and its allies. 
Th e fi rst of these was the new ruling adopted by the Harahap cabinet, 
which had benefi tted for the most part foreign importers. Th e second 
was the repeal of the Round Table Agreements, which meant that 
numerous Dutch companies had to sell their business interests in 
Indonesia. Th e only Indonesians who possessed the capital necessary to 
acquire these Dutch businesses were generally members of the Chinese 
community. Th is measure meant that the resentment of Indonesian 
entrepreneurs as well as a part of the rest of the population was also 
directed towards the Indonesian political establishment.
 At the end of 1956, then, Masyumi appeared as a clay-footed 
giant, weakened by its poor electoral performance and undermined by 
the revolt of a part of its membership. Paradoxically, it was President 
Sukarno who, at this point, seemed to give the party the opportunity 
of a new lease of life. His decision to steadily take apart the fi nal ves-
tiges of Indonesia’s parliamentary regime gave Masyumi the chance to 
take on the role of tragic martyr for democracy.
A New Cause, a New Impetus: Masyumi’s Response to the 
Political, Military and Regional Crisis
On his return from a long overseas trip to China, the USSR and 
Europe, President Sukarno took advantage of the toxic atmosphere 
which reigned over Indonesian politics to regain the initiative against his 
46 “Apa sebab2nja gerakan bangsa Indonesia turunan Arab berhasil?!”, Hikmah, 
2 June 1956.
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rivals. In two separate speeches, made on 28 and 30 October 1956, 
he invited his fellow countrymen to draw the necessary conclusions 
from the failure of Indonesia’s parliamentary democracy. Th e country, 
according to him, had to face up to the fact that the November 1945 
decree authorising the creation of political parties had been a grave 
error. He denounced what he called the “disease of the party system” 
and stated his wish to “bury” them and set up a “guided democracy” 
(demokrasi terpimpin), better suited to Indonesia’s political conditions. 
Masyumi’s condemnation of the president’s statements was immediate 
and unequivocal. On 29 October, Natsir responded to the fi rst of 
Sukarno’s speeches, warning his fellow Indonesians that if the presi-
dent’s proposals were followed, then “democracy would also be buried 
in the grave.” 47 A few days later, on 2 November, the party leadership 
voted a declaration reminding the public that despite the current diffi  -
culties, in no circumstances could “a dictatorship in whatever form 
constitute a solution.” 48
 Th ese responses to the president’s proposals marked a new stage 
in the party’s history, as they contained no reference to Islam’s values. 
For Masyumi’s leaders, the evocation of democracy—of its spirit, or 
soul (djiwa)—in itself suffi  ced. It was for its intrinsic values and despite 
all its imperfections, that it was to be protected, not because of any 
superior religious norm. Moreover, a signifi cant semantic shift in the 
language used to refer to democracy could be seen in Natsir’s state-
ment, in which he employed expressions such as “way of life” or dasar 
hidup (basis of life) which previously he had normally only used to 
refer to Islam. Th is was confi rmation of a certain secularisation of the 
party’s political identity. In a speech given on 7 November 1956 on the 
occasion of the 11th anniversary of the foundation of Masyumi, this 
was how Natsir defi ned the party’s struggle for democracy. Although 
Masyumi had certainly not abandoned all references to Islam, its 
response to President Sukarno’s proposals was primarily in the name of 
a democratic ideal, presented independently of Islam’s values. Moreover, 
this debate on the nature of the country’s institutions came at just 
the right time for the party: through a simple and unifying cause, it 
allowed Masyumi to regain the momentum it had lost since its elec-
toral defeat. 
47 A declaration by Mohammad Natsir to the press, Abadi, 30 October 1956.
48 A declaration by the central executive committee, Abadi, 3 October 1956.
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 Th e transformation of Masyumi’s image, both in the eyes of its 
members and its opponents, into the defender of a Western-style par-
liamentary regime, was certainly not immediate; furthermore, initially 
it was not the only party to condemn Sukarno’s proposals. Only the 
PKI and the much smaller PRI, led by Bung Tomo, gave their un-
reserved approval; NU spoke of a “desperation policy” which was op-
posed to the teachings of Islam, while the PNI rejected any measure 
which aff ected the system of political parties as a whole.49 However, 
these parties gradually accepted in the following months to sign up to 
the new political framework outlined by Sukarno. Masyumi and the 
PSI were the only ones who rejected outright any concession, a stance 
which led eventually to their downfall. Th e regionalist movement which 
had started at the same time radicalised the two sides further, and 
changed the nature of the confl ict from political to military.
 Since the beginning of the 1950s, the steady decline in govern-
ment military spending had led certain regional commanders, known 
as panglima, to look for resources elsewhere. In collaboration with local 
business circles, they put in place parallel channels for the export of 
raw materials, creating profi ts which previously went directly to the 
government in Jakarta. Th e eff ect of infl ation and the cost of offi  cial 
import-export channels meant that those in the outer islands took 
home in reality very little of the money generated by their mineral and 
agricultural raw materials, which constituted 70% of the country’s total 
exports. Th e parallel economy set up by the military in those regions 
allowed their inhabitants, therefore, to increase their income signifi -
cantly. However, in November 1956, the civilian and military authori-
ties in Jakarta started to put an end to these enterprises. Th e Army 
Chief of Staff , General Nasution, working closely with the president, 
drew up a large-scale plan to transfer certain army offi  cers, which was 
principally designed to regain control over certain regional military 
commands, but also to sideline the volatile Colonel Zulkifi  Lubis, 
who was Deputy Army Chief of Staff  and the main potential threat to 
Nasution’s power within the army.50 
49 Baladas, Indonesian Politics 1955–1959, p. 58.
50 Th e rivalry between the two men mirrored the confl ict within the army be-
tween two traditions, namely one which came from the KNIL (Nasution) and 
one which came from the PETA (Lubis). In addition to that, there had been, 
according to Goshal Baladas, a falling out between the two men’s parents.
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 Th e response of the offi  cers concerned was both quick and force-
ful. On 16 and 17 November 1956, Colonel Zulkifl i Lubis, who had 
just been given a command in North Sumatra, and Major Djelani, the 
new commander for West Java, took part in an attempted coup d’état. 
General Nasution immediately removed their commands and ordered 
their arrest, but Lubis managed to escape. For the army chief of staff 
and his deputy, this situation constituted a strange reversal of the roles 
they had occupied in the 17 October 1952 Aff air, during which Su-
karno had sided with Lubis against Nasution. During the 1952 crisis, 
the two opposing factions within the army had fi nally managed to put 
their diff erences aside, but this time the dispute crystallised resentment 
and discontent well beyond the reaches of the army. Th e offi  cers facing 
transfer stood together against Nasution and the government in a 
united front with the people of the areas they administered. On 26 
December 1956, Lieutenant-Colonel Husein, head of the “Banteng 
Council”—named after the division he commanded—seized power 
in Central Sumatra. Two days later, Colonel Simbolon, a commander 
in North Sumatra, announced in turn that he no longer recognised 
the authority of Ali Sastroamidjojo’s government. One of the rebels’ 
demands was the formation of a new government led by Mohammad 
Hatta; having announced his intention a few months earlier to resign 
from the position of vice president as soon as the Constituent Assembly 
was inaugurated, Hatta was now once again in a position to lead the 
country’s aff airs.51
 Th e regionalist revolt, which came about at the same time as 
President Sukarno’s plan for a “guided democracy”, forced the party, 
under pressure from its grassroots, to adopt a position strongly opposed 
to the Ali government. Th e initial stages of the crisis left the party in 
an uncomfortable position, and its response was overall a prudent one. 
Wary of stoking up further the tensions which had surfaced in the 
country, the party’s press limited itself to reporting the rebellion’s main 
events without commenting upon them in any way. However, certain 
members of the party leadership soon found it diffi  cult to hide their 
sympathy for the rebels’ demands.
51 For further reading on the motivations of this movement, which was not a 
separatist movement but rather one which wished to exercise political infl uence 
in the country, see Feith, Th e Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, 
p. 527 ff .
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 First of all, Masyumi was very much in favour of Mohammad 
Hatta’s return to the centre of the political arena. Since the announce-
ment of his decision to leave the vice presidency, the party’s leaders 
had, on numerous occasions, underlined their high regard for both 
the person and the calming role he played on the Indonesian political 
scene. For them, the Dwitunggal, the duumvirate of Sukarno and 
Hatta which had led Indonesia to independence, was now more than 
ever the only possible guarantee of stability for the country.52 Since 
Sukarno’s sensationalist declaration about the necessity to do away with 
political parties and with an alliance emerging between the president 
and the army chief of staff , Mohammad Hatta was now the only fi gure 
who could counterbalance the power held by the head of state. In ad-
dition, the vice president, without opposing Sukarno directly, did hint, 
on announcing his resignation, at his disagreement with the measures 
being introduced.
 Moreover, the party could no longer ignore the demands of re-
gions which contained the majority of its electorate. Since the failure 
of the Federal Republic of Indonesia—the last attempt by the Dutch to 
conserve some degree of infl uence in the country—a unitary state had 
become, for Masyumi and for the other parties, Indonesia’s only pos-
sible form of government. Subsequently, the party’s policy concerning 
the nation’s various regions consisted in campaigning for decentralisa-
tion with a view to giving them as much autonomy as possible.53 Now 
that a regionalist crisis had erupted, calls were made to take this policy 
a step further and on 2 October 1956, Rusjad Nurdin, a party fi gure 
from West Java, declared that his party might advocate a federal state 
and call for the creation of a senate representing the country’s regions.54 
Th e party leadership refused to confi rm this possibility, however, and 
52 See, for example, Abadi, 27 April 1956.
53 See, for example, Hikmah, 23 August 1952, in which an editorial proposed a 
trial period of economic autonomy for the regions in order to examine the viabil-
ity of the diff erent programmes. An even more revealing indication of Masyumi’s 
offi  cial stance on this thorny question was a series of articles by Mohammad 
Sjafei published in Hikmah (23 and 30 April 1955). Sjafei outlined the existing 
legislation before arguing for the greatest possible autonomy within the existing 
legal framework for the various administrative divisions, from village level right 
up to provincial level.
54 Abadi, 3 October 1956.
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a week later, Yunan Nasution, on behalf of the party’s executive com-
mittee (Dewan Pinpinan Partai), contested Rusjad Nurdin’s analysis of 
the situation, quoting the resolutions from the 1952 conference in 
favour of a “a unitary state with full autonomy.” Nasution nonetheless 
argued in favour of putting in place rapidly a fairer system of redistri-
buting the country’s resources between the state and the regions.55
 With the debate on the most appropriate state model for Indo-
nesia momentarily closed, the party now turned its attention to the 
question of what attitude to adopt towards the government. On 3 
December 1956, the party leadership broke the silence it had observed 
since the rebellion led by Colonel Zulkifl i Lubis in an article published 
in Abadi by Sjarif Usman, president of the Section for the Defence of 
Parliament, in which he off ered his analysis of the uprising. Although 
he did not go so far as to approve the claims made by the seditious 
offi  cers in charge of the uprising, he did implicitly criticise the crack-
down of the revolt organised by Nasution and also urged the govern-
ment to revive the Dwitunggal, which, for him, was the only way for 
the state to restore its credibility in the regions.56 
 Following these comments, other voices in the party spoke out 
calling for the government to resign. In the midst of a certain amount 
of confusion, there emerged within the party a debate: should the party 
demand a change of government, withdraw its ministers from cabinet, 
or wait until the situation became a little clearer? Mohammad Natsir 
favoured the latter of these three alternatives. In early December, he 
declared to the press that his party’s withdrawal from government was 
not on the agenda.57 As the eighth party congress approached—it was 
to take place from 22 to 29 December 1956—pressure mounted from 
the party’s grassroots to withdraw from government. Some delegates 
from Central Sumatra returned home before the debates even opened 
in order to lend their support to the Dewan Banteng. An editorial in 
Abadi, referring to the discussions underway in the congress, under-
lined the “particular responsibility” borne by Masyumi and the “some-
times exaggerated” hopes placed in its capacity to fi nd a way out of 
the country’s crisis.58
55 Abadi, 12 October 1956.
56 Abadi, 4 December 1956.
57 Abadi, 6 December 1956.
58 Abadi, 21 December 1956.
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 On the opening day of the conference, all of the party’s represen-
tatives from the outer islands, as well as from West Java, attacked 
the government’s policy violently. Th ey were convinced that the party’s 
stance would determine the government’s fate, and they demanded the 
withdrawal of all Masyumi ministers from government.59 Mohammad 
Natsir, whose term in offi  ce had come up for renewal, fi nally went 
along with the majority opinion.60 Th e congress’s fi nal resolutions re-
vealed a hardening of positions amongst a certain section of the party’s 
delegates. Th ese delegates demanded that the government modify its 
fi rst fi ve-year plan (1956–60) so as to redirect government investment 
and social benefi ts to those living outside of the major urban centres. 
More importantly, they revised the economic liberalism contained in 
the party’s 1954 emergency programme. Th ey called on the government 
to give appropriate economic protection to state companies which were 
still unable to keep up with foreign competition. Th ey wanted the 
entire import-export industry to be one of the economic sectors con-
trolled by state companies, and they also called for the use of foreign 
capital and experts to be limited to a maximum period of 15 years.61
 Th e 1956 conference marked the end, then, of the pragmatic line 
that Natsir had up to that point promoted. Fearing that its abandon-
ment of the coalition formed with the PNI and NU would leave the 
way open for the PKI to enter government, the party had up until 
then endeavoured to minimise the diff erences which arose from the 
government partnership. With the government’s hold over the political 
situation in rapid decline and part of the army as well as the country’s 
regions in open revolt against its authority, this strategy was leading 
the party into deadlock. Its participation in government had left it too 
compromised to hope to benefi t from the kind of political renewal that 
was being called for on all sides. Th e party’s grassroots, whose ideas 
were relayed by fi gures such as Sjarif Usman, Anwar Harjono and Isa 
Anshary, at that point obliged the leadership to change its strategy. 
59 Abadi, 26 December 1956.
60 Abadi, 28 December 1956. Th e only ones to oppose this decision were Soeki-
man’s supporters who recommended the continuation of cooperation with the 
other parties in the Ali government. For them, abandoning governmental respon-
sibilities in the middle of a political crisis amounted to an act of hostility towards 
Masyumi’s former allies.
61 Th e same foreign capital and experts which the previous congress had solicited 
in its resolutions. Abadi, 31 December 1956.
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Th ese fi gures were motivated by their sympathy for the regionalist 
movements, and they were certain that Masyumi’s foothold among the 
electorate meant that it was the only party the country could turn to 
in the ongoing crisis. In their view, the resignation of Masyumi minis-
ters would automatically bring down the government, and President 
Sukarno, in order to avoid the rebellion spreading, would then have no 
choice but to name Hatta at the head of a new government whose core 
would be made up of Masyumi ministers. Natsir, who was much more 
au fait with politics in Jakarta, reluctantly decided to follow this path. 
 During the opening days of the party congress, Natsir sent a dele-
gation to speak to Mohammad Hatta, and once he had been re-elected 
unopposed as head of the party, he duly went about implementing 
its new strategy. In his closing speech to the conference, however, he 
pointedly distanced himself from the rebels, explaining “that one didn’t 
have to be a jurist to see that what had been done by Simbolon in 
North Sumatra, by the Dewan Banteng in Central Sumatra and by 
Winarno in South Sumatra constituted actions which violated the laws 
of the land”, and that consequently “it was not Masyumi’s intention 
to recognise them.” He nonetheless added that the problem went far 
beyond the fate of the rebel leaders, that “the malaise had profound 
causes, and so for this reason, one could not just disregard what they 
had done and act solely using formal legal means and administrative 
procedures.” 62 Calling for national unity in the interests of the country’s 
security, he asked for discussions to be opened between the president 
“as head of state”, Mohammad Hatta “as a national fi gure” (sebagai 
tokoh nasional ) and the leaders of the political parties with a view to 
forming a government which would symbolise a beacon of hope in the 
midst of the country’s diffi  culties.
 On 9 January 1957, after a fi nal attempt to convince its coalition 
partners to resign, Masyumi withdrew from government.63 Subsequent 
events showed that Natsir’s initial forebodings and Soekiman’s reserva-
tions were both well-founded. Despite the increasingly obvious ten-
sions between the government parties, the Ali government remained 
62 Abadi, 3 January 1957.
63 Th e only organisation to support Masyumi’s move was IPKI. Its founder, 
General Nasution, clearly no longer had complete control over the organisation, 
which supported certain demands made by Perti as well as by the rebel offi  cers 
in charge of the regional insurrections. Abadi, 8 January 1957.
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in offi  ce for a further two months. President Sukarno put this time to 
good use by setting up a new political order which would marginalise 
Masyumi defi nitively.
Towards Guided Democracy
Although it did not cause the rest of the cabinet to leave offi  ce, the 
resignation of the Masyumi ministers did, however, have the result of 
heightening further the tension between Jakarta and the regions. In 
the weeks following the party’s departure from government, numerous 
militia groups held rallies to make their positions known, while the 
Plate 4.2 President Sukarno unveils his plan to dismantle the parties (Hikmah, 
3 November 1956).
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PKI held a series of meetings in order to lend its support to the presi-
dent and the government. Sukarno, taking full advantage of the growing 
political chaos, began to sketch out progressively the political alternative 
which he intended to propose.
 Once he had consulted with certain parties, and after a few off -
the-record comments made to a group of foreign journalists, the presi-
dent unveiled his “conception” (konsepsi) of democracy in a speech 
given on 21 February.64 It was a carefully orchestrated address lasting 
a few hours, during which the whole nation’s attention was focussed 
on the presidential palace. Siren bells and drums (lonceng and beduk) 
sounded; people were allowed to stop their work and the minister for 
information encouraged those who owned radios to turn the volume 
up as loud as possible so that everybody, including passersby, might 
hear the president’s voice.65 Pointing out what he saw as the failure 
of “Western-style democracy” to meet the needs of the spirit of the 
Indonesian nation, Sukarno called for the “old style” of government 
to be abandoned. In its stead, he proposed the formation of a gotong 
royong cabinet, based on the old Javanese principle of mutual assis-
tance between villagers, and the creation of a National Council (Dewan 
Nasional), whose members would be chosen from the representatives 
of the “functional groups” (golongan fungsional ) which Indonesian 
society was composed of, including industrial workers, peasants, intel-
lectuals, members of the military and the police force, entrepreneurs, 
Muslims, Catholics and Protestants.
 Th e proposals which the president put forward ruled out any 
compromise with the regionalist rebels and also excluded the possibility 
of a revival of the Dwitunggal.66 Th ey did, however, win him two 
64 Masyumi was excluded from these discussions and for several weeks it only 
managed to get rumours of the president’s plans. Th e party leaders denounced 
these plans, despite not knowing any details about them; they considered these 
consultations to be manœuvres designed to serve the interests of the PKI. See 
Abadi, 17, 19 and 21 January 1957.
65 Busjairi Badruzzaman, Boerhanoeddin Harahap Pilar Demokrasi (Jakarta: Bulan 
Bintang, 1982), p. 128.
66 Sukarno intended to use the political crisis the country was going through to 
restore the primacy of the president’s constitutional role which had been removed 
by the 1950 Constitution. He therefore had no desire to see his former ally-turned-
rival Mohammad Hatta return to prominence. J.D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political 
Biography (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990 [1st edition, 1972]).
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powerful allies in the shape of the PKI, which the regional elections of 
1956 showed was growing in strength, and the army, who, thanks to 
the National Council, could at last expect to have the political role it 
had been calling for. In the days following Sukarno’s speech, posters 
and slogans in favour of the “presidential conception” sprang up on 
the walls of the capital, and organisations close to the PKI, and to a 
lesser extent to the PNI, organised a series of marches.67 Th ose who 
opposed the president’s plan, foremost amongst whom was Masyumi, 
came under intense pressure and claimed to have been the victims of 
harassment and threats.68 
 On 28 February, representatives from the country’s political par-
ties went to the palace to give the president their assessments of his 
proposals. Th e PNI, the PKI, the Partai Murba and the PRN were 
the only ones to approve unreservedly of Sukarno’s intentions, while 
NU, the PSII, the Parkindo, the IPKI and the PSI without totally 
condemning the “conception”, did make a signifi cant number of reser-
vations. Th e Partai Katolik and Masyumi, on the other hand, unequi-
vocally rejected the president’s plans. Natsir’s party was aware of the 
crisis facing the country and was not opposed to a greater involvement 
by the president in political life. A speech made in the Assembly by 
Boerhanoeddin Harahap, the chairman of the party’s parliamentary 
group, explored several possible ways out of the political deadlock, 
each of which envisaged Sukarno playing an important role. Th e last 
of these potential solutions, and the most innovative of Harahap’s pro-
posals, advocated a return to the practices of the Yogyakarta govern-
ment which allowed the president to attend the most important cabinet 
meetings in order to put across his opinion.69
 For Masyumi, however, this increase in the head of state’s powers 
could only be envisaged if it was accompanied by his cooperation with 
Mohammad Hatta, which would preclude too much power being vested 
67 Feith, Th e Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p. 543.
68 On 2 March 1957, under the headline “Stop Intimidasi dan Terror”, Abadi 
reported the complaint lodged with the state prosecutor by representatives of the 
fi ve parties (Masyumi, NU, Partai Katolik, Parkindo and the PSII) against such 
intimidation. However, politicians themselves do not appear to have been the 
victims of direct assaults.
69 Badruzzaman, Boerhanoeddin Harahap Pilar Demokrasi, p. 127.
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in one person at the head of the executive.70 Moreover, the party 
had two further fundamental objections to the president’s proposals. 
Th e fi rst of these concerned the nature of democracy itself which, as 
Mohammad Natsir often repeated, “was oblivious to East and West but 
constituted a universal value.” Masyumi’s president gave short shrift to 
the idea of so-called eastern values referred to by Sukarno; for him, 
democracy could only be “guided” by the high moral values recognised 
both by the West and by Islam.71 Th e second objection, which was 
developed by Natsir in a long article published on 8 March, concerned 
the possibility of the participation in government of the PKI, the 
“Trojan horse” (Kuda Troye) which would smuggle a dictatorship into 
the country.72 Masyumi’s leaders played on this fear of communism to 
form a short-lived coalition in defence of parliamentary democracy. On 
2 March, Nahdlatul Ulama, the PSII, the Partai Katolik and Masyumi 
signed a declaration rejecting the president’s proposals.73 Th e party’s 
success in gathering these signatures allowed it to gain the upper hand 
politically by showing Sukarno that his proposals had not created the 
consensus on which he wished to found a new democratic norm.
 Th e continuing spiral of disorder in the regions, however, meant 
that this victory soon came to appear very empty. On the very day the 
joint declaration was signed, regionalist unrest spread to East Indonesia 
which had, until then, been unaff ected by the rebellion. On 2 March, 
in Makassar, Lieutenant-Colonel Sumual announced that he was going 
to declare a state of siege in the area under his command. Sumual’s 
70 Abadi dedicated a lot of space to Mohammad Hatta’s reaction to Sukarno’s 
proposals. Although the former vice president did not condemn the “conceptions 
of Bung Karno”, he did indicate the limitations imposed by the Constitution on 
the president’s plans as well as the diffi  culties in implementing it. He became an 
advocate of a presidential cabinet, without stipulating what role he would have 
in it. Mohammad Hatta, “Menindjau Konsepsi Bung Karno”, Abadi, 2 March 
1957.
71 Natsir developed the same arguments on many occasions. See the long article 
published in Abadi on 1 March 1951, in which he justifi es Masyumi’s refusal to 
approve the president’s proposals, using reasons which he had already evoked in 
October 1947. Natsir opposed Sukarno’s “orientalo-centrist” vision, and adopted 
the prodemocracy arguments used by the Indian deputy prime minister of the 
day, Radhakrisnan.
72 Abadi, 8 March 1957.
73 Abadi, 4 March 1957.
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seizure of power took place at the same time as the diff usion of a 
“Charter of Common Struggle” which adapted and adopted the region-
alist demands already formulated in Sumatra. Th is document contained 
a good deal of the ideas put forward by Masyumi, such as a fi ve-
year regional development plan, a reform of the distribution of export 
revenue and the revival of the Dwitunggal.74 It marked, for the insur-
rectionists, the beginning of a period of “total struggle” ( perjuangan 
semesta) from which the movement took its name (Permesta).
 Th ese events strengthened the alliance between Sukarno and 
General Nasution. Th e army chief of staff  advised the president to 
declare both a state of war and a state of siege (Staat van Oorlog en 
Beleg, SOB). He argued that this would have the twofold advantage 
of cloaking the regional commanders’ seizure of power with the trap-
pings of legality, while simultaneously giving the president the means 
to counter these rebellions. Such a measure would also allow Sukarno 
to take the initiative over the political parties who, in contrast to him, 
were powerless to act. On Nasution’s advice, the head of state seized 
on the opportunity provided by the resignation of the Ali government 
to decree a state of war and a state of siege on 14 March. Th e fol-
lowing day, Sukarno chose the president of the PNI, Suwirjo, to form 
a new cabinet whose goal would be to implement the fi rst stage of his 
reform programme by setting up the National Council. However, the 
formateur was not able to reconcile the demands of the various poli-
tical parties, and two weeks into negotiations he threw in the towel.75
 Once again, the initiative fell to Sukarno, who on 4 April ap-
pointed himself formateur. He asked the hundred or so political and 
military fi gures who were present at the presidential palace at the time 
of this announcement to put their reaction to it in writing. Of the 
fi ve Masyumi members present, two—Mohammad Noor and Muljadi 
Djojomartono—approved the president’s initiative, and they were ap-
pointed, respectively, minister for public works and minister for social 
74 See Barbara S. Harvey, Permesta: Half a Rebellion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1977), pp. 60 ff .
75 Th e PKI had threatened to paralyse the country with a general strike if Mas-
yumi took part in a government from which it was excluded. As a result, Mas-
yumi was not invited to sit at the cabinet table. NU considered that Masyumi’s 
participation in government was necessary to solve the regional crisis and so 
blocked all negotiations aimed at forming a new government. Abadi, 20 March 
and 10 April 1957.
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aff airs in the new government headed by the politically unaligned 
Djuanda.
 In the confrontation between Sukarno and Masyumi, the forma-
tion of the Djuanda government constituted for the president a decisive 
step towards fi nal victory. Th e previous weeks had shown the political 
class’s inability to unite around a common programme, and the presi-
dent’s initiative was particularly welcomed as the new government 
appeared to have a number of trump cards at its disposal. Firstly, 
Djuanda, apart from the fact that he was not Javanese, also had the 
advantage of possessing a reputation as honest and reliable. He was a 
fervent advocate of reconciliation between Java and the regions, and in 
his fi rst declarations as prime minister he promised to set up a develop-
ment plan for the outer islands, to grant them greater regional auto-
nomy and to revise the distribution of public money in favour of the 
regions. In addition to that, the government which he headed was 
composed of fi gures recognised for their abilities. None of them had 
been implicated in any of the various scandals which had rocked the 
political landscape during the previous years. Moreover, the diversity of 
the cabinet’s political and geographic origins made it one of the most 
representative governments that Indonesia had seen since independence. 
Finally, all of the political parties were represented at the cabinet table. 
Of the larger parties, only the PKI did not offi  cially have a seat, but 
several independents who had received portfolios were known for their 
communist sympathies. Moreover, the Communist Party supported the 
government unreservedly. Th e response to the new government was 
positive overall; even the prestigious leader of the PSII, Sjahrir, despite 
his opposition to Sukarno, approved the composition of the cabinet.76 
Th e only opposition voices that could be heard against the government 
came from Mohammad Hatta and Masyumi. Th e party once again 
found its views to be in step with those of the former vice president, 
who had just refused the president’s most recent proposal, and it broad-
cast this convergence of ideas freely.77
76 Baladas, Indonesian Politics 1955–1959, p. 123.
77 Hatta, who was very hostile to the Dewan Nasional, was off ered the presidency 
of another body, the National Planning Board. Abadi, 20 March 1957. Th e front 
page of Abadi was systematically taken up with Hatta’s speeches and political 
positions, relegating those of the party’s leaders to the inside pages. When Hatta 
did not make any statement, words were put in his mouth: in Abadi, a very long 
Chap4 (202-284).indd   238 8/14/15   5:39:04 PM
Th e Fall 239
 Th e formation of the Djuanda government signalled Masyumi’s 
move to the margins of the political arena. Th e party’s leadership de-
nounced Sukarno’s decision to appoint the new government under the 
powers given to him by the state of siege, and called for a salutary re-
action from “those who loved genuine democracy.” 78 A few days later, 
Mohammad Natsir, hardened the tone of the party’s message and in a 
premonitory speech declared that:
On this pretext, and on the same legal basis, the head of state, 
Sukarno, will, tomorrow or the day after, dissolve or suspend Parlia-
ment, elected by our people, or maybe break up the parties through 
emergency legislation.
Faced with such a prospect, it was now no longer possible to satisfy 
oneself with “polite opposition”, as “adopting a tolerant attitude to-
wards such methods, as Prime Minister Djuanda has asked us to do, 
would amount to ignoring the establishment of a dictatorial power in 
Indonesia.” 79
 Th is sombre prognosis by Masyumi’s president did not, however, 
succeed in aff ecting the coalition of support which had grown up 
around the Djuanda government and given it de facto legitimacy. Th e 
PSII and NU adopted a “wait and see” attitude and refused this time 
to echo Masyumi’s denunciation of the president’s methods. In a skilful 
political move, the government avoided requesting a vote of confi dence 
in Parliament, and Masyumi, realising that it was politically isolated, 
refused to call for one, as a majority vote in favour of the government, 
account (ten columns in all) was written about an imaginary conversation between 
the two pillars of the Dwitunggal. Th is strange text often adopted a humorous 
tone and mocked the president’s ideas while depicting Hatta as a man of modera-
tion and conviction; whose ideas were very close to Masyumi’s. Abadi, 23 to 26 
March 1957.
78 A declaration made by the Masyumi executive committee on 9 April 1957. 
Abadi, 10 April 1957. Th e executive committee banned its members from taking 
part in government and announced disciplinary measures which would be taken 
against those who violated this decision. On 9 May, Pangeran Noor was expelled 
from the party, while Muljati Djojomartono left the party of his own volition on 
24 May, the day he entered cabinet. Abadi, 27 May 1957.
79 A speech given by Mohammad Natsir to Parliament on 15 April 1957. Quoted 
in Badruzzaman Busjairi, Catatan Perjuangan H.M. Yunan Nasution (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Panjimas, 1985), pp. 243–4.
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which was highly likely, would rubberstamp its appointment.80 Sukarno 
was the main benefi ciary of the legal uncertainty surrounding the 
government’s legitimacy, and in mid-June, he began to implement the 
second stage of his programme.
 On 18 June 1957, the government announced the formation of 
the National Council which the president had called for. It comprised 
42 members and was inaugurated on 12 July. Apart from a few offi  -
cials—notably the chiefs of staff  of the armed forces and the head of 
police—it was made up mainly of representatives of the “functional 
groups” refl ecting the diversity of Indonesian society 81 as well as the 14 
representatives of the country’s regions. Despite the absence of repre-
sentatives from the political parties—these were added to the Assembly 
in 1959—the council’s composition also refl ected the political balance 
sought by Sukarno. Masyumi was the only party to have no sympa-
thisers within the new institution; the PNI and the PKI shared the 
seats awarded to those representing small farmers, industrial workers, 
young people and journalists, while NU had a monopoly over the seats 
belonging to the representatives of the ulama. Th e role attributed to 
the Council by Sukarno in the inaugural speech he gave was relatively 
ill-defi ned. It was to assist the cabinet and lend it greater authority 
by serving as an intermediary between it and society. In reality, how-
ever, the National Council only rarely intervened in the country’s poli-
tical aff airs during its fi rst year of existence, and it was only from 
mid-1958 that it took on the role desired by Sukarno of replacing the 
party system.
 Resolutely faithful to its new role as the staunch defender of par-
liamentary democracy, Masyumi rejected this new institution as being 
unconstitutional. It refused to go along with the opinion of eminent 
specialists in constitutional law who considered that the “groups” 
( golongan) mentioned in the 1950 Constitution allowed a system of 
“functional” representation of society.82 Th e party responded to this 
legal argument with practical considerations, asking how it could be 
80 It was only in February 1958 that Parliament voted confi dence in the Djuanda 
government.
81 Th e functional groups represented, amongst others, industrial workers, young 
people, peasants, women, members of the 1945 generation as well as leaders of 
the Muslim, Protestant and Hindu communities.
82 Th is was the view, in particular, of Professor Djokosartono, a recognised expert 
in constitutional law. Baladas, Indonesian Politics 1955–1959, p. 127.
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possible to improve a parliamentary system which functioned poorly 
despite its clear procedural rules by creating a new institution whose 
role was ill-defi ned.
 Finally, unlike the other Muslim parties, Masyumi saw the forma-
tion of the National Council as part of an ongoing development which 
would lead to the establishment of the guided democracy sought by 
Sukarno and thus, sooner or later, to the disappearance of political 
parties which were held responsible for all of the country’s woes. Th is 
reading of the situation fell on deaf ears in the Jakartan political class, 
and so Mohammad Natsir decided to look to the population of Suma-
tra during a visit there at the beginning of July. During a rally held in 
Bukittinggi, Masyumi’s president vigorously denounced the operation 
being led from the upper reaches of power aimed at turning the parties 
into the scapegoat (kambing hitam) for the political crisis. His speech 
Plate 4.3 “Th e cabinet” does not know whether to give its “report” to “the 
Parliament” or “the National Council”.
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received an enthusiastic reception; the reaction of a part of the popu-
lation to the president’s strategy contrasted starkly with the passive 
policy of consensus and the attitude of resignation which seemed to 
have taken hold of the capital. In Jakarta, Natsir was marginalised, but 
here he was on his home ground, leading him no doubt to be tempted 
by a withdrawal to his native region—hinted at in the speech he gave 
to close the Central Sumatra Congress:
It is indeed rather diffi  cult today to fi nd a place where partisan 
positions can fl ourish. By the grace of God, the region of Central 
Sumatra has remained unchanged, which makes it an extraordinary 
place. I have seen here a people attached to political parties for the 
delight in being together and not for the sake of creating divisions 
amongst ourselves, nor for the sake of creating a uniformisation 
amongst us all.83
 Th e resolutions adopted at the congress indicated that the Central 
Sumatra branch of Masyumi intended henceforth to provide a solution 
to problems at a regional level. Most of the demands formulated were 
addressed not to the government in Jakarta but to military authorities 
who had seized power in the region. Th e local party leaders wished, 
in particular, to promote the autonomy of the local customs authority, 
and to see the revenue generated by exports lodged in the Bank of 
Indonesia in Padang rather than sent to Jakarta. Th ey also undertook to 
organise a close cooperation with the region’s traditional organisations 
with a view to promoting justice, security and prosperity “for the peo-
ple of Central Sumatra in particular and for Indonesia in general.” 84
 Natsir’s experience in Sumatra, which was corroborated by other 
Masyumi leaders who visited the region frequently, reinforced the 
party’s conviction that outright opposition to the Djuanda government 
was the right path to follow. However, by refusing to distinguish the 
actions of the president from those of the prime minister, who was 
clearly not pursuing the same aims, the party involuntarily precipitated 
the reorganisation of political life which Sukarno had been seeking to 
promote over the previous year. At the beginning of August, the presi-
dent founded a New Life Movement (Gerakan Hidip Baru), designed 
83 Abadi, 6 July 1956.
84 Ibid.
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to promote austerity and revive the national spirit, but with the un-
stated aim also of marginalising political parties. Th is organisation, 
which was inspired by an organisation of the same name created by 
the Japanese during their occupation of Indonesia, was a total failure. 
It quickly became the butt of political satire in the capital, and the 
Masyumi press, naturally, had a fi eld day.85
 Meanwhile, the government endeavoured to implement the com-
mitments which Djuanda had made to the regions. In June, a new 
85 Daniel S. Lev, Th e Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957–
1959 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 30.
Plate 4.4 While Sukarno gesticulates before a few New Life Movement troops, 
his objectives are already being accomplished in the regions thanks to the 
collaboration between the army, the people and the regional administrations 
( Abadi, 5 August 1957).
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system of export licences (bukti export) was set up which was fairer 
towards the sectors producing raw materials. Its benefi ts were largely 
off set, however, by the eff ect of galloping infl ation, for which the new 
system itself was partly responsible. In addition, numerous delegations 
were sent to the regions in order to document the grievances of the 
local population and regional authorities. In mid-September, the prime 
minister organised a National Conference (Mujawarah Nasional) in an 
attempt to fi nd a long-term solution to the confl ict between the capital 
and the regions. Th is initiative was relatively successful insofar as certain 
rebel army offi  cers from Sumatra agreed to attend the conference along-
side government representatives. Th e debates gave rise to the adoption 
of a number of concrete proposals, most of which aimed at reviving 
the Dwitunggal and at ensuring, through the transformation of the 
National Council into a sort of senate, that the country’s provinces were 
better represented.86 Th ese recommendations went unheeded, however. 
Neither Sukarno nor Hatta wished to work together again, and the 
nine-member committee charged with examining the possibility of 
their collaboration was forced to admit that the gap between the two 
men was now considerable. Another committee was appointed by the 
National Conference to solve the army’s internal problems. It managed 
to reach a compromise solution which granted offi  cers involved in 
rebellions since 1956 an amnesty on condition that they would subse-
quently make a clear choice between respecting military discipline and 
pursuing their political activity.
 Masyumi, who was now entrenched in a position of resolute 
opposition to all government measures, endeavoured to minimise, with 
a certain lack of sincerity, the progress made by the National Con-
ference.87 Others adopted the same attitude towards the prime minis-
ter’s eff orts. President Sukarno seemed rapidly to lose interest in his 
prime minister’s work, while the army chief of staff , General Nasution, 
viewed the progress made in the discussions concerning the army in a 
very unfavourable light, as one of the main demands of most of the 
regional commanders was his resignation.
86 Baladas, Indonesian Politics 1955–1959, p. 129.
87 Boerhanoeddin Harahap, in a speech he gave in Medan, explained, for exam-
ple, that his party, which had long called for such an amnesty, regretted that it 
had not been given a more offi  cial status. Abadi, 3 October 1957.
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 On 30 November 1957, two events of a very diff erent nature 
sparked off  further tension within the country and undid all the eff orts 
made at reconciliation. Th e fi rst of these incidents was an assassination 
attempt on Sukarno which took place while he was going to his son’s 
school in the Cikini quarter of Jakarta. Several grenades were thrown 
in his direction, and although the president escaped narrowly with 
his life, several people were killed, including children. Th e tragedy in 
Cikini, far from weakening Sukarno, strengthened his position further. 
Th is was due, fi rst of all, to the emergence, in the aftermath of the in-
cident, of a popular belief, reinforced over time by other failed attacks, 
that the president was invulnerable.88 Furthermore, the attempt on his 
life allowed him, with the help of General Nasution, to compromise 
and undermine a little further those who were opposed to his pro-
gramme for guided democracy. Shortly after the attack and before the 
results of the preliminary investigation were made known, news spread 
that the perpetrators had acted on the orders of Colonel Zulkifl i for 
religious motives and were carried out in collaboration with certain 
members of Masyumi. Both Lubis and the Masyumi leadership vigor-
ously denied any participation in the aff air. On 8 December, the party 
published a long declaration denouncing the aspersions cast by certain 
newspapers close to the parties and organisations supporting the presi-
dent—Harian Rakjat Berita Minggu and Bintang Timur, amongst others
—and called on the military authorities to respect the principle of 
investigatory confi dentiality.89 During their trial, the accusations made 
against Lubis were confi rmed by the defendants; those concerning 
Masyumi’s involvement, however, remained based on hearsay.90 Th ese 
rumours nonetheless convinced Sukarno that a relentless struggle was 
now underway between himself and Masyumi. Th e Cikini attack also 
provided Nasution with the opportunity he was waiting for to put an 
end to the talks with rebel offi  cers. A month after the incident, he de-
clared that it was now impossible for the government to negotiate with 
88 Legge, Sukarno, p. 293.
89 Abadi, 9 December 1957.
90 Lieutenant-Colonel Sukendro in charge of the investigation declared that mem-
bers of Masyumi and GPII had indeed taken part in the attack but that it was 
impossible to affi  rm that those organisations themselves were directly involved in 
the aff air. Hikmah, 11 January 1958.
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murderers, and the committee appointed by the National Conference 
to restore order to the army soon ceased all activity.91
 At the very same time as a new period of tension was being 
opened in the capital by the attack against the president, the Western 
New Guinea question triggered a new crisis between Indonesia and its 
former colonial masters. Th e recovery of this part of the Indonesian 
archipelago, which had remained under Dutch sovereignty, was thought 
by Sukarno to be one of the few causes likely to allow him to mobi-
lise the nation’s support. Th e question was scheduled to be examined 
once again by the United Nations General Assembly, with the session 
due to take place at the end of November. In the month leading up 
to this crucial debate, the president had launched a series of stinging 
attacks against the Netherlands. Although Masyumi was fully in favour 
of Irian Barat becoming a part of Indonesia, it denounced on several 
occasions the president’s approach, which consisted in insulting and 
threatening the Dutch.92 Here, the party once again shared the position 
adopted by Mohammad Hatta, who had also distanced himself from 
Sukarno’s comments. On 29 November, the Indonesian motion aimed 
at obliging the Netherlands to enter into negotiations did not obtain 
the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. Th is failure 
heightened nationalist sentiments within the organisations supporting 
the president. On 3 December, the unions close to the PNI and the 
PKI took hold of most of the major plantations and companies be-
longing to the Dutch. On 5 December, the minister for justice ordered 
the deportation of some 46,000 Dutch living in Indonesia. It seemed 
at this point that Prime Minister Djuanda was overtaken by events; it 
was the president who appeared to have his hand on the tiller of the 
state. Djuanda warned his fellow Indonesians about the “ruinous” con-
sequences of these abuses, and had to resign himself to letting the army 
regain control over the situation.93 Having ordered them to leave the 
premises, the army promptly took control of the companies the union 
members had taken hold of.94
91 Baladas, Indonesian Politics 1955–1959, p. 131.
92 See Mohammad Natsir’s declarations in this regard. Abadi, 9 November 1957.
93 Lev, Th e Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 34.
94 As it was out of the question to hand these assets back to their former owners, 
the military controlled these companies until their nationalisation one year later. 
Th is contributed to fostering military offi  cers’ economic ambitions, which subse-
quently fl ourished under the New Order.
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 Th is national hysteria contrasted keenly with the economic prag-
matism which Masyumi had been advocating for many years. Th e party 
was now facing the rising tide of an extremely popular movement 
which, by cutting the “Gordian knot” of Dutch capitalism, put an end 
to years of uncertainty and hesitation.95 A speech given by Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara on 14 October 1957, during the widespread campaign 
against Dutch interests, illustrated how out of touch the party’s policy 
was with the political mood in the country. Th e main architect of the 
party’s economic policy called on his fellow countrymen “not to be 
afraid of the return of colonialism if we allow the entry of foreign 
capital.” 96
 A strictly economic analysis of subsequent events confi rms Mas-
yumi’s prognosis. Th e confi scation of Dutch businesses led to chaos, 
as the banking system and parts of the trading sector were completely 
disrupted. Th e captains of ships owned by the KPM were given the 
order to leave Indonesian territorial waters, leading to the loss over-
night of nearly 80% of the country’s tonnage.97 Th e events also led 
to a diplomatic fi asco which was cruelly summarised by Mohammad 
Natsir in Palembang: “the result of these actions … is that Indonesia 
is more isolated on the international stage. It has fewer friends, more 
enemies, and Irian Barat is still in Dutch hands.” 98 For Masyumi’s 
president, however, this was not the most worrying aspect of the whole 
aff air. He maintained that the question of Western Irian had “become 
the instrument of a wider project” aimed at “breaking our existing 
links with Western democracies” in order to “move Indonesia closer to 
the Russian bloc”. As proof of this devious scheme, Natsir cited the 
recent trip to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia by a government delega-
tion charged with negotiating the purchase of arms which the United 
States had just refused to give to Indonesia. According to him, evi-
dence could also be found in the fact that the Indonesian Communist 
95 Feith, Th e Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p. 584.
96 “Kita haruslah menghilangkan kechawatiran terhadap modal asing”.
 “Situasi internasional telah berobah sedjak kolonialisme mentjapai puntjak ke-
suburannja. Kita tidak usah takut akan kembalinja kolonialisme apabila kita 
mengizinkan masuknja modal2 asing.” Abadi, 15 October 1957.
97 Feith, Th e Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, p. 585.
98 An article by Natsir originally published in the newspaper Batanghari Sembilan 
in Palembang on 29 January 1958, and reproduced by Abadi on 1 February 1958.
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Party saw “its position within the government guaranteed and ensured”, 
while other organisations were “the victims of all sorts of stratagems 
designed to eliminate them.” 99
 According to Natsir, then, the famous “salami tactic” described 
ten years earlier by the Hungarian Mathias Rakosia was at work in 
the corridors of power. Th is very bleak outlook on the future of the 
Republic of Indonesia, which presented Sukarno as an instrument being 
more or less exploited by the Communist Party in its march towards 
power, could, in many people’s eyes, be put down to the personal 
situation of the party’s president when he wrote these lines. It is true 
to say that by the end of January 1958, Natsir had become a pariah, 
a rebel trying to justify his cause. Th e Irian Barat crisis had defi nitively 
marginalised the political system which had come into existence in 
November 1945. Th e traditional political parties now had the choice 
between rebelling against the government or adopting a sterile “wait-
and-see” policy, the path chosen by the PSII and NU who adhered, 
like the PNI and the PKI, to the nationalist jingoism whipped up by 
the president. Although a part of Masyumi’s leadership chose the for-
mer option, it was not, as such, a political choice. Despite the profound 
upheaval which had aff ected Indonesian politics, the party had not 
changed its stance since 1955 and remained stubbornly attached to its 
pro-democracy policy. In a way, the party’s rebellion was less against the 
government in Jakarta than it was against the old system of governance 
embodied by the party.
Th e PRRI: An Incongruous and Ill-Fated Rebellion
Th e seizure of Dutch companies and the attendant nationalist agitation 
gave the regionalist movement a new lease of life. Th e breakdown of 
most of the transportation links between the country’s islands led the 
rebel authorities to develop more trade links abroad. In Jakarta, the 
Masyumi leadership, which had publicly spoken out against the con-
fi scation of Dutch property, was now targeted as part of a campaign of 
intimidation led by youth organisations close to the PNI and the PKI. 
As the number of rumours and false accusations targeting the party 
continued to grow, Mohammad Natsir decided, in April 1957, to go 
99 Ibid.
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to the state prosecutor in order to inform him of “the totalitarian pro-
paganda methods which are beginning to spread.” 100 Over the course 
of that year, the government brought a signifi cant number of cases 
against the press: 125 proceedings were taken against journalists, 13 
of whom ended up in prison.101
Th e Hijra of the Masyumi Leadership to Sumatra 102
By the beginning of 1958, the attacks against Masyumi were no longer 
merely of a political nature. Attempts were made to intimidate Moham-
mad Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Boerhanoeddin Harahap, all 
of whom received threats. Rumours concerning their deaths or arrest 
swept the country; at one stage, Boerhanoeddin, for example, discovered 
that a part of his family living in Sumatra had come to Jakarta upon 
hearing of his death.103 It is diffi  cult to gauge, however, to what extent 
the Masyumi leaders were really in danger. Neither the contemporary 
press accounts nor their biographies have revealed any accurate details 
which could lead one to believe that their lives were in real danger. 
Th e violence seems to have been, above all, psychological in nature, 
but it was especially oppressive to the party leaders given how it con-
trasted with the atmosphere at the time in Sumatra, a region to which, 
as we have already seen, they had increasingly organised visits. 
 In mid-January 1958, several party leaders happened, for various 
reasons, to fi nd themselves in Padang. Mohammad Natsir came there 
from Medan where he had attended a ceremony at the Islamic Univer-
sity of North Sumatra in the company of Mohamad Roem,104 while 
Boerhanoeddin Harahap accompanied his wife there to visit an old 
100 “Teknik propaganda totaliter sudah mulai dilantjarkan sekarang ini.” Mas-
yumi’s president in this instance was criticising a report in the communist news-
paper, Bintang Timur, which claimed that Masyumi had 35 million rupiahs in 
the Bang Dagang Nasional Indonesia. Natsir deplored the fact that despite the 
party’s formal and detailed denials of such rumours, they had spread throughout 
the capital.
101 Edward C. Smith, “A History of Newspaper Suppression in Indonesia, 1945–
1965”, PhD diss., University of Iowa, 1969, quoted in Busjairi, Boerhanoeddin 
Harahap Pilar Demokrasi, p. 141.
102 Th e expression used by Masyumi members at the beginning of the New Order.
103 Busjairi, Boerhanoeddin Harahap Pilar Demokrasi, p. 142.
104 Roem was the rector of the university.
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friend.105 While these explanations for their presence in Padang should 
perhaps not be taken at face value, it does not seem that there was 
an organised plan to convene the Masyumi leadership with a view to 
organising some form of collective action from Sumatra. Th eir main 
motivation was to get away from the pernicious atmosphere that 
reigned in the capital. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was the only one who 
openly admitted to having fl ed the capital; in an open letter to the 
president, the governor of the Bank of Indonesia explained his actions, 
saying that “he was not ready to die stupidly, to become the prey of 
wild beasts in human clothing.” 106
 On 9 and 10 January, the Masyumi leadership met in Sungai 
Dareh, a small locality in Central Sumatra, at the invitation of Lieu-
tenant Colonel Husein, one of the military fi gures who was already in 
confrontation with the authorities in Jakarta. It was the party’s visceral 
anti-communism which led its leaders to join sides with the army 
rebels,107 a move which was helped, perhaps even prepared for, by the 
participation of local party branches in the protest movement which 
had started a few months earlier. In October 1957, regional party 
fi gures had participated, in Bukittinggi, in the creation of a Unitary 
Anticommunist Movement (Gerakan Bersama Anti-Komunisme) led 
by Colonel Djambek, one of the offi  cers at loggerheads with Jakarta. 
Th e organisation was founded in the aftermath of the degradation of 
the “Rachmat” mosque in Surabaya, allegedly committed by commu-
nists, and it was principally designed to give a religious dimension to 
the struggle against the infl uence of the PKI. Th e head of the move-
ment was Muhammad Djamil Djambek, one of the main fi gures of 
modernism in the region. Its declared goal was to fi ght against the 
growing infl uence in Indonesia, and particularly within the govern-
ment, of the “ungodly” (anti-Tuhan) ideology.108
105 Busjairi, Boerhanoeddin Harahap Pilar Demokrasi, pp. 143–4.
106 “Saja tidak bersedia mati konjol mendjadi mangsa binatang2 buas dalam tubuh 
manusia”. Abadi, 23 January 1958.
107 In his letter to the president, Sjafruddin wrote that from his point of view, 
there were only two solutions available to restore order in Indonesia: either the 
immediate formation of a national government provided for by the Constitution 
or a request for help to Russia and other communist countries, much like the 
one made by Janos Kadar’s government in Hungary. Ibid.
108 Abadi, 8 and 10 October 1957.
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 In Sungai Dareh, Mohammad Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara 
and Boerhanoeddin Harahap met with another fi gure of civil society, 
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, a member of the PSII and former minister 
for economic aff airs, who had left the capital several months previously 
following accusations of corruption. Also attending the meeting were 
most of the offi  cers hostile to General Nasution: Djambek, Simbolon, 
Lubis and Sumual. After a lively debate between the military and 
non-military participants at the meeting concerning what path the move-
ment should take, the insurgents fi nally settled on a demand which 
was already quite old.109 Th ey considered the procedure used by the 
president to appoint the Djuanda cabinet to be unconstitutional, and 
so they called for the immediate resignation of the government and the 
nomination of Hatta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta as formateurs. Th ey 
announced the formation of a Resistance Council (Dewan Perdjuangan), 
led by Lieutenant Colonel Husein which would have authority over all 
the country’s insurgent regional councils, in particular Dewan Banteng 
and Permesta. After this meeting, the Masyumi leaders travelled to 
Bukittinggi where they met with Mohamad Roem, who had inten-
tionally kept his distance in order to be able to act as a go-between. 
Natsir sent him back to Jakarta so that he could keep the party leaders 
there informed of the latest developments.
109 According to accounts of this meeting written later by Masyumi fi gures or 
supporters, the non-military participants are said to have vigorously opposed a 
project to proclaim Sumatra’s independence elaborated by the military offi  cers. 
See, in particular, Busjairi, Boerhanoeddin Harahap Pilar Demokrasi, p. 145; Ajip 
Rosidi, Syafruddin Prawiranegara Lebih Takut Kepada Allah SWT (Jakarta: Inti 
Idayu Pers, 1986), p. 203; Yusril Ihza, “Prolog PRRI dan keterlibatan Natsir”, 
in Pak Natsir 80 Tahun, buku pertama, Pandangan dan Penilaian Generasi Muda, 
ed. Anshary H. Endang Saifuddin and Rais M. Amien (Jakarta: Media Da’wah, 
1988), p. 140 ff .
 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara’s son, Farid, explained that his father and the other 
Masyumi fi gures who went to Sungai Dareh had three objectives: to prevent the 
regionalist movements from becoming separatist movements; to refuse the parti-
cipation of the PKI in cabinet; and to pursue dialogue with the government. 
See Anwar Harjono, ed., Pemikiran dan perjuangan Mohammad Natsir (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Firdaus, 1996), p. 144 ff . Th is interpretation of the meeting in Sungai 
Dareh was shared by Audrey and George Kahin in Subversion as Foreign Policy: 
Th e Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: Th e New Press, 
1995).
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 During the three weeks following the meeting in Sungai Dareh, 
there seemed no way out of the deadlock it had created. President 
Sukarno left Indonesia on 6 January on an offi  cial visit which lasted 
until 16 February. Greatly weakened by the crisis, the Djuanda govern-
ment held a series of formal and informal meetings in the capital, 
including with the Masyumi leaders who had remained in Jakarta, in 
an unsuccessful attempt to fi nd a peaceful solution to the problem. 
In the meantime, General Nasution began preparations for a military 
confrontation. On a trip to Sulawesi and Sumatra, he ensured the 
backing of those offi  cers who had not yet joined the rebellion. Th e 
military offi  cers belonging to the rebellion were also convinced that it 
was now necessary to see the confrontation with Java through to the 
end. Th e power they wielded in the regions gave them a taste for 
more. A profi table trade route was now in place with Singapore and 
Hong Kong, generating considerable amounts of revenue, both for the 
military offi  cers and the local population, and the increasing number 
of declarations made by the United States denouncing the collaboration 
between President Sukarno and the PKI brought them hope that some 
foreign assistance might be forthcoming.110
 On 10 February, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Husein sent an ulti-
matum to the government on behalf of the Dewan Perjuangan. In it, 
the rebels demanded the resignation of the Djuanda cabinet within 
fi ve days, the appointment of Hatta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta as 
formateurs and a guarantee that both Parliament and the president—
whose role was henceforth to remain strictly within the limits defi ned 
by the Constitution—would allow the new government to remain in 
offi  ce until the next elections. Th e following day, the government re-
jected these demands, and Nasution ordered the immediate arrest of all 
the rebel military offi  cers on charges of attempting to assassinate the 
president and undermining the integrity of the state.111
 When the ultimatum expired on 15 February, the rebels announced 
the formation of a Revolutionary Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, PRRI). 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was prime minister of this new government, 
with Boerhanoeddin Harahap as minister for defence and for justice 
and Soemitro Djojohadikusumo appointed business minister. Th ree 
110 Lev, Th e Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 38.
111 Abadi, 13 February 1958.
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rebel military offi  cers, Colonels Simbolon and Warouw and Lieutenant 
Saleh Lahade, were also given portfolios, and Mohammad Natsir was 
appointed as the government’s spokesman.
 If one were to believe the accounts given by the Masyumi leaders 
who took part in this enterprise, their participation in the revolutionary 
government happened through a combination of circumstances over 
which they had very little control. It is true that the document estab-
lishing the formation of the PRRI was signed by only one person, 
Lieutenant Colonel Husein, the head of the Dewan Perdjuangan. 
Sjafruddin later claimed that Husein had asked him to add his signa-
ture to the declaration. Th e new prime minister refused to do so in 
order to make it clear who the responsibility for this initiative fell 
mainly upon.112 A similar impression is given by the recollections of 
Boerhanoeddin Harahap, who claimed that a lot of what happened was 
improvised and that the Masyumi members’ half-hearted participation 
in a symbolic government was dictated mainly by circumstances.113 
 Th ese surprising remarks could be explained by the desire to 
whitewash an awkward past. However, there does seem to be proof that 
the Masyumi ministers’ reservations towards the enterprise they found 
themselves involved in were not simply the fi gment of Boerhanoeddin 
Harahap’s imagination. Th ere is fi rst of all the document proclaiming 
the existence of the PRRI, which only contains Husein’s signature, but 
more importantly, there is the modest position occupied by Mohammad 
Natsir in the government. If the Masyumi leaders in Sumatra had 
wanted their participation in the government to be a meaningful one 
and if they had wished to carry as much infl uence as possible within 
it, they would have given the position of prime minister to the party 
president: he, much more than they, enjoyed a real stature both in 
Indonesia and abroad. 
 Th e ultimatum issued on 10 February was, then, an attempt at 
calling the government’s bluff , and one whose failure the rebels had 
112 Rosidi, Syafruddin Prawiranegara Lebih Takut Kepada Allah SWT, p. 212.
113 “When the PRRI government was formed, I was invited to participate in it. 
Initially, I was to be minister of home aff airs. I was not wholeheartedly in favour 
as I did not want to become a minister, but in short what mattered most was the 
existence of a cabinet, which would be the basis for a rival government. Whether 
this cabinet had any real power or not was not the question. Before its inaugura-
tion, the military offi  cers decided to change its composition, without explaining 
their decision to us.” Busjairi, Boerhanoeddin Harahap Pilar Demokrasi, p. 153.
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not envisaged. Forced into action by the political crisis, they chose, in 
a manner of speaking, to rekindle the fl ame of the PDRI which was 
still smouldering in the region.114 In 1948, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara 
had not really contested Sukarno and Hatta’s legitimacy; he had simply 
posed as the guardian of legitimacy, with the intention of ensuring that 
the procedures provided for by the country’s provisional constitution 
were respected. Some ten years later, the PRRI also considered itself 
to be the symbol of resistance against the enemy, this time an internal 
one however, and above all the steadfast defender of constitutional rule. 
Th e similarity of the names given to the two provisional governments 
was not lost either on the country’s political class for whom acronyms 
played an important role. However, unlike the PDRI whose authority 
was uncontested, the PRRI enjoyed no such legitimacy when its exis-
tence was proclaimed, and their only chance of acquiring it would have 
been through a widespread rebellion in the outer provinces and inter-
national recognition of its existence. Fearing that this might materialise, 
the government in Jakarta reacted rapidly to the challenge to their 
authority posed by the rebels.
A Military, Political and Diplomatic Defeat
When Sukarno returned to Indonesia on 16 February, intense discus-
sions took place in the corridors of power in order to decide upon the 
attitude to adopt towards the PRRI. Hatta became the mouthpiece for 
those who wished, at all costs, to avoid a military intervention; these 
included Masyumi, the PSI but also the Christian parties. During a 
meeting he had with the president, Hatta proposed an overall solution 
to the crisis which involved the transformation of the National Council 
into a sort of Senate, whose members would be elected directly by the 
regions, the immediate breaking up of the PRRI accompanied by an 
amnesty for its members, and fi nally the formation of a presidential 
cabinet which he would head.115 After the rejection of these proposals 
114 Th e Provisional Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Daru-
rat Republik Indonesia) led by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara took on the role of the 
Indonesian state between December 1948 and July 1949. Th e president and the 
republican government were being detained at the time by the Dutch as part of 
their “second police action”. See supra Chapter 2.
115 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy, p. 143.
Chap4 (202-284).indd   254 8/14/15   5:39:09 PM
Th e Fall 255
and the collective decision made by Sukarno, Djuanda and Nasution 
to opt for a military solution to the crisis, Mohammad Hatta refused 
to participate in any new discussions. From that point, his only role 
in the ensuing national drama was that of a spectator.
 On 21 February, the Indonesian air force launched a large-scale 
bombardment of Padang and Bukittinggi, the two towns in Sumatra 
where the rebels had set up their headquarters, and also Manado, the 
capital of North Sulawesi. On 12 March, the ground off ensive began, 
with Nasution’s troops fi rst of all seizing control of Pekanbaru, a stra-
tegic locality due to its proximity to the oilfi elds belonging to the 
American company, Caltex.116 On 16 May, Medan fell to government 
troops, and in mid-April they took over Padang. Th e theatre of military 
operations then moved to Sulawesi where, in mid-May, the Indonesian 
army took control of Gorontalo. Finally, at the end of June, Manado, 
the last bastion of the PRRI-Permesta rebellion, fell.
 Th e rebels’ military defeat was complete after scarcely four 
months. Th e speed of this rout revealed not only the rebel troops’ lack 
of preparation, but also the failure of the insurgents’ attempts to form 
alliances both within the country and internationally. In reality, most of 
the rebel offi  cers, both in Sumatra and in Sulawesi, had not believed 
that the authorities in Jakarta would be capable of initiating a military 
confrontation. Th e proclamation of the PRRI was above all a political 
act which the insurrectionists were not ready to defend by force. For 
various reasons, the general uprising in the country’s regions which 
they had counted upon did not materialise. In Sulawesi, the core of the 
insurrection was made up of members of the Minahasa ethnic group 
who were Christian and, by and large, well-educated. Since colonial 
times, the Minahasa constituted a sort of elite, both in public adminis-
tration and in the service sector, which made it very diffi  cult for them 
to attract the support of those who were a lot less well-off  and some-
what jealous of the Minahas’s infl uence.117 In Sumatra, the PRRI suf-
fered from the defection of the commander of South Sumatra, Colonel 
116 Th e Indonesian government at the time feared a military intervention by the 
US marines in Pekanbaru on the pretext of protecting Americans living there. 
According to Sjafruddin Prawiranegara’s son, it was the rebels themselves who 
refused the American proposal to invade the town. Harjono, ed., Pemikiran dan 
perjuangan Mohammad Natsir, p. 145.
117 Ibid., p. 152.
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Barlian. Th ough initially supportive of the protest movement, he re-
fused to approve the creation of the revolutionary government, and 
decided to remain neutral during the confl ict. His decision to maintain 
the region’s oilfi elds under his control deprived the PRRI of an impor-
tant lever against Jakarta as well as considerable fi nancial resources.
 Th e rebels’ cause was also aff ected by defections from outside 
Indonesia, notably by the United States. Th eir decision to act had been, 
in part, predicated on the signifi cant amount of American support they 
had received since the autumn of 1957. Concerned by the progress of 
communism, President Eisenhower, his Secretary of State, John Forest 
Dulles, and Dulles’s brother Allen, director of the CIA, decided at 
that time to launch what Audrey and George Kahin described as “the 
most signifi cant American operation since the Second World War”.118 
By November 1957, the insurgents had benefi tted from a signifi cant 
delivery of arms. Boats and submarines collected rebel troops in order 
to bring them to training camps in the American military bases in 
Okinawa, Saipan and Guam. In December, after the seizure of Dutch 
assets by the government in Jakarta, the American policy of supporting 
the insurgents was carried out more openly. Parts of the Th ird Marine 
Division were posted off  the coast of Sumatra, and this situation 
naturally encouraged the rebels’ military intransigence. On 11 Feb-
ruary, the day after the Dewan Perdjuangan had issued its ultimatum to 
Jakarta, Secretary of State Dulles publicly criticised President Sukarno 
and tacitly approved of the formation of a rebel government. Moreover, 
the CIA was convinced that the movement would obtain the support 
of all those who were at loggerheads with the government, whether 
they were Moluccan separatists, Darul Islam or even certain sections 
of the prestigious Siliwangi Division. Th e fact that most of Indonesia’s 
neighbours did not hide their sympathy towards the rebellion was 
further evidence for the Americans that it would succeed; indeed some, 
such as Taiwan, the Philippines, Th ailand and Malaysia, were already 
providing the rebels with assistance. After the proclamation of the 
PRRI, the United States reinforced their supply of military assistance, 
notably providing Sulawesi with considerable aerial support.119 How-
ever, they never granted the Sumatran government’s more political 
118 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy, p. 8.
119 Harjono, ed., Pemikiran dan perjuangan Mohammad Natsir, p. 167.
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requests, namely the recognition of the PRRI as a legitimate authority 
in Indonesia but also the freezing of the Jakartan government’s assets 
held in American banks.
 Th ere were two reasons for the American authorities’ about-turn 
in this aff air. Firstly, the rebellion did not live up to the hopes of 
an emergent movement which would succeed in mobilising support 
amongst Indonesians living outside of Java who were disillusioned with 
the government in Jakarta. Th e insurrection never went beyond three 
regions in Sumatra—South Sumatra, South Tapanuli and Jambi—and 
the provinces of Central Sulawesi and North Sulawesi. Secondly, the 
speed and effi  ciency of the Jakartan authorities’ reaction took the 
Americans by surprise, and they were disappointed by the feeble resis-
tance off ered by the rebels—they abandoned Medan and Padang having 
scarcely put up a fi ght. By the end of April 1958, the Americans had 
appointed a new ambassador in Jakarta, Howard Jones. His mission 
was to erase the disastrous impression left in the Indonesian capital by 
the American intervention, and to attempt to preserve some form of 
infl uence there for the United States.120 His endeavours were greeted 
favourably by Djuanda, Sukarno and Nasution, who were eager to 
avoid the risk of the Americans landing in Sumatra (a part of the 
Seventh Fleet was still sailing near its coast). On 20 May, Secretary of 
State Dulles confi rmed his new policy in a declaration condemning any 
intervention in favour of the rebels, and shortly afterwards a contract 
for the sale of arms was drawn up with the Indonesian government.121
An Incongruous Leap in the Dark
After the uprising’s military failure and the loss of American support, 
the nature of the Masyumi leaders’ participation in the PRRI changed. 
As we have already seen, the course of events over the fi rst half of 1958 
could support the theory that party fi gures played a secondary role in 
operations, but from mid-1958, it was clearly they who took hold of 
the movement’s reins. Th ey were now considered to be traitors to the 
120 Th e capture in May of an American pilot, A.L. Pope, jeopardised the secrecy 
of the operation, which had been kept secret from the American public, and thus 
made it urgent for the American government to repair relations with Jakarta.
121 Harjono, ed., Pemikiran dan perjuangan Mohammad Natsir, p. 183.
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nation by the Jakartan authorities, and they engaged upon a hardline 
policy, demonstrated by their entering into negotiations with move-
ments which identifi ed with Darul Islam in Aceh and Sulawesi. Th is 
new strategy gave rise to considerable tension within the rebel govern-
ment, as the two main regions under its control—North Sumatra and 
North Sulawesi—contained Christian populations, and a certain num-
ber of PRRI offi  cers, including Simbolon, Kawrilarang and Sumual, 
were Christians.
 Th ese army offi  cers, who were supported by Sumitro Djojohadi-
kusumo and Colonel Zulkifl i Lubis—both Muslims—tried to oppose 
this attempt to create new alliances.122 Despite their misgivings, a 
de facto collaboration began between what remained of the PRRI’s 
troops and Daud Beureu’eh’s men in Aceh as well as Kazar Muzakkar’s 
forces in Sulawesi. Th e reinforcements provided by Darul Islam had 
little real eff ect, however. By the time these alliances were concluded, 
the authorities in Jakarta had already managed to considerably weaken 
the Islamic movements by forcing the surrender of a considerable 
number of their members in Sulawesi and Aceh.123 By mid-1958, the 
members of the PRRI had been forced by the off ensives carried out by 
government troops to lead an itinerant existence, more often than not 
in the jungle, and so no longer represented a real danger to the govern-
ment in Jakarta.124
 At the beginning of 1960, in a pathetic display of hubris, the 
Masyumi leadership tried to re-launch the rebellion through a political 
act. Th ey managed to convince the members of the Dewan Perdjuangan, 
as well as a few representatives of the Aceh and Sulawesi movements, 
of the necessity of transforming the revolutionary government into a 
new state, and on 8 February 1960, the United Republic of Indonesia 
(Republik Persatuan Indonesia, RPI) was offi  cially founded. For Natsir 
and his supporters, this move violated two of their long-held principles. 
122 Ibid., p. 202.
123 In both cases, the government managed to foment dissident movements. In 
Aceh, it promised to create a “special region” (Daerah Istimewa) enjoying a consi-
derable degree of autonomy.
124 For an account of the roving lifestyle which Mohammad Natsir and his fol-
lowers led at the time in the jungle, see Audrey R. Kahin, Islam Nationalism and 
Democracy: A Political Biography of Mohammad Natsir (Singapore: NUS Press, 
2012), pp. 114–39.
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Firstly, it was in fl agrant contradiction with the initial aim stated by 
the movement of avoiding the creation of a separatist state; it also 
created, contrary to what its offi  cial name might lead one to think, a 
federation of states free to choose their own form of government in 
accordance with their own specifi c cultural values.
 Th e United Republic of Indonesia was never more than an illu-
sion. Th e state’s future constitution which was announced at its pro-
clamation was never drafted, and apart from the position of president, 
which was occupied by Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, no institution was 
established. Th ere was no indication as to the founders’ intentions, 
apart from the fi ve principles proclaimed on 8 February:
Faith in a unique God as link
Th e preservation of and deference towards fundamental human rights
A government founded on concertation and democracy
Th e federal organisation of society
Solidarity with all the world’s nations 125
Th e Pancasila as a source of inspiration is obvious here; one could even 
say it was plagiarised. Th ree of the fi ve principles—the fi rst, the third 
and the fi fth—are virtually identical to those that appear in the pre-
amble to the 1950 Constitution, and the changes made to the two 
other principles are not what one could call radical—“social rights” is 
replaced by “human rights” and “federal” takes the place of “national”. 
On reading the RPI’s only institutional credo, its project seems to be a 
decidedly modest one. Th e state’s religious sources were formulated in 
a very classical style inspired by the Sanskrit tradition, far from what 
was openly feared by the Christian military offi  cers at the time of the 
alliance with Darul Islam. Even though they were no longer, in theory, 
constrained by Sukarno and the PNI, they could not—or would not—
allow the recognition of the primacy of Islam for which they had 
fought. It was their participation in a rebellion, then, which fi nally 
obliged the legalists within the party to recognise the truth which they 
had long refused to admit, namely that it was impossible to establish 
an Islamic state in Indonesia without seriously compromising the unity 
of the country. Although the party members who took part in the 
rebellion were politically marginalised, they reasserted the hierarchy of 
125 Quoted in Badruzzaman, Boerhanoeddin Harahap Pilar Demokrasi, pp. 154–5.
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values which had always guided their action: democracy, religion and 
the unity of the nation. Th e creation of a federal state with the possi-
bility for each of the individual states to freely choose its own mode of 
government settled once and for all the question of Islam’s place in the 
country’s institutions. As Natsir subsequently suggested, this institu-
tional framework opened the possibility for certain regions to recognise 
Islam as a source of law, while preserving the right for all to choose 
other sources. It is one of history’s ironies that the solution to the 
deadlock created by the Constituent Assembly debates was formulated 
far from the country’s centres of power, somewhere in the Central 
Sumatran jungle in front of a scattering of troops.
 In the early months of 1961, the rebellion’s divisions worsened 
further. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo had already split from his comrades 
in Sumatra and now busied himself mainly with sending arms to 
Sulawesi from Singapore. In an attempt to negotiate the terms of their 
surrender, Simbolon and Husein founded a “Military Emergency Gov-
ernment” which disavowed the United Republic of Indonesia. Sulawesi 
was the scene of the movement’s fi rst capitulations, with Colonel 
Kawilarang coming to an agreement at the end of March with the 
army chiefs of staff  on the conditions of a ceasefi re. A few days later, 
he surrendered along with 36,000 men—the bulk of the Permesta 
forces. In Sumatra, Husein and Simbolon capitulated in July, while 
Zulkifl i Lubis laid down his arms on 18 August, the day after a speech 
given by Sukarno in which he promised to award an amnesty to all 
those who returned to the fold of the motherland before 5 October.
 At the end of August, deprived of any military support and under 
threat from the pro-PKI militia who were pursuing them, Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara and Boerhanoeddin Harahap gave themselves up to gov-
ernment troops near Padang, having sent a pathetic letter to Nasution 
in which they announced that “the RPI was ceasing all hostilities”. 
Meanwhile, Natsir remained in hiding for a few more weeks in the 
company of Colonel Djambek and a handful of loyal followers. For 
them, the question was no longer to know whether they should give 
up the game, but how to fi nd a way of surrendering without getting 
killed. Dahlan Djambek had previously failed in his attempt to do 
the same: a communist militia, the Organisation of Popular Youth 
(Organisasi Pemuda Rakjat, OPR), having got wind of where he was 
supposed to surrender, waited in ambush for him and shot him down. 
Natsir was luckier, however: he managed to surrender without injury 
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on 25 September and was imprisoned in Padang.126 In 1962, he was 
transferred to Jakarta along with the other PRRI leaders.
 Th e PRRI-Permesta movement not only failed, it collapsed. As 
Barbara S. Harvey very accurately remarked, the rebellion ended up 
favouring the development of a regime which it had set out to combat 
as “central authority was enhanced at the expense of local autonomy; 
radical nationalism supplanted pragmatic moderation, and the infl uence 
of Sukarno and the PKI were augmented at the expense of Hatta and 
the Masjumi.” 127 Th e failure of the enterprise can be put down, in 
large part, to the rebels’ lack of military preparation. Th is was not just 
a question of the rebel troops’ motivation and military equipment; 
above all, it was because of their leaders’ failure to convince the Indo-
nesian military staff  of the legitimacy of their struggle against commu-
nism. Most of the country’s senior military offi  cers were concerned 
about the infl uence of the PKI, but, like Nasution, they deemed it 
preferable to give their support to Sukarno. It seemed to them more 
eff ective to fi ght communism within the confi nes of Guided Demo-
cracy rather than to defy the president openly, and the rebel military 
offi  cers adopted the same point of view after the failure of their opera-
tion. Th eir return to the fold of the army took place seamlessly: no 
charges were pressed against them and most of them maintained their 
rank. Quite a diff erent fate awaited the civilian members of Masyumi. 
Th eir party was now unable to protect them from the wrath of the 
president, who seized this opportunity to get rid of this troublesome 
opposition party defi nitively.
Th e End of Masyumi
During the early months of 1958, the Masyumi leadership found itself 
on the horns of a dilemma. Th e man who had turned the revolutionary 
movement into a party of government, and who had converted the 
party to a legalist position which espoused moderation, had just fl outed 
the law and jeopardised the country’s unity. Its president’s exodus from 
the capital, along with two of its most important fi gures, left Masyumi 
in a quandary. Th e strategy for opposing Sukarno’s plans, to which the 
126 Kahin and Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy, p. 216.
127 Harvey, Permesta, p. 150.
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party had remained faithful up until that point, was based on a strict 
interpretation of the Republic’s founding documents. If it did not now 
fi rmly condemn the party leaders who were involved in the PRRI, it 
would lose all credibility.
A Party Reprieved: Th e Ambivalent Condemnation of 
the PRRI
In January 1958, the party fi gures who remained in Jakarta organised 
a series of meetings in an attempt to fi nd a way out of the crisis. 
On 1 February, three of Natsir’s closest collaborators—Prawoto Mangku-
sasmito, Faqih Usman and Mohamad Roem—were dispatched to 
Sumatra to open discussions with the rebels. Th ey informed the insur-
gents that they had received assurances from the army, via the Sultan 
of Yogyakarta, that no military operation would be undertaken as long 
as no dissident state was created.128 
 Th e ultimatum launched by the Dewan Perjuangan on 10 Feb-
ruary was as much the result of the failure of these attempted negotia-
tions as it was a consequence of the inability of the Masyumi leaders 
involved in the rebellion to keep a hold on the course of events. In 
response to the ultimatum, the party’s vice president Soekiman and its 
general secretary Yunan Nasution issued a relatively nebulous declara-
tion on behalf of the leadership, stating that: “the current diffi  culties 
will not be overcome by encouraging a confrontation between the 
centre and the regions; on the contrary, equality for both sides must 
be deepened as much as possible.” 129 At this stage of the rebellion, it 
seems that the attitude adopted by Natsir and his two close supporters 
had not yet given rise to any wrangling between the Javanese branches 
and the non-Javanese branches of the party. Th e Masyumi branch in 
Yogyakarta, for example, voted a motion on 13 February which was 
virtually identical to the one published a few days earlier by the South 
Sumatran branch. Th e aim of these declarations was to denounce the 
rumours suggesting a possible proclamation of independence in Sumatra 
as the work of the PKI and its henchmen who wanted to exacerbate 
the crisis.130
128 Lukman Hakiem, Perjalanan mencari keadilan dan persatuan: Biografi  Dr 
Anwar Harjono, S.H. (Jakarta: Media Da’wah, 1993), p. 205.
129 Abadi, 14 February 1958.
130 Abadi, 4 and 13 February 1958.
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 Th e reaction by the leadership in Jakarta to the proclamation of 
the PRRI on 15 February was one of consternation. Th ey eventually 
decided to maintain the legalist line which they had always stuck to, 
and the following day, voted a declaration proclaiming the Working 
Cabinet, the National Council and the Revolutionary Government to 
be “all three unconstitutional”.131
 Th e debates which preceded the adoption of this motion brought 
to light a signifi cant amount of friction within the party. A few days 
earlier, Mohammad Natsir made it known that he did not wish his 
name to be associated with Masyumi in order to avoid the party being 
seen to be involved in the rebellion. Did this mean that he should 
be removed as president of the party? Most of the party leaders were 
against this solution, and some even called for an offi  cial declaration 
of support for Natsir’s actions; however, others supported by Jusuf 
Wibisono and Soekiman demanded a fi rm condemnation of the PRRI. 
Th ey explained that the revolutionary government had been created 
without any prior consultation with the Masyumi leadership and, in 
addition, that it supported an armed uprising, which the party had 
always denounced.132 Th e solution which was agreed upon consisted 
of a compromise between these two positions: Natsir was neither offi  -
cially supported nor directly denounced and he remained, in theory, 
the president of Masyumi and one of its main lieutenants. Prawoto 
Mangkusasmito, considered to be his spiritual son, was appointed 
interim president. Th e party’s unity was thus preserved and Soekiman 
and Jusuf Wibisono abstained from making any public comment on 
the question.
 However, one of the party’s secondary fi gures, A.N. Firdaus, a 
representative of Persis and a member of the party’s governing body, 
began a vigorous campaign denouncing the suicidal strategy of his col-
leagues. In March, he unsuccessfully appealed to the party to call an 
extraordinary sitting of the party congress in order to announce Natsir’s 
deposition. In September, he published an article in Pos Indonesia—the 
successor to Keng Po, which had been banned in February—severely 
criticising the attitude of Kasman Singodimedjo. One of the artisans 
of the pro-Natsir branch’s victory, Singodimedjo, had just been arrested 
131 “Kabinet Karya, Dewan Nasional, Pemerintah Revolutionner sama-sama 
inkonstitutionel.” Abadi, 17 February 1958.
132 Soebagijo I.N., Jusuf Wibisono. Karang di Tengah Gelombang, p. 233.
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for having stated that the responsibility for the regional rebellion lay 
above all with the government.133
 All of the party’s leaders agreed with the rebels on two points: 
their call for a new government founded on a collaboration between 
Sukarno and Hatta; and their denunciation of the communist threat. 
By focussing all of its propaganda on these two issues, Masyumi suc-
ceeded in masking divisions over the following months. It did not 
manage, however, to shift the balance of power, which was very much 
weighted against it. Th e fears nourished by the army, the PNI and 
NU in relation to the communists’ growing infl uence could have, a few 
weeks earlier, helped to form a formidable alliance and thus limited 
considerably the PKI’s room for manoeuvre, but the participation of 
Masyumi leaders in the PRRI rendered such a prospect impossible. 
Masyumi was now isolated and this was confi rmed by the PNI’s at-
tempt to create ties with the PKI.134 Th e party leaders who had re-
mained in Jakarta did fi nd themselves, however, in complete opposition 
with their Sumatran colleagues on one point: they denounced any 
foreign intervention in the ongoing confl ict. Th e rebels, on the other 
hand, on top of the assistance they received from abroad, called on a 
number of occasions for international mediation.135
 Between February 1958 and January 1960, Masyumi adopted a 
much more low-key role on the political scene. Th e tone of its leaders’ 
speeches became gradually less aggressive towards the government, and 
was sometimes even conciliatory, far from the enfl amed rhetoric of 
Natsir’s fi nal months as president. Th e party was still very much part 
133 Firdaus described Kasman’s speech as a “death trumpet” and accused those 
who refused to unequivocally condemn the rebels of sacrifi cing the interests of 
the umma. Lev, Th e Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 137. Firdaus’s remarks 
were quoted by the prosecutor during Kasman’s trial a few months later.
134 In the days following the proclamation of the PRRI, Soekiman’s only public 
intervention was an appeal launched on 23 February to the inhabitants of Java. 
Masyumi’s vice president told them that their island was now at the forefront of 
the struggle against communism (Djawa front terdepan dalam hadapi Komunis). He 
deplored the fact that in several parts of Java, the local PNI leaders had con-
cluded agreements with the PKI, explaining that the events taking place in the 
country’s outer islands should not distract them from their struggle. Abadi, 24 
February 1948.
135 See the radio appeal launched by Sjafruddin Prawiranega. Abadi, 26 February 
1958.
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of the opposition, though: in December 1958, they voted against the 
government’s budget 136 and on several occasions E.Z. Muttaquien, the 
highly dynamic leader of the party’s parliamentary group, took the 
government to task about its economic policy.137 But these criticisms 
were measured rather than systematic, and more importantly, the party’s 
press sometimes took a much more benevolent view of the executive.138 
Th is restrained and moderate tone also characterised, though to a lesser 
extent, the party’s reaction to the new advances made by President 
Sukarno. 
 Between July and November 1958, the National Council issued 
a series of proposals designed to reduce the role of political parties in 
favour of the functional groups. In September, it appointed a commit-
tee chaired by a trade unionist close to the PNI, Ahem, who took up 
an idea put forward by General Nasution a few months earlier, namely 
the revival of the 1945 constitution.139 Sukarno then tried to get the 
parties to approve these proposals; the PNI, NU and the PKI, fearing 
the president would take further, more radical measures, accepted the 
idea of a “simplifi cation of the political system” and proposed the abo-
lition of small parties, much to the outrage of those concerned.
 With Sukarno’s ideas receiving an undeniably favourable echo 
amongst Indonesia’s political class, there was once again a debate within 
Masyumi over what position to adopt. Th ose leaders who were close to 
Soekiman proposed a complete overhaul of the party’s political strategy. 
Based on the supposition that a major shift in the balance of power 
between secular nationalists and the supporters of Islam was not in 
the offi  ng, Jusuf Wibisono called on the Muslim parties to form a 
136 Abadi, 20 December 1958.
137 Abadi, 3 November 1958 and 19 March 1959. In August 1958, the Djuanda 
government undertook wide-ranging monetary reform in an attempt to halt the 
country’s spiralling infl ation: the money supply was drastically reduced and the 
rupiah was devalued by 300%. Th e hopes raised by these draconian measures 
were soon dashed, however, as infl ation continued and most of the production 
sectors of the economy which fuelled the country’s exports, and thus were the 
principal source of foreign currency—sugar cane, rubber, tea and coff ee—fell by 
almost 20% between 1957 and 1961.
138 See, for example, the support provided by one of the leaders of the Yogyakarta 
branch, Ahmad Basuni, for the government’s nationalist economic policies. Abadi, 
3 December 1959.
139 Lev, Th e Transition to Guided Democracy, pp. 201–11.
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vast anti-communist front with the nationalists. Some concessions had 
to be made to achieve this, namely accepting the revival of the 1945 
Constitution and recognising Pancasila as the only state ideology.140 
 Th e policy advocated by Prawoto and his supporters, and the one 
which was fi nally implemented, was essentially a classic Masyumi stra-
tegy. Th ey held a series of meetings with leaders of the other Muslim 
parties, and endeavoured to recreate a united Islamic front which they 
thought would be capable of having a bearing on events. In January 
1959, their eff orts seemed to be making progress: a meeting with the 
representatives of the Muslim League, including NU, the PSII and 
Perti, produced an alliance based on their common desire to call on 
the Constituent Assembly for an Islamic foundation for the state.141 
Over the following days, thanks to carefully orchestrated negotiations, 
this initiative received the support of various Muslim organisations.142
 It was, fi nally, left up to Masyumi’s ninth congress—which turned 
out to be the last one—held at the end of April 1959, to decide which 
of the two strategies to adopt. For the members of the Prawoto branch, 
this congress was to be, as Yunan Nasution explained, “a simple routine 
aff air”; 143 for Soekiman’s supporters, it represented their last opportu-
nity for Masyumi to return to the political arena. Th e confrontation 
between the two wings took place fi rst of all over the party leadership. 
Prawoto and his allies won a resounding victory: he was elected presi-
dent of the party and his closest supporters retained their positions 
within the party’s governing body—these included Fakig Usman, 
Mohamad Roem, Yunan Nasution, Kasman Singodimedjo and Anwar 
Harjono. Prawoto’s followers were the uncontested winners, then, but 
they showed themselves to be magnanimous in victory towards their 
rivals and during the election for vice president, they withdrew their 
candidates in order to allow Soekiman to be elected to the position.144 
140 Soekiman’s supporters rarely had the opportunity to publish articles in the 
Masyumi press organs, and so he communicated his proposals through Pos Indo-
nesia, 27 September and 5 October 1958. Quoted in Lev, Th e Transition to Guided 
Democracy, p. 229.
141 Abadi, 5 January 1959.
142 GPII on 5 January, and Peladjar Islam Indonesia on 7 January. Abadi, 6 and 
8 January 1959.
143 Abadi, 20 April 1959.
144 Abadi, 28 and 30 April 1959. Th e newspaper did not give the details of the 
vote but Jusuf later declared that the election was won by a very small majority.
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Jusuf Wibisono, the staunchest opponent to Prawoto’s wing, was not 
even present at the congress, having already relinquished his position 
within the party’s governing body in December 1958.145
 Th e Masyumi press only gave a very low-key account of the 
confrontation during the congress between the two wings. Th e daily 
newspapers close to the PKI and the PNI had a fi eld day, however. 
According to them, the dividing line in the debates was between, on 
the one hand, the branches from Central Java and East Java who fa-
voured Soekiman’s ideas and, on the other, the representatives of West 
Java and the outer islands who supported the continuation of a policy 
of opposition.146 It is impossible to confi rm this hypothesis given that 
there are no precise records of the votes cast. It does seem a little 
simplistic, however, given that some of Soekiman’s supporters, such 
as Firdaus, were Sumatran, and two of his opponents, Prawato and 
Kasman, were Javanese.
 Th e Prawato wing’s victory was confi rmed when the congress 
came to consider the most recent proposal made by Sukarno, namely 
the abandonment of the 1950 Provisional Constitution and a return to 
the 1945 document which conferred far greater powers upon the head 
of state. Th is possibility was fi rst touched upon by the government in 
February 1959, and it was offi  cially presented by the president during 
an important address pronounced before the Constituent Assembly 
on 22 April 1959. Th e speech, entitled “Res Publica, sekagli lagi [once 
more] Res Publica ” was in essence a virulent attack against the sluggish-
ness of the proceedings in the Assembly. It contained an ultimatum 
implicitly addressed to the assembly members: if they did not manage 
to conclude their proceedings before the president’s return—Sukarno 
was due to fl y out the following day for a two-month international 
trip—the 1945 document would be brought into force by decree.147
 Th e response of the Masyumi congress to this declaration was 
conciliatory in tone, but in substance it was very fi rm. In its resolution, 
voted on 29 April, the party refers enthusiastically to the return to 
“the spirit of the 1945 Constitution, founded on peace and national 
145 Soebagijo I.N., Jusuf Wibisono. Karang di Tengah Gelombang, p. 240.
146 Lev, Th e Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 252.
147 As J.D. Legge has highlighted, this tactic consisting in provoking a debate 
before departing on an offi  cial trip was a well-oiled strategy used by the presi-
dent. Legge, Sukarno, p. 302.
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unity as well as on the Dwitunggal Sukarno-Hatta.” It accordingly 
called for the immediate formation of a presidential cabinet based on a 
cooperation between the two men, and aided by excellent and sincere 
men (terbaik dan djujur). Masyumi issued a very fi rm refusal con-
cerning a return to the Constitution itself, however, and argued for the 
continuation of the proceedings at the Constituent Assembly which
Up until now [had] shown nothing to suggest that it [was] unable 
to fi nd points of agreement between the diff erent groups and 
movements which exist within society and are the outcome of the 
elections.148
Th e party was convinced that a united umma “constituted a potential 
capable of stabilising the situation in all areas”, and it asked the other 
Muslim parties to reject the government’s programme designed to re-
instate the 1945 Constitution, calling for a collaboration with the 
other democratic parties in order to organise a common struggle for 
the preservation of democracy in Indonesia.149
 Th e confrontation between the Prawoto and Soekiman wings of 
the party also concerned another internal party problem, namely the 
status to be accorded to the extraordinary members and the constituent 
organisations—mainly unions—within Masyumi. Shortly before the 
congress, Jusuf Wibisono, president of the Union of Muslim Workers 
of Indonesia (Sarekat Buruh Islam Indonesia, SBII), had informed the 
party leadership of his desire to break the ties linking the two organisa-
tions. Th is was part of a project aimed at allowing the merger of the 
country’s various Muslim unions, which had previously been suggested 
by his predecessor, Daljono. When the idea was initially proposed, 
Jusuf was against it and indeed had harnessed the grassroots support 
generated by his opposition to seize control of the leadership of the 
union.150 However, the political context which the SBII operated in 
was completely diff erent in 1959. Jusuf Wibisono, faced with an in-
creasingly effi  cient communist union apparatus, and above all, being 
aware of the rumours circulating about a possible ban on Masyumi, 
wished to preserve his organisation’s room for manoeuvre.
148 Abadi, 30 April 1959.
149 Ibid.
150 Soebagijo I.N., Jusuf Wibisono. Karang di Tengah Gelombang, p. 131.
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 Th ere was no doubt an ulterior motive behind this move. Jusuf 
Wibisono was one of the rare Masyumi leaders to have openly declared 
himself in favour of an active cooperation with the nationalists within 
Guided Democracy. He was hostile to the confrontational strategy 
adopted by his party in the Constituent Assembly, and since 1957 he 
had consistently expressed his point of view on this issue.151 In April 
1957, he was placed in custody on charges of corruption, but he was 
released again in March 1958 at the same time as other Masyumi mem-
bers were entering prison.152 Th e offi  cial reason given for his release was 
the prosecution’s lack of evidence, but given the circumstances at that 
time—the state of war meant that the justice system was heavily reliant 
on the army—it is easy to surmise that he was shown a certain degree 
of clemency. Finally, let us not forget that he was the only Masyumi 
member to agree to join the DPR-GR in 1960, as a representative of 
SBII, which had since been rechristened Gasbindo.153 Soekiman, who 
had been given the same opportunity, turned down Sukarno’s off er.
 Th e question of SBII’s status obliged the congress, once again, to 
come to a decision on the attitude to be adopted in relation to Guided 
Democracy. Th e decision arrived at was consistent with the line set 
out by Prawoto: the party refused to break its links with the union.154 
However, the party was aware of the threat posed to the “Masyumi 
family” by the possibility of a ban on the party, and the congress thus 
declared that it was ready to envisage a change in the extraordinary 
members’ status.
 Th e 1959 congress marked the refusal of the majority of the party 
delegates to choose between loyalty to its former leaders, on the one 
hand, and the legalist line which the party had always defended, on the 
other. Although it was not what you could call a “routine congress”, 
its refusal to reorient the party’s strategy did mean that it was not a 
congress which broke with the past. In his closing speech, Prawoto paid 
generous homage to his predecessor:
151 Ibid., pp. 205–6.
152 Ibid., pp. 208–17.
153 He used the words of the Philippines president, Manuel Quezon, to justify 
his decision: “my loyalty to my party ends where my loyalty to my country 
begins.” Soebagijo I.N., Jusuf Wibisono. Karang di Tengah Gelombang, p. 239.
154 Abadi, 12 May 1959.
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You Natsir, wherever you are, will always remain for me a ‘spiritual 
elder’ and you can be sure that there will always be a place in your 
pupil’s heart for you.155
 Th e congress did, however, reveal a change in the party’s tone. 
Both the speeches given and the resolutions adopted, were devoid of 
any mention of a Sukarno dictatorship. By the time the congress had 
opened, it was clear that the PRRI’s rebellion was a complete failure 
which had undermined the party. Its leaders were now under close 
surveillance by the authorities, and any publicly expressed position 
which was too virulent could result in immediate arrest. Kasman 
Singodimedjo had been imprisoned since 5 September 1958 for having 
pronounced a speech a few days earlier in Magelang considered by 
the courts to be in support of the rebels.156 Shortly afterwards, other 
members of the party’s national leadership, such as Udin Sjamsuddin 
and Mardardi Noor, suff ered the same fate, and in October 1958, fi ve 
party fi gures from the Masyumi branch in West Java were sent to jail 
for having published one of their resolutions criticising the presidential 
“conception”. Finally, in several parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi, the 
party was banned outright by the military authorities.
 In this oppressive atmosphere, the Masyumi leadership’s opposition 
became more moderate, though their policies remained substantially 
the same. Th ey did not rule out a return to the 1945 Constitution, 
and indeed the party had on a number of occasions, over the previous 
years posed as an advocate of a strong executive branch. For the party 
leadership, however, institutional change could only be brought about 
by a vote in the Constituent Assembly. In fact, they hoped that such a 
vote would provide them with a chance to reap the rewards of their ef-
forts to restore the unity of Muslim parties, and the Masyumi deputies 
155 “Buat aku sendiri kau Natsir, ditempat manapun kau berada, akan tetap men-
djadi ‘abang-rohaniku’ dan pertjajalah, bahwa di-sudut hati adikmu tetap bersedia 
tempat untukmu.” A speech made on 27 April 1959, quoted in S.U. Bajasut, 
Alam Fikiran dan Djedjak Perdjuangan Prawoto Mangkusasmito (Surabaya: Docu-
menta, 1972), p. 76.
156 Kasman accused a journalist working for the Antara news agency, whom he 
suspected of having communist sympathies, of having twisted his words. Panitia 
Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman, Kasman Singodimedjo 75 tahun, Hidup itu berjuang 
(Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1982), p. 221.
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began a campaign in the Assembly in an attempt to have the famous 
Jakarta Charter included in the 1945 document as a preamble. Th is 
symbolised for them the prospect of a certain political revival, but once 
more their hope to control events was an illusory one. Although the 
unity of political Islam’s supporters held fi rm during the series of votes 
organised in the Constituent Assembly in early June 1959—almost 200 
deputies supported the document which included the Jakarta Charter
—at the same time, the nationalist camp, supported by the PKI, also 
remained solid in their support of the president’s programme—260 
votes in total—which only mentioned Pancasila. As neither side was 
able to obtain the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution, 
the Assembly remained in complete deadlock.157
 In the president’s absence—he was still abroad on an offi  cial visit
—the army once again took the initiative. On 3 June 1959, Nasution 
outlawed all political activity, ostensibly in order to prevent any risk of 
confrontations.158 Th e parties themselves were not banned, but it was 
now impossible for them to organise any political gatherings. Th e press, 
meanwhile, was invited to censor itself and was to report neither the 
discussions on the return to the 1945 Constitution, nor the debates in 
the Assembly opposing the supporters of Islam and Marxism. Th e army 
then launched an intense propaganda campaign designed to convince 
the president to bring the 1945 Constitution into force by decree, and 
all the parties, except for Masyumi and the PSI, eventually accepted 
this solution. Wahab Hasbullah, the rais am of NU, who had up until 
that point remained loyal to the “Muslim bloc” in the Constituent 
Assembly, declared that it was now the only possible alternative to 
the establishment of a military junta.159 Sukarno, who was kept up to 
date regularly on events, had thus attained his objective once again. 
He held the key to an inextricable deadlock which he had himself 
157 See infra, Chapter 5.
158 According to Daniel Lev, there was a real danger of this happening in Bandung 
where members of communist youth groups and GPII were spoiling for a fi ght. 
Lev, Th e Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 270.
159 Ibid., p. 273. NU’s leadership made no offi  cial declaration on the subject, but 
it had clearly made a choice to favour its political survival over either the defence 
of democracy or the demand for an Islamic state. Fealy, “Ulama and Politics in 
Indonesia”, Chapter 6, “Th e Politics of Accommodation, 1957–1962”.
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partially brought about, although he was genuinely concerned about 
the increasingly important role played by Nasution during his absence. 
On 5 July 1959, less than a week after his return, he announced the 
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the return to the 1945 in-
stitutions. Th e Jakarta Charter, instead of being included as a preamble, 
was simply considered a source of inspiration for the Constitution.
 Th e disappearance of the Constituent Assembly saw Masyumi lose 
the last forum in which it could still believe that it existed politically. 
It was absent from cabinet and marginalised in the DPR—whose re-
placement was expected before long. Its role seemed to be confi ned to 
the writing of its own eulogy for various commemorative ceremonies. 
Th e speeches made by the party leadership were now resolutely turned 
towards the past and contained no proposal for the future, which 
seemed to hold no place for them. On 17 August 1959, on the occa-
sion of the 14th anniversary of independence, Masyumi’s Religious 
Council (Madjelis Sjuro) recalled the sacrifi ces made for the nation’s 
independence by the heroes of Islam and the attempt by the repre-
sentatives of the umma “on all occasions” to communicate “the divine 
message”.160 A few days later, at the last meeting of the party’s repre-
sentatives in the Constituent Assembly, Prawoto Mangkusasmito relin-
quished the duties which he had been entrusted with by the Ninth 
Congress. He explained that the eff orts deployed by the representatives 
of Muslim parties to see the adoption of a “new Constitution in 
conformity with the teachings of Islam” had failed because of the 
president’s decision on 5 July, and that consequently the party’s repre-
sentatives were “discharged of the responsibilities which had been 
conferred upon them by the resolutions passed by the aforementioned 
congress.” 161
 Th is interpretation, which excludes any consideration of Mas-
yumi’s responsibility for the failure of the debates to reach a consensus, 
was widely advanced in the subsequent writings of the party’s leaders. 
Th ose accounts drew particular attention to the fact that when the 
Constituent Assembly was about to be dissolved, Prawoto and Sardjan, 
160 “Seruan Madjelis Sjuro Masjumi dalam menghadapi situasi baru dan ulang 
tahun kemerdekaan ke XIV”, in Bajasut, Alam Fikiran dan Djedjak Perdjuangan 
Prawoto Mangkusasmito, p. 452.
161 Ibid., pp. 92–3.
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the leaders of the Masyumi group in the DPR, were on the verge of 
reaching a compromise with the president of the PNI, Soewirjo, and 
Prime Minister Djuanda.162 Worried by the progress being made in the 
assembly, President Sukarno allegedly decided to act swiftly in order to 
be able to impose Guided Democracy.
 Masyumi appeared to fall into a state of lethargic depression for 
the remainder of 1959. Its leaders hardly ever ventured outside the 
capital, and what rare events that were organised, such as the celebra-
tion of the 14th anniversary of the party’s foundation, invariably harped 
on about past grandeur.163 As the weeks went by, the party began to 
fall apart. Faced with the fast-growing threat of being outlawed, the 
leadership decided on 8 September to abolish the party’s extraordinary 
member status in order to safeguard the futures of the organisations 
associated with it. With the party crumbling, SBII decided to leave the 
umbrella organisation and seize the independence which it had been 
refused a few months earlier. Th e particular role which its president, 
Jusuf Wibisono, played in the political scene gave it reason to hope that 
a place for it in the country’s new political dispensation was possible.164
 At the end of July 1959, Prawoto informed the president that his 
party had fi nally decided to accept the 1945 Constitution. He added 
that he reserved the right to demand from the executive, both the 
president and the government, the same respect for the country’s insti-
tutions.165 In July, the new government was formed, headed by Sukarno, 
along with a Supreme Consultative Council (Dewan Pertimbangan 
Agung), which took the place of the National Council and the National 
Project Council. Th e establishment of these new institutions provoked 
hardly a single reaction from the party. Likewise, the proliferation 
162 Anwar Harjono, “Mengenang Pak Sardjan (Alm.) dan beberapa pejuang lain-
nya”, Media Dakwah, no. 216, June 1992. A former Muhammadiyah offi  cial, 
Lukman Harun, also informed me that Mohammad Natsir had told him of the 
existence of such a compromise. Interview, September 1996.
163 See Abadi, 8 November 1959.
164 Th is is what SBII’s leaders explained during a meeting of the union’s sections 
in Central Java at the beginning of November 1959. SBII announced that it was 
ready to take part in Indonesian-style socialism and to take advantage of the cen-
tral role which the government claimed it wished to give workers’ movements. 
Abadi, 3 November 1959.
165 Hakiem, Perjalanan mencari keadilan dan persatuan, p. 193.
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of pro-Sukarno slogans by the state propaganda machine—Manipol-
USDEK and NASAKOM—sparked no debate within the party.166
 It was only at the end of 1959, when Sukarno began to do away 
with the remaining vestiges of parliamentary democracy—the parties 
and Parliament—that Masyumi seemed to rediscover some semblance 
of life as it undertook to prepare its departure from the political scene 
with “its fl ag fl ying high”.167
A Ban or a Sabotage? Masyumi, the New Regime’s 
Expiatory Victim
In December 1959, Presidential Decree no. 7 (Penetapan Presiden, 
Penpres 7/1959) set out a certain number of conditions for the exis-
tence of political parties. Henceforth, they had to clearly state their 
adherence both to the principles of Pancasila and to the principles of 
the political manifesto outlined by the president earlier in the year on 
17 August. Moreover, the president reserved the right to abolish any 
political organisation in opposition to the foundations of the state. In 
a break with the moderate attitude he had adopted towards the presi-
dent in the previous months, Prawoto Mangkusasmito’s reaction to the 
decree was a vigorous one. He questioned whether it was in confor-
mity with the 1945 Constitution and explained that it should be con-
sidered a “political directive” ( penggarisan kebidjaksanaan) rather than an 
“act of law” ( pembinaan hokum). He went on to remind his readers 
that his party’s ideology was founded on Islam and wondered, dis-
ingenuously, if this meant that it was in opposition to the foundations 
of the state. In a very sarcastic conclusion to his speech, he explained 
the intransigent attitude of his party through its respect for Sukarno’s 
recommendation,
166 “Manipol” referred to President Sukarno’s political manifesto; “USDEK” re-
ferred to its foundations (Undang-Undang 45, Sosialisme à la Indonesia, Demo-
krasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi Terpimpin, Kepribadian Nasional: the 1945 Consti-
tution, Indonesian-style socialism, Guided Democracy, a guided economy and 
national identity). Th e acronym NASAKOM (Nasional, Agama, Komunis) signi-
fi ed the alliance between nationalism, religion and communism.
167 Th e expression was used by the American ambassador in Jakarta, Howard P. 
Jones, in his Th e Possible Dream (New York: Hartcourt Brace Jovanovitch, 1971), 
p. 155.
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declared everywhere relentlessly, by inviting us, the Indonesian na-
tion, to adopt the spirit of the royal eagle, the spirit of the buff alo, 
to ‘break through the undergrowth and overturn the obstacle’ [the 
Physical Revolution’s slogan], and prevent us from becoming sheep-
like men, capable only of bleating.168
Th e change of tone in this declaration was clear. Over the previous 
two years, Prawoto had conducted a policy focussed on limiting the 
damage to the party, but now he was rekindling the “Natsirian” spirit 
to condemn Sukarno’s manoeuvre. Th is speech marked the beginning 
of a new off ensive—the party’s fi nal stand—against Guided Democracy. 
Certain decisions by Sukarno, which heretofore had not provoked any 
reaction, were now lambasted by the Masyumi deputies in Parliament.169
 In March 1960, Presidential Decree no. 3/1960 infl icted the fi nal, 
mortal blow to parliamentary democracy in Indonesia. Th e Assembly 
elected in 1955 was dissolved and the president announced its replace-
ment with a new Parliament “Gotong Royong”, whose members would 
be chosen by the president and where representatives of political parties 
would only hold a minority of seats—129 in total as opposed to 154 
for the functional groups. Th e political class was this time unanimous 
in its condemnation of the new decree. On 7 March 1960, the day 
of the last parliamentary session, the Assembly Speaker, Sartono—a 
member of the PNI—announced that he would refuse to apply the 
presidential edict. In a moving show of unity, the entire Assembly rose 
to sing the national anthem, Indonesia Raya, and then organised a press 
conference. Th e deputies and the press had hardly left the Assembly 
building, however, before they were subjected to what was known at 
the time as the “telephone culture” (kebudajaan tilpon). Th is consisted 
of the military authorities rapidly making it known to the political 
leaders and the newspaper editors that they had better not take things 
any further.170 On 12 March 1960, Abadi, ignoring this warning, 
published Prawoto Mangkusasmito’s disillusioned reaction, off ering a 
fi nal illustrated lesson in parliamentary democracy:
168 Abadi, 16 January 1960.
169 Th e presidential decree no. 2/1959, for example, which had been issued several 
months previously, was castigated by one of Masyumi’s representatives in the 
Assembly, Blaja Umar. Th e decree forbade senior civil servants (those who were 
“group F” civil servants) from joining a political party. Abadi, 22 January 1960.
170 Soebagijo I.N., Riwayat hidup dan perjuangan H. Zainal Abidin Ahmad 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1985), p. 101.
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In relation to this question of the Assembly, I am no longer an 
actor in it, neither am I a candidate for such a role …. Concerning 
the Assembly, I have known up until now, two sorts: parliaments 
with an opposition and parliaments without an opposition. A par-
liament without an opposition that I have been able to observe 
is the People’s National Congress in Bejing. When were able to 
attend a few sessions of this assembly, which counts almost 1,200 
members, our experience of it was a rather curious one. As head of 
the Constituent Assembly’s delegation, Mr Wilopo, had the honour 
of addressing the Congress. Th e applause during the speech did not 
seem to indicate that it had received a very warm reception, and 
we soon understood the reason why. Once he had fi nished giving 
his address, the chairman of the session whispered something to 
Wilopo which amounted to ‘You should have applauded, so that 
they would do the same.’
What we also found rather curious was how voting was carried out. 
Th e motion to be voted on was read by the chairman of the session 
who then asked ‘who is in agreement?’ Th e chairman himself had 
already raised his hand and soon all the members of the assembly 
followed suit, indicating in this way their agreement. Th is is how a 
parliament without opposition functions in the People’s Republic 
of China …. It is of course too early to claim that a similar con-
ception will prevail when the ‘DPR—Gotong-Royong’ is formed. 
What we know today are a few signs which can help us to have an 
idea of how things will turn out.171
 For Masyumi’s president, the main sign he had of what was to 
come was the fate that his party, a symbol of the opposition to Su-
karno’s plans, was suff ering. Th e party had already been both removed 
from cabinet and absent from the various institutions that had been 
created, and the same was likely to happen to them in the new assem-
bly. Prawoto rebuff ed Sukarno’s promise to maintain an opposition 
force, citing the logic of Guided Democracy. It was now impossible 
to place any trust in the head of state who, a few months earlier, had 
guaranteed that the dissolution of Parliament was impossible within 
the framework of the 1945 Constitution. More attached than ever to 
a conception of democracy inherited from the Enlightenment, Prawoto 
171 Abadi, 12 March 1960.
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concluded with a quotation by Voltaire, addressing one of his political 
enemies in these terms:
Sir, I disagree with your opinions and I will combat them every-
where and always, but it happens to be your right to express these 
opinions and I will also defend it with all my force.172
Th e political class was ready to make one last defi ant stand and Mas-
yumi leaders seized this opportunity to set up the Democratic League 
a few days later. On 25 March, this provisional coalition published 
a manifesto denouncing as unconstitutional the formation of a new 
assembly through the nomination of deputies and demanding that the 
government suspend the measure.173
 Th e identities of the 15 representatives who signed this document 
refl ected the motley nature of this new alliance. Th e party with the 
most number of signatures was the IPKI, a party largely composed 
of members of the army. Th is may have seemed surprising given that, 
as we have already seen, the military had played a crucial role in the 
germination of Guided Democracy. It can be explained partially by 
the divisions which reigned within the military staff , but above all by 
the desire of numerous offi  cers to put pressure on the president in an 
attempt to prevent the communists from enjoying too important a role 
in the new regime. Th e next most important party was Masyumi with 
three representatives: Fakih Usman, Anwar Harjono and Mohamad 
Roem; Prawoto did not sign the manifesto but a few days later he lent 
his support to it. Two NU leaders were also present—K.H.M. Dachlan 
and Imron Rosjadi—who both broke with their party’s support for the 
president’s line, and there were also two members of the PSI, two from 
Parkindo and fi nally, Kasimo, the leader of the Catholic party.
 Th e fi rst real eff ect created by the Democratic League’s manifesto 
was to attract the wrath of the president. In a declaration made in 
Tokyo, where he was on visit, Sukarno accused its signatories of ig-
noring the suff ering of the people, supporting the rebels and receiving 
funds from a foreign power.174 What worried the president about this 
initiative was, of course, the participation of the IPKI. Sukarno was 
172 Ibid.
173 Abadi, 25 March 1960.
174 Hakiem, Perjalanan mencari keadilan dan persatuan, p. 201.
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well aware of a part of the army’s open hostility to his desire to in-
clude the PKI in his political game plan. In December 1959, military 
offi  cers had tried to ban the PKI’s congress, and it was only on the 
express order of the head of state that it had been able to go ahead.175 
At that particular point in time, Masyumi and the PSI were no doubt 
ready to back a temporary seizure of power by the army, as long as 
it was carried out in order to enforce the 1945 Constitution and fi ght 
against the infl uence of communism. Such a scenario would have 
allowed the rehabilitation of their leaders who were involved in the 
rebellion led by the PRRI-Permesta, and at the same time would have 
provided a solution to the regional crisis. For the army to commit 
itself further, however, it needed the assurance that it would have a 
united Muslim bloc behind it. Th e PSII joined the enterprise late in 
the day,176 but once again, though, NU remained loyal to Sukarno; a 
few days after the proclamation of the Democratic League, its general 
secretary denounced the party members who had signed the famous 
declaration.177 Th e defection of NU consolidated the support Sukarno 
enjoyed from the army chief of staff , General Nasution, who had 
already condemned the new organisation. Deprived of the army’s pro-
tection, the Democratic League spent the next few months involved in 
verbal posturing. In March 1961, it was abolished by Sukarno for its 
opposition to his Manipol.
 By the end of March 1960, consultations had begun on the for-
mation of the new Gotong-Royong Parliament. A preliminary list was 
circulated containing the names of those whom the president had 
intended to sit in the new assembly. Soekiman’s name appeared on 
the list as a representative of intellectuals (cendekiawan). A few days 
later, Soekiman informed the Antara news agency of his refusal to take 
his seat. He recalled the emotion he felt when singing the national 
anthem along with his fellow deputies during the last session of the 
elected Parliament, and he even appeared off ended that “an attitude 
175 Lev, Th e Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 284.
176 Abadi, 6 May 1959.
177 Certain party leaders within NU, such as the head of the party in North 
Sumatra, approved the initiative taken by the Democratic League. Abadi, 2 May 
1960. Th e leadership of Anshor, NU’s youth organisation, also supported the 
league and tried to convince NU to forbid its members from participating in the 
DPR-GR. Abadi, 2 June 1960.
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demonstrating a certain cowardice or even feebleness of spirit” was 
expected of him.178 Soekiman’s decision, and more importantly the way 
in which he let it be known publicly, soured defi nitively his relations 
with Sukarno, who refused to meet with him thereafter.179 Th e unity 
of Masyumi, then, was more or less preserved up until the end. Jusuf 
Wibisono was the only party fi gure to accept a seat in the new assem-
bly: he was appointed as president of the SBII, which had broken all 
ties with Masyumi during its congress in Semarang in January 1960.180 
He had been removed from the party’s governing body in December 
1958 and after his appointment he broke off  all relations with Mas-
yumi. Within his own union, a number of voices spoke out against the 
support he had given to Guided Democracy.181 Th e other main union 
within Masyumi, the STII, had also been approached to send a repre-
sentative to the DPR-GR, but it had refused to do so.182
 Despite the fact that Masyumi was now isolated on the political 
landscape, its stubborn refusal to collaborate with the new regime was 
in danger of ruining the new path of political consensus. At the begin-
ning of July 1960, Sukarno decided to resort to the techniques he had 
honed the previous year. On 22 June 1960, he had the government 
issue a commencement order for Presidential Decree 7/59, authorising 
certain political parties to be banned. On 22 July, he summoned 
leaders representing the PSI and Masyumi to the presidential palace 
and gave them a week to prepare their defence. Th ey were to explain 
whether or not their party came within the provisions of Article 9 
of the decree.183 Th is strange procedure was designed to give a vague 
semblance of legality to an authoritarian decision. Th e article in ques-
tion had obviously been formulated with the intention of outlawing 
Masyumi. It provided for the dissolution of a party for two reasons: 
fi rst for having a programme which violated the principles and goals 
of the state; and second for taking part in the support for a rebellion 
178 Abadi, 8 April 1960. Quoted in Dr. H Amir Hamzah, eds., Wawasan Politik 
seorang muslim patriot: Dr. Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, 1898–1974 (Malang: YP2LM, 
Malang, 1984), pp. 301–3.
179 Soebagijo I.N., Jusuf Wibisono. Karang di Tengah Gelombang, p. 238.
180 Ibid., p. 240.
181 See infra, Chapter 6.
182 Abadi, 28 April 1960.
183 Abadi, 22 July 1960.
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either through direct participation or assistance provided by its leaders 
or through the party’s refusal to denounce its members’ actions.184
 On 28 July, Prawoto Mangkusasmito and Yunan Nasution on be-
half of Masyumi, and Sutan Sjahrir, Subadio Sastrosatomo and Murad 
for the PSI returned to the palace to deliver their written reply to the 
question they had been asked a week previously. Th e meeting only 
lasted seven minutes; no debate took place, although the exchanges 
were cordial and courteous. Sukarno enquired about each man’s family, 
and then explained that their arguments would be examined during a 
meeting scheduled for this purpose on 30 July.185 Th e documents which 
the Masyumi leaders handed over to the president gave a negative 
answer to the question asked. For them, Masyumi did not fall within 
the category of parties targeted by Article 9 of Presidential Decree 7/59. 
Th e party’s fundamental orientation was not “in contradiction with the 
principles and goals of the state, as those principles and goals, which 
were defi ned by the preamble to the 1945 Constitution, were part of 
the teachings of Islam.” 186 Consequently, “a programme which violates 
the principles and objectives of the state would be in contradiction 
with the principles and objectives of the party itself.” 187 Concerning the 
accusations of Masyumi’s involvement in a rebellion, the party leaders 
considered that they could not stand. When the presidential decree was 
published, the party leadership had been elected by the congress held 
in April 1959, and contained no member who had participated in an 
uprising or provided assistance to the rebels. Moreover, Masyumi had 
been banned since September 1958 in the country’s troubled regions —
Tapanuli, West Sumatra, Riau, North Sulawesi and Central Sulawesi—
and these branches had sent no delegates to the party’s ninth congress. 
Finally, in a declaration made on 17 February 1958, the party had 
clearly condemned the ongoing rebellions.
 Th e party leadership had, then, submitted itself in good grace to 
the president’s demands. It must have been aware, however, that by 
avoiding the central question concerning its refusal to denounce the 
party leaders who were implicated in the rebellion, it had failed to 
184 Quoted in Hakiem, Perjalanan mencari keadilan dan persatuan, p. 208.
185 Abadi, 29 July 1960.
186 Hakiem, Perjalanan mencari keadilan dan persatuan, p. 208. In his biography 
of Yunan Nasution (pp. 259–60), Badruzzaman Busyairi provides a version very 
close to the answer given to the president.
187 Ibid.
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exonerate the party from its responsibility under the terms of the new 
legal provision. Rather than contesting outright the legitimacy of the 
enquiry that Masyumi was subject to, which would after all have been 
in accordance with the party’s stance over the previous two years, its 
leaders seemed to hope that they could convince the judicial authori-
ties of their innocence. Th is legalist attitude had already led Prawoto 
to criticise the commencement order for Penpres 7/59 on the basis 
that it did not mention the consultation by the Supreme Court which 
had been initially intended.188 For this same reason, he welcomed with 
satisfaction, on 30 July, the decision made by the Presidential Council 
(Badan Pembantu) to transfer the investigation fi les on Masyumi and 
the PSI to the Supreme Court, and declared himself to be confi dent 
that the court would be willing to examine the legality of the decree 
in question.189 By respecting the measures taken against them, they 
endeavoured to maintain their ability to contest the legality of these 
measures before a court. Th e Masyumi leadership continued to stick 
with this line of defence despite the fact that it was clearly not working.
 Th e reason for this failure was that Sukarno’s attack on Masyumi 
was primarily a political act. Th is was demonstrated by the timing of 
his announcement outlawing the two parties. Th e speech which he pro-
nounced every year on 17 August, on the event of the anniversary of 
independence, had provided in previous years the perfect occasion on 
which to defi ne the ideology of Guided Democracy, and as expected, 
the address he gave in 1960 followed the same pattern. In a marathon 
speech overfl owing with Anglicisms, the president announced the re-
newal of a “revolutionary logic” (logika revolusioner). According to him, 
Indonesia had gone through three phases since its emancipation from 
the colonial yoke: fi rstly, a period between 1945 and 1950 of “Physical 
Revolution”; then from 1950 to 1955, a “periode survival [sic]”; and 
fi nally from 1955 to the present day, a “periode investment [sic]”. By 
this fi nal period, he meant material investment, intellectual investment 
and investment in terms of “human skills”, which together were sup-
posed to contribute to a “socialist construction”. Th is “construction” 
was to be pursued in a favourable political atmosphere “suasana-politik-
favourable ”. Liberal democracy, however, clearly did not lend itself to 
creating such an atmosphere, and so it had to be “entirely destroyed” 
188 Abadi, 14 July 1960.
189 Abadi, 1 August 1960.
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(bongkar sama sekali ). Th e construction of a “building of Indonesian 
socialism” ( gedung sosialisme Indonesia) gave rise to “squawking by the 
inhabitants of the old house—the PRRI-Permesta, the RPI, a league 
here, a league there, a newspaper here, a newspaper there, an essay here, 
an essay there.” 190
 For Sukarno, there were two attitudes to the Revolution which 
were equally blameworthy. One of them consisted in saying, like 
Kartosuwirjo had at the foundation of his Islamic state, that it had 
failed, while the other maintained that it was over. Th e head of state 
explained that the Revolution, which had in fact by then been going 
on at that point for 15 years, could very well last for another 25, 
35 or even 45 years before reaching its end. It was because of this 
that the reorganisation of the party system, initiated by the December 
1959 decree, was necessary. Th e aim of the new regulation was to 
clarify the political situation, as it was supposed to eliminate “counter-
revolutionary parties”. It did not, however, create a dictatorship; rather, 
it was “the application of a universal principle, a principle common to 
all countries according to which those in authority cannot be expected 
to authorise the existence of forces who want to destroy the state” and 
put “in danger the safeguard and the pursuit of the Revolution”. It was 
on this basis “that after having consulted with the Supreme Court”, 
Sukarno announced a measure which was more striking in its form 
than in its substance, namely that he had given Masyumi and the PSI 
a month to wind down their organisations. If the two parties had not 
complied with the demand within this time, they would be outlawed.191
 Th e Masyumi leadership had already learnt the news of the presi-
dent’s decision to ban the party before he pronounced his speech. Very 
early the same day, at twenty past fi ve in the morning, a letter had 
arrived in the party’s headquarters from Sukarno’s chief of staff , con-
taining “Presidential Decision no. 200 of the year 1960” (Keputusan 
Presiden Republik Indonesia N° 200 Tahun 1960) that ordered the 
dissolution of Masyumi
… on the basis that this organisation (this party) has organised 
a revolt, because its leaders participated in a rebellion christened 
‘Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia’ or ‘United 
190 Abadi, 18 August 1960.
191 Ibid.
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Republic of Indonesia’ or, at the very least, have given their assis-
tance to a rebellion and that this organisation (this party) has not 
offi  cially denounced the actions of the members of its leadership 
concerned.192
Th e Masyumi leadership’s communiqué which accompanied the publi-
cation of the presidential document in Abadi merely indicated, in a 
slightly ambiguous manner, that within the one-month deadline, the 
measures “deemed necessary” ( jang dianggap perlu) would be taken, 
without specifying by whom. As soon as he received the president’s 
decision, Prawoto Mangkusasmito entered into a series of consultations 
in order to determine the best attitude to adopt. He charged two law 
fi rms with examining what legal recourse was open to it and took 
soundings from within but also from outside the Masyumi leadership.193 
 A consensus quickly emerged that it would be better to comply 
with the presidential order and avoid the party being offi  cially out-
lawed. Th ere was a fear within the party, it must be said, that a ban 
would lead to the confi scation of the party’s assets and the arrest of its 
leaders. In addition, Prawoto and other senior party leaders seemed to 
be hopeful that, despite all the evidence to the contrary, a court case 
could succeed. On 13 September 1960, four days before the ultimatum 
expired, the Masyumi leadership sent a letter to the president in which 
they informed him of the dissolution of the party, “including its 
Madjelis Sjuro and the Muslimat sections”.194 Th is short missive was ac-
companied by a memorandum from Prawoto Mangkusasmito, affi  rming 
that his party’s decision was in line with the party’s steadfast tradition 
of respect for the law, and he warned the president that he intended to 
fi le a legal action before the courts in Jakarta as a “simple citizen”.195
 On 11 October 1960, the court’s presiding judge, in his ruling on 
Prawoto’s petition, declared that the question was not within his juris-
diction to decide, and Masyumi subsequently disappeared defi nitively 
from the political scene.196 It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say 
that the dissolution of the party was the one issue on which President 
Sukarno and the Masyumi leadership had agreed on for several years. 
192 Ibid.
193 Busjairi, Catatan Perjuangan H.M. Yunan Nasution, p. 262.
194 Bajasut, Alam Fikiran dan Djedjak Perdjuangan Prawoto Mangkusasmito, p. 160.
195 Ibid., pp. 161–3.
196 Busjairi, Catatan Perjuangan H.M. Yunan Nasution, p. 263.
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Strangely enough, the Masyumi leaders insisted on a number of occa-
sions that their party’s disappearance was a voluntary one. Th ey spoke 
out vigorously against PKI allegations in the early 1960s claiming that 
they had been outlawed.197 Th is insistence could be explained, in the 
aftermath of the party’s dissolution, by the desire to protect its former 
members from repressive government measures. Why, though, 30 years 
later, was there still a stubborn insistency to establish a subtle distinc-
tion between being banned and disbanding under the threat of an 
impending ban? 
 My interpretation of this attitude is that it is indicative of the ex-
tent to which the party was traumatised by the participation of Natsir 
and his close supporters in the PRRI rebellion. Th is act constituted a 
violation of the law and was in defi ance of the authority of the state. 
Th e fact that it had been committed in defence of a genuine form of 
democracy did not take anything away from its shamefulness, especially 
in a country where, until recently, the offi  cial conception of the exer-
cise of power was closer to Guided Democracy than to the 1950s 
parliamentary regime. For Sukarno, on the other hand, it is easy to 
understand his interest in seeing the modernist party dismantle itself. 
By doing this, Masyumi was implicitly recognising its errors, and as 
it was one of the symbols of a parliamentary democracy incapable of 
functioning, it was also carrying with it the burden of the sins of this 
regime. By voluntarily abandoning the political scene, it was fi nally 
adhering to the consensus sought by the president, which was to be 
the foundation of a new Indonesia.
197 See, in particular, Hakiem, Perjalanan mencari keadilan dan persatuan, p. 212; 
Bajasut, Alam Fikiran dan Djedjak Perdjuangan Prawoto Mangkusasmito, p. 159, 
Busjairi, Catatan Perjuangan H.M. Yunan Nasution, p. 264.
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chapter  f i ve
Governing in the 
Name of Islam
Th e Pitfalls of a Self-Evident Notion
Today the issue of an Islamic state is a protean notion which cannot be readily systemised, and this is true for the entire Muslim world. 
Th e plan to found a state on the principles of Islam has too often 
been considered both by its opponents and proponents as a blueprint 
whose details are self-evident. Th is consensus surrounding what form 
an Islamic state should take has for many years constituted a rallying 
point in much the same way that Marxism did for a long time, dividing 
opinion on the question into two distinct groups which remain reso-
lutely closed to all discussion. 
 In the case of Masyumi, the notion of an Islamic state was by 
turns, and sometimes simultaneously, a slogan, a myth, a programme 
and a reality. Th e debate surrounding Negara Islam in Indonesia has 
long been a problematic one littered with pitfalls. Th is was already the 
case in the 1950s when Masyumi attempted to mark itself out from 
both the secularist ideals of the nationalists and the destructive funda-
mentalism of Darul Islam; it remains the case today due to the radi-
calisation of Islamists’ demands as well as the disparate nature of Islam 
in Indonesia, where religious divides often overlap with ethnic and 
economic divisions. It is an issue in which Western researchers can also 
easily become ensnared, as their cultural background can often lead 
them to believe that an Islamic state is the only alternative that exists 
to a democratic state. Finally, it should be remembered that the Indo-
nesian term “Negara” is another possible source of confusion as it can 
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be understood to refer to a state, a country or, in certain cases, a 
nation. Th e meaning of this word is ambiguous in Indonesian, unlike 
in English where the term “Islamic state” does not mean the same as 
“Islamic nation” or “Islamic country”.
 Th ere are two major advantages to presenting an Islamic state as a 
self-evident notion. It allows one to suggest the sacred nature of such 
an entity and also to do away with the delicate task of providing a 
clear defi nition of such an entity. It is no doubt for this reason that 
Masyumi when elaborating its ideology never clearly defi ned in a 
founding document what constituted an Islamic state; this notion was 
gradually outlined at its party conferences and in the writings of its 
leaders. It also evolved over time in response to diff erent events which 
often shaped the party’s leaders’ ideas. Given this mutability of Mas-
yumi’s concept of an Islamic state, it is diffi  cult to comprehend this 
ideology without looking at its source and the context in which it 
was articulated. A speech made by Isa Anshary during the insurrection 
against the Dutch colonial power and a contribution by Zainal Abidin 
to a debate in the Constituent Assembly could be considered just as 
representative of Masyumi as an address by Jusuf Wibisono during 
the election campaign of 1955, despite the fact that the tone of the 
speeches, the chosen topics and the examples used to illustrate their 
points were very diff erent and, in some cases, contradictory. 
 It is hardly surprising, then, that researchers looking to summarise 
Masyumi’s policy in a few sentences should have so often come up with 
inconsistent conclusions which were often not mutually compatible. 
Some such as George McTurnan Kahin focussed on the moderate 
nature of Masyumi’s aspirations, while others, such as Baladas Ghosal, 
considered Masyumi to be radical and intransigent.1 It would, there-
fore, be illusory, perhaps even disingenuous, to claim to be able to 
provide a precise and coherent vision of Masyumi’s ideal of an Islamic 
state. On the contrary, what this chapter proposes to acquaint the 
reader with is the chaotic and sometimes contradictory evolution of 
Masyumi’s political ideology, starting with the fi rst articles by its future 
leaders in the 1930s, and taking us up to the failed attempt by the 
Constituent Assembly in the late 1950s to establish a new constitution.
1 Baladas Ghoshal, Indonesian Politics, 1955–1959: Th e Emergence of Guided Demo-
cracy (Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Company, 1982), pp. 46–7; George McTurnan 
Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1952), p. 305.
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Th e Nationalist Perspective on an Islamic State
In order to understand the debate surrounding the notion of an Islamic 
state, which dominated the Indonesian political landscape from the 
proclamation of independence in 1945 until the banning of Masyumi 
in 1960, it is necessary to situate it in the context of the country’s 
nationalist movement. Th e future leaders of Masyumi at this time were 
infl uenced by two diff erent forces which shaped their political theory. 
Th ey took part, alongside other representatives of the reformist move-
ment, in a heated debate with secular nationalists concerning the 
foundation upon which to build an Indonesian national identity. Th e 
notion of a Negara Islam, which they presented as a natural and even 
necessary framework for a Muslim nation, placed them in opposition 
to secularists. At this stage, the debate was not concerned with which 
form of government to choose, nor was it about the nature of the 
country’s institutions; it was rather about whether Islam should be 
recognised as a constitutive element of Indonesian society. Th e question, 
then, was not if Islam could constitute the cornerstone of an indepen-
dent state, but instead to know if the future state of Indonesia could 
be built upon an ideological foundation which did not include Islam. 
 Th e main arguments put forward by Islamists were of a religious 
nature, tending to establish an organic link between a Muslim nation 
and an Islamic state. Islam being “a complete way of life”, a good 
Muslim could only look to Islam as the source of his political inspira-
tion. Naturally, this sense of a sacred duty left no room for compro-
mise; it endured throughout Masyumi’s history, though the political 
intransigence which it gave rise to was surmounted momentarily by a 
more pragmatic attitude, linked no doubt to the necessity to look for 
democratic approval and the compromises attendant upon the exercise 
of power. However, it came back to the fore again at the end of the 
1950s during the debates in the Constituent Assembly.
 Towards the end of the 1930s, however, the future leaders of the 
party went beyond the strictly religious aspect of the debate about the 
future Indonesian state. In response to the proposals made by secular 
nationalists, they eventually became convinced of the danger of their 
own intransigence. By refusing to envisage any other alternative to the 
recognition of the primacy of Islam in the future state, certain Muslim 
leaders could see that they were excluding themselves from any involve-
ment in the building of that state. Breaking away from the isolationism 
of their mentors, Mohammed Natsir and his peers, both in their roles 
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as political representatives and in their writings, contributed to a broad 
exchange of ideas aimed at defi ning the conditions under which a 
democracy would be established in Indonesia, and by doing so paved 
the way for the participation of Islamists in parliament.
Independence through Islam and for Islam
Th e future leaders of Masyumi arrived on the political scene at the 
beginning of the 1930s at a time when the leaders of the Muslim com-
munity were growing worried about their loss of infl uence in Indo-
nesian society. Th eir initial cause was not the fi ght against the Dutch 
colonial power but rather the opposition towards those who were 
fi ghting for an independent Indonesia in which Islam would only have 
a secondary role. For Islamists, then, the main concern was not poli-
tical independence, which was in danger of leading to a secularised 
state. Th eir desire was, fi rst and foremost, to establish a society with 
the requisite conditions for the fl ourishing of Islam, and also to remind 
members of the Indonesian Muslim community of their duty towards 
the Almighty.
 Continuing the work carried out by Sarekat Islam and Muham-
madiyah for the defence of the Muslim community in the Dutch 
East Indies, the writings and speeches of the future Masyumi leaders 
had three aims which were intimately linked: to convince their fellow 
countrymen of the greatness of Muslim civilisation, to bring about a 
renewal of the teaching of Islam and to underline the unifying role of 
Mohammad’s religion in the establishment of the Indonesian nation.
 As we have already seen, the reformist movement in general was 
characterised by a harkening back to a golden age of Islam.2 At the 
beginning of the 1930s, Mohammad Natsir, under various pen-names 
(Mu’azzin, IS., Spectator, A. Moechlis), devoted a considerable amount 
of his writings to this topic. In a series of articles which appeared be-
tween June 1936 and March 1937 in Pedoman Majarakat and Pandji 
Islam, he endeavoured to show the importance of Islam in the develop-
ment of modern science. In “Islam and Culture”, he set out to describe 
the main features of Muslim culture, insisting on the scientifi c projects 
carried out during the high-point of the Caliphate, its role in the trans-
mission of knowledge from the Ancient Greek and Roman worlds 
2 See supra, Chapter 1.
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to Renaissance Europe through its contributions in a variety of areas 
ranging from astronomy to medicine.3 A few months later, Natsir paid 
homage to the early 19th-century Muslim philosopher, Ibnu Makawaih, 
whose introspective method may have infl uenced Schopenhauer.4 In 
Pedoman Masjarakat, he also mentioned Abu Nasar Al-Farabi from the 
10th century, who was one of the forefathers of political economics, 
according to Natsir. Finally, in an attempt to refute some of Islam’s 
critics who claimed that it had invented nothing, Natsir, in Pandji Islam, 
cited, amongst others, the 11th-century polymath Ibn al-Haytham, 
the inventor of the camera obscura and, by extension, the precursor of 
modern photography.5 Th ese examples which Natsir used to illustrate 
the wealth of Islamic civilisation had another purpose, however, which 
was to show Muslims that there was a pressing need for them to de-
velop the same critical frame of mind (ruh intiqad ) which enabled 
illustrious Muslim scientists to question and surpass the accepted knowl-
edge of their day.
 Convincing fellow Muslims of the greatness of Muslim civilisation 
and making Islam the cornerstone of a new national consciousness, 
however, would only make sense if the population was educated in the 
Muslim faith. Yet despite the best eff orts of the Muhammadiyah move-
ment over the previous 20 years, there was still a long way to go before 
this would be the case. Islam was taught in pesantren in a way which 
prevented it from opening up to modern society. Th e vast majority of 
the future Indonesian elite attended schools which were based on the 
Dutch model where everything was designed to keep Islam at bay, as 
the development of a secularist nationalist movement later showed. 
Mohammed Natsir was so taken aback by the lack of religious knowl-
edge of his secondary school classmates that he actually dedicated his 
fi rst books to them. Komt tot het gebed (Come and Pray) (1930) was 
taken from classes he gave at Jalan Jawa School in Bandburg; Guden 
Regels uit den Qu’ran (Th e Golden Rules of the Koran) (1932) provided 
a selection of Koranic verses translated into Dutch; and fi nally, Het 
Vasten (Fasting) spoke of the main religious practices of Islam, in parti-
cular the practice of fasting. At the same time as he was writing these 
3 Pedoman Masjarakat, June 1936, in Capita Selecta, vol. 1 (Bandung: I.W. Van 
Hoeve, n.d.), pp. 3–9.
4 “Ibnu Maskawah”, Pedoman Masjarakat, February 1937, ibid., pp. 10–2.
5 “Ibnu Sina”, Pedoman Masyarakat, February 1937, “Djedjak Islam dalam ke-
budajaan”, Pandji Islam, 1937, ibid., pp. 13–8, 24–9.
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books, Natsir began his teaching career. He began modestly, teaching a 
few classes in 1930 while still at secondary school, and after completing 
a training programme organised by the government, he became the 
head of the Islamic Educational Committee (Komite Pendidikan Islam) 
and the Islamic Educational Institute which had been founded by 
Persatuan Islam.6 In 1934, he published a short pamphlet entitled 
“Th e Ideology of Islamic Education”, which contained a summary of 
his convictions concerning the teaching of Islam. 
 In this work advocating Muslim education, Natsir wished most of 
all to persuade his fellow Muslims of the necessity of a way of teaching 
Islam which was open to the modern world. Following a classical rhe-
torical formula used by Muslim reformists and frequently adopted by 
Masyumi, his pamphlet makes use of two types of arguments. Th e fi rst 
takes its inspiration from secular examples by contrasting, for example, 
the model used by Japan, which managed to achieve quick and sus-
tained development by providing access to education to as many people 
as possible, with the model used by Spain which was overtaken by 
most of its rivals because of its lack of investment in the educational 
fi eld. Th e second argument made reference to a religious obligation 
based on verse 104 of the Al Imran surah.7 For Natsir, the Holy Book 
advocated a form of teaching which was open to the modern world in 
general and to the latest developments from the West in particular. A 
signifi cant part of the future Masyumi leader’s work in the 1930s was 
devoted to this struggle for the development of education which he 
considered to be a necessary precondition for Islamic nationalism to 
exist.8 His decision to become a teacher and by so doing to refuse a 
6 Th is institution off ered classes for preschool up to secondary school. Ajip Rosidi, 
M. Natsir, sebuah biografi , vol. 1 (Jakarta: Girimukti Pasaka, 1990), pp. 169–70.
7 “And let there be [arising] from you a nation inviting to [all that is] good, en-
joining what is right and forbidding what is wrong, for those will be the success-
ful.” Koran (III, 104). Natsir concluded from this verse that the Indonesia umma 
had to recruit a group entrusted with the education of children so that this task 
“would not be delegated to those who do not have the same ideas, the same edu-
cation, the same faith or the same religion as us.” Mohammad Natsir, “Ideologi 
didikan Islam”, in Capita Selecta, vol. 1, pp. 53–61.
8 In “Sekolah Tinggi Islam” (“Islamic Higher School”), published in 1938 (Capita 
Selecta, vol. 1, pp. 66–79), Natsir deplored the absence of an Islamic university 
in Indonesia. Th is, he argued, encouraged the creation of an elite who were more 
interested in the West.
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scholarship which would have enabled him to pursue his studies in the 
Netherlands typifi es the third of the future Majumists’ aims: to enable 
Islam to unify the disparate elements of Indonesian nationalism.
 Natsir, who was very worried about the loss of the infl uence of 
Islam amongst Indonesia’s elite, became convinced very early on that 
the religious neutrality encouraged by a section of the nationalist move-
ment was merely the fi rst step in a de-Islamifi cation programme 
endorsed by the colonial government for the benefi t of the Christian 
community. Th is conviction led him to become involved in the on-
going debate between progressive Muslims and nationalists since the 
end of the 1920s.9 Th is wide-ranging debate had begun with a con-
frontation between Sukarno and Haji Agus Salim, who was soon to 
be joined by Ahmad Hassan and his followers from Persatuan Islam 
(Persis), Fachroeddin, Moenawar Chalil and Mohammad Natsir.
 Secular nationalists refused to accept Islam as the principle inspi-
ration for their struggle for three main reasons. Th ey considered fi rst 
of all that their religion was unable to respond to the problems of the 
modern world, and as such they even deemed it to be partly respon-
sible for the 300-year-long colonisation of Indonesia. According to 
them, a strong independent nation could only be constituted by using 
the Western model of government which had managed to confi ne reli-
gion to the private sphere and to the fi eld of religious worship. Th is 
point of view was confi rmed by what were, in their eyes, positive exam-
ples of dynamic countries with secular governments, such as Turkey, 
Persia and Egypt. Th e second argument put forward was a little more 
particular to Indonesia and was based on the idea that it would be 
impossible for Islam to claim to have a unifying role in the Dutch East 
Indies, given that the country was home to minority groups of other 
religious faiths, namely Christianity, Buddhism and Animism. Th e fi nal 
argument advanced was that the history of the Indonesian people’s 
struggle for independence had shown that religious organisations had 
9 Several works have looked at the major stages of this debate: in 1936, Persatuan 
Islam published under the title Soerat-soerat Islam dari Ende letters sent by 
Sukarno, who was in exile at the time, to Achman Hassan; in 1968, the Associa-
tion of Islamic Education in Padang (Jajasan pendidikan Islam, Padang) published 
a collection entitled M. Natsir versus Soekarno: Th e Unity of Religion and State 
(Persatuan agama dengan negara), containing around 10 texts written by the fu-
ture president of Masyumi, most of which can be found in Capita Selecta.
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failed to obtain any signifi cant concessions from the Dutch colonial 
power despite their best attempts over two decades.10
 Th e leaders of Persatuan Islam countered the arguments of secu-
larist nationalists with their own line of reasoning, which appeared in 
numerous articles published mainly in Pembela Islam, Pandji Islam and 
Al-Lisan. In 1941, the fi gurehead of Persatuan Islam, Ahmad Hassan, 
gave a brief summary of the party’s arguments in a book entitled Islam 
and Nationalism (Islam dan Kebangsaan). Th e premise posited by the 
advocates of Islamic nationalism was that independence did not con-
stitute an end in itself, but rather that it could only be envisaged as a 
means towards another goal, namely the recognition of Islamic norms. 
Th e freedom of the nation could only fl ourish if it was exercised as 
part of a struggle for Islam, and so to venerate a secularist form of 
nationalism would be akin to polytheism (shirk).11
 Mohammad Natsir, in his opposition to Sukarno, used the same 
type of reasoning when listing the religious entitlements one could 
enjoy in a “neutral” state: freedom of religion, the possibility of paying 
the zakat, legislation on marriage and divorce which was adapted 
to people’s religions. His argument was that the same guarantees 
would be available under any form of government, including colonial 
government.12 Th is argument was no doubt intended to provoke secu-
larists, but the message was clear: the nationalists could count on the 
support of the Muslim community’s leaders only if they recognised 
Islam’s primordial role. Th e theorists belonging to Persis refuted the 
nationalists’ argument that an Islamic state was impossible because 
of the presence of other religions in the country, insisting that they 
would refuse to give in to the “law of the minority”.13 Th e nationalists 
10 Dr. Muh. Ridwan Lubis, Pemikiran Sukarno tentang Islam (Jakarta: C.V. Haji 
Masagung, 1992), pp. 136–48.
11 See the declarations made to this eff ect by Fachroeddin al-Kahiri, in Pembela 
Islam, no. 59, March 1933, quoted by Howard Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic 
Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1970), 
p. 87.
12 Pandji Islam, 20 February 1939. Quoted in Deliar Noer, Th e Modernist Muslim 
Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1942 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 
1973 [2nd edition, 1978]), p. 278.
13 Ahmad Hassan asked the question: “Is it appropriate for us to dismiss the 
importance of a majority of 90% because of a minority of 10%? Would such an 
agreement be fair?” Islam dan Kebangsaan, p. 41. Quoted in Federspiel, Persatuan 
Islam, p. 88.
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were given to understand that they were bad Muslims and were in-
diff erent to the danger that some of their fellow Muslims “could re-
nounce their faith and abandon Islam for Christianity, Buddhism or 
Th eosophy.” 14 Th e political representatives who defended an Islamic 
state reminded those Muslims who had forgotten their religious duty 
—those who, according to Natsir, were guilty of “dishonesty towards 
Islam” 15— of the role played by Muslim organisations in the fi rst steps 
of the struggle for national independence; Natsir referred to the “willing 
sacrifi ces” whose debt needed to be repaid. When Sukarno and his sup-
porters pointed out that Sarekat Islam had failed in its attempt to bring 
together the Indonesian people, Natsir maintained that this was the 
fault of those who had founded rival groups. Th ose groups, by trying 
to replace a commonly held set of values, Islam, with a purportedly 
original culture which harkened back to the great empires that once 
dominated the archipelago, had succeeded in distancing the people 
from their leaders.
 Mohammad Natsir was not the only future prominent Masyumi 
member to use such arguments. A speech given by Kasman Singodi-
medjo in 1925, shortly after he became a member of the leadership of 
the Jong Islamieten Bond used one of those arguments among its cen-
tral themes. He heavily criticised the lack of communication between 
the members of the “intellectual group” ( golonga intelektuil ) and the 
people. He blamed this failing on linguistic problems (most of the 
organisations’ members communicated in Dutch), and on a diff erence 
in lifestyles (most intellectuals had adopted a European lifestyle), but 
also on the lack of a set of common cultural references. Th e references 
used by “some” came from a classical Javanese culture, glorifying the 
era of the great Hindu kingdoms like Majapahit. He went on to ex-
plain that these references made sense “for people like us who have the 
time to study these legends and wonderful stories” but they did not 
serve any purpose if you wanted to “recreate a bond with the people.” 
Islam, on the other hand, constituted the natural bedrock for a “senti-
ment of fraternity” amongst the people and should therefore become 
14 Pandji Islam, 30 January 1939. Quoted in Noer, Th e Modernist Muslim Move-
ment in Indonesia, 1900–1942, p. 276.
15 Ibid.
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the cornerstone on which to build national unity.16 Th e desire of the 
secular nationalists to rebuild a national culture without referring 
directly to Islam also infl uenced the choice of Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, 
future president of the Masyumi party, to leave the nationalist move-
ment and join the ranks of Sarekat Islam. As he explained in an article 
published in 1930, he had been particularly shocked by a tendency 
amongst some of his friends in the nationalist movement to liken the 
exile of nationalists in Digul (one of the main internment camps set up 
by the Dutch) to the pilgrimage to Mecca.17
 Initially, the involvement of the future members of the Masyumi 
party in the debate concerning the construction of the new Indonesian 
nation was essentially based on defending the place of Islam. Th eir dis-
agreement with the leaders of the nationalist movement on the issue of 
Indonesia’s Muslim identity, which they considered to be under threat, 
succeeded in acquiring them a certain prominence in the small circle 
of progressive Islamist activists, however. Th eir involvement was not 
merely based on a simple reminder of the religious obligations behoving 
their fellow Muslims; by carrying on the work of their illustrious pre-
decessors, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto and Agus Salim, they also wished to 
create the conditions which would allow their fellow countrymen to 
adhere to their political ideal.
Political Activism and the Beginnings of a Muslim 
Democracy
Th e debate within the Muslim community about how an Islamic state 
should be established in Indonesia was dominated by the central ques-
tion of whether it should be an obligation or a choice. For a part of 
the community, the debate remained an academic one insofar as they 
never considered an alternative to demanding an Islamic state. Ahmad 
Hassan, for example, adamantly maintained his posture as the voice 
of truth and never attempted to go beyond it in order to adopt the 
16 A speech given by Kasman to the JIB, Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman, 
Kasman Singodimedjo 75 tahun, Hidup itu berjuang (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang), pp. 
434–48.
17 “Tentangan tehadap agama Islam”, Pembela Islam, October 1930, in Sukiman 
Wiryosanjoyo, Wawasan politik seorang muslim patriot, Dr. Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, 
1898–1974, ed. Amir Hamzah (Jakarta: YP2LPM, 1984), pp. 15–22.
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more diffi  cult role of proposing compromise solutions. Others, how-
ever, wanted to engage in a more concrete debate on the question, and 
as a result, became politically active. 
 From its foundation in 1945, Masyumi welcomed both camps 
within its ranks, but there quickly appeared a distinction between party 
members who confi ned themselves to a strictly religious role within 
the religious council of the party (the Madjelis Sjuro, literally the con-
sultative council) on the one hand, and those who by taking on an 
executive role in the party found themselves having to make political 
decisions on a regular basis, on the other. Th is distribution of roles no 
doubt refl ected the aptitudes and preferences of the various members 
within the party, but more importantly, it was also evidence of a funda-
mental diff erence between how each group regarded their religion. For 
one group, it was an inherent truth which must remain immutable, 
and for the other it was a set of general principles whose application 
could be adapted to the present day.
 Th e beginnings of this separation between the strictly religious 
roles and the political roles within the party were apparent well before 
independence. It could be seen in the involvement of certain members 
(Soekiman, Natsir, Sjafruddin and Prawiranegara) in political parties 
(the PSII, Permi and PII) and not merely in associations like Persis.18 It 
could also be seen in their writings; unlike Ahmad Hassan, Fachroeddin 
or Moenawar Chalil, the future members of the Masyumi executive 
did not limit themselves to participating in the debate on nationalism 
and its religious nature. Soekiman and Natsir in particular devoted a 
signifi cant part of their writings to more political and more pragmatic 
questions concerning how to emancipate their nation. Th is led them 
to refl ect upon democracy, its manifestations and its evolution in the 
West, and on its compatibility with the substrata of Indonesian society, 
in particular with Islam. Th ese refl ections, which were not carried out 
exclusively with reference to religion, allowed Masyumi to sketch out 
what would become, a few years later, the main objective of its project, 
namely the construction of a Muslim democracy.
 Of the four theorists within Persis involved in the debate with 
nationalists, Mohammad Natsir was the only one to pursue a political 
career. In a series of articles which appeared between December 1938 
18 See supra Chapter 1.
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and December 1939, he analysed the fate of indirect rule, a policy 
which a section of the nationalist movement in the Volksraad had 
called for. Th is People’s Council created by the Dutch in 1917 saw 
both its powers and in its number of representatives increase in 1927. 
From then on, it was no longer simply a consultative body; a series 
of texts in specifi c areas had to obtain its express approval in order to 
become law. In addition, the number of representatives in the Council 
rose from 38 to 60. However, though Indonesians still only made up 
half of the assembly members and the two separate electoral colleges 
(Indonesian and European) which elected the assembly’s representatives 
totalled barely 2,000 members. Th is meant that the nationalists had no 
chance of obtaining a majority. Given this balance of power and the 
repressive policy carried out by the East Indies government since 1929, 
some parties decided to enter into a policy of cooperating with the 
colonial power.
 Th e largest party to engage in this policy of cooperation with the 
Dutch East Indies government was Parindra (the Greater Indonesia 
Party). It was founded in 1935 through the merging of Budi Utomo 
with a few intellectual clubs and non-Javanese organisations favourable 
towards nationalism. In 1936, a section of the PSII, which up until 
then had been resolutely opposed to any cooperation, declared itself in 
favour of limited cooperation with the colonial power, which involved 
its participation in the Volksraad. In September of the same year, the 
“Sutardo petition” was presented by Parindra to the Volksraad, where 
it received a majority. Th e petition proposed a motion calling for 
the organisation of a conference to discuss the details of institutional 
change in the colony, which would eventually lead to an autonomous 
government that would remain part of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands. Th e Sutardo petition was rapidly opposed by the government of 
the Dutch East Indies, and the Dutch government formally rejected it 
in November 1938.
 In his analysis of this event, Natsir showed a clear capacity for 
political observation. Natsir the realist and man of action eclipsed 
Natsir the theorist of Islamic nationalism; he saw that the refusal to 
accept the Sutardjo petition by the Netherlands tolled the death knell 
for the hopes of those who favoured an egalitarian partnership between 
the Dutch metropolis and its colony. It was at the same time, however, 
a salutary event as it brought to an end the crisis within the nationalist 
movement which had begun with the attempt by some to collaborate 
with the colonial power in an attempt to gain infl uence and advance 
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their aims. As Natsir said, what appeared to be a failure would turn 
out, on the contrary, to awaken a sense of unity in the national con-
sciousness so long as one respected the maxim of the French sociolo-
gist Gustave Le Bon that “our opinion of things changes with the 
unfolding of events … [and] only a fool has unchanging opinions.” 19
 Th e pragmatism Natsir showed in his choice of quotation is re-
fl ected in all his articles on the Sutardjo petition. It is evidence of his 
refusal to enclose himself in a struggle for an Islamic cause removed 
from political realities. Th e future president of Masyumi, much more 
so than his colleagues of Persatuan Islam, wished to be seen as a prag-
matist. He pointed out that the absence of any prospect of evolution 
in the status of the Dutch East Indies put the survival of the colony 
in danger, as Snouck Hurgronje had predicted in the 19th century.20 
Th e Dutch government’s opposition to change, the most recent example 
of which being their refusal to accept the Sutardjo petition, paved the 
way for the uniting of all nationalist currents within GAPI (Gabungan 
Politik Indonesia, Indonesian Political Union), the broad nationalist 
grouping of the late 1930s. In addition, nationalist aspirations were 
about to receive a boost with the outbreak of war in the West.21 When 
German troops invaded the Netherlands a little over a year after the 
failure of the Sutardjo petition, Natsir urged the authorities to imme-
diately recognise the inevitability of Indonesian independence, enjoining 
them not to “miss the bus” so as not to lose the support of a nation 
of 60 million inhabitants.22 Th e question of Islam was for the moment 
not on the agenda; Natsir’s demands were made in the name of a 
higher cause of freedom and in the name of modernity, which necess-
arily implied democracy. His vision for the future of his country—
which involved obtaining fi rst, independence and democracy, and 
then pursuing the recognition of Islamic values—naturally opened up 
numerous possibilities for cooperation with the defenders of secular 
nationalism.23
19 Quoted in French in the article with a translation in Indonesian. “Diselitar 
Petisi Sutardjo”, Pandji Islam, December 1938. In Capita Selecta, vol. 1, p. 237.
20 “Aliran assosiasi Exit”, Pandji Islam, January 1939, ibid., p. 244.
21 “Parlemen Indonesia”, Pandji Islam, October–December 1939, ibid., pp. 253–
78.
22 Pandji Islam, May 1941, ibid., pp. 356–60.
23 He had already affi  rmed this in February 1939. Pandji Islam, 6 February 1939; 
Noer, Th e Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1942, p. 277.
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 At the same time, Soekiman, who started out in the nationalist 
movement, was also changing his ideas about Indonesian independence; 
contrary to Natsir, however, he was moving closer to Islam. Initially 
schooled in Western political culture, he also turned in the late 1930s 
to the founding texts of Islam as a source for his political ideas. In an 
article in 1939 denouncing the absence of a true parliament in Indo-
nesia, for example, he reminded readers of the importance of this 
institution in the history of democracies such as England and the 
Netherlands, and also in the Koran. He quoted the Al-Imran Surah,24 
drawing from it the conclusion that the “form of government recom-
mended by Islam was to be founded on consultation” and that an 
Islamic government was to speak and debate with the community 
about all things that concerned the fate of the community.” 25
 Well before independence then, the foundations of what was to 
become the political ideology of Masyumi had already been laid by a 
few of its future members. What set these members apart was that they 
strove simultaneously to achieve the ideals both of Islam and of demo-
cratic independence. During the period of Japanese occupation which 
followed the outbreak of the Second World War, they were obliged to 
keep a low profi le. Th e new occupiers of Indonesia adopted a strategy 
which intended to rely on the specifi c religious demands made by 
representatives of the Muslim community in order to counter the more 
political demands of the secular nationalists. When Masyumi was 
founded by the Japanese, it showed no interest in theorising about an 
Islamic state. Apart from a personal initiative which came very late in 
the day from a member of the Offi  ce of Religious Aff airs (Shumbu), 
Haji Suzuki, to convince the Japanese military command to establish an 
Islamic state in Java, the Japanese did not have the slightest idea about 
the place Islam could occupy in an independent Indonesian state.26
24 “So by mercy from Allah, [O Muhammad], you were lenient with them. And 
if you had been rude [in speech] and harsh in heart, they would have disbanded 
from about you. So pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult them 
in the matter. And when you have decided, then rely upon Allah. Indeed, Allah 
loves those who rely [upon Him].” Koran (III, 159).
25 “Indonesia berparlement”, Adil, 30 December 1939, 6 and 13 January 1940, 
in Wiryosanjoyo, Wawasan politik seorang muslim patriot, pp. 40–55.
26 Harry J. Benda, Th e Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the 
Japanese Occupation 1942–1945 (Th e Hague and Bandung: W. Van Hoeve Ltd, 
1958), p. 286n67.
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 Th e infl uence of this period on the elaboration of the future Mus-
lim party’s political ideology was nonetheless important. By allowing 
the Islamic leaders to build a solid network throughout the entire 
archipelago, the Japanese created the necessary conditions to allow the 
establishment of a broad social movement, which the party was later 
to consider as the conditions for the construction of a Negara Islam.27
Th e Prospect of a Democratic Islamic State: 
Cautious Silence and Moderate Proposals
Th e party which was founded in November 1945 was very much at 
the crossroads of Indonesian Islam. Its mission was to represent on the 
political stage the disparate ambitions of a community composed of 
traditionalists, modernisers and neo-fundamentalists. As one of several 
political organisations in a parliamentary democracy, Masyumi had to 
go in search of as big a democratic mandate as possible, and these con-
straints were to weigh heavily on the party when it came to defi ning 
its political manifesto. Although it was a central topic, the question of 
the sources of Islamic law was a very sensitive one due to the diffi  culty 
in getting modernisers and traditionalists to agree. In addition, it be-
came dangerous to even mention the possibility of an Islamic state 
because of the fear that the non-Muslim parts of the country would 
break away. From its foundation in 1945 until the announcement 
of the results of the Legislative and Constituent Assembly elections, 
Masyumi was aware that power was within its reach. It elaborated its 
political identity, then, with the constant idea of maintaining a consen-
sus which was thought to guarantee victory in the elections. Over the 
years, in order to maintain public goodwill, Masyumi developed an 
institutional project which was both cautious and moderate in tone. 
Th e form of government that it called for was mainly inspired by 
Western democracies, and no reference was made to the place to be 
occupied in it by Islamic norms. Th is ideology for the main part ori-
ginated in the infl uence held by a small group of moderate and pro-
gressive party leaders who followed Natsir’s example and attempted to 
respond to the challenge posed by nationalists.
27 See infra, Chapter 6.
Chap5 (285-347).indd   299 8/14/15   5:39:57 PM
300 Islam and Politics in Indonesia
Progressive Secularisation until 1956
Between 1945 and 1950, the prevailing party objective which over-
shadowed any other was the preservation of Indonesian unity. It was a 
subject which was to dominate the resolutions adopted at the founda-
tion of the party as well as during the fi rst three party congresses, and 
it always appeared before considerations about the role of Islam. In the 
founding statutes of 1945, the fi rst objective to be defi ned was “the 
consolidation of the Republic of Indonesia’s sovereignty and of Islam” 
(Menegakkan kedaulatan Repoeblik Indonesia dan Agama Islam). In Solon 
in February 1946, emphasis was put on the principle of “100% inde-
pendence” along with “the desire to remove Indonesian citizenship from 
any inhabitant who hindered the cause of independence.” In Yogyakarta 
in 1947 and in Madiun in 1948, diplomatic questions linked to the 
struggle for independence made up the main part of the programmes 
adopted. Th e strictly religious aspect of the party’s aspirations seemed 
at this time to take a backseat, and any mention of it was made with 
great caution.
 Th e various documents which were adopted during the foundation 
of Masyumi and its successive party congresses (statutes, programmes 
and various motions) contained only one clear demand for an Islamic 
state (Negara Islam). Th is was contained in the domestic policy pro-
gramme adopted in the Solo congress in February 1946. Instead of 
the term Negara Islam, however, which was used by party members 
themselves very often, vaguer terms were employed, thus opening up 
the possibility of compromise. Th e founding statutes in November 
1946, for example, announced Masyumi’s goal as “the achievement of 
the ideals of Islam within the state structure”. Th e fi rst party congress, 
held in February 1946 in Solo, adopted a formula which was often 
subsequently echoed: “a Republic of Indonesia founded on Islam”. Th e 
programme published at the Solo congress spelled out the party’s desire 
to “achieve the ideals of Islam within the state structure in order to 
build a state founded on popular sovereignty and a society based on 
the principles of justice found in the teachings of Islam.” 28 Th e next 
four party congresses used virtually the exact same wording. 
 Th e party’s priority, then, was the defence of the Republic of 
Indonesia, as it was defi ned in the Constitution of 1945. Masyumi 
28 Domestic policy programme adopted at the Solo congress, February 1946.
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thus accepted not to challenge the compromise which had been ham-
mered out on the subject of Pancasila during the debates in the Komite 
Nasional Indonesia Pusat (KNIP). Th e resolutions adopted by the party 
refl ected the fact that it now adhered to this state ideology, even if the 
wording of the resolutions often had an Islamic fl avour to them. Th e 
party’s statutes of 1945 identifi ed amongst its objectives the goal of 
“organising the life of the people on the principles of faith, devotion, 
humanistic social conscience, fraternity and equality before the law, in 
accordance with the teachings of Islam.” Th is assimilation of the prin-
ciples of Pancasila into the party objectives was not merely a temporary 
consequence of the revolutionary period, however. Th ey were regularly 
adopted in successive programmes at party congresses, and they ap-
peared again in the party statutes after their revision in 1952.29 Th e 
new statutes this time had an additional section — an “exposition” (Tafsir 
Azas) — which was a good indication of how far the party mem-
bers had come since the Jakarta Charter of June 1945 envisaging “the 
obligation for Muslims to apply Islamic law”. Masyumi’s ideal was now 
“a state imbued with divine grace … in which Muslims would have 
the possibility of organising the private as well as the social aspects of 
their lives in accordance with the teachings and the laws of Islam.” 30 
Th e replacement of the word “obligation” with the word “possibility” 
refl ected the evolution of Masyumi’s policy in the fi eld of religion 
during the fi rst years of the Revolution. Th e recognition of the role of 
Islam in public life could not be imposed from on high, but had to 
emerge as a conviction from a long and patient process of persuasion 
which would be carried out within a democratic state.31
 After 1950, the Republic of Indonesia was no longer in danger 
of seeing its sovereignty hampered by its former colonial masters, but 
Masyumi’s doctrine remained nonetheless consensual. Th is was due to 
29 Th e domestic policy programme approved by the 1946 congress proposed to 
“reinforce and enhance the cornerstones of the Republic of Indonesia’s Constitu-
tion, namely faith in a unique God, a fair and civilised humanity, the unity of 
Indonesia, and a democratic system which operates wisely through consultation and 
representation so as to allow the creation of an Islamic society and an Islamic 
state.” As we have already seen, this was the only offi  cial party document which 
made clear reference to an Islamic state, which appears here to be the conse-
quence of the application of the principles of Pancasila rather than as a precondi-
tion for their acceptance.
30 Tafsir-Azas, 1952.
31 See supra Chapter 2.
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another danger the party faced but which came, this time, from within. 
Th e proclamation by Kartosuwirjo in August 1949 of his “Negara Islam 
Indonesia” led to cautious responses by party leaders. Any demand 
in relation to an Islamic state formulated too heavy-handedly was in 
danger of leading to an association in people’s minds between Masyumi 
and the rebellion in West Java. In 1952, during the sixth party con-
gress, when new party statutes were drawn up, the “goals of the party” 
included the “application, in accordance with the divine scheme of 
things, of the teachings and the law of Islam in the life of every man, 
of society and of the Republic of Indonesia.” However, wary of any 
tendentious interpretation of this aim, the party specifi ed in the offi  cial 
commentary accompanying the new statutes that these goals would 
be pursued “in accordance with the rule of law and according to the 
normal procedures of a democratic country”, and reminded the public 
that “unrest would only lead to the wasting of material and spiritual 
forces, and no responsibility could be taken for it [by Masyumi].” 32
 As the elections approached, the timidity of Masyumi’s claims 
was even more obvious. Th e party’s press made no bones about playing 
the Muslim card,33 but the party itself seemed to want to hush up 
its Islamic identity as well as any demands which were of a religious 
nature. No reference to religion was made in the various documents 
(general resolutions, urgency programme and election manifesto) 
adopted during the conference of December 1954 in Surabaya. More 
surprising again was the fact that the only election manifesto published 
by the party entitled “Voting for Masyumi means …” (“Memilih 
Majumi Berarti ”) contained no reference to religion whatsoever. Th is 
was all the more unusual given that it was one of the most compre-
hensive manifestos to be published by the party: it set out 55 institu-
tional, social and economic reforms which the party pledged itself to 
carry out if they were elected. Th ere was only one single mention of 
the term “Islam” or allusion to the Muslim religion.34 On the question 
of the form of government, the party’s proposals stressed solely the 
democratic nature of the new state. It was a manifesto which could 
have been drawn up by a number of non-religious parties including the 
32 Tafsir-Azas Angggaran Dasar, 1952.
33 We could cite the cover of Hikmah published on 24 September 1955, which 
reproduced the fatwah issued by the Congress of Medanese Ulamas making it 
obligatory to vote for the Muslim party.
34 See Chapter 6.
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Plate 5.1 An example of the secularisation of campaign themes: Th e 1955 
electoral programme.
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PSI and even the PNI. Neither the press at the time nor the leaders 
of Masyumi, nor even the observers and historians of this period, ever 
commented upon or even pointed out this inconsistency, despite the 
fact that it was evidence of the complexity of the role of Islam in 
Masyumi’s ideology. Th e party’s project was certainly underpinned by 
religion—most of the measures proposed had been justifi ed by virtue 
of their connection with the teachings of Islam—but with elections 
looming, it seemed neither prudent nor necessary to draw attention 
to that fact. In short, Masyumi’s programme was as much a refl ection 
of their fears as it was of the party’s underlying beliefs. Its aim was to 
create a socially-minded democracy inspired by the West which would 
be in harmony with the party members’ religious beliefs. Th is would 
allow religious convictions to fl ourish and as a result, they would no 
longer need to be represented politically.
Th e Party’s Institutional Project: Th e Experience of 
Western Democracies
From its very fi rst party congress, Masyumi busied itself in outlining 
the legal framework for the new state which it wished to see appear, 
and from the outset, parliamentary democracy was clearly affi  rmed as 
the favoured option. Th e requirement of a parliament elected directly 
by universal suff rage was amongst the resolutions adopted at the fi rst 
congress in Solo (1946), and adopted again later at subsequent con-
gresses. Th e religious justifi cation for this choice was clearly outlined 
in the “struggle programme” (Program perjuangan) adopted in 1952, 
which stated that “the form of government which was most compatible 
with the democratic principles of Islam was the Republic.”
 In order to “protect the interests of the regions”, the struggle pro-
gramme provided for legislative power to be held jointly by the two 
houses of parliament. Th ere was to be an assembly composed of 
members whose number for each region depended on the size of its 
population, and a senate in which every region was represented by 
the same number of members.35 Concerning the executive branch, the 
party made an unusual proposal: it suggested that there should be “a 
presidential regime in which the president, as head of the executive, 
should be accountable before the People’s Representatives’ Assembly”.36 
35 “Struggle Programme”, 1952.
36 Ibid.
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Th is choice was a move away from the American form of government 
which had obviously inspired their choice of a legislative model. How-
ever, it can be explained by the vicissitudes of Indonesian politics, 
namely the ambiguous status of President Sukarno since the adoption 
of the 1950 Constitution, which needed to be clarifi ed. Th e 1950 
document allowed for no presidential accountability before Parliament 
and accorded Sukarno very limited powers in theory; yet it also per-
mitted him to exercise considerable infl uence over political life. Th e 
party, then, intended to rebuild a new balance of powers by virtue of 
this rather unusual institutional innovation (a head of state can nor-
mally never be held accountable before the legislature except in cases of 
impeachment).
 Th e type of election to be used for the head of state was never 
specifi ed in the “struggle programme”, nor did it appear in any other 
document published by Masyumi. It seems in any case unlikely, given 
his accountability before Parliament, that the president was to be 
elected by universal suff rage. Concerning the person of the president 
himself, the 1946 congress adopted a resolution stipulating that he had 
to be of Indonesian origin, without specifying if the fact of being born 
Indonesian was suffi  cient; this had the potential to be problematic, in 
particular for those with Chinese ancestry. Th e resolution also required 
the head of state to be “Muslim in religion and in spirit” (beragama 
dan berdjiwa islam). Th is second requirement was taken from the long-
standing demand made by the representatives of Islam, which was 
regularly formulated during the debates in 1945. As it was in contra-
diction with the moderating tendency present in the subsequent offi  cial 
programmes, however, it fell out of favour after 1946.37
 Th e second point mentioned in the proposals for the new consti-
tution made by Masyumi concerned the guarantees to be made to the 
inhabitants of Indonesia. A rule of law founded on the teachings of 
Islam, which the party wished to see established, would allow them to 
ensure the “spiritual and material protection of the whole population 
of Indonesia, be they citizens or foreigners.” 38 Human rights were to 
37 Moreover, the expression used seems to indicate that the mere fact of belonging 
to the Muslim religion (beragama islam) was not enough; the head of state also 
had to have the soul (berdjiwa) of a Muslim. Th is was a shot across the bows of 
the secular nationalists: the vast majority of them were Muslims but they may not 
have demonstrated the “spirit” implied by the resolution. However, no clarifi ca-
tion was given about how to determine the requirements needed to be fulfi lled.
38 Program perjuangan, 1952.
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be constitutionally guaranteed, and women were to have the same poli-
tical, social and economic rights as men.39 Th e election manifesto for 
the Constituent Assembly elections, which the party was later to adopt, 
stipulated, however, that this guarantee would apply “in conformity 
with the particular character, aptitudes and obligations of the sexes.” 40 
An essential human right for Masyumi was the freedom of religion. 
In November 1945, the defence of Islam had been the great unifying 
issue, but this preoccupation was soon extended to other religions also 
and in 1946, both issues—the defence of Islam and the defence of 
religious worship in general—were present. Masyumi gradually became 
a mouthpiece for the entire religious community without distinction 
of belief. Its 1955 manifesto stated that voting Masyumi signifi ed 
“guaranteeing freedom of religion and promoting a harmonious coexis-
tence between religions.” 41 
 It was imperative for Mohammad Natsir’s party to banish the 
spectre of religious intolerance which the party’s opponents regularly 
brandished. In order to lend weight to these commitments, the Tafsir 
Azas of 1952 referred to verse 256 of the Al Baqarah Surah in the 
hope of proving to the party’s detractors that even a literal interpreta-
tion of the Holy Book protected religions other than Islam from any 
mistreatment.42 Th e same document quoted another passage from the 
Koran in order to affi  rm the necessity to “fi ght for the protection of 
monasteries, churches and places of prayer as well as mosques, in short, 
wherever the name of Allah is invoked.” 43
39 Ibid.
40 Masyumi Electoral Programme, September 1955.
41 “Mendjamin kemerdekaan beragama serta menjuburkan keragaman hidup 
antara agama”.
42 “Th ere shall be no compulsion [in acceptance] of the religion. Th e right course 
has become clear from the wrong. So whoever disbelieves in Taghut and believes 
in Allah has grasped the most trustworthy handhold with no break in it. And 
Allah is Hearing and Knowing.” Koran (II, 265).
43 “Permission [to fi ght] has been given to those who are being fought, because 
they were wronged. And indeed, Allah is competent to give them victory. [Th ey 
are] those who have been evicted from their homes without right—only because 
they say, ‘Our Lord is Allah.’ And were it not that Allah checks the people, some 
by means of others, there would have been demolished monasteries, churches, 
synagogues, and mosques in which the name of Allah is much mentioned. And 
Allah will surely support those who support Him. Indeed, Allah is Powerful and 
Exalted in Might.” Koran (XXII, 39–40).
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 What few references to the Koran there were then in Masyumi’s 
programmes only served to remove any suspicion that the party was 
guilty of religious intolerance. It was the accusations of its political 
opponents which had forced the party to airbrush out in this way any 
reference to the religious foundation of its programme. However, this 
circumspection presented a major drawback: it left the public in the 
dark concerning a central question, namely the role of Islamic norms 
in the construction of the new country’s substantive law.
Th e Ambiguities of Sharia Law
During the debates leading up to the adoption of the 1945 Constitu-
tion, the demands made by the representatives of Islam concerning 
the application of Islamic norms seemed relatively clear. Th e Jakarta 
Charter, which seemed at the time to contain the essence of their 
demands, envisaged the application of Islamic law to all Indonesian 
citizens of the Muslim faith. As already mentioned, this demand was 
never clearly formulated by Masyumi before the debates in the Con-
stituent Assembly between 1956 and 1957, and the offi  cial party line 
on that question never really appeared. Th e deliberate vagueness in 
party programmes surrounding which parts of Islamic law were to be 
included in the future laws of the land meant that it was very diffi  cult 
to give a precise overview of this area. However, although it may not 
be possible to identify clearly what the party’s intentions in this area 
were, one can at least understand their general philosophy.
 Various motions voted by the party in congress called for the 
application of certain elements of Islamic law. Th e majority of these 
sought a minimalist application of Muslim penal law. Th e party con-
gress in Solo, for instance, called for the banning of betting ( pendju-
dian), liquor (minuman keras), opium (madat) and usury (riba). Th ese 
demands appeared again in the urgency programme adopted in 1949, 
which added prostitution ( pembatasan) to the list while at the same 
time calling for these social evils to no longer be banned but merely 
contained. Curiously enough, these measures appeared in the section 
of the programme devoted to the working class. Could this be seen 
as meaning that there was a desire to limit the devastation caused by 
these scourges in the poorer sections of society but to tolerate them 
elsewhere? It is hardly likely, but the way the poorest section of society 
was given priority in this regard is nonetheless striking. Th e outlawing 
of those particular social evils and the measured penal sanctions which 
were liable to be applied posed no real problem in a democratic state. 
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However, the banning of adultery, mentioned in 1946, was a much 
more sensitive topic, as sharia law specifi ed a very heavy penalty for 
women—stoning. Th e Masyumi programme, however, did not set out 
any sanction, and subsequent comments by the party leadership indi-
cated that if a punishment was to be chosen for this wrong, it would 
be done in accordance with the mores of the time. In any case, the 
question did not subsequently arise, since the issue was soon to disap-
pear from the party programme.
 Apart from a few measures directly inspired by the Koran, refer-
ences to Islamic law remained very vague. One of the measures adopted 
in 1946 spoke of “applying the laws of Islam as widely and as com-
pletely as possible in society and in people’s way of life.” 44 Yet again, 
however, the part of the programme this demand appeared in meant 
that its signifi cance was reduced: it fi gured in a section which con-
cerned neither political measures nor social measures, but was devoted 
to religion. Is this yet again a sign of the desire to establish a de facto 
separation between social issues and religious issues, or does it merely 
reveal a certain amateurism in the party’s drafting of offi  cial docu-
ments? Th e lack of structural organisation in the Masyumi party would 
lend us to think that the second hypothesis is more likely.45
 Let us look fi nally at the question of which Islamic norms were to 
be referred to. Th ere appeared to be no real debate on this question: 
the Koran and the Sunnah had always been presented as the unique 
sources of law.46 In accordance with the reformist tradition, no later 
text was ever mentioned. Masyumi 
remained loyal to the principles of the Muslim religion, namely that 
our society must constitute a group of believers devoted to God, in 
other words one who obeys the laws and rules laid out by Allah 
in the Koran, and who are guided by the way the Prophet put 
into practice these commandments and these divine rules, that is 
to say by taking into consideration the situation and one’s epoch.47
44 “Melaksanakan hukum-hukum Islam seluas-luasnja dan sesempurnja-sempurnja 
dalam hidup dan kehidupan masjarakat.” Urgency Programme, Solo Congress, 
1946.
45 See infra, Chapter 6.
46 Th e 1952, Tafsir Azas, for example, referred to “the teachings of Islam as they 
are defi ned by the Koran and the Sunnah” (“adjaran dan hukum-hukum Islam 
sebagai jang terjantum didalam Qur’an dan Sunnah”).
47 Tafsir Azas, 1952.
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Th e wording used here shows both the audacity of the Masyumi leaders 
in defi ning their doctrine and their caution in drafting it. Th eir auda-
city can be seen in the fact that their approach allows for some of 
the “sayings of the prophet” (Hadiths) not to be considered as literal 
sources of law. While Mohammad’s ability to adapt to his time was 
emphasised and was to serve as a guiding light, one had to be careful 
not to automatically include in Indonesian substantive law the rules he 
had adopted as a head of government.48 Caution needed to be exer-
cised, however, as the wording was slightly ambiguous, and the subtle 
distinction just mentioned was perhaps not obvious to all the partici-
pants in the 1952 conference. Indeed, within the Muslim community, 
this point of view was not unanimously shared. Th e proposals for the 
new constitution elaborated by the Conference of the Preachers of 
Islam, held in April 1953, specifi ed that the legal framework of the 
state was the Koran and the Hadiths. Because the wording of the Tafi r 
Azas said nothing about the possibility of selecting from or interpreting 
“the Prophet’s sayings”, it left the door open for the Conference to 
adopt a literal application of the political rules of Islam. Th e resolutions 
of this eminent assembly, which was presided over by Daud Beureu’eh, 
the radical leader of Aceh, appeared in the preparatory documents for 
the seventh Masyumi party congress (1954), though they were not re-
tained in the fi nal resolutions.
 Th e party’s programme for Indonesia’s institutions, as it was for-
mulated in their offi  cial documents, appeared then to be the result of 
the confl icting infl uences mentioned earlier. Th e moderation and pro-
gressiveness of those who drafted the programme emerged from the text 
both in the very general, consensual tone of its proposals, as well as 
in the obvious references to the principles of government of Western 
democracies. However, this aspect of the party does not give us the 
full picture of its identity. Although the logic of Masyumi’s proposals 
seemed to evince a complete overhauling of Muslim law and a system 
which would allow the elected parliament to exercise an almost total 
latitude of interpretation of Koranic principles, no document clearly 
set out the details of this new system. Faced with the vagueness of the 
party’s offi  cial documents, it is useful to turn to the comments of the 
48 Certain Masyumi fi gures, notably Jusuf Wibisono and Rusjad Nurdin, echoed 
this interpretation in their writings, stating that the Prophet’s state should not be 
considered as a model Islamic state.
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various Masyumi leaders in order to fi nd some useful insights into the 
party’s political ideology and its developments.
Th e Project for a Muslim Democracy: 
Commentaries and Writings by Representatives 
of the Party’s Progressive Wing
Th e resolutions and programmes adopted by Masyumi were often 
commented upon and elucidated by the party leaders. Th is was done 
on behalf of the party in front of various audiences (the Legislative 
Assembly, the Constituent Assembly and political rallies) or in the 
press, but also on their own behalf in various published works. Ana-
lysing these contributions to the debates with traditionalists, on the 
one hand, and with secular nationalists, on the other, allows one to 
better comprehend the ideological and political foundations of the 
party’s offi  cial resolutions. It also enables one to understand how the 
diff erent crises faced by the party infl uenced the formulation of its 
political programme.
Models and Counter-Models: Th e Th orny Question 
of the Sources of Law
Th e modernist branch of Islam held a considerable amount of infl uence 
within Masyumi’s party executive. Th is was already the case before 
NU’s split in 1952, and it became even more so subsequently. As we 
have already seen, this was never fully refl ected in the institutional 
proposals made by the party. Even after 1952, the party’s publications 
avoided the thorny question of the interpretation (ijtihad ) of the holy 
texts, apart from a few carefully worded references to this fundamental 
notion. As they were wary of alienating the Muslim traditionalists, 
who made up a majority of the Muslim community, the party never 
offi  cially rejected the legacy of the medieval schools of jurisprudence. 
In 1954, the party’s religious council (the Madjelis Sjuro) even pub-
lished a fatwa stating that the party “honoured the madhhab.” 49
 When party leaders explained their programme, however, their 
opinions were bolder and often went beyond the offi  cial party line. 
49 “Muktamar Masjumi ke VII di Surabaja, 23–27 des 1954”, in Pemimpin, 
Madjallah Tengah berdasar islam, no. 6 tahun II, December 1954.
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Without putting it in so many words, most of them presented the 
institutional programme of their party with a view to distinguishing it 
from other programmes which were inspired by political Islam. Th ey 
wished to distance themselves from two currents within Islam: on the 
one hand, traditionalists who conveyed an image of rural backwardness 
(kolot); and on the other hand, wahhabite-inspired fundamentalists 
who represented a refusal to accept any modernising of politics. Jusuf 
Wibisono, who was vice president of Masyumi on several occasions, 
became an expert in this type of rhetoric. He dreaded, as did the party 
leadership to a lesser extent, the confusion of the party’s programme 
with the Islamic states of the Middle Ages and their contemporary 
descendants, notably Saudi Arabia. 
 In April 1945, he published two articles in Hikmah devoted to 
Masyumi’s political ideology. Th ese were meant to be a response to the 
criticisms that were so often levelled at the party. He took a particularly 
hard stance against the commonly held idea that “religion could not 
constitute the bedrock of a modern state”.50 He recognised, nonethe-
less, why many people held this point of view—European economic 
development had begun with the emergence of a separation between 
church and state. Moreover, the Muslim world had fallen behind the 
West economically, apart from Turkey which was the only country to 
have clearly separated Islam from the state. Although it was impossible 
to contest these facts, Wibisono maintained that the conclusions drawn 
from them were based on a complete misunderstanding, for it was 
not the Muslim religion which explained this lack of development; it 
was, “on the contrary, precisely because Muslims did not follow the 
teachings of Islam” that such stagnation existed. He explained that:
According to the interpretation of progressive Muslims, for exam-
ple, the form of government wished for by Islam is a republic and 
not an absolutist monarchy. If a state is established as an absolute 
monarchy, it runs contrary to the aspirations of Islam.51
A few months later, during a Masyumi rally in Yogyakarta, Wisibono 
repeated the same arguments more forcefully, saying that the Muslim 
community, according to him, had been living for several centuries 
contrary to the teachings of the Koran. To further this argument, he 
50 Hikmah, 3 and 10 April 1954.
51 Ibid.
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made reference to the writings of Schnouck Hurgronje, the illustrious 
Dutch Islamicist, who explained in one of his works that the umma 
had abandoned its principles. It was not that the Koran was not being 
read and recited, said Wibisono; the problem was rather that the sacred 
text was being referred to blindly “without any real refl ection on its 
meaning.” 52
 Th e causal connection made between the separation of religion 
and state on the one hand, and progressive politics and democracy, 
on the other, was an idea that Masyumi fought relentlessly against for 
several years. Th e fi rst argument they used was of a religious nature, 
namely that Islam did not recognise such a separation, as it was a 
“complete way of life” (nizam).53 However, as they were aware that this 
simple observation was of limited use, they developed the idea further, 
saying that Islam was indispensable as the moral cornerstone of poli-
tical life and of the state. Some wily nationalists suggested that as it 
was something pure, religion should not mingle (dicampur) with poli-
tics which, by essence, was impure. Jusuf Wisibono turned this argu-
ment back on his opponents, however, saying that politics would be 
purifi ed by contact with religious principles. He went on to say that 
the state had to be founded on a set of morals (kesusilaan) so as not 
to be in danger of becoming too authoritarian, and that the principle 
source of morality was religion “no matter which religion, Hinduism, 
Islam, Christianity or other religions”. Th is well-meaning universalism, 
which was typical of Masyumi’s attitude at a time when it was pre-
senting itself as the defender of all religions, was nonetheless tempered 
by a reminder that “in Islam, religion and politics make up a whole 
and cannot be separated from one another.” 54 Wibisono insinuated in 
his article that other religions which could make this distinction would 
be able to fl ourish without impediment in a state governed according 
to the principles of Islam, and he was joined in this point of view 
by other Masyumi leaders. It was then in the name of Islam that the 
Masyumi leadership consistently declared that the state it envisaged 
52 Abadi, 10 July 1954.
53 Masyumi leaders often repeated this argument, a notable example being in a 
letter written by Mohammad Natsir to Prime Minister Wilopo protesting against 
the circular issued by the public prosecutor banning political discussions in places 
of worship. Abadi, 20 July 1953.
54 Jusuf Wibisono, “Ideologi Politik Masjumi”.
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would be democratic and would respect fundamental human rights 
such as they were respected in the constitutions of modern states.55 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, for instance, explained during a meeting of 
senior party members in 1953 that the Muslim religion constituted 
“the surest of guarantees for democracy and for the rights and protec-
tion of recognised minority groups in society” because justice, which was 
the “source of that democracy”, was “the keystone of the Muslim religion’s 
principles (soko-guru dari pokok2 agama islam).” 56
 Masyumi’s leaders recognised that the problem facing them was 
that the founding texts of Islam had often been misinterpreted by 
certain Muslims. Th is had provided nationalists with arguments in their 
campaign against the assimilation of Islamic laws into the substantive 
law of the country. In this respect, the party leaders were clearer in 
their comments than they had been when drafting their programmes. 
It became clear that the Koran and the Hadiths were indeed the only 
sources of Muslim law, but their instructions should be interpreted 
in such a way as to adapt them to one’s time. Consequently, the Fiqh 
books, which had been subject to heavy criticism, could not constitute 
sources of law.57 Th is refusal to recognise Fiqh as well as their rejection 
of ijma (here understood as the consensus of the ulamas) reveals the 
modernists’ underlying confl ict with traditionalists. Natsir highlighted 
the diffi  culty of determining with any precision what constituted ijma. 
Was it the consensus reached by all the members of the ulama or 
just by a majority? Was the ulama community to be considered as the 
national ulama or as the international ulama ? Such uncertainty, con-
cluded Natsir, meant that ijma could not be taken into consideration in 
the construction of the country’s substantive law.58 Anshary explained 
55 It being understood that these “modern states” were all “Western states”, as 
Mohammad Natsir’s speech in the 1952 Congress pointed out.
56 Abadi, 10 March 1953.
57  HAMKA described them as being “obsolete”. Harun Nasution, “Th e Islamic 
State in Indonesia: Th e Rise of Ideology, the Movement for its Creation and the 
Th eory of the Masjumi”, MA thesis, McGill University, Montreal, p. 147. Isa 
 Anshary explained that since the Muqallidieen period, which marked the end of 
direct reference to sources of Islam and the emergence of fi qh, the teachings of 
the ulama and the kiyai amounted to a blind repetition in front of people who 
in turn repeated what they heard without understanding it. See Isa Anshary, 
Filsafah perdjuangan Islam (Medan: Saiful, 1949 [2nd edition, 1951]), pp. 70–1.
58 Islam Sebagai Ideologie, p. 14.
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that in his opinion, only the consensus reached by the “companions of 
the prophet” (Idjma shahabat) could be followed ( jang boleh diturut).59 
According to him, the only area which the ulama had authority over 
was the fi eld of worship ( fard’ain ou ubudiyah), an area in which there 
was no real room for interpretation. Muslims, for example, had to pros-
trate themselves towards Mecca three times (raka’at) for evening prayer 
(sembahjang maghrib) but only twice for morning prayer (sembahjang 
subuh) “without having to look for a reason why (tidak boleh orang 
mentjari tahu).” 60 Th e rules which dealt with the relations between 
men ( fard kifayah ou mu’amalah ma al-nas), however, and which con-
cerned the interpretation of divine norms (ijtihad ), clearly came under 
the remit of a parliament elected by the people. Zainal Abidin Ahmad 
and Mohammad Natsir stressed the necessity of having parliamentary 
representatives who knew and understood the laws of Islam, but who 
were also versed in the modern sciences.61 However, as the candidates 
were to be elected uniquely on the basis of universal suff rage, ulamas, 
including those who were progressive, would not benefi t from any 
entitlement to sit in parliament.
 Masyumi’s most immediate political rivals were the Islamic tradi-
tionalists, but this did not mean there were no divisions within the 
party’s reformist majority over which religious norms to refer to. Th ese 
divisions were evidence of the ambivalent nature of Muslim reformism 
in Indonesia. Isa Anshary, for example, the virulent party head in West 
Java, was emblematic of the most intransigent tendency within the 
party. He was a product of the Persatuan Islam tradition and was a 
precursor of those tempted by neo-fundamentalism, who were later to 
grow into the organisation called Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia.62 
With his infl amed rhetoric, he was well-versed in vilifying the impious 
(kafi rs) and the unfaithful (munafi ks) who, he said, claimed to love 
Islam but in fact acted contrary to its laws. In his eyes, the world and 
59 Anshary, Falsafah perjuangan Islam, p. 68.
60 Ibid., p. 78.
61 Zainal Abidin Ahmad, Membentuk Negara Islam (Jakarta: Widjaja, 1956), 
p. 231; Mohammad Natsir, Islam sebagai Dasar Negara, pp. 29 ff .
62 For further reading on this matter, see Rémy Madinier and Andrée Feillard, 
Th e End of Innocence? Indonesian Islam and the Temptations of Radicalism (Singa-
pore: NUS Press, 2011).
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the human race would not be safe “as long as the laws of the Koran 
and the Hadiths are not applied throughout the world.” 63 Th is political 
struggle to establish Islamic law was, for him, more about remaining 
strictly faithful to the holy text and less about interpreting the Koran 
through contemporary eyes. Jusuf Wisibono on the other hand, clearly 
followed the latter path, and he was fond of reminding his readers that
Th e Masyumi group is composed of Muslim leaders who think 
that each generation is entitled to propose an exegesis of the Koran 
which is in tune with the situation of the day. If this were not the 
case, then Islam could not really serve as the bedrock of a developed 
country.64
Loyalty to the past was not an end in itself, and it was better, according 
to him, not to feel “bound too much by the lessons of the ulama who 
lived in a time far removed from our nuclear age”, but on the contrary 
to “pursue ijtihad in order to look for explanations and teachings 
which, in my opinion, are purer.” 65
 One of the stumbling blocks which constituted a barrier to agree-
ment between the diff erent sensibilities within the party was Islamic 
penal law (hudid ). Some of its measures seemed to come from another 
age, and nationalists often brandished the spectre of those measures to 
win over voters. Given the progressive tendency of a majority of the 
party leaders, it could legitimately be expected that they did not intend 
to apply the sentences provided by such laws, but it was not always as 
simple as that. Certain sanctions written in the Koran and the Hadiths 
held a sacred value for a large part of the Muslim community, in parti-
cular those who were close to Persatuan Islam. Th is little radical 
organisation from Bandung, unlike Muhammadiyah, had always refused 
to envisage the possibility of adapting somewhat the sentences set out 
in the Koran and the Hadiths. Concerning the amputating of thieves’ 
hands, for example, Ahmad Hassan explained that the severity of the 
sanction was intended to frighten those who might be tempted by such 
63 Abadi, 30 December 1953.
64 “Ideologi politik Masjumi”, Hikmah.
65 Th e allusion to purity was, of course, not accidental. Th is issue was a real ob-
session for the most intransigent adherents of reformism, who wished to give it a 
new, modern interpretation.
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a misdemeanour, and that if it were applied in Indonesia, it would 
have the eff ect of dissuading thieves and thus promote the prosperity of 
society, as it had already done in the Islamic states where it existed.66 
For the most moderate members of Masyumi, there was a lot of unease 
surrounding this topic. Yet again, one of the few members to mention 
it openly was Jusf Wibisono. In his analysis of the political ideology of 
Masyumi, he reminded his readers that this area of Muslim law was one 
of the factors which discredited its application during colonial times:
Within every state court sat a mosque offi  cial who acted as a 
‘religious counsellor’. Th e presiding judge was obliged to consult 
his opinion and ask ‘what does your law provide for a thief?’ Th e 
counsellor’s reply was invariably ‘the cutting off  of his hand’. His 
hand had to be cut off , whatever he had stolen. Naturally, this 
consultation was merely a formality and the amputation was never 
carried out by the Dutch East Indies government. Th e presiding 
judge was [nonetheless] obliged to ask the question to the mosque 
representative acting as ‘religious counsellor’.
Wisibono hoped that there was no danger of a similar situation arising 
in an independent Indonesia, and he shot across the bows of tradi-
tionalists by writing that: “according to the current interpretation of 
progressives, the sentence of ‘cutting off  hands’ must not be applied to 
a convicted thief.” 67
 Th ere remained, however, amongst most Masyumi leaders, a 
certain amount of self-censorship which was distinctly visible in the 
party’s offi  cial documents. Th ey clearly wanted to found a modern state 
free from any reference to past Islamic states. Th eir inspiration for this 
came incontestably from Western democracies, and, unlike successive 
Islamic states in the Muslim world, it pushed them to reinterpret 
thoroughly the sacred texts of Islam. In many cases, even the example 
of the Prophet could not be followed. However, the presence within 
the reformist leadership of a small but vocal minority who held up 
the Prophet’s era as an absolute model prevented any clear and cogent 
formulation of a radical new ideological departure.
66 Federspiel, Persatuan Islam, pp. 145–6. Federspiel points out, however, that 
while Persatuan Islam maintained that the rules of Islamic criminal law were 
divine commandments, it never really called for their application in Indonesia.
67 Wibisono, “Ideologi politik Masjumi”.
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What to Do with Pancasila? Th e Pitfalls of Masyumi’s 
Debate with the Nationalists
From the foundation of Masyumi in 1945 until the fi rst session of the 
Constituent Assembly in 1956, its programmes regularly made reference 
to the principles of Pancasila, and the party’s offi  cial positions on this 
doctrine were regularly commented upon by the party leadership. Th e 
question of the adoption of Pancasila as the defi nitive foundation upon 
which to build the Republic of Indonesia gave rise to a debate which 
opened up a new ideological front in the battle between Masyumi and 
the nationalists. Th e contributions to this debate by Masyumi leaders 
had a threefold aim. Firstly, they wished to persuade the Muslim com-
munity that retaining Pancasila in the Constitution was not contrary 
to the party’s goals. Secondly, they wanted to convince the Indonesian 
people in general, and the non-Muslim section of the population 
in particular, of the sincerity of their stance by demonstrating that 
Masyumi’s projects were not in contradiction with Pancasila. Finally, 
they endeavoured not to allow nationalists to have an exclusive claim 
over the national ideology but rather to use it as a propaganda weapon 
for the benefi t of Islam.
 Th roughout the revolutionary period and up until the beginning 
of the 1950s, party offi  cials busied themselves with justifying to their 
members the sacrifi ce which they had consented to when independence 
was declared, namely that the state would be founded on the fi ve prin-
ciples of Pancasila and not explicitly on Islam. One of the most promi-
nent arguments put forward in favour of this decision was the necessity 
of achieving national unity in order to defend what were considered to 
be two intimately linked interests: independence and Islam. A number 
of arguments were also advanced concerning the nature of the Indo-
nesian state founded in 1945. All the party’s theorists agreed that the 
country’s institutions were compatible with the principles of Islam. 
Some even pointed out that the Republic of Indonesia fulfi lled one 
of the requirements laid out in the fi rst programmes established by 
Masyumi, namely the obligation for the president to be Muslim. Since 
his exile on Sumatra at the beginning of the 1930s, Sukarno had often 
been considered close to the Muhammadiyah movement. He became a 
member of the movement at that time, and his third wife, Fatmawati, 
was the daughter of the local head of the reformist movement.68 During 
68 For an account of this exile in Bengkulu and its infl uence on Sukarno’s concep-
tion of religion, see Lubis, Pemikiran Sukarno tentang Islam, pp. 75–7.
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the debates in 1945, the future president took the opportunity to draw 
attention to his Muslim identity, and also pointed to his desire to 
see Muslim ideals prosper in society. In addition, Mohammad Hatta, 
who was vice president and could thus be called upon to replace the 
head of state, was known for his piety and was close to most of the 
Masyumi leadership. Another source of satisfaction for the Masyumists 
was soon to appear with the creation in January 1946 of a Ministry of 
Religions. All religious questions, which had up until then come under 
the remit of various governmental departments, were now transferred 
to this ministry. It was the case, for example, of the appointment of 
penghulus, who had the responsibility of celebrating weddings, orga-
nising divorces and calculating the division of inheritances. Th e ap-
pointment of imams, which had previously been carried out by the 
regents, was also transferred to the new ministry, as were the supervi-
sion of religious education (for the public as well as for private schools) 
and the overseeing of religious courts.69
 On a more general level, the enshrinement in the Preamble to the 
Constitution of Pancasila, whose principles included belief in a single 
God, the pursuit of solidarity and humanism as well as the democratic 
functioning of the state, was considered by Masyumi as a victory for 
the Islamic community. As Mohammad Natsir explained in 1954, “with 
Pancasila, the current foundations of the Republic of Indonesia are 
like extracts from thousands of sila which are to be found in Islam.” 70 
Certain Masyumi leaders pushed this idea of associating the existing 
institutions and their party’s ideals very far. Z.A. Ahmad and Moham-
mad Natsir, in particular, went so far as to state that the Indonesian 
state already fulfi lled all the conditions needed to be called an Islamic 
state. In one of his books, Zainal Abidin Ahmad set out eight require-
ments necessary for a state to be considered an Islamic state. It had 
to be sovereign; it had to have a constitution and a parliament; be 
a republic and be founded on Islam, law and consultation with the 
people; and fi nally, it had to pursue a policy of peace. He explained 
that Indonesia, unlike the majority of states who claimed to be Islamic, 
69 H. Aboebakar, Sejarah hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim dan karangan tersiar 
(Djakarta: Panitya Buku Peringatan Alm. K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, 1957), pp. 596, 
600–1.
70 A lecture given by Mohammad Natsir in Bukittinggi, Antara, 22 July 1954, 
reproduced in Capita Selecta, vol. 2, p. 293.
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fulfi lled almost all these conditions, the reference to Islam being the 
only one missing.71 During a lecture given in Karachi in 1952, Moham-
mad Natsir declared that like Pakistan, Indonesia was “also an Islamic 
state … for Islam is obviously recognised as the Indonesian nation’s reli-
gion and spiritual conviction, although it is not stated explicitly in the 
Constitution that it is the state religion.” 72
 Th is insistence on the Islamic aspects of Pancasila had a dual 
purpose. It was intended both to persuade the most ardent supporters 
of a political role for Islam that they could be proud of their represen-
tatives’ achievements, and to reassure the other wing of Masyumi con-
cerning the party’s plans. Th is latter objective came more and more to 
the forefront as the elections approached. Party offi  cials were convinced 
that their victory would depend on their ability to attract not only 
confi rmed Islamist activists, but also both Muslims and non-Muslims 
who seemed uneasy about the political role of Islam. Th e party’s pro-
grammes and resolutions were thus cleansed of all egregious proposals 
which might wound the sensibilities of potential electors. Likewise, 
there was a reassuring character to the public statements made by party 
leaders, who had been forced by their opponents’ brandishing of the 
spectre of an Islamic state to adopt a prudent tone. In August 1950, 
for example, the bi-monthly periodical, Suara Partai Masjumi (Th e Voice 
of Masyumi ) tried to speak out against the systematic lumping together 
by nationalists of the notion of “Darul Islam ” (“Abode of Islam”) and 
the fundamentalist movement led by Kartosuwirjo.73 Th is was already 
a lost cause, however, and the party offi  cials had to abandon this ex-
pression, which had until then been used quite extensively in their 
speeches. Th e separatist insurrection which had been carried out under 
this name had defi nitively tarnished the vast majority of the popula-
tion’s understanding of it. Th e term “Darul Islam” belonged thereafter 
to Kartosuwirjo and his followers, and it now embodied the absolute 
71 Ahmad, Membentuk Negara Islam, pp. 114–5.
72 To justify his argument, Natsir emphasised the fact that the belief in a unique 
God had moved from fi fth to fi rst place in the order of Pancasila’s principles. 
“Sumbangan Islam bagi perdamaian Dunia”, Capita selecta, vol. 2, p. 61.
73 “Th e expression ‘Darul Islam’ should not become a sort of were-wolf (momok) 
in the eyes of non-Muslims, but rather should constitute a call to unity under 
the protection of a single, generous and just God.” Suara Partai Masjumi, August 
1950.
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antithesis of a Pancasila state, as Masyumi’s political opponents endeav-
oured to show.74
 Nationalist attacks against Masyumi’s policies achieved a higher 
profi le following a speech pronounced by the head of state in Amuntai 
(Kalimantan) on 27 January 1953. In this speech, Sukarno advocated 
a national state (Negara nasional ) as opposed to a state founded on 
Islam (Negara yang berdasar Islam) which, according to him, would lead 
inevitably to the breakaway of the non-Muslim regions of the archi-
pelago, and would irremediably compromise the reintegration of West 
Irian into the national territory. Th is was a direct and frontal attack 
on Masyumi, as the expression used by the president made explicit 
reference to the party’s programme. 
 Several senior party members reacted strongly to this speech. 
Mohammed Saleh Suaidi, the mayor of Yogyakarta, upbraided the 
president for having inconsiderately “thrown himself into the cauldron 
of ideological struggle” (menjeburkan dirinja dalam kantjah pertarugan 
ideology). For him, the two concepts could not be juxtaposed, as only 
a “national state founded on Islam and its laws” (Negara nasional jang 
berdasar dan berhukum Islam) was acceptable. Th e use of the word 
“breaking away” by the head of state was a sign of prejudice against 
the Muslim community because nowhere in Indonesia did exclusively 
non-Muslim zones exist.75 It was of course Isa Anshary, the radical 
troublemaker of the party who was to react the most virulently. In the 
weeks after Sukarno’s speech, he penned a series of articles and speeches 
which denounced the head of state’s understanding of Indonesian 
society, lamenting an attitude which was “far from the wisdom which 
one might expect from a head of state”.76 
74 A good example of this is the speech given by Sukarno in March 1952 to 
the civil servants working in the Ministry of Information. Th e president explained 
that “the vocation of the fi ve sila which make up the state ideology is to defend 
the unity of the diff erent sections of the Indonesian people in order to turn it 
into a strong nation … Th e fi rst sila is formulated as faith in a unique God, and 
not in Islam as Darul Islam would prefer.” Quoted in Marcel Bonneff  et al., 
Pantsjasila, trente années de débats politiques en Indonésie (Paris: Editions de la 
Maison des sciences de l’homme, 1980), p. 87.
75 Mohammed Saleh Suaidi cited as an example the regional capital of the Maluku 
Islands, Ambon, where “according to an offi  cial report Muslims comprise 60% 
of the population, the remaining 40% being Catholics or Protestants.” Abadi, 12 
February 1953.
76 Abadi, 11 February 1953.
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 It soon appeared to the senior members of the party, however, 
that the controversy was becoming a source of embarrassment for them. 
Th e outraged reactions to Sukarno’s provocative speech and the series 
of demonstrations which it caused were in grave danger of tarnishing 
the reassuring image that the party had worked so hard to construct. 
As a result, the president and vice president of the party, Mohammad 
Natsir and Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, both attempted to calm passions. 
Speaking in early March in Medan, the day after a demonstration 
attended by 60 Muslim organisations protesting against the Amuntai 
speech, Natsir urged the public to solve this problem between Muslims 
in the spirit of Islam, so that “those outside Masyumi cannot take 
advantage of this unrest in order to turn Islamic organisations against 
the head of state, who is himself a Muslim.” 77 Soekiman for his part 
carefully avoided any direct reference to the controversy. In the public 
statements he made following Sukarno’s speech, he limited himself to 
adopting the offi  cial position of Masyumi on this question, which was 
to constantly remind the public of the guarantees made to other reli-
gions by Islam.78 Beforehand, Soekiman and Natsir had succeeded in 
getting the party’s executive to adopt the same stance. On 16 February, 
the Masyumi spokesman published a communiqué stating that the 
party was convinced that the president’s speech did contain some wis-
dom, “whether we appreciate it or not”.79 For the party offi  cials, rather 
than giving way to the cries of alarm which came from a community’s 
sense of indignation, which would mean falling straight into the trap 
Sukarno had laid, Masyumi had to seize the opportunity to pursue 
and intensify the pedagogical approach which it had initiated several 
years previously.
 Th is complex battle concerning the place of Islam in Indonesia’s 
institutions continued over the following months. Sukarno, through 
77 Abadi, 5 March 1953.
78 See, for example, his press conference in Solo. Abadi, 7 March 1953.
79 Abadi, 17 February 1953. Th is declaration, which amounted to a stinging dis-
avowal of Isa Anshary’s comments, caused a certain amount of turmoil within 
the party. Two weeks later, the executive committee published a new document 
“in response to the accusations by certain newspapers which had declared that 
the Masyumi leadership considered that the Amuntai speech was a minor issue.” 
Th is document explained that while the question it raised was certainly an essen-
tial one, it was necessary fi rst of all “to eliminate the public’s misunderstanding 
of Islam as an ideology for society and for a state, in particular concerning the 
freedom of religion.” Berita Masjumi, 2 March 1953.
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a series of speeches astutely designed to undermine Masyumi’s fragile 
unity, endeavoured to appear both as the faithful disciple of a properly 
understood Islam as well as a defender of the non-Muslim population’s 
interests, and hence of the cohesion of the Indonesian nation. On 13 
April 1953, during the celebration of the mi’raj ceremony at the presi-
dential palace, he explained that he had made his speech in Amuntai 
“as a Muslim”, and that the question of whether his Islam was faultless 
or not, whether it was a “100% Islam” or not—an expression regularly 
employed by Masyumi members—“would be determined by God”. As 
a member of the Islamic community, he invited his fellow Muslims to 
“steer clear of any exclusivist or isolationist attitudes” as they would be 
“in contradiction with the spirit of Islam”. He made shrewd use of a 
speech given by Mohammad Natsir the previous year to illustrate his 
comments. Th e speech, said Sukarno, “contained a message which every 
Muslim should refl ect upon”, namely that a “genuine” Islam could not 
be reduced to the celebration of the birth of the Prophet (mulud ) but 
also had to be faithful to the spirit and teachings of Islam.80 Th ree 
weeks later, the head of state once again demonstrated his ability to 
incorporate his opponents’ arguments. In a public lecture given at the 
University of Indonesia, he developed one of Mohammad Natsir’s 
favourite themes: that “Islam is not only a religion, but also constitutes 
a way of life” (Islam bukan hanja satu agama tapi juga satu way of life). 
In his address, Sukarno explained that people often held the mistaken 
belief that religion should not get involved in a country’s political 
aff airs. Th is was an error because Islam was not only a “personal aff air” 
(suatu privaatzaak), as it established no distinction between church and 
state.81 He adopted one of Masyumi’s classic arguments to explain that 
“contrary to what certain nationalists claim”, if Muslims held power in 
the country, the state would not become a theocracy because such a 
form of government did not exist in Islam. Th e president considered 
that nationalists were spreading a number of misconceptions about 
the Muslim religion. He maintained, however, that Muslims, likewise, 
frequently misinterpreted what lay behind nationalists’ aspirations. 
According to Sukarno, two diff erent Islamic groups had, over the pre-
vious 30 years, held two opposing assessments of nationalism. Th e fi rst, 
80 Abadi, 14 April 1953.
81 Like many of Masyumi’s thinkers, Sukarno made no distinction here between 
church and religion.
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represented mainly by Permi (Persatuan Muslim Indonesia), considered 
that Islam recognised the legitimacy of nationalism as long as it was 
not interpreted narrowly. Persis (Persatuan Islam), on the other hand, 
refused any recognition of nationalism by Islam. Concluding his long 
speech, the president reminded his audience that in 1945, the unity 
of the nation had been threatened by the desire, albeit a legitimate 
desire, of each group to see their ideas prevail. It was only through the 
adoption of Pancasila, whose precepts, “as Mohammad Natsir himself 
agreed, did not contradict the principles of Islam”, that this unity was 
preserved.82
 President Sukarno in his speech demonstrated once again his 
political nous. By co-opting almost word for word the arguments of 
Masyumi’s president, he made it impossible for the party to rebut his 
arguments without running the risk of amplifying the divisions to 
which he discretely drew his audience’s attention. Masyumi was the 
main protagonist in this confrontation between political Islam and the 
head of state, and this clash exposed the party’s internal contradictions, 
just as the debates over the 1945 Constitution had exposed the ten-
sions within political Islam. In the eyes of a large section of the popu-
lation, however, Pancasila remained an essential factor for the cohesion 
of the nation, and Sukarno was its protector, its incarnation almost, 
which did not seem to be inconsistent with his Muslim identity.
 In May 1954, another presidential declaration put Masyumi’s 
leaders in an awkward position. It took place during the inauguration 
of a church in the Maluku Islands, where the heated debate over the 
state’s future form of government had led to an escalation in tensions 
between the Catholic and Muslim communities. Sukarno apologised 
to the audience for the acts committed by irresponsible Muslims, and 
exhorted young people to defend Pancasila as the constitutional corner-
stone of Indonesia. Th is declaration was lambasted by one of the fi gures 
of the Indonesian Islamic Youth Front of the Maluku Islands (Front 
Pemuda Islam Indonesia Maluku), who criticised the head of state for 
his intervention in an ideological debate at a time when elections were 
about to be organised, and also asked him which Muslim community 
had instructed him to apologise to Christians. As the controversy grew, 
Masyumi intervened to take the defence of the president, with the 
82 Abadi, 8 May 1953.
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local party leader, Mohammad Basir, indicating that he regretted the 
declarations of the Islamic Youth Front member.83
 By this time, the party’s leaders had accepted, albeit half-heartedly, 
the strategy of appeasement recommended by Natsir and Soekiman 
towards Sukarno. Isa Anshary continued to take the president to task, 
but he took care to point out that he was doing so in a personal capa-
city and not on behalf of the party.84 On several occasions, he even 
tried to calm the debate. On 30 March 1953, he declared that the 
Muslim community “did not wish to create a new state”.85 Th is expres-
sion, which entailed a de facto recognition of Pancasila as the founda-
tion for the country’s institutions, was subsequently employed by other 
Masyumi fi gures.86 With the elections looming, Masyumi came to the 
conclusion that the offi  cial ideology of the Republic of Indonesia ap-
peared untouchable and that it would be wiser to swear loyalty to it; 
after all, its capacity to unite could allow the party to usurp some of 
its benefi ts.
 Th is acceptance of Pancasila as a cornerstone for the foundation 
of the Indonesian state did not signify, however, that the party was 
aligning itself with the nationalist interpretation of this ideology. On 
the question of how to interpret Pancasila, President Sukarno had 
shown himself to be skilled at turning his opponents’ own arguments 
against themselves, but the party leaders did not intend to be outdone 
by this. Th ey adopted two types of attitude towards the question of 
Pancasila, the fi rst of which consisted in posing as the guardians of the 
true Pancasila in order to better resist any attempt by their rivals to 
usurp the fi ve principles.
 Once the Masyumi leadership had committed itself to making 
an eff ort at presenting its political theories within the framework of 
Pancasila, despite the tension and debate this created within the party, 
83 Abadi, 14 May 1954.
84 Abadi, 15 March 1953.
85 Abadi, 31 March 1953.
86 Mohamad Roem declared in April 1954, for example, that “the ideal of an 
Islamic state does not signify a break with our Republic. We do not want to 
build a new state. Th e notion of an Islamic state has been the victim of mis-
representations, owing in particular to the poor example shown by Kartosuwirjo, 
who strayed from the path when he decided to found a new state.” Abadi, 21 
April 1954.
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they could no longer allow the nationalist camp to be the only ones to 
appropriate the state ideology. In an editorial that appeared in Hikmah 
on 29 September 1954, the magazine’s chairman, Mohammad Natsir, 
and its editor, A.R. Baswedan, applauded the discernment shown by 
their political opponent. Th is was in reaction to a declaration made 
a short time before by Sukarno in which he stated that the national 
ideology could not belong to one party, and that the PNI could not 
present itself as founded upon Pancasila, as it would mean that “the 
others would not want any part in it”.87 Even Isa Anshary, who was 
reluctant to follow the party line set out by Natsir, was wont to criti-
cise his opponents for their lack of respect for Pancasila. In a stinging 
diatribe against the Ali government, for example, he explained to 
Masyumi party activists that an analysis of Pancasila, article by article, 
led one to the conclusion that the members of the government “were 
not faithful to it, but, rather, were unprincipled (tidak berpantjasila tapi 
nyataan bertanpasila).” 88
 Emphasising the importance of Pancasila in Indonesia’s heritage 
was not the only aspect of how Masyumi exploited the national 
ideology. Th e other attitude that the party’s leaders adopted was aimed 
at off ering a Muslim interpretation of Pancasila designed to explain to 
the electorate how it could serve as the cornerstone of a state which 
conformed to the teachings of Islam. For them, the ideology defi ned 
in 1945 was merely the outline of a theoretical framework which 
had to be interpreted in accordance with the teachings of Islam. Th e 
premise behind this conclusion was the fact that Sukarno, in a speech 
given on 1 June 1945, had moved the sila which exalted the faith 
in a unique God from fi fth place to fi rst place in the Preamble to 
the Constitution adopted on 18 August. Th is, they explained, was not 
done for practical reasons, but refl ected instead a hierarchy of values.89 
For Masyumi, the Constituent Assembly, by doing this, wished to 
crown the fi rst sila as the “foundation for the four others”.90 Masyumi’s 
87 Hikmah, 25 September 1954.
88 Abadi, 30 December 1953.
89 Bonnef et al., Pantsjasila, trente années de débats politiques en Indonésie, pp. 22, 
28.
90 An expression often employed by Masyumi’s leaders. See, for example, A.R. 
Daswedan’s article entitled “Who Has Really Become the Enemy of Pancasila?”. 
Abadi, 1 June 1956.
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theorists used this idea as a starting point to develop a message pre-
senting Pancasila as a “receptacle” (wadah) to be fi lled. Th is interpreta-
tion of the national ideology adopted one of President Sukarno’s argu-
ments that every political movement should take part in the defi nition 
of Pancasila. It allowed Mohammad Natsir, in May 1954, to assert his 
party’s attachment to the fi ve principles, but at the same time to sug-
gest the limits of this attachment:
In the eyes of a Muslim, the wording of Pancasila is not perceived 
in principle as a ‘foreign thing’ to which he must be opposed. He 
recognises in it the refl ection of part of what he already sees around 
him. Th at does not mean, by the same token, that this Pancasila is 
the same thing as a hymn or that it embraces all the teachings of 
Islam. So long as Pancasila contains the goals of the Muslim reli-
gion, we, Muslims, in order to accomplish these virtues, will not, 
in all sincerity, want to see it abandoned. In a land steeped in 
Islam, Pancasila will fl ourish. Let us hope that this Pancasila, which 
was launched around nine years ago as a formulation of fi ve aspi-
rations but whose substance has yet to be fl eshed out, will not 
materialise over time into something which is opposed to the 
Koranic principles.91
Islamic Democracy at an Impasse: Th e Debates at 
the Constituent Assembly (1957–59)
After the elections of 1955, the party’s resolutions touched less often 
on the question of the country’s institutions, which was now in the 
hands of the Constituent Assembly. Th e congress of 1956, however, 
refl ected the hardening of Masyumi’s position on this issue. After the 
Constituent Assembly elections, the party’s message became noticeably 
more radical. While the party declared that it was now up to the 
Assembly to determine the foundations of the state, Masyumi’s eighth 
congress, held in Bandung in 1956, also recalled the party’s demands, 
namely that “Islam be decreed the absolute foundation of the Republic 
of Indonesia” and that “the Muslim religion be confi rmed as a general 
source of law for the Republic of Indonesia.”
91 “Apakah Pantjasila bertentangan dengan Adjaran Al-Quran?”, Abadi, 22 May 
1954, Hikmah, 29 May 1954, Capita Selecta, vol. 2, pp. 144–50.
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 As for the last party congress held in Yogyakarta in April 1959, 
all that was left for it to do was note the Constituent Assembly’s 
failure and to regret that the government had not given it the time to 
accomplish its task. Th e resolutions with respect to institutional ques-
tions were all devoted to the issue of the day: the return to the 1945 
Constitution. Th e party’s representatives were mainly concerned with 
showing that the Dwitunggal was indispensable in order for the new 
regime to function properly. Th e party put forward no other demand 
related to Islam and contented itself with pointing out that the Muslim 
community should play a stabilising role in the country.92
An “Island Lost in the Middle of Choppy Waters”: Th e 
Political Conditions which Led to the Party’s Intransigence
As a result of the party’s decision to adopt more moderate positions, 
which ultimately led to it being punished at the polls, its leadership, as 
we have already seen, came under pressure from the party’s rank and 
fi le. Th e balance of power thrown up by the election left Masyumi 
with little hope in the short term. Th e party’s Islamic identity, which 
had rarely been highlighted during the campaign, became the rallying 
point for its new strategy. Th is new approach consisted in establishing 
itself as the clear leader of the Muslim parties in the Constituent 
Assembly and trying to obtain the recognition in the new constitution 
which it had failed to secure in the elections. Th is strategy of con-
fronting the supporters of a state founded on Pancasila soon revealed 
itself to be fruitless; it did, however, allow the party’s deputies to clarify 
their demands concerning the country’s future institutions.
 Th e Constituent Assembly was elected in December 1955 and 
inaugurated on 10 November 1956. During the two and a half years 
of its lifetime, it held seven plenary sessions, each lasting two to three 
weeks. It was convened for the last time on 2 June 1959, and on 7 
July, the Assembly was offi  cially dissolved by presidential decree. During 
its proceedings, the Constituent Assembly succeeded in adopting a 
certain number of resolutions concerning the nature of the state, its 
symbols and its protection of human rights. Apart from these provi-
sions, which for the most part incorporated decisions already adopted 
in 1945 and reaffi  rmed by the country’s two subsequent constitutions, 
92 See infra, Chapter 4.
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the Assembly made no signifi cant progress on the question of the 
country’s institutions. It hit a stumbling block early on during the two 
sessions which took place in 1957 and which were devoted to the defi -
nition of the foundations—or philosophy—of the state (Dasar Negara). 
 Th e 514 members of the Constituent Assembly very rapidly split 
into three factions of varying size. Th e largest group was composed of 
supporters of Pancasila ; it comprised the representatives of the PNI 
(116 deputies), its nationalist allies (the IPKI with 8 deputies and 
GPPS with 5), the Christian parties (16 deputies from Parkindo and 
10 from the Catholic Party), the Communist Party (60 deputies) and 
its affi  liated movements (such as Republik Proklamsi with 20 deputies), 
the PSI (10 deputies) and the Chinese party, Baperki (2 deputies) as 
well as a certain number of regional movements, making up a total of 
274 seats. Islam’s supporters were made up of the 112 Masyumi repre-
sentatives, NU’s 91 representatives, the 16 deputies belonging to the 
PSII and Perti’s seven seats, as well as four regional movements such as 
the Gerakan Pilihan Sunda (Sudanese Election Movement) which held 
one seat each, giving a total of 230 seats. Th e 10 remaining members 
in the Assembly were from three small parties: Partai Buruh, Partai 
Murba and Acoma. Th ey made up a small group claiming to be the 
guardians of the spirit of 17 August 1945 and they campaigned, in the 
name of a proletarian doctrine, for an “economic and social founda-
tion” to the state. Its small number of supporters meant that this 
original ideology did not carry much weight in the Assembly debates; 
moreover, the other two factions each claimed that its essential princi-
ples were already contained in their programmes. Th ey took on a more 
important role from 1958 onwards, however, as the offi  cial representa-
tives of Sukarno. Th ey defended the “presidential conception”, cam-
paigned for the adoption of “Guided Democracy”, and were among 
the few deputies to support the government’s proposals.93
 Th e three groups did not change their positions one iota during 
the debates, and indeed the antagonism between them gradually 
worsened. At the close of the third session on 6 December 1957, the 
deputies merely adopted a preliminary report drawn up by an ad hoc 
93 For a complete treatment of the composition of the Constituent Assembly, 
see Adnan Buyung Nasution, Th e Aspiration for Constitutional Government in 
Indonesia: A Socio-Legal Study of the Indonesia Konstituante 1956–1959 (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992), pp. 32–4.
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preparatory committee, chaired by Masyumi’s Kasman Singodimedjo, 
and invited the committee to pursue its work.94 From then on, no 
further signifi cant progress was noted. Th e majority of the debates 
centred on the defi nition of the philosophy of the state (Dasar Negara), 
which the Assembly devoted three sessions to. Th e one matter that the 
various groups agreed on was that this question would eff ectively deter-
mine the entire institutional apparatus of the state. For want of being 
able to settle this essential question, however, the Assembly fell back on 
more consensual issues. In 1958, it defi ned the form of government, 
which was to be republican approved the provisions concerning the 
nation’s symbols, such as the fl ag and the national anthem and con-
fi rmed that the country’s language was to be Indonesian and its capital 
Jakarta. It also adopted 19 articles protecting human rights. Th e satis-
faction expressed on behalf of the Assembly by its speaker, Jusuf 
Wibisono, masked an almost total failure, however. From the beginning 
of 1959, the Constituent Assembly lost any control it had over its own 
order of business, as it merely reacted to the various government initia-
tives motivated by Sukarno’s desire to revive the 1945 Constitution. 
A large majority of deputies were opposed to this proposal, and the 
government responded by making a few concessions, notably the agree-
ment to take into account the provisions already voted. However, the 
Assembly’s opposition was confi rmed in three consecutive votes, on 
30 May, 1 and 2 June 1959, which eff ectively led to its dissolution.
 Due to the balance of power which existed in the Assembly, the 
determining factor in its debates was whether the Muslim bloc and the 
Pancasila group could come to an agreement. Th e political confi gura-
tion in the Assembly meant that the two groups were condemned to 
cooperate with each other, as in order to be adopted a proposal needed 
to receive a two-thirds majority. However, from the outset, the two 
sides were completely unable to come to an understanding, with both 
sides advancing similar arguments to justify their refusal to compro-
mise. On the nationalist side, Pancasila was portrayed as a combination 
94 Th e report recommended that the state’s philosophy should be established in 
accordance with the particularities of the Indonesian state; be inspired by the 
1945 Revolution; guarantee the system of consultations (musyawarah) as the basis 
for resolving state aff airs; guarantee the freedom of religion and worship; and 
guarantee the principles of humanity, of an open form of nationalism and of 
social justice. Tentang dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, 1958, 
vol. 1, p. 166.
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of all of Indonesia’s existing schools of thought, and it was argued that 
this original quality made it the only ideology liable to guarantee the 
unity of the nation. Given that they had won the most number of 
seats in the Assembly, the nationalists intended on maintaining the 
status quo adopted in 1945, which, they reminded their fellow depu-
ties, had been rubberstamped by the Muslim representatives. Th e 
supporters of Islam, on the other hand, had quite another view of 
things. From an early stage, Masyumi’s representatives, who were able 
to infl uence the debates considerably, demonstrated a rather peculiar 
state of mind. Breaking with the moderate line and the conciliatory 
tone which their party had adopted during the election campaign, they 
showed themselves from the outset to be hostile to any compromise.
 Th ere are several reasons which explain this new state of mind. 
Th e fi rst of these is the euphoria created by the solidarity which the 
Muslim parties had rediscovered after years of in-fi ghting. Th is unity, 
which was often in stark contrast to the political manoeuvrings going 
on at that time, remained solid throughout the Assembly’s lifetime. Th e 
Islamic parties constituted a genuine political bloc, and the Masyumi 
press took every opportunity to remind its readers of this. Th e second 
reason was linked to Masyumi’s electoral misfortunes, which had been 
put down to the conciliatory strategy which Natsir had succeeded in 
imposing up until election day. Th e Masyumi president’s policy was 
now being contested within the party, and he gave Isa Anshary and 
Kasman Singodimedjo, two advocates of a more radical approach, com-
plete freedom to enter the fray against the nationalist camp. Th e desire 
to be seen to give no ground to the nationalist camp came from the 
need to give the party a new impetus. Th e Constituent Assembly was 
a setting tailor-made for this: its location in Bandung, four hours by 
train from the hectic atmosphere of the capital, gave it the feeling of 
being somewhat outside of time. It was, according to Natsir, “like an 
island lost in the middle of the choppy waters of politics … tranquilis 
in undus” a place conducive to endless debates which, it was hoped, 
would bring a comprehensive solution to the political problems which 
the inconclusive result of the elections had left unresolved.95
 Th is intransigence was not exclusive to Masyumi, nor indeed to 
the leaders of political Islam in general. In fact, it was one of the 
common points shared by the entire Assembly. Amongst Masyumi’s 
95 Ibid., p. 111.
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representatives, however, this attitude was clearly a strategic choice. 
For the party, the Constituent Assembly’s role was to make a clean 
sweep of the agreements which had been made since 1945; all of the 
country’s institutional questions which had been settled were now to 
be put back on the table. Th e painfully wrought compromise reached 
in 1945 and which nationalists wished to use as a starting point for 
the Assembly’s debates could no longer, in the eyes of Masyumi, be 
used as an undisputed model.
New Attitudes towards Pancasila
Contrary to the conciliatory tone adopted in previous years towards 
Pancasila, Masyumi’s deputies, in their declarations, now engaged in a 
radical reassessment of the conditions under which they would be pre-
pared to accept its inclusion in the Preamble. In their eyes, the Muslim 
community had conceded an immense sacrifi ce for the sake of national 
unity in 1945. Now that the country’s independence was no longer in 
the balance, discussions should be reopened, and it was the nationalists’ 
turn this time round to be prepared to make concessions. Although 
this attitude was new for the party, the underlying resentment had 
already been present. Some Islamists had never accepted the climb-
down they had made on 18 August 1945. Th e intransigence of their 
position was due to their impression of having been duped by the 
nationalists, from whom they had received guarantees that the solution 
adopted—the withdrawal of the famous seven words from the Jakarta 
Charter—was a provisional one. 
 In their speeches in the Assembly dealing with that point in time, 
the Islamic representatives’ appraisal of the 1945 compromise was 
clearly dominated by this sentiment of having been hoodwinked. 
Kasman Singodimedjo recalled that the urgency of the time, and the 
need to confront the Japanese and the Allies had been the reasons 
behind the Muslim representatives’ decision to temporarily abandon 
their demands. Th eir three main requests had been the obligation for 
Muslims to put Islamic law into practice, the proclamation of Islam as 
a state religion, and fi nally, the requirement for the president to be a 
Muslim. He explained that these demands had been sacrifi ced in return 
for the nationalists’ promise to start work on a new constitution within 
six months.96 Isa Anshary took this idea much further and a part of 
96 A speech given by Kasman Singodimedjo, ibid., p. 187.
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his marathon speech to the Assembly—the transcription is 70 pages 
long, without the appendices—was given over to a radical reassessment 
of the 1945 Constitution which was “the work of a few leaders and 
the choice not of a majority of the people, but of Jakarta.” 97 Recalling 
the sacrifi ces conceded by Muslims for independence, he declared that 
the seven words of the Jakarta Charter:
… off ered the Muslim community the opportunity and the freedom 
to put into practice the laws of Islam within the state which was 
about to be created. Th e way clearly seemed free, the Muslim com-
munity had the hope and the guarantee of seeing Sharia and the 
Muslim credo blossom in this world of freedom.98
For Isa Anshary, the Muslim community’s participation in the struggle 
against the country’s former colonial masters was inseparable from its 
hope of seeing its ideology triumph. Th e disappearance of the famous 
seven words had, therefore, “been perceived by the Muslim community 
as a ‘disappearing trick’ still covered in a mysterious pall … like an act 
of political fraud.” Naturally, the nationalists were, for him, the driving 
force behind this manoeuvre, but for the fi rst time, he also criticised 
the Muslim leaders who had accepted this compromise:
Th e policy of tolerance, which was interpreted in a dogmatic fashion 
by Muslim parties and their politicians at that time, was felt by 
the Muslim community to have betrayed the hope and the future 
possibilities of Islam’s struggle. Th is policy of tolerance only led to 
liquidation and capitulation, which meant giving in and submitting 
yet again, without attempting to fi ght and to resist. It is an account 
which illustrates and demonstrates the weakness of the ideological 
struggle led by the Muslim parties and their politicians.99
 Th is was going beyond a condemnation of the nationalist camp’s 
betrayal, and denouncing Masyumi’s entire policy of conciliation which 
had been initiated by Soekiman in 1945 and continued by Natsir. 
A Pandora’s box had now been opened and party members could openly 
express their refusal of Pancasila. Other party representatives plunged 
97 Tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, vol. 2, p. 182.
98 Ibid., p. 185.
99 Ibid.
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into the breach, and in denial of the obvious, rejected the choices 
made by Masyumi over the previous ten years. Zainal Abdin Ahmad, 
for example, declared that Pancasila had in fact never been recognised 
by the previous constitutions as they had only enunciated fi ve general 
principles common to numerous cultures.100 For these Masyumi mem-
bers, the real debate was about to start, and this time Islam’s supporters 
would not back down.101 Once the Masyumi deputies’ objective was 
decided upon, they could only envisage one outcome, namely the un-
conditional surrender of the supporters of Pancasila. Was this a nego-
tiating ploy on the part of Masyumi in particular—and the supporters 
of Islam in general—in order to put itself in a stronger negotiating 
position? Th e party’s obstinacy in maintaining this position in the face 
of clear numerical evidence (not a single nationalist representative had 
rallied to their cause) and the changing political context (the Consti-
tuent Assembly’s position was weakening daily as a result of Sukarno’s 
programme) tend to lead one to the conclusion that this was not the 
case. It is possible, then, in light of these declarations, to conclude that 
Masyumi’s entire political programme underwent signifi cant change 
at this time. Although the discussions never dealt with the legitimacy 
of particular institutional provisions, the arguments used by the party 
fi gures to demand the inclusion of Islamic principles in the Preamble to 
the Constitution implicitly revealed a certain conception of democracy.
A Th eist Democracy
Political Islam, which Masyumi represented, was in a minority in the 
Constituent Assembly. However, due to the requirement of a qualifi ed 
majority—two-thirds of the votes—in order to adopt a new constitu-
tion, they enjoyed a blocking minority which they used liberally. In 
explaining their refusal of any compromise, the party’s deputies could 
have merely invoked the logic underlying the Assembly’s rules, which 
were the same as those used in most democracies, namely that as soon 
as the question of modifying the constitution arose, a qualifi ed majority 
100 A speech given by Z.A. Ahmad, Tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia dalam 
Konstituante, vol. 1, pp. 357–8.
101 One such example of this intransigence can be found in a speech given by 
Kasman Singodimedjo, in which he replaces the expression “a unique God” (Tuan 
yang Maha Esa) with the word “Allah”. Ibid., p. 168.
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was required. It would not have been unreasonable for Masyumi’s 
representative to oblige the nation’s representatives to arrive at a con-
sensus which would be suffi  ciently broad so as to give any constitu-
tional reform indisputable political legitimacy. Th ey only rarely ever 
availed of this argument though, preferring instead to use theoretical 
considerations to justify their refusal to compromise. By doing so, they 
allowed two important aspects concerning their programme for an 
Islamic state to be clarifi ed.
 Th e basic premise of their arguments was the need to establish 
a democracy within the framework of an immanent norm. Popular 
sovereignty was accepted, and even solicited, as long as it did not 
transgress the limits of divine law. It was in the name of this principle 
that the party’s representatives objected to the nationalists’ contention 
that the ideals of Islam were contained in Pancasila, a notion which 
all those who spoke on behalf of Masyumi argued vehemently against. 
Th e idea that there might exist a norm above their religion was un-
bearable to them because, as Kasman Singodimedjo explained, it was 
“impossible to consider Pancasila as a ‘superfaith’ (supergeloof   )” and to 
see the “creation of Allah” subordinated to “the work of men”.102 
 Th e question, then, was how to reconcile this superior Islamic 
norm and the laws which were passed by Parliament. Certain Masyumi 
deputies, such as Isa Anshary, did not bother to clarify this delicate 
issue further than by saying that “Islam as a principle and as law” held 
a solution “for all of humanity’s problems, for all nations and in all 
eras.” 103 Others, however, such as Mohammad Natsir, adopted a classic 
reformist distinction, pointing out that with relation to all matters 
concerning worship, namely “the relation between men and God”, 
“everything which is not ordained is forbidden”.104 On the other hand, 
matters concerning “the world of men” were governed by the principle 
102 Ibid., p. 183.
103 Tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, vol. 2, p. 201.
104 According to Harun Nasution, Ibn Tamiyya was the fi rst to establish this 
distinction between what concerned worship (ibadat) and what concerned the 
relations between men (mu’amalat). Mohammad ‘Abduh adopted this distinction 
and introduced the idea that while the Koran and the Sunnah provided specifi c 
rules about ibadat, when it came to mu’amalat they only gave general principles 
which man would have to apply to the circumstances of his life. Nasution, “Th e 
Islamic State in Indonesia”, pp. 127–8.
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that “everything that is not forbidden is authorised”. For the president 
of Masyumi, “beside these rules which have been fi xed and those limits 
which must be taken into account for the safeguard of humanity”, 
there existed “a vast area where man had to take initiatives, use his 
reason and his capacity for interpretation in all areas of life, in accor-
dance with progress and the demands of one’s time and place.” 105 
Natsir gave no details concerning the “limits” which were to circum-
scribe man’s freedom to reason and interpret. Kasman Singodimedjo 
followed a similar line of reasoning. He presented the practice of free 
interpretation (ijtihad ) not as a right but as an obligation written in 
the Koran (verse 27 of the Az-Zumar Surah),106 which was to be 
carried out, however, under the guidance of “the leaders of the people, 
the state and the government … before the people and before God.” 107
 For these Masyumi leaders, then, Islam contained a series of 
norms, some of which should become the object of interpretation with 
a view to adapting them to the circumstances of the day, but others 
which could not undergo any adjustment. At fi rst sight, the existence 
of immutable rules in the area of worship did not seem to raise any 
insurmountable problems. In Indonesia, however, the question of which 
text to refer to was the source of much debate. Th is was attested to 
by the confrontation between traditionalists and modernists in their 
shared mosques during prayer time, when certain aspects of the ritual 
were considered by some to be obligatory and by others outlawed.108 
Concerning political questions, the problem seemed an even thornier 
one. Th e contributions made by Masyumi’s deputies left two essential 
questions unanswered. Firstly, which were the norms considered to be 
absolute and to which the principle of democracy had to give way? 
Secondly, what body or authority could be charged with identifying 
these norms and ensuring they were respected, and where would it get 
its legitimacy from? Natsir refused to use the term “theocracy” to speak 
about a “state founded on Islam” (Negara jang berdasarkan Islam) due 
105 Tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, vol. 1, p. 130.
106 “And we have certainly presented for the people in this Koran from every kind 
of example—that they might remember.” Koran (XXXIX, 27).
107 Tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, vol. 1, p. 174.
108 One of the most important disputes over worship rituals is dealt with by 
N.J.G. Kaptein, “Th e Berdiri Mawlid Issue among Indonesian Muslims in the 
Period from circa 1875 to 1930”, BKI 149, 1 (1993): 124–53.
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to the absence in the Muslim faith of a hierarchical clergy who could 
act as God’s representatives on Earth. Th is was a classic argument, 
and it led him to defi ne the kind of state which he aspired to as 
a “democratic-Muslim state” (Negara demokrasi Islam) or, to “give it a 
generic name”, a “theistic democracy”.109
 In the absence of an undisputed religious authority, the second of 
the two questions referred to above seemed to be left hanging in the 
air. In reality, although they never openly admitted it, the Masyumi 
members’ attitude in the Constituent Assembly showed that they 
claimed for themselves a preponderant role in defi ning what constituted 
legal norms, thus sometimes violating the democratic principle which 
they otherwise defended. Given that the nationalist secularists held 
more than half the seats in the Assembly, a refusal to envisage the 
adoption of Pancasila as the foundation of the state obliged the theo-
rists of an Islamic state to perform some verbal gymnastics on the link 
between democratic principles and majority rule. Kasman Singodimedjo 
declared himself to be in full agreement with Sukarno when the presi-
dent denounced what he called majokrasi, the tyranny of the majority, 
a concept which, he claimed, Islam did not recognise. He added, 
however, that God did not authorise minokrasi either, “that is to say 
the pressure and threats of a small group on the majority!” 110 In the 
minds of Masyumi deputies, the majority held in the Assembly by the 
supporters of Pancasila did not refl ect reality, namely the existence of 
an overwhelming majority of Muslims in Indonesia, which justifi ed 
their demand for a state founded on Islam. Natsir denounced the para-
dox which consisted in the supporters of Pancasila wanting, in the 
name of democracy, to force the Indonesian people to accept an argu-
ment which fl outed democratic values. Given that a democracy had to 
guarantee minorities the right to exist within society, there was oppo-
sition to Islam becoming the offi  cial philosophy of the state on the 
basis that non-Muslim groups also existed in the country. Th e president 
of Masyumi went on to ask “on what basis do we have to accept 
Pancasila as the philosophy of the state, when Pancasila also belongs 
only to one side which does not represent the other groups existing 
in Indonesia?” 111
109 Tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, vol. 1, p. 130.
110 Ibid., p. 183.
111 Ibid., p. 113.
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 By ceaselessly basing their legitimacy on the existence of a Muslim 
majority in Indonesia—and not on the number of votes received by the 
candidates who were campaigning for a state founded upon Islam—
Masyumi eff ectively denied their fellow Muslims the right to complete 
political autonomy. Natsir was astute enough to base his criticism of a 
secularist vision of society, which he described as being “without reli-
gion” (ladienyah), on examples chosen from Western history. He ex-
plained, for example, that one could “clearly notice the consequences” 
in the constitutional domain, “through the emergence and the develop-
ment of the Nazi ideology”, which could be ascribed, according to him, 
not only “to a certain Adolph Hitler and the situation in Germany”, 
but “also to the existence of several factors in Western culture”. Natsir, 
as was his wont, quoted a European expert to support his argument—in 
this case it was Herman Rauschning—and pointed out that the most 
important of these factors had been “the carefree and irreverent attitude 
towards the rules of civilisation … and the setting aside of religion’s 
teachings.” 112 Th e decision to refer to a totalitarian ideology which 
had come to power through democratic elections was, naturally, not 
a fortuitous one. Natsir did not want to develop this point further, 
however, and it was once again Isa Anshary who voiced most clearly 
the problem posed by those Muslims with secularist aspirations.
 Striking a much more religious note than Natsir, Isa Anshary 
expressed his surprise at having to “confront the Muslim community 
itself, that is to say the men who admit to being Muslim but who 
refuse Islamic law”:
Why, at a time when we are reading and remembering the divine 
revelation which commands us to … found our state and our society 
on the principles of Islamic law, why do a part of our brothers in 
the faith turn away from this call and from their conscience? 113
Th is turbulent fi gure from West Java then went on to quote the 
Koran to denounce the true nature of those unworthy Muslims 114 
112 Ibid., p. 122.
113 Tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, vol. 2, pp. 196–7.
114 “But the hypocrites say, ‘We have believed in Allah and in the Messenger, and 
we obey’; then a party of them turns away after that. And those are not believers. 
And when they are called to [the words of ] Allah and His Messenger to judge be-
tween them, at once a party of them turns aside [in refusal].” Koran (III, 47–48.)
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before, a little later in his speech, warning them that God’s wrath 
was imminent.115 As for the consequences for Indonesia if the nation’s 
deputies—the majority of whom were Muslim—refused defi nitively to 
fulfi l their religious duties, Isa Anshary remained ambivalent. However, 
his espousal of djihad fi  sabililla, which in this instance was clearly 
intended to mean an armed struggle, and the ambiguity of his declara-
tion that “for the safeguard of the mother country, the only way to 
guarantee the security of the state and the nation’s vigilance would be 
for the Republic of Indonesia to adopt Islam as its ideological founda-
tion”, seemed loaded with menace.116 Th ere was only one short step 
from the glorifi cation of the defence of an Islamic state to the exaltation 
of an armed struggle to establish such a state. Although Isa Anshary 
refrained from taking this step, he nonetheless fi nished his address by 
stating “honestly and sincerely … that the seemingly endless problem 
of Darul Islam promoted by Kartosuwirjo, Daud Beureu’eh and Kahar 
Muzakkar could only be solved if the Constituent Assembly adopted 
Islam as the foundation stone of the state.” 117 Th ese comments allow 
one to appreciate the distance travelled by Masyumi since the party’s 
fi rm condemnations of Darul Islam during the run-up to the election; 
Kartosuwirjo’s movement, which had long been a millstone around the 
party’s neck, now constituted an argument in favour of an Islamic state.
 Another representative of the most intransigent wing of Masyumi 
who had now been given carte blanche to speak out on behalf of the 
entire party was Kasman Singodimedjo. He also referred to the Koran118 
to deny Muslims any latitude in their choice of institutions.
115 “Indeed, those who disbelieve in Allah and His messengers and wish to dis-
criminate between Allah and His messengers and say, “We believe in some and 
disbelieve in others”, and wish to adopt a way in between—Th ose are the dis-
believers, truly. And we have prepared for the disbelievers a humiliating punish-
ment.” Koran (III, 150–151).
116 Tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, vol. 2, p. 205.
117 Ibid.
118 Not all of the rules laid down by Masyumi’s leaders were inspired by the Holy 
Book. Some of them, although they were not based on any particular source, 
seemed to brook no discussion. Th is was the case with the rule decreed by Isa 
Anshary to disqualify any secular intepretation of nationalism: “Islam would not 
recognise a nationalist movement or a nationalist doctrine if it was to be used to 
fi ght against Allah’s laws on the pretext of protecting the unity of the nation.” 
Ibid., p. 211.
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O you who have believed, obey Allah [the Koran] and obey the 
Messenger [Hadiths] and those in authority among you. And if you 
disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you 
should believe in Allah and the Last Day. Th at is the best way and 
best result.119
For Kasman, the meaning of the verse was clear. Th e parallel drawn 
between the terms “believers” and “those amongst you” indicated “with 
certainty the obligation for believers to hold governmental power in 
order to guarantee the realisation of the word of God (Koran) and 
of the Prophet (Hadiths).” 120 Man’s freedom to choose remained none-
theless at a much earlier stage. Man could “choose his religion, he does 
so freely for it was what God wanted but if he becomes a Muslim, 
then he must carry out what his faith commands.” Th e Muslim com-
munity therefore, had to “put Islam into practice 100% in Indonesia”. 
It was an “order from God” whom “we fear even more than our fellow 
man, whether he hold power or not, in Indonesia and/or throughout 
the world.” 121
Th e Shura against Democracy
Given that no earthly authority, even one whose legitimacy had been 
conferred by universal suff rage, could go against an obligation defi ned 
by divine will, the Constituent Assembly’s remit seemed markedly 
restricted. One question remained, however: what gave Masyumi repre-
sentatives the legitimacy to be able to declare themselves the sole inter-
preters of the divine will? Most of them did not provide any clarifi ca-
tion on this point; they presented their interpretation of Koranic rules 
as self-evident without feeling the need to justify their authority to 
decree what constituted an immutable principle and what corresponded 
to an adaptable norm. 
 Th e only ones to venture an attempt at such a justifi cation were 
the more hard-line supporters within the party. Isa Anshary and 
119 Koran (IV, 59). Th e references to the Koran and the Hadiths in square brackets 
do not appear in the original verse, but correspond to Kasman’s interpretations.
120 Tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, vol. 1, p. 175.
121 Ibid., p. 176. Kasman reminded his audience, shortly before, that if God had 
wanted to convert all of humanity to Islam, he would have had no diffi  culty in 
doing so, but that he had chosen to leave man free to convert or not.
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Kasman Singomdimedjo both invoked the authority of organisations 
presented as being representative of the Indonesian Muslim community, 
although by doing so they unwittingly brought their conception of 
democracy closer to that held by their worst enemy. In order to justify 
the ban which, according to him, existed against Muslims joining orga-
nisations claiming to be communist, Isa Anshary referred to a long 
list of documents which he published along with his speech as an 
appendix.122 Kasman Singodimedjo chose to refer in his speech to the 
programme published by the Joint Movement Against Communism 
(Gerakan Bersama Anti-komunisme) in Bukittinggi in October 1957.123 
 Th e fact that the two men used a variety of sources to illustrate 
their points was without doubt not a coincidence. It illustrated their 
desire to refer not to one single authority, such as an assembly of 
ulamas who were qualifi ed to identify and interpret the divine norm, 
but to a consensus agreed upon by several bodies supposed to represent 
the Muslim community. Th is procedure, which was designed to circum-
vent a strict application of the democratic principle, was indicative of a 
shift in the interpretation of the meaning of the term shura (religious 
consensus). Previously, Masyumi’s theorists’ reading of this notion was 
consistent with the classic reformist approach, which used shura to prove 
the existence of a democratic ideal in Islam by likening it to uni-
versal suff rage, the foundation stone of popular sovereignty. Th e various 
declarations which we have just studied show that this notion now 
appeared to have been markedly diluted to a much narrower meaning. 
Th e right to participate in the emergence of this consensus was now 
122 A fatwa issued by the ulamas of Makasar in Sulawesi on 8 June 1954; a reso-
lution voted by the Front Pembela Islam in Makasar which united all the Muslim 
parties and organisations in the region; two texts published in 1932 by the 
Al-Azhar University on “the cruelty of Russia towards the Muslim community” 
and on communism in general; testimony provided by a representative of the 
Turkestani people at the Asia-Afrika Conference in Bandung illustrating the 
“murderous terror of communism”; a declaration by Masyumi’s West Java branch 
announcing the creation of its Anti-Communist Front in October 1954; a fatwa 
issued by Persatuan Islam’s ulamas in 1954 on the role of Muslims in the estab-
lishment of an Islamic state; a fatwa issued by Masyumi’s religious council on 
communism issued at the Sixth Congress in Surabaya in December 1954; and 
the resolution voted by the Indonesian Congress of Ulamas held in Palembang 
in September 1957 demanding the outlawing of the PKI. Tentang dasar negara 
Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, vol. 2, pp. 248–96.
123 Tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, vol. 1, p. 187.
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confi ned to those Muslims who were aware of their obligations towards 
God. Th ose faithful who had neglected the teachings of their religion—
namely the supporters of Pancasila—had no choice but to comply with 
this, and the enemies of God—the communists—had to disappear. 
After more than two years of heated debate in the Assembly in 
Bandung, the proposition defi ning an Islamic state could be summed 
up in the form of a syllogism: the only Muslims who were capable 
of identifying the Islamic principles to be applied were those who re-
spected those same principles.
 Th e Constituent Assembly announced for Masyumi, then, the end 
of a period which had begun in 1945. In November of that year, 
the representatives of political Islam had accepted, in response to the 
challenge laid down by Sukarno the previous June, to form a party 
ready to take part in elections. Th e arguments which they developed in 
Bandung were for the most part the same as those used by their pre-
decessors in the KNIP. When it had become clear that it would now 
be impossible to draw up a new constitution, the fi nal debates in 
the Assembly began to sound like the echo of the discussions held 
12 years previously. Masyumi’s deputies, as well as the rest of Islam’s 
representatives, declared themselves ready to accept a return to the 
1945 Constitution, on condition that the Jakarta Charter would be in-
cluded in the preamble, as was initially intended.124 Th e term “Islamic 
democracy” once again took on the meaning it had in the fi rst months 
of 1945, namely a regime in which the exercise of political freedom 
had to be oriented towards the accomplishment of an Islamic ideal.
A Collective Failure: Limited Democracy versus Guided 
Democracy
To only examine Masyumi’s demands concerning the new constitution 
would run the risk of shouldering it with all the blame for the failings 
of the Constituent Assembly, when in fact the party does not bear full 
responsibility. In reality, the failure of the Assembly to reach a con-
sensus and the resultant involuntary sabotaging of Indonesian demo-
cracy was caused collectively. As we have already seen, the head of 
state’s denunciation of a Western-style parliamentary democracy, and 
the elaboration of his programme for Guided Democracy were not 
124 Nasution, Th e Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia, pp. 104–6.
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the consequence of the Constituent Assembly’s inability to draw up a 
constitution.125 Sukarno’s proposals were made offi  cially on 21 February 
1957, but they were merely the logical conclusion of what had already 
been alluded to in his speeches given on 28 and 30 October 1956, 
two weeks before proceedings in the Assembly began. From the outset, 
then, the Assembly’s deputies were aware of the president’s intentions. 
 What is fascinating about Sukarno’s political programme was the 
parallels which could be drawn between it and Masyumi’s. Just as their 
respective arguments in the run-up to the election on the necessity 
to give substance to Pancasila had far more points in common than 
either of them wished to admit, the doctrine behind the programmes 
they proposed from 1957 onwards was based on the same observations 
and the same logic. For both the president and Masyumi’s theorists, 
the Indonesian people had shown, during the previous elections, their 
inability to adopt the modus operandi of a full-fl edged democracy. Th e 
Indonesian nation, which was divided by movements with divergent 
aspirations and which was in danger of breaking up, had become 
incapable of providing itself with a coherent ideology and a collective 
structure capable of implementing it. What the president and Masyumi 
both proposed—each in their own diff erent way—was to take on the 
diffi  cult mission of imposing a narrow framework within which the 
ideals of the nation’s various constituent groups could be voiced. In 
both cases, this was to be done in the name of values which were con-
sidered superior to democracy—Islam for Masyumi, national cohesion 
for Sukarno. What was most striking, however, in the fi nal showdown 
between Masyumi and Sukarno was not the similarity between their 
proposals, but rather the incoherence of the Muslim party’s overall 
strategy. Masyumi fi gures—foremost amongst them Natsir—were capa-
ble of simultaneously developing two contradictory lines of argument 
in order to rebut Sukarno’s proposals. While within the Constituent 
Assembly they claimed to be ready to go along with Sukarno’s pro-
gramme to bury democracy, outside it on the other hand, and in parti-
cular in the Legislative Assembly where all of Masyumi’s leading fi gures 
had a seat, they posed as the fi ercest defenders of the very same con-
cept. Th is Janus of Indonesian politics appeared, once again, as the 
conjunction of two confl icting traditions.
125 See supra, Chapter 4.
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 Th e desire on the part of the Muslim parties to present a united 
front in Bandung was no doubt conducive to Masyumi’s intransigence. 
Th e alliance of those supporting a state founded on the principles of 
Islam was established around a hard-line position, built upon a certain 
amount of one-upmanship between Muslim leaders, and consolidated 
by the opposition’s cohesion. Th e attitude of Nahdlatul Ulama played 
an important role in this regard. Th e traditionalist party, thanks to its 
ideological fl exibility but also the ties which it had established with 
nationalist leaders, seemed to be in the best position to attempt to 
bring the two movements together.126 Moreover, one of its slogans 
during the election campaign was: “support for the ideals of a collabo-
ration between Islam and Nationalism” (Pendukung Cita-Cita kerjasama 
Islam-Nasional ).127
 Th e political ideology of Nahdlatul Ulama was based upon the 
Islamic jurisprudence which had been developed over the space of fi ve 
centuries by the great jurists of the Sunni school.128 One of the essen-
tial elements of this doctrine was the very strong link established 
between order and piety. Only a stable regime, even if it was an unfair 
one, could guarantee the proper application of Islamic laws. Th is was 
summed up in the maxim, “a year of tyranny is better than a week 
of anarchy”. Th is principle inspired the two ideas around which NU 
organised its participation in Indonesian political life. Th e fi rst of these, 
known as maslahat, meaning useful or benefi cial, was to guide ulamas 
in their political choices: any decision had to be the result of weighing 
up the benefi t (manfaat) which one could calculate it to give and the 
wrong (mafsadah) which one feared it to bring. Th e second principle, 
called Amar ma’ruf nahi mungkar—meaning “the preservation of good 
and the hunting down of evil”—was taken from verse 104 of the Al-
Imran Surah.129 Following the tradition of their illustrious predecessors 
126 Andrée Feillard, Islam et armée dans l’Indonésie contemporaine: Les pionniers de 
la tradition, Cahier d’Archipel 28 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995), pp. 47–8.
127 Gregory John Fealy, “Ulama and Politics in Indonesia: A Political History of 
Nahdlatul Ulama, 1952–1967”, PhD diss., Monash University, 1998, Chapter 2, 
“Religio-Political Th ought”.
128 Principally, al-Baqillani (950–1013), al Baghdadi (d. 1037), al-Mawardi (974–
1058), al-Ghazali (1058–1111), Ibn Taimiyya (d. 1328); Ibn Jama’a (d. 1333) and 
Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406).
129 “And let there be [arising] from you a nation inviting to [all that is] good, 
enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong, and those will be the suc-
cessful.” Koran (III, 104).
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during the Abbasid Caliphate, the NU leaders drew from these pre-
cepts a form of political quietism which allowed them on several occa-
sions to collaborate with nationalists. 
 According to Greg Fealy, NU had two objectives during its parti-
cipation in the debates over the country’s institutions. Firstly, to allow 
the broadest possible application of Islamic law in the country’s sub-
stantive law—for matters such as marriages, inheritance and the pay-
ment and use of the zakat—and secondly, to guarantee Muslims the 
best possible conditions for the exercise of their religious obligations—
employment law needed to be adapted to allow prayer and fasting 
during Ramadan, for example. Th e constitutional recognition of the 
Islamic character of the state, on the other hand, appeared secondary 
to NU, and unlike Masyumi, it would have been ready to fi nd a com-
promise on that issue with the nationalists. However, the declarations 
of NU’s representatives in the Assembly did not indicate any conces-
sionary attitude. Rowing back from their previously conciliatory atti-
tude towards Pancasila, the traditionalists refused its adoption as the 
foundation stone of the new Constitution. Th ey feared in particular 
that the vague nature of the fi rst principle—the belief in one supreme 
God—would turn out to be a thin edge of the wedge which the Java-
nese mystical movements (kebatinan) would drive home to demand 
their own offi  cial recognition.130
 In some respects, the traditionalist party’s institutional programme 
seemed far more comprehensive than its reformist rival’s. As one of 
NU’s representatives Ahmad Zaini pointed out in his speech, their legal 
corpus was signifi cantly broader, integrating as well as the Koran and 
the Hadiths which were to serve as the foundations to the consti-
tution and to the country’s organic laws, all the Sunni jurisprudence 
(ilmu fi qh) containing most of what would constitute the country’s 
substantive laws as well as their principles of application.131 More im-
portantly, Nahdlatul Ulama, unlike Masyumi, had solved without diffi  -
culty the thorny problem of arbitrating between the divine norm and 
the democratic norm. Its programme clearly envisaged the presence of 
ulamas within an upper chamber charged with verifying the laws voted 
by the lower chamber to ensure their conformity with what Islamic 
130 Feillard, Islam et armée dans l’Indonésie contemporaine, pp. 51–2.
131 Nasution, Th e Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia, pp. 85–6.
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law prescribed.132 During the debate on Dasar Negara, one of the 
Nahdlatul Ulama deputies, Ahjak Sostrosugondo, pointed out the con-
tradiction between divine sovereignty and popular sovereignty. For 
him, the belief in God which was written into Pancasila should lead 
to the recognition by all Indonesian citizens of divine sovereignty. He 
went on to explain that in actual fact, however, an atheistic ideology—
communism—had developed in Indonesia by hiding behind the prin-
ciple of popular sovereignty—a principle according to which anyone 
was entitled to express their opinion, and could freely deny the exis-
tence of God. From this, then, Ahjak Sostrosugondo drew the logical 
conclusion that popular sovereignty was incompatible with faith in 
God.133 Far from playing the moderating role that one might have 
expected, the representatives of Nahdlatul Ulama exacerbated the in-
transigence of the “blok Islam” in the Constituent Assembly. While the 
limitation of democracy envisaged by Masyumi could be appreciated 
more in their attitude during the debates than in their speeches to 
the Assembly, Nadhlatul Ulama’s members’ view on this question was 
unambiguously clear.
 If we look now at the positions adopted by the various Islamic 
organisations, Masyumi’s stance appears to be a relatively moderate one. 
Th e sole representative of the Sudanese Election Movement (Gerakan 
Pilihan Sunda, Gerpis), a Muslim groupuscule from West Java, de-
manded in his speech the recognition of “mosques as centres of state 
power”.134 Th e Masyumi leadership was clearly also prone to such one-
upmanship, especially seeing as it was sometimes carried out by orga-
nisations which were affi  liated to it. One of the party hardliners, Isa 
Anshary, for example, who was a Masyumi deputy as well as a repre-
sentative of Persatuan Islam within Masyumi, used this dual status 
adroitly. Quoting a manifesto which had been adopted shortly before 
by Persatuan Islam, he reminded his friends that “the representatives 
of the Muslim community in the Constituent Assembly … would not 
accept their responsibility before God and before the court of history” 
132 Fealy, “Ulama and Politics in Indonesia”. It intended to establish a senate 
composed of regional representatives, although the exact nature of how they 
would uphold the Constitution was not specifi ed.
133 Nasution, Th e Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia, pp. 111–2.
134 Ibid.
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if they accepted “whether voluntarily or under duress” a constitution 
“which is not founded upon Islam (i.e. the Koran and the Sunnah).” 135 
It should be pointed out, however, that not all of those who spoke on 
behalf of Masyumi succumbed to the temptations of such an unyielding 
position. Mohammad Sardjan, for example, reiterated the stance taken 
by the party throughout the election campaign, and refused to enter 
into a debate aimed at defi ning an Islamic democracy which was op-
posed to the nationalists’ model or the Western version of popular 
sovereignty. For him, “democracy, like chemistry, knows no frontiers”; 
its principles were universal and foremost amongst these were the re-
spect for the individual’s fundamental freedoms and multi-partyism.136
 On the whole, the Bandung Assembly was anything but the “island 
lost in the middle of choppy waters” which Mohammad Natsir had 
described. Here, as elsewhere, the formulation of Masyumi doctrine 
was subject to both the contingencies of the day and the rules imposed 
by an intractable two-sided confrontation. Th e speeches made by the 
party’s leaders sometimes sketch the outline of the theistic democracy 
which embodied their cause, but more often than not, they leave us 
with more questions than answers. Masyumi’s theorists never reached 
an agreement, for example, on the defi nition of an Islamic state; it was 
a question on which there were two often divergent points of view 
which converged only from time to time. Th e fi rst theory was the most 
formalistic one; it followed the tradition of Masyumi’s revolutionary 
heritage and one could defi ne it using the words of H.M. Saleh Suaidy 
who, at the 1949 congress, described it as “a state in which the state 
itself implements the laws of Islam for all aff airs and all problems.” 137 
Th is vision of an Islamic state was defended within the party’s leader-
ship by a minority group whose main spokesman was Isa Anshary. It 
off ered Masyumi activists a clearly identifi ed objective, which would be 
achieved “when [within the state] the guarantee of a religious way of 
life and the application of Islamic law [was] affi  rmed.” 138 Th e second 
conception of an Islamic state was inspired by Mohammad Natsir, for 
whom this notion referred more to a process than a result. For him, a 
country like Indonesia, which already recognised the belief in a single 
135 Tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante, vol. 2, p. 202.
136 Nasution, Th e Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia, p. 114.
137 Kongres Muslimin Indonesia, 20–25 Desember 1949 di Jogjakarta.
138 Anshary, Falsafah Perjuangan Islam, pp. 207–8.
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God, could automatically be considered as an Islamic state. Nonethe-
less, the Muslim community could not be satisfi ed with this label and 
had to strive, both in political life and in society, to put the teachings 
of Islam into practice.
 Given these divergent defi nitions, it is easy to understand the 
unifying role of the notion of a “state founded on Islam” (Negara yang 
berdasar Islam) which was retained in the various offi  cial party docu-
ments. It avoided the party having to agree on a precise defi nition of 
their aspirations, and this ambivalence allowed it to be adaptable to the 
changes in the party’s demands. A broad interpretation of this notion 
allowed it to serve as the basis of a very open electoral programme 
capable of appealing to the “statistical Muslims”; a narrow interpreta-
tion could justify the party’s intransigence at the Constituent Assembly 
when it called vociferously for the formal recognition of Islam by the 
state. Th is second, more radical, attitude owed a lot to the political 
circumstances of the day. It turned out to be in contradiction with 
the Masyumi network’s painstaking work, undertaken for more than 
ten years with the intention of bringing into existence the ideal of an 
Islamic society in Indonesia.
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chapter  s i x
Th e Ideal of an Islamic Society
Masyumi was not a typical political party in the sense that its aim was not solely to gain power in order to implement Islam’s 
values from above. It laid out a vision for society, but it also wanted 
to realise this vision through the organisations which were affi  liated to 
it. In this sense, it was not so much the country’s dominant party as 
it was a social movement. Th e vagueness of its programmes and the 
absence of a shadow cabinet contrasted with the scale of the activities 
carried out by its social assistance network. Th is project for Islamisation 
from below was a parallel activity which was not in competition with 
the party’s political objectives; both branches of the party suff ered from 
the same contradictions, however.
Th e Masyumi Network and How It Operated
Masyumi was a lot more than a simple political party; it was a vast 
network whose ramifi cations were diffi  cult to apprehend completely. 
Th is was due partly to its organisational structure, which gathered 
under one umbrella both individual members and numerous Muslim 
associations. In addition, Masyumi exercised direct control over the 
various organisations charged with providing social infrastructure to the 
Muslim community, including militia groups and unions. Finally, the 
party brought its infl uence to bear over most of the initiatives under-
taken in the name of Islam.
A Family Portrait: Th e Th ree Circles of the Keluarga 
Masyumi
Founded by the representatives of the main Islamic organisations in 
Indonesia who carried on the torch lit by the Japanese when they 
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founded the Muslim Consultative Council, Masyumi was originally 
more of a community-based organisation than a political party. Islam’s 
representatives, as we have already noted, entered the political arena 
reluctantly, and the decision by the Provisional Assembly to authorise 
political parties had been severely criticised by the party. Th e Muslim 
leaders’ political culture and the spirit of unity which had characterised 
the revolutionary period did not dispose the party to accepting a multi-
partite system. It was not suited to debating ideas and taking part in 
verbal battles whose outcome was decided upon by a vote. However, as 
they could not just stand by and passively observe the reorganisation 
of public life, they were obliged to provide themselves with the poli-
tical machinery which would allow them to make their voice heard. 
Until 1949, Masyumi’s organisational structure was marked by the 
circumstances in which the party had originated when it was only one 
element in a vast network designed to provide social structures for the 
entire Muslim community.
A Federative Structure
Th e community-based nature of the party could best be seen in the 
party’s two types of members. Th e party’s statutes ( Anggaran Dasar, AD) 
stipulated that there were to be ordinary members (anggauta biasa), 
composed of Indonesian citizens belonging to the Muslim faith; and 
extraordinary members (anggauta istimewa), comprising Islamic orga-
nisations ( perkoeempoelan2 Islam). Th e party rules ( Anggaran Roemah 
Tangga, ART) stated, however, that only ordinary members had the right 
to vote. Th e organisations could only voice an opinion (timbangan), 
though in order to allow this, the executive committee was supposed 
to organise consultative meetings “whenever necessary”.1
 Th e role of the constituent organisations was also recognised in 
the dual structure of the party leadership. “Next to” (disamping) the 
executive committee, the party statutes provided for a Consultative 
Council or Party Council (Madjelis Sjoero or Dewan Partai) which, as 
well as being composed of a chairman and three vice-chairmen, in-
cluded “ulamas and Muslim fi gures representing the associations and 
1 Anggaran Dasar, Articles IVa and IVb. Anggaran Roemah Tangga, Articles Va, Vb, 
VIc, ibid., pp. 12–5.
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movements which the Indonesian Muslim community is made up of.” 2 
Th is council was initially conceived as a sort of body which would 
lend credibility to the strictly political side of the organisation. It had 
a large remit: it was charged with “voicing opinions and fatwas for the 
intention of the leadership whenever it was deemed necessary.” 3 Th e 
two main founding organisations, the Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul 
Ulama, participated actively in this council, and between them they 
divided up the positions of chairman (K.H. Hasjim from NU) and the 
vice-chairman (K.H.A. Wahid from NU; and Ki Bagus Hadikusumo 
and Kasman Singodimedjo from Muhammadiyah). Th e two other 
Islamic associations which had joined Masyumi at its foundation, the 
Pekikatan Umat Islam and the Persatuan Umat Islam, were each simply 
given a seat as an extraordinary member. Most of the positions within 
the executive committee (Pengurus Besar), however, were reserved for 
those who had been active during the pre-war years in political parties, 
notably in the PII and the PSII. Amongst the 10 executive committee 
members endowed with specifi c roles, such as that of president, vice 
president, treasurer and spokesperson, Muhammadiyah only had two 
representatives and Nahdlatul Ulama only had one.4
 Finally, Masyumis’s extraordinary members were also able to use 
the party congress as another way of bringing their infl uence to bear 
on the party. Th e congress constituted the party’s supreme authority: 
it had to be held every two years to determine the party’s policy, and 
every four years it voted on the leadership of the party. Th e congress 
was composed of representatives from diff erent party branches but also 
of delegates from the constituent organisations.5
 Th e composition of the party’s central leadership remained the 
same until 1952, at which point it was modifi ed to ease the tensions 
which had arisen from the new balance of power between the members 
2 “… beberapa Alim-Oelama serta pemoeka-pemoeka islam jang meroepakan per-
wakilan dari perkoempoelan-perkoempoelan dan aliran-aliran jang terdapat dalam 
kalangan Oemmat Islam Indonesia.” Anggaran Dasar, IVb.
3 “Memberi pertimbangan dan fatwa kepada Pimpinan setiap waktoe dianggap 
perloe.” Anggaran Dasar V.B.
4 Th ese two groups were better represented, however, amongst the 10 members of 
the executive committee who did not have a specifi c role. Six of them belonged 
to Muhammadiyah or NU.
5 Anggaran Dasar, 1945, Article V.
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of the executive committee and the representatives of religious orga-
nisations. At this time, a new legislative body called the Party Council 
(Dewan Partai) was created to hold supreme authority within the party 
between congresses.6 It was composed of members of the executive 
committee—now known as the Pimpinan Partai—three representatives 
elected by each regional branch, two delegates appointed by each con-
stituent organisation, three Masyumi parliamentary deputies and two 
members of each special organisation (badan chusus).7 Th e council had 
to assemble at least once a year, either at the invitation of the executive 
committee or at the request of a third of the party members.
 From its outset, the party benefi tted from its widespread presence 
throughout the country. Th is was initially thanks to Muhammadiyah, 
which was fi rmly established in the country’s most populous regions, 
but also to Nahdlatul Ulama which was well-implanted across Java. 
As other Muslim organisations joined Masyumi, this network spread 
further to include Persatuan Islam of Western Java, Persatuan Ulama 
Seluruh Aceh, Al-Jamiyatul Wasliyah and Al-Ittihadiyah of Northern 
Sumatra, Mathla’ul Anwar of the Banten region (West Java), Nahdlatul 
Wathan of Lombok, and fi nally the Al-Irsyad movement, which had 
been revived by Indonesia’s Arab community. Th e party, naturally 
enough, adopted a nationwide structure which mirrored the state’s 
administrative divisions. Each region—known as karesidenan, following 
the terminology inherited from the Dutch—was given its own leader-
ship ( pimpinan daerah) which, because of its role as representative of 
the party’s central leadership, was also called Kommissariat Pengoeroes 
Besar. Th is body was elected by diff erent branches (cabang) within each 
region, with every district electing one representative. Every sub-district 
(keasistenan) formed a sub-branch (anak-cabang), and an offi  ce (ranting) 
was opened in every village.8 In December 1949, when the new ad-
ministrative divisions were drawn up, Masyumi revamped its party 
structure. Th e regions, which had been transformed into provinces, 
were now under the responsibility of a new authority called wilajah —
6 It adopted the role previously played by the Religious Council (Madjelis Sjuro).
7 Anggaran Dasar, 1952, Article X. As well as these members, the party statutes 
adopted in 1956 added the presidents of each regional branch (ketua wilajah), 
all of the party’s parliamentary deputies and two representatives from the Central 
Religious Council (Madjelis Sjuro Pusat).
8 Anggaran Roemah Tangga, 1945, Article I.
Chap6 (348-408).indd   351 8/14/15   5:40:50 PM
352 Islam and Politics in Indonesia
meaning zone or region—while the party’s other subdivisions retained 
their original names.
Masyumi’s Special Organisations (Badan Chusus)
Masyumi refl ected a desire to provide structures for the entire Muslim 
community, and it presided over the birth of several organisations, 
sometimes termed “autonomous” (badan otonoom), whose role was to 
take charge of various sectors of society.
Muslim women of Masyumi
Muslimat—sometimes spelled Muslimaat—was founded at the same 
time as Masyumi on 7 November 1945. In accordance with the rules 
of Islam concerning the separation of the sexes, it constituted Mas-
yumi’s female counterpart. Its offi  cial name was “Muslim Women of 
Masyumi” (Masjumi Muslimat). Th e fi rst role given to this organisation 
was to off er women the possibility of becoming party activists. Th e new 
Masyumi statutes adopted in 1952 mentioned explicitly, in Article 1, 
that it was open to the so-called weaker sex, but envisaged, in Article 
13, that female members would dispose of their own organisation and 
leadership. Muslimat had identical goals (azas dan tidjuan) to its male 
counterpart, namely “ensuring the sovereignty of Islam as well as of 
the country and implementing the principles of Islam in the state.” 9 
On top of that, the organisation had set itself some specifi c goals to ac-
complish, such as “leading women from all social categories, including 
workers and peasants, to an awareness that they belong to the nation 
and to the state as well as to Islam”; “instilling [in them] a feeling 
of responsibility and an awareness of their own value (rasa turut ber-
tanggung djawab dan sadar atas harga diri pribadi ) as members of the 
nation (bangsa) and as members of womankind (sexe-bewust). Like the 
other special organisations within Masyumi, such as unions and youth 
movements, the Muslimat played an important role in providing the 
Muslim community with structures and in raising their awareness. 
 Muslimat had a dual mission, namely to help its members to 
think and act not just as women, but also as Muslim women. Th ese 
9 “Menegakkan kedaulatan negara dan agama Islam; melaksanakan tjita-tjita Islam 
dalam kenegaraan.” Muslimat’s statutes can be found in H. Aboebakar, ed., 
Sedjarah Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim dan karangan tersiar (Jakarta, 1957), pp. 
423–4.
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two goals were not to be separated, but certain resolutions adopted 
during the foundation of the organisation emphasised the desire for 
emancipation—the resolution to encourage the election of women to 
Parliament and to regional assemblies, for example—while others in-
sisted more on the need to be faithful to their religious identity, such 
as the resolution to campaign for legislation on marriage which would 
be in compliance with the teachings of Islam. Th e Muslimat organi-
gram copied Masyumi’s: it disposed of sections in villages and it was 
represented at the party congress by its own delegates sent by the 
local branches—one in ten delegates sent by the branches was to be 
a woman—and by the regional branches—a quarter of the regional 
delegates had to be female.10 However, these representatives more often 
than not assembled in a “Muslimat Congress” held concomitantly with 
Masyumi’s congress. From 1949 onwards, the president of Muslimat 
was entitled to sit on Masyumi’s executive committee, and this right 
was extended in 1952 to the organisation’s vice president. 
 Th e independence of the woman’s organisation seemed reasonably 
signifi cant. During its congress in December 1949, for example, it 
decided to found its own “women’s party” ( partai wanita), called the 
Muslimat Party. In order to give more substance to its election pro-
gramme, Muslimat published, under its own name, a “struggle pro-
gramme” ( program perjuangan) as well as an urgency programme 
(urgensi program), whose content diff ered very little from Masyumi’s 
versions and which revealed a desire to take into consideration all of 
the nation’s problems, whether they be political, economic or social. 
Th is initiative, however, was not taken any further. Th ere appears to 
be no evidence that the Partai Muslimat presented a list during the 
local elections, and for the elections to the Legislative Assembly and 
the Constituent Assembly in 1955, the Muslimat candidates were in-
corporated into Masyumi’s list.
The Muslim youth movements
On 2 October 1945, at the Muslims’ House in Jakarta (Balai Muslimin 
Indonesia), a students’ hall of residence, a meeting was held between 
10 At the 1946 congress, for example, one in 10 of the representatives sent by 
local branches was a woman while the ratio was one in four for the regional 
branches. Al-Djihad, 4 February 1946. Th ese proportions varied very little at 
subsequent party congresses.
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Muslim leaders—K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim from Nahdlatul Ulama, Anwar 
Tjokroaminoto from the PSII and Mohammad Natsir—and young 
students from the Superior Institute for Islam (Sekolah Tinggi Islam) 
which had just opened its doors. It was during this meeting that the 
possibility of transforming the Japanese Masyumi into a new organisa-
tion was fi rst raised—a possibility which one month later became a 
reality. Th e participants decided there and then to create an Indonesian 
Muslim Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia, GPII), 
whose leaders were chosen from amongst the students present.11 Th e 
GPII embodied the youthful impetuosity which had played a signifi -
cant role in the fi rst months of the Indonesian Revolution, and in a 
certain sense, it paved the way for its elder counterparts in Masyumi. 
It was not until the Congress of Indonesian Muslims on 7 and 8 
November, however, that the new organisation’s statutes—quite a brief 
set of rules—were published. Th e aim of the Indonesian Muslim Youth 
Movement, like that of Masyumi and Muslimat, was to defend both 
Islam and the independence of Indonesia. Its missions (oesaha) was 
to “bring about the unity of Indonesia’s young Muslims in order to 
trumpet the word of Allah” and to “improve their understanding of 
the mechanisms of the state.” 12 Th e GPII wished to have as broad an 
appeal as possible and admitted to its ranks all those between the ages 
of 15 and 35. Although the organisation was open to both sexes, like 
Masyumi, the GPII quickly developed an organisation reserved for 
women: the GPII Puteri.
 Contrary to the declarations made by its leaders, the GPII was in 
fact closely associated with Masyumi.13 Its headquarters were located 
in the same premises as Masyumi, its statutes declared that it acted 
“under the authority of Masyumi,” 14 and like Muslimat, it sent its 
11 Aboebakar, ed., Sedjarah Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim dan karangan tersiar, pp. 
449–50; Lukman Hakiem, Perjalanan Mencari Keadilan dan Persatuan: Biografi 
Dr Anwar Harjono, S.H. (Jakarta: Media Da’wah, 1993), pp. 70–7; I.N. Soebagijo, 
Harsono Tjokroaminoto Mengikuti Sang Ayah (Jakarta: PT. Gunung Agung, 1985), 
pp. 82–3.
12 Anggaran Dasar GPII, Article 6.
13 See, in particular, the remarks made by Anwar Harjono to the eff ect that the 
GPII was not affi  liated to any party or any existing organisation. Hakiem, Biografi 
Anwar Harjono, p. 69. See also similar statements made by Ahmad Buchari 
during his trial. Supra, Chapter 3.
14 Anggaran Dasar, Article 5.
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own delegates to Masyumi’s congresses. It should also be pointed out 
that Harsono Tjokroaminoto, elected president of the GPII in October 
1945, was not re-elected to this position in November because he had 
just been appointed to the “youth section” (bagian pemuda) of Mas-
yumi’s executive committee along with Mh. Mawardi. Th ey, however, 
both entered the GPII’s new executive committee, chaired by R.A. 
Kasmat, as advisors. Th e dependant link between the youth movement 
and its elders in Masyumi was, then, clearly established in 1945, al-
though it did fade somewhat subsequently. From the beginning of 
the 1950s, the GPII organised its own congresses at diff erent dates 
to Masyumi’s, and the speeches pronounced on those occasions often 
emphasised the independence of the movement. In October 1953, for 
example, Dhalan Lukman, a member of the movement’s leadership, 
declared “the GPII is not a political party, it is an organisation which 
was founded autonomously and without interference.” 15 Th is desire 
for independence seemed, on the whole, to have received the blessing 
of the party leaders. It should be said, however, that it was a relatively 
mild desire, as the youth movement adopted resolutions which, for the 
most part, echoed those voted by its elders. 
 When deciding upon the attitude to adopt towards its “autono-
mous organisations” in general, and the GPII in particular, the party 
command was torn between two diff erent approaches. Th ey appreciated 
the large political rallies at which the entire “Masyumi family” assem-
bled, as they served the party’s aim of bringing as much infl uence as 
possible to bear on Indonesian political life.16 On the other hand, if 
the young activists in charge of the GPII appeared overly dependent 
on the political programme defi ned by their elders, they ran the risk 
of losing support. Th is was all the more likely given that there was 
stiff  competition at the time between the various youth movements. 
Th e Marxist movements showed themselves to be very active, and orga-
nised numerous events which were open to all organisations.17 Th ere 
were also several other Muslim youth groups looking for support 
from the young Muslims targeted by the GPII: PSII and particularly 
15 Abadi, 12 October 1953.
16 Th e congress in February 1946 in Surakata, for example.
17 GPII systematically denounced these initiatives.
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Nahdlatul Ulama had signifi cant youth movements. Finally, there were 
two other organisations close to Masyumi—the Indonesian Muslim 
Pupil (Peladjar Islam Indonesia, PII) and the Association of Muslim 
Students (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI)—who, in theory, both 
derived their membership from pupils and students but who, because 
they did not enforce their membership requirements strictly, also com-
peted with the GPII for followers.18
Militia groups
Th e holy war against Dutch colonial power played, as we have already 
seen, a crucial role in creating the unity necessary for the formation of 
the party.19 It also played an important role in the provision of social 
infrastructure by activist Islam. Th e Muslim party had inherited from 
the Japanese a powerful militia, the Hizboellah—meaning the Army of 
God—which was incorporated into the organisational structure of the 
“Masyumi family” at their congress in November 1945. Th e resolution 
passed at the time describing it as “the only place where young Muslims 
can take part in armed struggle” made Hizboellah the military wing of 
the GPII.20
 Th e issue of whether this militia would be subordinated to the 
party was never properly settled, however. Th e militia had in its favour 
the prestige established by their participation in the armed struggle 
over the previous several months. Th e political and religious elite who 
had just taken over control of the group could, at most, provide it 
with moral support and material assistance. Th e desire to do so gave 
rise to the formation of the Barisan Sabilillah: “troops in the path of 
God” who in theory were the “special sections” (barisan istimewa) of 
the regular Indonesian army (Tentara Kearman Rakjat), but who in 
18 Th e PII was founded during the Indonesian Muslim Congress of 1949.Th e 
HMI was founded in 1949 and saw itself as the inheritor of the Jong Islamieten 
Bond. Several of its members subsequently joined Masyumi, though the organisa-
tion never had offi  cial links with the party. Victor Tanja, Himpunan Mahasiswa 
Islam, sejarah dan kedudukannja di tengah gerakan-gerakan muslim pembaharu di 
Indonesia (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1991), pp. 52–4.
19 See supra Chapter 2.
20 “Satoe-satoenja lapangan Pemoeda Islam oentoek berdjoeang dalam ketenteran 
(kemilitéran).” Anggaran Dasar GPII, Masjoemi, Partai Politik Oemmat Islam 
Indonesia, p. 23.
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actual fact provided assistance to Hizboellah exclusively.21 According to 
the group’s statutes, membership of the Barisan Sabilillah was virtually 
automatic for any Muslim, and so all Masyumi members were consi-
dered to have joined this militia who, unlike Hizboellah, were clearly 
placed under the authority of the party.
The unions
Masyumi’s leaders admired greatly the community support systems pro-
vided by the communists, and they adopted their practice of affi  liating 
unions to their party. Four of Masyumi’s constituent organisations 
became involved, in the name of Islam, in the fi eld of labour relations.
 Historically, the fi rst union to rally behind Masyumi was Sarekat 
Dagang Islam Indonesia (SDII), the descendent of the prestigious 
organisation of the same name founded in 1912. Masyumi gradually 
took control of it over the course of 1946, and in January 1947, the 
party invited all the trade associations founded by party members to 
join SDII.22 Th is “special organisation” subsequently contributed very 
little to spreading the party’s social ideals. It never managed to redis-
cover its pre-war prestige, and Masyumi soon gave up its hopes of 
turning it into the main mouthpiece for the party’s economic policy. 
Masyumi’s press only very rarely reported on SDII’s activities and in 
the preparatory documents for the party’s seventh congress held in 
Bandung in 1956, the Union of Indonesian Islamic Traders no longer 
appeared on the list of the party’s special organisations.23 
 Th is falling out took place despite the links between the small 
business community and the santri. According to Deliar Noer, it was 
due to that community’s individualist mentality,24 but two explanations 
could also be added, which are in fact interrelated. Th e fi rst one is the 
historical links between the SDII and the Partai Sarekat Islam Indo-
nesia, which split from Masyumi in 1947; the second is the Masyumi 
21 A decision made by the Kongres Oemmat Islam Indonesia which took place in 
Yogakarta on 7 and 8 November 1945, in Masjumi, Partai Politik Islam Indonesia, 
p. 19.
22 Al-Djihad, 4 January 1947. A few months earlier, the Masyumi branch in 
Surakarta—the birthplace of the SDII—had announced the foundation of the 
Perikatan Dagang Muslimin Indonesia (PERDAMI). Al-Djihad, 18 October 1946.
23 Pimpinan Partai Masjumi, Muktamar Masjumi Ke VIII, 22–29 Desember 1956 
Di Bandung, p. 66.
24 Deliar Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafi ti, 
1987), p. 56.
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leaders’ desire to counter the infl uence of communists in the workplace 
by appealing to the working classes a goal that an organisation com-
prising mostly of small businessmen would clearly fi nd hard to achieve. 
Th e party could no longer maintain its pre-war elitist position; it now 
had to provide itself with mass movements which would be capable of 
appealing to the most modest social classes in society. Once the party 
was solidly established in the parts of the country controlled by the 
Republic, the leadership set about accomplishing this task.
 In November 1946, the Union of Indonesian Muslim Peasants 
(Sarekat Islam Tani Indonesia, STII) was founded. Its aims were both 
political—“to ensure the sovereignty of Indonesia and help Masyumi 
to incorporate the teachings of Islam into the state”—and social—“to 
promote the status of peasants in Indonesian society”.25 Th e union in-
tended to implement their policy by means of the creation of coopera-
tives, the organisation of training programmes on modern agricultural 
practices, tools and machinery as well as various measures designed to 
protect small landowners by combating problems such as loansharking, 
selling harvests at a loss and transferring land to foreigners.26 Th e STII 
was offi  cially charged with implementing Masyumi’s economic policy in 
the countryside, and initially its demands were quite broad in nature, 
calling for measures such as the stabilising of prices and the improve-
ment of the country’s transport infrastructure.27 It was only in the 
early 1950s that it focused on taking part in projects which specifi cally 
involved agricultural practices, such as the rice-harvesting programme, 
developed in conjunction with governmental bodies, and the creation 
of village cooperatives. However, it seems that the union’s achievements 
on the whole, as we will see later, fell considerably below the goals it 
set for itself.
 In November 1947, one year after the foundation of the STII, 
the Indonesian Muslim Workers Union (Sarekat Buruh Islam Indo-
nesia, SBII) was created on the initiative of Soekiman. Th is organisa-
tion’s main objective was to counter the growing infl uence of the All 
Indonesia Centre of Labour Organizations (Sentral Buruh Seluruh 
Indonesia, SOBSI), which was under the auspices of the Communist 
25 Anggaran Dasar STII, Articles I.b, I.a, II.1 and II.2. Berita Partai Masjumi, 
March 1950.
26 Ibid., Articles IIIa, b, c, d.
27 Al-Djihad, 6 November 1946.
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Party.28 Th e internal structure of the SBII was organised both according 
to the country’s geographical divisions and to its members’ sectors 
of activity. As with Masyumi, the union was divided into diff erent 
branches which corresponded to the country’s administrative divisions, 
but at the same time, within every local branch, members were divided 
up according to their sector of activity into a dozen diff erent sections, 
including civil servants, employees of the Ministry of Religions, trans-
portation industry, ports and the petrol industry.
 Th e last Masyumi trade union was created much later in May 
1945, when Mohammad Natsir inaugurated the Indonesian Islamic 
Fisherman’s Union (Sarekat Nelajan Islam Indonesia, SNII). As with 
the other unions affi  liated to Masyumi, its mission was twofold: “to 
accomplish/apply the teachings and the laws of Islam within the fi shing 
sector” and “to increase fi shermen’s standard of living” by “raising their 
level of education, improving their knowledge of fi shing techniques”, 
but also by “strengthening fi shermen’s attachment to their trade 
through the removal of any inferiority complex in relation to the rest 
of society.” 29
 Th e special organisations were part of the extended “Masyumi 
family”. Th ey were placed under the auspices of the party leadership 
and were supposed to pave the way for an ideal Islamic society which 
Muslim leaders wished to create. Th eir ability to garner political sup-
port was in theory considered to be incidental; their real role was to 
transform the sectors of society which they represented. Th ey were 
invited to participate in discussions on national issues, but above all, 
they were charged with developing awareness amongst the country’s 
Muslims of the values and rules of their religions. Th eir programmes 
and their achievements constituted a valuable indicator of the reality 
behind Masyumi’s policies.
28 I.N. Soebagijo, Jusuf Wibisono, Karang du Tengah Gelombang (Jakarta: Gunung 
Agung, 1980), p. 98. Iskandar Tedjasukmana, dates the creation of the SBII to 
1948, on the basis of an article written by its vice president M. Dalyono, Th e 
Political Character of the Indonesian Trade Union Movement (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1958), p. 45.
29 Pengurus Besar SNII, bagian penerangan, Anggaran-Dasar Serekat Nelajan Islam 
Indonesia, Article 2, 1955.
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Th e Muslim Network and Its Role
Masyumi’s infl uence was not limited to the type of associations and 
organisations which were clearly defi ned in its statutes. As well as the 
offi  cial ties that it established with a large number of the umma ’s sup-
port systems, more informal links were also made with diff erent com-
ponents of the country’s Muslim network. To describe or even to give 
an exhaustive list of the associations which, at one stage or another, 
had ties with Masyumi either on a local or national level, would be 
both diffi  cult and tedious. Th e Indonesian Muslim Congress (Kongres 
Muslimin Indonesia) held in Yogyakarta from 20 to 25 December 
1949 does however give one an idea of the extent and great diversity 
of this network.30 Masyumi clearly had a signifi cant infl uence in the 
organisation of this vast gathering. Not only was it held directly after 
the party’s fourth congress at the same venue, it was chaired by Wali 
al-Fatah, a member of the Masyumi leadership who was the party’s 
communications offi  cer, and its secretary general was H. Saleh Suaidy, 
a member of the Religious Council. 
 Th e undeclared intention of this vast gathering was to get the 
Muslim community to close ranks behind Masyumi, at a time when 
the country’s independence had just been formally recognised. Political 
Islam’s unity had been dented by the breakaway of the PSII two years 
previously, and at the recent Masyumi congress strong tensions had 
emerged between traditionalists and modernists. Th e Indonesian Muslim 
Congress was the fi rst sign of a new political strategy which Masyumi 
subsequently employed enthusiastically, namely that of using as large 
as possible a federation—regardless of how big or representative its 
constituent organisations were—as an instrument for the key features 
of the party’s policies. At the closure of the congress, its chairman, 
Wali al-Fatah was able to triumphantly announce the creation of a 
Committee of the Indonesian Muslim Congress (Badan Kongres Mus-
limin Indonesia, BKMI) which would be a “fortress of unity for the 
umma ”.31 Th is liaison committee assembled 129 associations, including 
30 Th is was the eighth Indonesian Muslim Congress. Th e previous congress had 
been organised in November 1945 and had given rise to the formation of 
Masyumi.
31 Badan Usaha dan Penerbitan Muslimin Indonesia, Kongres Muslimin Indonesia, 
20–29 Desember 1949 di Jogjakarta, p. 18.
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all of Masyumi’s special organisations and extraordinary members, with 
the notable exception of Nahdlatul Ulama.32 Alongside powerful orga-
nisations affi  liated to Masyumi, the committee contained such obscure 
associations as the Purwokerto Muslim Committee, the Tegal Ulama 
(Alim-Ulama Tegal), the Amuntai Charity Committee (Badan Pen-
jelenggara Amal Amuntai) and the Ambon Union of Muslim Workers 
(Persatuan Islam Buruh Ambon).33 Th e BKMI was headed by a general 
secretariat composed of Abdul Gaff ar Ismail, Anwar Harjono and 
Wali al-Fatah, all of whom were either current or future members of 
Masyumi.
 Th e 1949 Muslim Congress also decided to create more specialised 
organisations, including a Women’s Institute (Lembaga Kewanitaan) 
attached to the general secretariat and three youth organisations. Th e 
three youth organisations each had a diff erent goal: one was geared 
towards attracting pupils (the Peladjar Islam Indonesia), one was aimed 
at students (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia), while the third 
(Dewan Pemuda Islam Indonesia) was supposed to federate all Muslim 
youth movements. A Union of Muslim Teachers (Persatuan Guru Islam 
Indonesia) was also created, as was an Association of Muslim Journalists 
of Indonesia (Wartawan Muslimin Indonesia). Finally, the congress set 
up a “committee of experts for the publication of Muslim magazines 
and books”, responsible for organising the translation and publication 
of an unabridged Indonesian version of the Koran.34
 In the years that followed, the Badan Kongres Muslimin Indonesia 
did not give the impression of being particularly active. It was consi-
dered, in the words of HAMKA, to be “only a creature of Masyumi” 
(kuda-kuda Masjumi sadja) and it never managed to attract the PSII 
back into the extended Muslim family.35 Th is failure did not prevent 
the Masyumi leadership from founding other organisations designed to 
bring together Muslim associations. Th e party regularly tried to exploit 
the Muslim community’s outrage provoked by various political spats. 
In 1953, in an attempt to make political capital out of the various 
32 NU’s youth organisation, Anshor, was part of the committee, however.
33 Badan Usaha dan Penerbitan Muslimin Indonesia, Kongres Muslimin Indonesia, 
20–29 Desember 1949 di Jogjakarta, pp. 112–5.
34 “Menjusun dan menerbitkan terdjamahan Quran jang lengkap dengan bahasa 
Indonesia.” Ibid., pp. 89–92.
35 Hikmah, 26 September 1953.
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instances of “insults to Islam”, Masyumi tried to re-establish the unity 
that had been lost with the revival of Nahdlatul Ulama and the break-
away movement’s participation in the Ali government by attempting 
on several occasions to bring Muslim associations under one umbrella, 
both at a local 36 and national level.37
Th e Lame Duck of Indonesian Politics: 38 Th e Limits of 
Community-Based Politics
Masyumi grew rapidly during the fi rst years of the Revolution, a period 
which lent itself to rather chaotic ways of functioning. For the party, 
the end of 1945 and the early months of 1946 constituted a genuine 
moment of euphoria. Taking advantage of the organisational structures 
inherited from Japanese Masyumi, and also the very strong feeling 
of unity which had emerged within the Islamic community after the 
Muslim Congress of November 1945, the Masyumi leadership set up a 
series of local party branches. Th e party’s press often published trium-
phalist communiqués, such as the one published on 26 January 
1946 in Al-Djihad, which proclaimed that in the region of Cirebon, 
Masyumi was going to set up fi ve branches, 64 sub-branches and 985 
village sections, thus covering the entire region’s localities. Two weeks 
later, it was the turn of the regional leadership in Madiun to announce 
grandiose projects for the party’s development. Th is attempt by the 
diff erent regional leaderships to outdo one another by making eye-
catching declarations means that it is diffi  cult to determine with any 
36 Amongst the organisations created were the Umma Action Union (Kesatuan 
Aksi Ummat Islam) established in Yogyakarta also; and fi nally a Consultation 
Council for the Muslim Community (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Ummat Islam) 
in Bandung; and the Union of Muslim Troops (Kesatuan Barisan Islam) in Yogya-
karta between the HMI and the Association of Muslim War Veterans (Persatuan 
Bekas Perjuang Islam), which never actually saw the light of day. Ibid.
37 An example being the Coordination Committee for Islamic Organisations 
(Badan Kontak Organisasi Islam) founded in Jakarta at the beginning of 1953. 
It was run by Sjarif Usman, a senior fi gure within Muhammadiyah and Masyumi 
who was elected to the Assembly in 1955, and it organised large demonstrations 
in February and March 1954 to protest against various declarations made by 
nationalist and communist fi gures which were judged to be disparaging towards 
Islam. Abadi, 1 March 1954.
38 To use an expression commonly employed in Indonesian politics at that time 
when referring to Masyumi.
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certainty the party’s actual growth. What is certain, however, is that 
amongst both its rivals and the foreign observers present in Indonesia, 
Masyumi soon benefi tted from the reputation of being the largest party 
in Indonesia, and continued to do so up until the 1955 elections.39
 Calculating the number of party members remained a thorny 
problem even after the heady enthusiasm of its fi rst years. Th is was a 
refl ection of the grave crisis of identity which plagued the party right 
up to its dissolution, but also of its organisational disposition. Th e 
diffi  culty in calculating the number of party members lay in the un-
certainty of what actually constituted a party member. Was one only 
to consider individual members or were extraordinary members to be 
included also? In other words, should a member of Nahdlatul Ulama—
before the 1952 split—and a member of Muhammadiyah be automati-
cally considered as a member of Masyumi? Th e question was compli-
cated further in 1952 with the creation of a new category, known as 
core-members (anggauta teras).40 Th is new group was to be composed 
of individual members who were particularly active within the party. 
Th ey were selected from the party’s ordinary members, and their role 
was “to undertake particular missions at the request and on behalf of 
the party leadership.” Th is status allowed them to attend meetings of 
the party’s executive committee and voice their opinions on the mis-
sions they had been entrusted with, though they were not entitled to 
vote there.41 Finally, core-members were supposed to contribute more 
to the party’s fi nances: their membership subscription cost 2.5 rupiahs 
per month, unlike ordinary members who only paid 0.5 rupiahs.42 
According to Deliar Noer, though, this arrangement, which was in 
violation of a custom of asking those who were most involved in the 
party to pay less, was not entirely respected.43 We have no clear picture 
39 Th is was the conclusion arrived at by George McTurnan Kahin. “Indonesian 
Politics and Nationalism”, in (Asian Nationalism and the West, ed. William L. 
Holland (New York: Th e Mac Millan Company, 1953), p. 74.
40 According to Noer (Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, p. 53), the existence of 
this category of core members had been decided at the party’s inaugural congress 
in 1945. However, the decision only appears in the statutes adopted at the 1952 
congress.
41 “… diatas tanggung-djawab dan permintaan anggauta pengurus/pimpinan ber-
kewadjiban aktip membantu sesuatu usaha partai.” ART 1953, Article 8.4.
42 ART, Articles 22 and 23.
43 Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, p. 53.
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of what place this new category of members occupied within the party, 
as no accurate count was made of their number. It is my view that 
this supplementary, and ultimately futile, complication of the party’s 
organisational structure was above all an illustration of an approach 
which consisted in identifying, often loosely, the entire Muslim com-
munity with their political cause, but which cloaked the party’s diffi  -
culty in developing party activism to any real extent.
 Th ere were obvious reasons for Masyumi to regularly advance 
colossal fi gures when referring to its supporters. One of these was the 
need to justify its claim to be the unique representative of a Muslim 
community numbering in the tens of millions. Before the Round Table 
Conference Agreement in 1949, the party contended that it had more 
than two million members within the territory controlled by the 
Republic.44 Two years later, after it had established itself across the 
country, it claimed to have founded 237 branches, 1,080 sub-branches 
and 4,982 village sections, making up a total of ten million members.45 
Th e fi rst cracks in this veneer of self-importance appeared when Jusuf 
Wibisono, one of the party’s vice presidents, explained in 1951 that 
although Masyumi membership was normally estimated to be around 
13 million, the number of members registered with the party’s execu-
tive offi  ce did not exceed 600,000, and those who possessed a valid 
membership card only numbered 400,000.46 Th ese harsh observations 
were accompanied by some very lucid considerations about the status 
of the party’s constituent organisations, which we will come back to 
later on. Jusuf Wibisono’s article had an undeniable impact on the 
party, and fanciful claims about its size subsequently became quite 
rare. Th e guide to political organisations published by the Ministry of 
Information, whose only source of information on membership num-
bers came from the parties themselves, did not provide any fi gures for 
Masyumi in its 1954 edition, unlike in previous years.47 It was only in 
1956—perhaps as a result of its poor performance in the elections—
that the party leaders decided to carry out the very fi rst exhaustive 
44 Statistics given by Soekiman in his presentation of the party in Kementerian 
Penerangan Republik Indonesia, Kepartaian di Indonesia, 1950, p. 9.
45 Kementerian Penerangan, Kepartaian di Indonesia, 1951, p. 14.
46 Jusuf Wibisono, “Masjumi di masa datang”, Suara Partai Masjumi, February 
1951.
47 Kementerian Penerangan, Kepartaiain dan Parlementaria Indonesia, 1954.
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inventory of the party’s membership. Th e undertaking did not get very 
far however, as only six out of 13 regions and 63 out of 276 branches 
took part in the survey. Nonetheless, the 667,868 members that the 
survey listed allow one to have an idea of the party’s magnitude.48
 Masyumi’s inability to calculate accurately how many members it 
had should not be seen simply as proof that the party’s activists were 
not committed enough to its cause; quite the contrary in fact. During 
the revolutionary period, Masyumi gave the feeling of being, above all, 
a big family, and this lasted well beyond 1949. Paradoxically, however, 
the stronger people’s feeling of attachment to this “keluarga Masyumi ” 
was, the less they bothered with the party’s administrative formalities. 
At all levels of the party, there was a signifi cant number of keen acti-
vists who had never actually gone through the procedures required to 
register properly with the party. Th e most famous case concerning a 
national party fi gure was that of H. Rasjidi, who had been minister for 
religions in the fi rst Sjahrir government formed in November 1945. 
Rasjdi was a member of Muhammadiyah, and so he had been given 
his place in cabinet as a member of Masyumi, despite the fact that he 
had never actually offi  cially joined it. Th is type of embarrassing scenario 
still existed long after the Revolution had fi nished. At the 1956 party 
congress in Bandung, Deliar Noer met a university professor, Gadjah 
Mada, who was present as a representative of the Yogyakarta branch of 
Masyumi, but whose name appeared on no party membership list.49 
Another party fi gure in Yogyakarta, Achid Masduki, who headed the 
Masyumi group in the regional assembly during the 1950s, confi ded 
to me that he too had never obtained a membership card.50
 Th e sense of community belonging amongst the party’s closest 
supporters was forged during the period known as the “Physical Revo-
lution”. It was founded upon Masyumi’s ability to provide support 
systems for diverse sectors of society and various activities. During the 
armed struggle with their former colonial masters, Masyumi not only 
formulated political and religious goals for their followers, but also 
helped to furnish the armed forces with supplies, to provision the local 
populations and to administer the parts of the country which had been 
48 Although one should not trust completely the sincerity of all of these declara-
tions. Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, p. 53.
49 Interview in Jakarta, September 1996.
50 Interview in Yogyakarta, September 1996.
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devastated by the war.51 It was perfectly natural, then, for the party to 
continue to expand in this way after the Revolution. Once Masyumi 
had established a new branch in a locality, it set about creating local 
sections of the Muslimat, the GPII, the STII and the SBII, sometimes 
even opening a branch of one of its constituent organisations if one 
did not already exist. In February 1951, for example, the Madjen 
branch of Masyumi announced the opening of an STII section as well 
as a local branch of Muhammadiyah.52 Th is development of the party’s 
off shoots favoured good relations between its diff erent organisations, 
especially since the local heads more often than not came from the 
same small circle of people. A good example of this was H. Marcoesya, 
who founded the Masyumi branch in Banjarsari in Central Java in 
1948, participated in the creation of the Muhammadiyah branch there 
in 1952, and as a landowner, also held a position within the local 
STII section. He and a small group of friends controlled the various 
Masyumi organisations jointly by rotating the key positions between 
themselves; although ordinarily, one person could not head two dif-
ferent organisations, nothing stopped him from chairing one while 
acting as treasurer in another.53 In the case of Muslimat and the GPII
—or the PII, depending on the locality—they were more often than 
not in the hands of the wives and children of Masyumi fi gures.
 Relations between the diff erent members of the keluarga Masjumi 
were also fostered by the holding of various local events, which pro-
vided an opportunity for the party’s diff erent organisations to come 
together. At village and district level, meetings were generally composed 
of Masyumi and its “autonomous organisations”, such as Muslimat, the 
GPII and the party’s unions. Th e visit of a senior party fi gure, who 
generally visited several localities per day and wished to meet as many 
people as possible in a short period of time, was another occasion for 
party gatherings. Th ese visits gave the party an opportunity to organise 
strong shows of support in towns and villages by festooning the streets 
with fl ags bearing the star and crescent moon. When the election cam-
paign started properly in 1954, a new custom appeared which consisted 
in organising a horn-honking motorcade throughout the locality being 
51 Th roughout 1946, Al-Djihad reported on the wide range of activities being 
carried out by the party. See, in particular, 29 January, 4 March, 9 April and 7 
May 1946.
52 Berita Masjumi, 27 February 1951.
53 Interview in Banjarsari, September 1996.
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visited. Th e popularity of the visiting dignitary and the party’s presence 
in the region was now no longer measured by the number of people 
attending a traditional rally, but rather by the size of the traffi  c jam 
created by their convoy. On 21 July 1954, during a visit to West Java, 
Isa Anshary was welcomed in Lumajang by “sixty cars and fi fty motor-
bikes”, which led the Abadi reporter to conclude that he had received 
a better welcome there than the previous day in Besuki.54 On 27 
March 1955, Mohammad Natsir attracted “eighty cars and numerous 
motorbikes sent by the GPII” in Mataram on the island of Lombok. 
A few weeks later in Massa, he improved his score with nearly 200 
vehicles, “including jeeps and lorries”,55 though he never managed to 
surpass Isa Anshary and Jusuf Wibisono, who were welcomed on 3 
July 1954 in Yogyakarta by “at least 125 cars and 200 motorbikes”.56
 Five years after the Physical Revolution, the preparation of the 
elections provided an opportunity for the cooperation between the 
diff erent constituent organisations to be renewed, and the “Masyumi 
family” (keluarga Masjumi ) was rechristened “the crescent moon and 
star family” (keluarga bulan bintang) in reference to the party’s emblem. 
Between the Revolution and the elections, two crucial moments in 
Indonesian history, one area in which “family solidarity” was very 
strong was the communication of Masyumi’s policies. When the party 
deemed it particularly important to air its position on a certain issue, 
the local sections of all the party’s constituent organisations took care 
of matters. Th e party’s press would subsequently be bombarded with 
messages and motions from the four corners of the country, generally 
using the same terms employed in the communiqué sent out from 
party headquarters.
 Once Masyumi’s network was fi rmly established throughout the 
country, its various components carried out their activities at a steady 
pace. Th eir diversity—they reached out to all areas of society and were 
represented at all political levels—and their number—there were several 
thousand local sections—means that it would be impossible here to 
paint a complete picture of them. I will restrict myself to examining a 
few examples which will give us an insight into the Masyumi family’s 
modus operandi.
54 Abadi, 23 July 1954.
55 Abadi, 31 March and 6 June 1955.
56 Abadi, 6 July 1954.
Chap6 (348-408).indd   367 8/14/15   5:40:53 PM
368 Islam and Politics in Indonesia
A Chaotic System
Masyumi appeared, on the surface, to possess a clear hierarchical struc-
ture, and also boasted an impressive catalogue of constantly updated 
party rules, but it suff ered from three major fl aws throughout its 
history. Th e fi rst was linked to the internal hierarchy of the party, 
the second was connected to the party’s fi nances and the third was 
related to the attribution of roles to Masyumi’s diff erent constituent 
organisations.
 Th e relations between the sections, branches and leadership of the 
party and their respective roles and responsibilities never corresponded 
in practice to what the party’s statutes had laid out. In theory, only 
the party bodies holding authority at the national level—the executive 
committee and the congress—were entitled to speak out, on behalf of 
all its members, on national or international issues. In reality, all local 
sections of the party did this. In most cases, this did not aff ect the 
running of the party, and was even part of a strategy, albeit an un-
spoken one. When the Sukabumi branch of Masyumi delivered a 
demand to the head of state, the government and the minister for 
defence, calling for the region’s crime problems to be dealt with more 
effi  ciently, it stepped beyond its remit, but it nonetheless followed the 
party line on this issue.57 However, when in December of the same 
year the West Java branch called for the resignation of the government 
and threatened to ask the president to name a new cabinet, or when 
the South Sumatra branch declared that it considered the second Ali 
government to no longer be in offi  ce since the announcement of the 
“Sukarno conception”, they both went much further than Masyumi’s 
“offi  cial” positions.58 Likewise, although the party’s statutes only allowed 
the congress to pass judgement on the policies pursued by the execu-
tive committee, local branches regularly voiced their opinions on this 
topic. In the vast majority of cases, this amounted to nothing more 
than a vote of confi dence in favour of the party leadership, who did 
not pass any comment on it, but in at least one case, the opposite took 
place. In September 1956, the Masyumi branch in Sulawesi adopted a 
motion calling for the withdrawal of Masyumi ministers from cabinet. 
Th is declaration, which was reported by all of Indonesia’s newspapers, 
57 Abadi, 4 February 1953.
58 Abadi, 21 December 1953 and 6 March 1957.
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was an embarrassment for the leadership. A few days later, Mohammad 
Natsir published a somewhat muddled explanation. He reminded the 
local party branches that they were entitled to speak out on regional 
issues, and not national ones. He also stated that the Sulawesi declara-
tion had been adopted “because of the local situation” and that for this 
reason it was authorised by the party leadership.59
 Th e second area which illustrates the party’s malfunctioning was 
the management of its fi nances. Th e party’s rules stated that every 
member had to pay a monthly contribution (iuran) to the party—this 
was fi xed in 1953 at 0.5 rupiah for ordinary members. Th ese funds 
were to be shared amongst the diff erent components of the party ac-
cording to a very strict division: 50% was to go to the sections, 10% to 
the sub-branches, 20% to the branches, 10% to the regional branches 
and 10% to the national leadership.60 Th e treasury department regu-
larly published announcements in the party’s press reminding members 
of this rule, which would indicate that they did not apply these regu-
lations strictly. Th e testimony which I managed to obtain from local 
party leaders confi rmed this impression.61 All of those with whom I 
spoke explained that the collection of members’ contributions happened 
in a very piecemeal fashion—during a party rally, for example. At 
various party gatherings, people gave according to their means, and 
they did so with the feeling that they had fulfi lled the duty in Islamic 
law to give alms (zakat). Th is way of raising money posed two prob-
lems for the party leadership. Th e fi rst was how to calculate the amount 
of money which had been collected, and thus the sum which should 
be transferred to the party headquarters; the second was a question of 
principle which gave rise to several controversies: was it possible to use 
money raised as zakat for electoral purposes? 62
59 Abadi, 13 September 1956.
60 Anggaran Rumah Tangga, Article 22.
61 According to Mr Khamdan, who became a party member in Pamekasan in 
1955, there was no subscription and membership cards were issued for free. 
Interview in Bandund, September 1996.
62 In July 1954, for example, correspondent for the daily newspaper Suluh Indo-
nesia accused the local Masyumi branch of having misappropriated 73,000 rupiah 
in 1950 and 1951 to fund its election campaign. Th e branch in question strenu-
ously denied these accusations, citing testimony given by religious fi gures that 
the amount in question had indeed been transferred to the zakat committee, 
which contained representatives of all Muslim organisations. Th is scandal took 
on national signifi cance and the minister for religions was asked to intervene. 
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 Masyumi’s inability to manage its fi nancial aff airs soundly and 
effi  ciently revealed the disparity between the wishes of the party leaders 
eager to build a modern political party and the country’s sociological 
realities. Th e economist and senior party member, Sjafruddin Prawira-
negara, who was charged with the diffi  cult task of overseeing Masyumi’s 
fi nances, bleakly noted this disparity in February 1951 in a long report 
on the party’s fi nancial situation. He pointed out the danger for the 
party’s independence of its members’ non-payment of subscription fees. 
Th e report was unequivocal: the budget for the previous year which 
had been managed by the party leadership amounted to 522,125.47 
rupiahs, of which only 4% came from membership subscriptions; less 
than 5% of the party’s members were actually fully paid up. Sjafruddin 
deeply regretted this state of aff airs, and warned the party of the threat 
which this situation posed to its independence. If it was obliged to 
“apply for subsidies from the government”, Masyumi “would no longer 
be in a position to exercise any oversight” over the government if ever 
it turned out to be corrupt.63
 Th e third problem that the Masyumi network was confronted 
with was the distribution of roles between its diff erent components. 
Th e party’s desire to set up support structures for the Muslim commu-
nity in Indonesia had led, as we have already seen, to the creation of 
a series of independent organisations—each charged, in theory, with a 
specifi c sector of society. In reality, however, things were not so simple. 
Th e national leaders and the local sections of the diff erent movements 
did not always limit themselves to the activities provided for by their 
statutes; this sometimes owed to the fact that they possessed a certain 
set of skills or a marked interest in a particular area. Th e party itself did 
not appear to set strict boundaries to their projects, even if it meant 
that they encroached on the special organisations’ domains. Apart from 
its purely political activities, it regularly initiated projects dealing with 
a wide variety of areas. On several occasions, for example, Masyumi 
took on the role normally occupied by its unions in order to intervene 
in labour disputes in various sectors of the economy. In January 1953, 
Th e minister, however, refused to become involved in the aff air, explaining that, 
in theory, only imams or an Islamic government were entitled to collect and dis-
tribute the zakat, but given that Indonesia did not recognise Islamic law, the state 
could not take on this task. It was thus up to the religious organisations to come 
to an arrangement on the question. Abadi, 2 December 1954.
63 Suara partai Masjumi, February 1951.
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one of the sections in Jakarta created a Mutual Assistance Association 
(Jajsan Usaha Bersama) which was a mutual savings cooperative de-
signed to provide poor small farmers in the surrounding area with 
fi nancial and technical assistance.64 A few months later, the Masyumi 
regional branch in Jambi, without any particular regard for the Union 
of Muslim Peasants (STI), bought a part of the local suppliers’ rubber 
production in order to maintain price levels, and then asked the govern-
ment to buy it from them.65 Likewise, the party regularly dealt with 
questions of education, which normally came within the remit of the 
GPII. It was, for example, behind the creation of several educational 
establishments, from an Islamic secondary school in Kediri in 1946 to 
an Islamic university in Medan a few years later.66
 Two organisations with links to Masyumi—the Indonesian Mus-
lim Youth Movement (GPII) and, to a lesser extent, Muslimat—took 
a very broad interpretation of their roles. Th e GPII’s natural area of 
expertise covered all matters concerned with education in general, and 
in particular the place religion should occupy in schools. Some of 
the organisation’s resolutions, which it had adopted both at local and 
national gatherings, dealt with this area. It campaigned, for instance, 
for government recognition of fi nancial assistance to religious schools, 
and also for a change in the school curriculum in order to incorporate 
mandatory religion classes into public school timetables.67 However, for 
reasons which we have touched on previously, the GPII endeavoured 
throughout the period concerned to establish itself as a political orga-
nisation in its own right, speaking out regularly on contemporary 
national and international issues. Among its forays into the political 
arena, were the organisation of a vast campaign on the problem of 
Irian, a demand made to France to stop its repression of the “Islamic 
Liberation Movement” in Morocco and its call for the Ali Sastro-
amidjojo government to resign.68 Th is wide-ranging activism enabled it 
to pose as a representative of the entire Muslim youth community and 
not just those young people who supported Masyumi. Th ey thought, 
moreover, that the same attitude should apply to the organisation’s 
64 Hikmah, 7 January 1953.
65 Abadi, 22 October 1953.
66 Al-Djihad, 21 November 1946.
67 See, for example, the resolutions voted by the GPII’s seventh congress. Abadi, 
23 February 1955.
68 Berita Masjumi, 5 January and 7 March 1951. Abadi, 7 January 1955.
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elders, and called for Muslim unity, “regretting” the decision by 
Nahdlatul Ulama to leave Masyumi and later calling for the formation 
of a single Muslim group in the Constituent Assembly elected in 1955.
 Masyumi’s women’s organisation focussed on three areas in parti-
cular: the fi ght against illiteracy, the establishment of marriage laws 
“in conformity with the teachings of Islam” and the defence of public 
morality. Th ese objectives were closely linked insofar as they all aimed 
at protecting or improving women’s condition: the diffi  culty women en-
countered acquiring a social status on a par with men’s was due to their 
lower level of education; Muslim matrimonial law was considered to 
be the body of law which would best protect women’s interests; fi nally, 
women were the greatest victims of the erosion of public morality. 
Muslimat initially set out to achieve these objectives through training 
programmes which they established both locally and nationally.69 Over 
the years, however, initiatives taken regionally meant that the organisa-
tion extended its fi eld of activity considerably. It became involved in 
the economic sector through its management of savings cooperatives 
designed to fi nance small-scale business projects, such as the door-
to-door selling of goods. Its activities developed from simple courses 
on hygiene to managing hospitals, and its campaign against illiteracy 
brought it sometimes into the country’s universities.70 Th e Muslimat’s 
extension of their sphere of activity led it, naturally enough, to broaden 
the scope of the resolutions it voted at its national congress. From 
1949 onwards, various demands were made in the name of improving 
women’s lot, which touched on areas as diverse as politics—a new con-
stitution was called for—economics—a proposal was made to nation-
alise banks—and international aff airs—a motion for Indonesian mem-
bership of the UN was passed.71 Th ese incursions into the political fi eld 
69 In April 1954, for example, the organisation announced the creation of a centre 
designed to help women not only run their households but also understand the 
society in which they lived. Th e courses lasted six months, and on top of cooking 
lessons, they included classes on spirituality, politics and history. Abadi, 21 April 
1954.
70 Th e Muslimaat branch in Bandung was indicative of this evolution: during the 
1950s, it ran several cooperative banks, two hospitals and also participated in the 
foundation of the Bandung Islamic University (UNISBA). Interview with Oya 
Somantri, September 1996.
71 See the accounts of the Muslimat’s congresses between 1946 and 1955 in 
Aboebakar, ed., Sedjarah Hidup K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim dan karangan tersiar, pp. 
423–35.
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for the most part echoed Masyumi’s policies, and the women’s organisa-
tion never provoked the party politically in the same way that its youth 
organisation did.
 Th e unions were the only organisations within the Masyumi 
family who limited themselves to a specifi c fi eld of activity. Th is was no 
doubt due to their limited resources: the Indonesian Muslim Workers 
Union (SBII) only had a membership of 250,000, while the Union 
of Indonesian Muslim Peasants (STII) had barely more than 100,000 
members.72 Th ese organisations were both involved in providing their 
members with training programmes—their local sections regularly an-
nounced the holding of training sessions designed to improve workers’ 
technical knowledge—but also to better their understanding of politics 
and religion. In SBII’s case, the majority of its eff orts were devoted 
to training programmes whose aim was to train union representatives 
capable of countering the infl uence of communist unions within fac-
tories and companies. Th eir knowledge of Islam enabled these offi  cers 
to be appointed as imams in their workplace and to give advice both 
of a spiritual (rohani ) nature and of a legal nature to the workers who 
were, “for the most part, Muslims”.73 Th e peasants union, on the other 
hand, focussed on acting as an intermediary in transactions between 
rice producers and the government, who bought their harvest. Th e 
outcome of this undertaking, which determined the infl uence held 
by the union, was ultimately dependent on whether Masyumi was in 
government. During Ali Sastroamidjo’s fi rst government in 1954, for 
example, the STII’s calls for the sale of rice to be entrusted to the 
organisations that had already proved their ability to perform such 
tasks fell on deaf ears.74
 Before fi nishing this brief description of the activities carried out 
by the Masyumi network, we should dwell a little on what turns out 
to be one of its main characteristics, namely the disparity between the 
programmes announced by the party and their implementation. Of the 
72 Masyumi’s two other unions did not have a very signifi cant role in labour rela-
tions. Th e Union of Indonesian Islamic Traders no longer appeared on the list 
of the party’s “autonomous organisations” from the 1950s, while the activity of 
the Union of Muslim Fishermen was very limited and was rarely reported in the 
party’s press.
73 See the report on a training programme off ered to workers, which lasted a 
month and included an exam at the end. Abadi, 18 July 1953.
74 Abadi, 19 January 1954.
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numerous reports in the party’s press about the “Masyumi family’s” 
activities, very few of them concerned projects which were actually 
completed—almost 70% of them announced upcoming initiatives.75 It 
was obviously not in the interests of the party to hush up its own 
accomplishments, and as we have already seen, its leaders were wont to 
organise anniversary gatherings to celebrate its achievements. Th e only 
plausible explanation for this silence, then, is that most of these pro-
grammes either did not materialise or only lasted a couple of months. 
 Th is disparity between the enthusiasm with which projects were 
unveiled and the failure to follow through and accomplish them was 
prevalent at all levels of the Masyumi family. At the national level, we 
have already seen that the famous “core-members” (anggauta teras) set 
up by the Urgency Programme in December 1949 were only ever men-
tioned subsequently to note that they were not paying the requisite 
contributions. Likewise, the ambitious project for a political academy, 
which the party had announced with bells and whistles in September 
1946, never in fact saw the light of day. Th is establishment, which was 
set to open in Yogyakarta, was supposed to become “one of the sources 
of Islam’s renaissance”. It was to off er courses given by experts in 
the fi elds of Islamic law, constitutional law, economics, sociology and 
history.76 No further mention was made in the following years of this 
“political academy” and Achid Masduki, who in 1948 became a party 
representative in the regional assembly in Yogyakarta, has no recollec-
tion of such a programme.77 As for the Study Committee on Decen-
tralisation, whose creation was announced in April 1951, it never 
published a report on its activities, despite the fact that there was no 
shortage of matters to consider or opportunities to intervene in the 
debate.78 At a local level, the party’s achievements should, logically, 
have provided it with powerful leverage during the campaign leading 
up to the 1957–58 regional elections. However, the space devoted by 
Abadi to singing the party’s praises at every regional election only men-
tioned its promises, and likewise the accounts of visits by national party 
leaders only rarely mentioned specifi c programmes which had actually 
been undertaken.
75 Th is percentage was calculated based on the 310 dispatches which appeared in 
the 10 editions of Berita Masjumi published in March and April 1951.
76 Al-Djihad, 25 September 1946.
77 Interview, Yogyakarta, September 1996.
78 Berita Masjumi, 3 April 1951.
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 Th e press’s silence on party activities mentioned above did not 
always signify that those enterprises had met with failure, however. Th e 
party often co-opted activities which were already being carried out 
traditionally in villages, and so their success was not always dependent 
on Masyumi involvement. In Banjarsari, for example, the STII coordi-
nated the custom of mutual help ( gotong royong) in order to foster 
cooperation in certain activities, such as the upkeep of roads or the 
repairing of houses. Th is section of the union did not, however, found 
a cooperative.79 In other villages, though, the ambition of a local party 
fi gure or a community’s desire to broadcast its achievements could 
mean that these activities were given a more offi  cial air, and presented 
as being carried out in the name of the party. Th e link between these 
programmes and the party, which the press drew attention to, relied, 
then, on a small number of individuals. Masyumi’s involvement in 
such projects was above all for publicity reasons. Th e organisational 
and fi nancial capacity of the Masyumi family did not allow it to pro-
vide the kind of technical or fi nancial assistance that would make it 
an indispensable part of such an operation.80 It was enough, then, for 
a local Masyumi fi gure to lose interest in a project, or simply stop in-
forming his superiors about it, and any links between it and the party 
would disappear; this, however, had very few real repercussions for 
what was actually happening on the ground.
Confl icts: Th e Battle for Power and the Confrontation 
between Traditionalists and Modernists
Th e dual nature of the party’s membership, with both individual mem-
bers and constituent organisations, meant that its internal disputes 
could originate from two diff erent sources. Th ey could come in part 
from the existence within the party of diff erent wings which were led 
by rival party fi gures who disputed the party leadership and had dif-
ferent strategic visions for the party. Th ey could also be caused by the 
diffi  culty in getting diff erent organisations, who represented diff erent 
trends within Islam and who had a long history of discord, to work 
together.
79 Interview with H. Marcoesya, September 1996.
80 Th ere is no evidence of the larger branches sharing expertise with or lending 
material to the party’s village sections. Moreover, money generally circulated, if at 
all, from the lower echelons of the party to its higher levels.
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 A bitter confl ict occupied Masyumi’s leaders for almost the entire 
lifespan of the party, opposing two men who represented two diff erent 
wings within the organisation. Th e two men were Soekiman Wirjo-
sandjojo, the party’s fi rst president, and Mohammad Natsir who suc-
ceeded him as party leader in 1949. Th e two men’s diff erent political 
sensibilities could be traced back to 1945 and were often presented as 
being the result of a generational clash.81 Th is clash should not merely 
be taken to indicate a diff erence in age between the two men, however
—there was, after all, only 10 years between them. Nonetheless, 
Soekiman, who was born in 1898, had already attained some political 
experience before the war. By the time independence was proclaimed, 
he was already a noted leader and was recognised as such by Masyumi’s 
inaugural congress where he was elected leader ahead of the chairman 
of the PSII Abikusno Tjokrosujoso. Like the other fi gures of this 
“generation of 45”— angkatan 45 as it was custom to call them in 
Indonesia—Soekiman had been greatly aff ected by the internal wran-
glings of the nationalist movement in the 1920s and 30s, including 
those caused by Muslims.82 
 Since that time, he was ready to make considerable concessions 
for the sake of the sacrosanct struggle for independence, and this made 
his relations both with the traditionalists of Nahdlatul Ulama and the 
secular nationalists of the PNI much easier.83 Although Soekiman was 
a devout Muslim, his educational career meant that his knowledge of 
Islam was limited. He never contested the primacy of the ulama in 
religious matters, even if they were traditionalists, and always showed 
them profound respect. During his very active presidency from 1945 
to 1949, religious offi  cials within the party saw their role recognised 
within the Madjelis Sjuro, which entitled them to intervene in the 
elaboration of the party’s central policies.84 Although he belonged to 
the modernist movement within Islam, Soekiman always maintained 
good relations with the leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama. He wanted to turn 
Masyumi into the party of the entire umma, and as he was aware that 
the balance of power within Indonesian society was favourable towards 
the traditionalists, he always endeavoured to placate their sensibilities. 
81 See, for example, Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas nasional, p. 60.
82 See, supra, Chapter 1.
83 Amien Rais points this out in his preface to a collection of Soekiman’s articles 
entitled Wawasan Politik Seorang Muslim Patriot Jakarta (Jakarta: YP2LPM, 1984).
84 A right which the religious offi  cials used very rarely in reality.
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 His relations with the nationalists were informed by the same 
mindset. Soekiman was part of the group of national leaders who had 
virtually never left Yogyakarta between 1946 and 1950. He had be-
come instilled with the ultra-nationalist spirit which reigned at that 
time in the Republic’s capital, and for two years he maintained a hard 
party line which consisted in demanding “100% independence” and 
refusing any offi  cial participation by Masyumi in Sjahrir’s fi rst two 
cabinets, which, at the time, were engaged in negotiations with the 
Dutch. Th is closeness of opinion between Soekiman and nationalists 
subsequently enabled him to maintain favourable relations with the 
head of state when Soekiman himself became prime minister from 
April 1951 to April 1952, and indeed he supported the president’s 
intransigent position on Western New Guinea. When Masyumi, by 
this stage under Natsir’s leadership, entered into open confrontation 
with the president over his institutional reforms, Soekiman attempted 
to avoid the deterioration of relations with Sukarno. When this fi nally 
became inevitable, his criticism of the head of state always remained 
moderate in tone, in contrast with the vitriolic attitude of other Mas-
yumi leaders.
 Soekiman had a vision of the party as a vast popular gathering, 
founded on a shared sense of belonging to a community which was 
both religious and national. Th is explains his insistence on the party’s 
role in establishing social support structures, an objective he placed 
at the top of his party’s agenda.85 For him, the ideas defended by 
Masyumi had to progress from the bottom up through all levels of 
politics and society. From his point of view, discord was best avoided, 
and cooperation with other political forces, even if it was not perfect, 
was always preferable to getting involved in a power struggle. Th is 
consensual attitude was not extended towards the communists, how-
ever, and indeed the fi ght against communism was, for Soekiman, one 
of the main arguments in favour of a policy of harmonious cooperation 
between parties, based on a tireless search for the lowest common 
denominator.
 Soekiman had arrived at religion through politics, and his poli-
tical career refl ected this order of priorities. Natsir, on the other hand, 
85 See, for example, a speech given by him on 6 May in Yogyakarta, reproduced 
in Wawasan Politik Seorang Muslim Patriot, pp. 277–300.
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took the opposite path. He was first of all a teacher within Persatuan 
Islam before moving on to the Madjelis Islam Bandung during the 
Japanese occupation, and up until January 1946, his political role was 
a secondary one. In August 1945, he was appointed to the KNIP and 
at the same time he became head of youth affairs within the Masyumi 
leadership. Shortly afterwards, his organisational abilities as well as the 
excellent relationship he had with Sutan Sjahrir earned him a seat at 
cabinet in January 1946 as minister for information.86 Natsir quickly 
emerged as the leader of the trio of Masyumi members composed 
of himself, Sjafruddin Prawinegara and Mohammad Roem, who had 
agreed to participate, initially in a personal capacity, in the government 
headed by the PSI leader.87 
 At the 1949 congress which saw Natsir take over the presidency 
of the party, he did not just represent the young generation against 
Soekiman. His experience within Persatuan Islam—an elitist organisa-
tion—and his collaboration with Sjahrir made him the representative 
of another vision of political action founded more on coherence than 
on consensus. The comprehensive religious education he had received 
and his conception of Islamic nationalism, which he had written about 
extensively, meant that he was not inclined to share a political platform 
with either traditionalists or nationalists. For him, Masyumi should not 
simply be a loosely defined expression of Muslim sensibilities exerting 
only a diffuse influence on Indonesian political society, but rather a 
body capable of exercising real political power. Soekiman had been the 
president of a vast movement which had established itself as an orga-
nisation. Natsir, on the other hand, was the president of a full-fledged 
party. By drawing the political consequences of Muslim reformism—
through such measures as the significant curtailment of the ulamas’ 
sphere of activity and the favouring of a pragmatic approach—he be-
came the architect of a realignment of Masyumi towards the political 
centre-ground, focussed around a more coherent ideology. He refused 
on several occasions to accept nationalism as a principle of government; 
unlike Soekiman, he was convinced that Masyumi could lead the 
country without entering into an alliance with the PNI. According to 
86 A relationship which began in their Bandung secondary school at the end of 
the 1920s. Rudolf Mrazek, Sjahrir: Politics and Exile in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University, 1994), p. 47.
87 See supra, Chapter 2.
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him, popular support for the government should be founded on reli-
gious sentiment rather than on national sentiment. This was demon-
strated by the alliances he made with Christian parties and the fact 
that he never tried to placate Sukarno.
 Mohammad Natsir’s rise through the party ranks was one source 
of the growing discord between modernists and traditionalists. The 
congress of December 1949, which saw him take over the presidency, 
was also the occasion of a modification in the party’s statutes which re-
duced the power of the ulama within the religious council. In Natsir’s 
opinion, a well-run party was one in which there was a clear hierarchy 
of its executive organs, and as the Madjelis Sjuro’s right to interfere in 
the efficient running of the party was deemed to be in contradiction 
with this, it was removed. By refusing to take into account the increas-
ingly pressing concerns of the traditionalists, Natsir played an essential 
part in the 1952 split. Unlike Soekiman, however, he never recognised 
the underlying reasons for this schism, a schism which turned out to 
be extremely damaging for the party in the 1955 elections.88
 The opposition between the two wings of the party was, then, 
a lot more than just a confrontation between two people. It led to a 
profound change not only in the party’s strategy, but also in its very 
identity. For numerous reasons, this internal party quarrel and its con-
sequences went largely unnoticed, however, outside a small circle of 
national leaders. A sort of tacit accord between the two protagonists 
meant that they never mentioned their differences publicly.89 When 
88 In 1988, in an interview published in Editor and reproduced in Mochtar Rais 
and Lukman Fatahullah, eds., Mohammad Natsir Pemandu Ummat (Jakarta: Bulan 
Bintang, 1989), pp. 107–9. The former president of Masyumi maintained that 
NU’s split from the party was solely due to its desire to be given the position of 
minister for religions.
89 The only person to break this unwritten rule was Soekiman’s close ally, Jusuf 
Wibisono. In an interview with the press agency Aneta in March 1951, he called 
for Mohammad Natsir to resign as prime minister so as to allow the party to 
reflect on the consequences of the failure of the conference on Irian. In May 
1953, he also refused to give his support to the Wilopo government, which in-
cluded several of Natsir’s close supporters, such as Prawoto Mangkusasmito and 
Mohammad Roem. There was even talk in the press about Wibisono splitting 
from the party, a rumour which he quickly denied (Abadi, 27 May 1953). Later 
that year in September, the possibility was raised of Masyumi’s Soekiman wing 
supporting the Ali government, which contained no Masyumi representatives, 
but Jusuf Wibisono eventually ruled it out (Abadi, 5 September 1953).
Chap6 (348-408).indd   379 8/19/15   12:39:35 PM
380 Islam and Politics in Indonesia
Mohammad Natsir succeeded Soekiman as head of the party in 1949, 
he endeavoured to allow his rival to step down gracefully as leader. Th e 
outgoing party chairman received the title of honorary president of 
the party, which had been created especially for the occasion, and was 
also named Head of the Congress and of the Party Council (Presiden 
Partai, ketua Muktamar dan Dewan Partai). Natsir succeeded him at 
the Head of the party’s Executive Committee (ketua Dewan Pimpinan 
Partai) where all of the important decisions were taken.
 Th e development of Masyumi between its birth and the mid-
1950s was a paradoxical one, due in large part to its nature as a 
Muslim party. It was founded on an adherence to common values per-
ceived as absolute and unchanging, and it grew very rapidly, brushing 
aside the political contingencies which could have hampered its emer-
gence. Its dazzling expansion throughout the country was largely thanks 
to its dual membership procedure, with both individual members and 
Muslim organisations. Up until 1949, the country’s pressing need for 
patriotism bolstered the sacred nature of the Muslim community’s 
union and held the organisation steadfastly together; after that date, 
however, the party’s foundations began to show signs of weakness. 
Masyumi was in fact built upon a somewhat illusory aspiration, namely 
that its constituent organisations would miraculously put their religious 
and social diff erences to one side once they entered the political arena. 
A few years after its creation, the party, in a way, paid the price for 
its initial eff ortless success. Sensitive issues, such as the status of ulamas 
or the recognition of madhhabs as a source of law, had been carefully 
avoided so as not to hinder the collaboration between modernists and 
traditionalists. Th e demands of a more coherent policy championed 
by Mohammad Natsir led to a painful reassessment of the party’s uni-
tary myth.
 At Masyumi’s foundation, as we have already seen, a distribution 
of roles between ulamas and political leaders naturally took place. Th e 
former had taken control of the party’s religious council (Madjelis 
Sjuro), while the latter occupied the party’s executive committee 
(Pengurus Besar). Th is allocation of roles led to an imbalance in 
the number of representatives between Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul 
Ulama. Although the country’s main traditionalist organisation had been 
given the chairmanship (K.H. Hasjim As’jari) as well as the posi-
tion of fi rst vice chairman (K.H.A. Wahid Hasjim, the chairman’s son) 
on the religious council, it only possessed three seats within the execu-
tive committee. Muhammadiyah, on the other hand, not only enjoyed 
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a strong representation on the Madjelis Sjuro, but also dominated the 
Pengurus Besar, with fi ve of its members occupying seats there—K.H. 
Faqih Usman, R.A. Kasmat, H.M. Farid Ma’ruf, Junus Anies and M. 
Mawardi. In addition, the position of president was held by Soekiman, 
and two vice president positions were occupied by Wali al-Fatah and 
Prawoto Mangkusasmito, all three of whom were considered to be 
members of the modernist organisation. Nahdlatul Ulama was, to a 
certain extent, paying the price for its lack of political activity before 
the war. Unlike Muhammadiyah, its leaders had not got involved in 
any of the parties—the PSII, the PII or Permi—which might have 
allowed them to acquire the necessary experience in this fi eld. Th is 
apparent imbalance had initially been accepted by NU’s ulamas how-
ever, as their only power base, the religious council, was originally sup-
posed to play a prominent role within the party. It appeared that the 
head of documents presenting the party’s hierarchy could intervene 
when it so desired in the party’s debates, had to be consulted by the 
executive committee on political issues which touched on religious 
matters, and its opinion prevailed within the party if it voted unani-
mously on an issue.90 During the Physical Revolution, this distribution 
of roles worked relatively well. Th e ulamas gave Islam’s seal of approval 
to the struggle against the colonial power and were therefore honoured 
at national and local meetings of the party.91 Th e Madjelis Sjuro was 
regularly consulted for its opinion. In June 1946, for example, when 
the Masyumi leadership called on the Muslim community to respond 
favourably to the national loan which the government had just issued, 
it was careful to publish the decision by the Madjelis Sjuro to allow 
subscribers to receive a supplement (tambahan) to the amount lent.92 
Th e Indonesian people’s “holy war” against the Dutch, which was 
perfectly conducive to bringing about unity and a heightened sense 
of religious sentiment within the Muslim community, represented, 
then, the golden age in the collaboration between political leaders and 
90 Anggaran Dasar, 1945.
91 On 28 January 1946, for example, Al-Djihad reported on a series of meetings 
between Mayumi fi gures, ulamas and leaders of the Sabilillah and Hizboellah 
militias in order to “ensure the construction of a land of Islam or of an Islamic 
state (Darul Islam atau Negara Islam).”
92 Al-Djihad, 21 June 1946.
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ulamas. A few years later, Wahid Hajim himself drew attention to 
the fact that the two groups complemented each other. Th e political 
leaders allied solid theoretical knowledge with sound political sense, 
while the ulamas exerted a real infl uence over the Islamic community, 
though lack of coordination meant that it remained limited to a re-
gional level.93
 Th is admirable unity, which, with the passing years, was no 
doubt recast in an idyllic light, came to an end after 1949. With the 
confl ict against the Dutch over, the ulamas’ calls to holy war were no 
longer necessary and became embarrassing even. Kartosuwirjo’s rebel-
lion against the Republic was accompanied by the proclamation of an 
Islamic state in West Java, with the intention of extending such a state 
across the country. Within a party which now wished to join coalition 
governments, this uprising discredited the slogans which Masyumi had 
employed only a few years earlier.
 Th is party’s distancing of itself from the Darul Islam rebellion 
led to domination by its political wing, within which Muhammadiyah 
had always been better represented than Nahdlatul Ulama.94 Th e fi rst 
sign of this change was the modifi cation at the 1949 congress of the 
Madjelis Sjuro’s status: it became a mere consultative organ with no 
real infl uence in defi ning the party’s policy line as there was no longer 
an absolute obligation to refer issues to it. Th e leaders of Nahdlatul 
Ulama spoke out against what they considered to be a breach of their 
initial contract with the party. According to them, “all issues were now 
considered only from a political point of view without taking religious 
directives into account.” 95 Th is crisis led to criticisms by each side 
becoming widespread, and old grievances between traditionalists and 
modernists resurfaced. Th e Nahdlatul Ulama leadership criticised Mas-
yumi for having stepped outside a strictly political role and for orga-
nising religious and social activities, thus encroaching on the constituent 
93 Muhammad Asyari, “Th e Rise of Masjumi Party in Indonesia and the Role of 
the Ulama in Its Early Development, 1945–1952”, MA thesis, McGill University, 
1976, p. 124.
94 Despite a drop in its numbers within the executive committee, which went 
from 45.83% in 1948 to 28.57% in 1949, according to Syaifullah’s calculations. 
Gerakan Politik Muhammadiyah dalam Masyumi (Jakarta: Grafi ti, 1997).
95 “Riwajat singkat partai Nahdlatul-Ulama”, in Kementerian Penerangan, Kepar-
taian dan Parlementaria Indonesia (Jakarta, 1954), p. 412.
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member’s prerogatives.96 Having noted this loss of infl uence within 
Masyumi, they decided, shortly after the congress in Yogyakarta, to 
create their own political executive committee.97
 In this emerging confl ict, organisational issues were not the only 
bone of contention. Th e tone employed by a section of Masyumi’s 
leadership towards religious dignitaries, which was often condescending, 
also contributed much to the worsening of this malaise. During the 
1949 congress, for example, Mohammed Saleh, a member of Masyumi 
who was mayor of Yogyakarta, created an uproar by declaring that 
politics was too complex an area to be confi ded to the ulamas. Th e 
NU representatives protested in reaction to these comments, and when 
Saleh refused to withdraw them, some members left the room. A little 
later, during a meeting of the party leadership in Bogor, K.H. Wahid 
Hasjim’s speech was disturbed by chatter and joking in the audience.98 
It was, however, precisely those within Masyumi who were the least 
respectful of the authority of traditionalist dignitaries who gained con-
trol of the party leadership in 1949, after the election of their cham-
pion, Mohammad Natsir, as president of the party’s executive committee 
(Dewan Pimpinan Partai ).99
 Like the previous generation of leaders, the new leadership had 
mostly been educated in the Dutch system, and thus possessed clear 
management ability. It had also, on top of that, received a sound reli-
gious education which enabled it to claim a certain authority in that 
area. Mohammad Natsir had received his political education within 
96 In his opening speech at the Palembang Congress in 1952, K.H.A. Wahab 
Hasbullah explained that Masyumi organised celebrations for Islam’s main feast 
days during which it collected the zakat and then distributed it to the needy. He 
then went on to say: “Given what I have just said, we can understand that most 
Muslims might not be able to see the dividing line between the role of a social 
and charitable organisation and that of a political party. Th at is the reason why 
many have become disenchanted with or even suspicious [of the party].” Quoted 
in Naim Mochtar, Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama Movement: Factors that Led to Its 
Emergence as a Political Party (New York, 1961), p. 9.
97 Madjelis pimpinian politik. Th is committee was dissolved when NU became a 
party.
98 Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, p. 87.
99 Soekiman retained the title of party president and in 1951 became president 
of the Presidum before being demoted, at the 1952 congress, to the rank of vice 
president, under Natsir’s authority.
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Persatuan Islam and was a confi rmed reformist who had no problem 
criticising Islam’s traditionalist movements. His relations with Nahdlatul 
Ulama were therefore strained. Soekiman, who was culturally, and no 
doubt spiritually, much closer to the NU’s Javanese leaders, had man-
aged during his leadership of the party to maintain a certain internal 
harmony; 100 in the leadership contest with Natsir, for example, he had 
enjoyed the support of traditionalists. Moreover, Natsir’s conquest of 
the party leadership had coincided with the arrival of K.H. Wahab at 
the head of Nahdlatul Ulama. Wahab succeeded Hayim Asy’ari, who 
had died in 1947 and been one of the main architects of Nahdlatul 
Ulama’s growth since 1926. Th e harmony between the two organisa-
tions under the leadership of Soekiman and Asy’ari was replaced, then, 
with a bitter rivalry between Wahab and Natsir, both equally convinced 
of their religious and political legitimacy to lead Muslims. Faced with 
the realisation that they were losing their infl uence within Masyumi and 
that their relations with the generation of young up-and-coming mem-
bers in the party were deteriorating, the temptation for NU’s ulamas 
to split from Masyumi was understandable. When the Wilopo govern-
ment was formed in 1952, their “loss” of the Ministry of Religions—
which was the last advantage resulting from their collaboration with the 
modernists—freed them of their last remaining ties with Masyumi.101
 Th e traditionalist ulamas’ discontent was not the only source 
of disagreement threatening the party’s unity. Successive eff orts by 
Masyumi’s leadership to preserve a certain cohesion between its extra-
ordinary members also came up against the problem of the reformist 
organisation’s confl icting ambitions. As had been the case during the 
colonial period, Persis played, within Islam, a role which was incom-
mensurate with its number of members—it had barely more than 
10,000 members at the beginning of the 1960s. Th is small but vocif-
erous organisation from West Java, which had been re-established in 
1948, exerted considerable infl uence over Masyumi through four of its 
members. Mohammad Natsir remained in close contact with his former 
100 Unlike Natsir who had not hesitated to publicly criticise K.H. Wahid Hasjim, 
the minister for religions, concerning his policy on pilgrimages. Muhammad 
Asyari, “Th e Rise of Masjumi Party in Indonesia and the Role of the Ulama in 
Its Early Development, 1945–1952”, p. 127.
101 See supra Chapter 3.
Chap6 (348-408).indd   384 8/14/15   5:40:56 PM
Th e Ideal of an Islamic Society 385
fellow students, and although he took on no position within Persis 
when it was reformed, he helped in the reorganisation of its educa-
tional programme in Bangil.102 Th ere is no doubt that by the beginning 
of the 1950s, Natsir had emancipated himself from the infl uence of 
Ahmad Hassa; as a government fi gure who had been converted to 
moderate pragmatism, he could no longer be considered the spokesman 
of the fundamentalist position which the Bandung organisation was 
prone to adopt. However, the special relationship he maintained with 
its leaders, who now represented Masyumi’s hard-line wing, no doubt 
contributed to the radicalisation of his stance after 1956.
 Isa Anshary was, without doubt, one of the architects of this radi-
calisation. Th e man who Natsir had aff ectionately dubbed “Masyumi’s 
McCarthy” had taken over the leadership of the party in West Java 
shortly before being elected head of Persatuan Islam in 1948. He 
entered the party’s executive committee in 1954, and was one of the 
party’s representatives in the Provisional Assembly, before being elected 
to both the Legislative and Constituent Assemblies in 1955. Ahmad 
Hassan, on the other hand, remained somewhat aloof from politics. 
Both within his own organisation and then within Masyumi from 1952 
as a member of the Madjelis Sjuro, the spiritual leader of Persatuan 
Islam preferred to limit his activities strictly to the fi eld of religion for 
health reasons and also because of his interest in that area. To complete 
this brief overview of Persis’s fi gures who were involved with Masyumi, 
let us look quickly at the case of Moenwar Chalil, a respected ulama 
close to Natsir. Although he never occupied an offi  cial role in the 
party’s national governing bodies, he enjoyed, thanks to Natsir, consi-
derable infl uence within the keluarga Masyumi through the columns he 
wrote in the party’s press.103
 Persatuan Islam’s infl uence over Masyumi was particularly strong 
in the area of relations between the constituent organisations. Its leaders 
considered that one of the party’s main objectives was to provide a 
defi nitive resolution to contentious religious issues between the diff erent 
movements within Indonesian Islam, be they questions of principle 
102 Howard M. Federspiel, Muslim Intellectuals and National Development in Indo-
nesia (New York: Nova Science Commack, 1992), p. 118.
103 Moenwar Chalil was for a long time in charge of the section in Hikmah en-
titled “Friday Refl ections”.
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(khilafi yah) or subsidiary issues of less importance (  furu).104 Th is ap-
parent desire to make concessions in actual fact led to the deterioration 
of relations between traditionalists and modernists within Masyumi, 
since for Isa Anshary, Moenwar Chalil and Ahmad Hassan, there was 
no room for compromise on these questions. Th eir proposal to put an 
end to the discord ruled out the possibility of the traditionalists con-
tinuing to use the madhhab as the basis for their religious interpreta-
tions. Naturally enough, when Nahdlatul Ulama decided to split with 
Masyumi, the harshest criticism of this move came from Persatuan 
Islam. Ahman Hassan accused the leaders of the traditionalist orga-
nisation of having betrayed the legacy of Hasjim As’jari, one of the 
architects of the unity of Islam in 1945. He rejected outright the argu-
ments of a religious nature advanced by those who supported the split, 
and noted ironically that nearly six years had passed before NU had 
realised that a political party had to be founded on one of the Islamic 
schools of jurisprudence. For him, it was clear that the only reasons 
behind this schism were base political ones.105 Th is denunciation by 
Persis’s leaders was echoed by Masyumi’s senior fi gures, thus jeopar-
dising any possible future reconciliation with NU. 
 In a manifesto published by the Bandung organisation in 1956, 
it declared that it could not accept “the point of view which maintains 
that, in the name of unity, the questions of furu and khilafi yah should 
be evaded”. It went on to say that it was impossible for it to accept 
“such a betrayal of religious principles”. Th e document clearly accused 
the Masyumi leadership of “being completely aware of what constituted 
an innovation (bid’ah) and doing nothing to combat it.” 106 Reading 
this document allows one to understand the pressure which Masyumi’s 
leaders were under. Persis’s infl uence had not only contributed to the 
sidelining of Soekiman but also hindered Natsir in his eff orts to get 
104 Th e great dispute between taqlid and ijtihad belongs to the category of 
khilafi yah. Th e question of talqin (a sort of sermon pronounced by an ulama at 
the end of a funeral service) or that of the declaration made by believers before 
certain rituals (ushalli or niyah) belongs to the area of Islamic jurisprudence 
known as furu. Federspiel, Muslim Intellectuals and National Development in Indo-
nesia, p. 158.
105 Ibid., pp. 161–2.
106 Quoted in Federspiel, Muslim Intellectuals and National Development in Indo-
nesia, p. 159.
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rid of this awkward issue by attempting to forge in the Constituent 
Assembly a new unity amongst Islam’s representatives.
 Th e problems which Masyumi encountered with Muhammadiyah 
were of a diff erent nature. Masyumi never had disagreements with the 
modernist organisation over matters of religious ideology that it had 
with Nahdlatul Ulama, and to a lesser extent, Persatuan Islam. From 
the outset, Muhammadiyah held a position of considerable infl uence 
within the party’s executive committee, and this was consolidated with 
the departure of Nahdlatul Ulama’s representatives. Between 1952 and 
1959, the percentage of Muhammadiyah members sitting on the exe-
cutive committee varied between 54% and 68%.107 It was the largest 
of Masyumi’s extraordinary members, representing more than half of 
the party’s members, and seemed satisfi ed about its status within the 
party, until the 1955 elections at least. Th e few modifi cations to the 
party’s statutes it had requested had been granted,108 and in return 
it regularly reminded its members of their duties towards Masyumi. 
In February 1953, it decided to reinforce its “ideological discipline” 
(disiplin ideology) by forbidding its members from becoming activists 
in non-Muslim parties. According to Kasman Singodimedjo, who was 
both a member of Muhammadiyah and part of Masyumi’s leadership, 
some of the modernist organisation’s members were also affi  liated to 
the PNI, the PSI and even the PKI. Th is was considered to be harmful 
for the unity of the organisation,109 and with the elections approaching 
it made regular announcements reminding the public that it belonged 
to Masyumi.110
 Th e election results announced at the beginning of 1956 sparked 
off  a grave crisis within the reformist movement, however, endangering 
its membership of Masyumi and thus the very existence of the party. 
Of the 57 Masyumi deputies elected to the Legislative Assembly, 
only 13 could claim to be members of Muhammadiyah, while at the 
Constituent Assembly, it held 21 of the party’s 112 seats. If we look 
at the number of national representatives in 1956, we can see that 
107 Syaifullah, Gerakan politik Muhammadiyah dalam Masyumi (Jakarta: Grafi ti, 
1997), pp. 140–59.
108 In particular the clarifi cations it had requested concerning the participation of 
constituent organisations in the party’s governing bodies. Ibid., pp. 190–3.
109 Abadi, 18 February 1953.
110 See the declarations made by A.R. Sutan Mansur, the president of Muham-
madiyah, in Hikmah, 27 February 1954, and in Abadi, 26 September 1955.
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Muhammadiyah only represented 4% of the popular vote,111 while 
Nahdlatul Ulama, whose candidates had stood for election indepen-
dently of Masyumi, had won 45 seats in the Parliament and 91 in the 
Constituent Assembly, giving it 20% of the total number of deputies. 
Th e diff erence was considerable for two organisations of such a similar 
size—both possessed a few million members—and it was inevitable for 
the modernist organisation to feel some resentment towards Masyumi. 
According to HAMKA, who, at the height of this crisis, wrote a short 
book aimed at defending the organisation’s membership of the Muslim 
party, several of Muhammadiyah’s local branches had demanded that 
all ties with the party be severed. Th e Riau branch considered itself to 
have been particularly hard done-by: it represented the lion’s share of 
Masyumi’s local membership, and yet had not received a single seat at 
the elections, while the nearby Minangkabau branch, where the mod-
ernist organisation was less well-represented, had obtained fi ve seats. Its 
leaders were the fi rst to send a motion to Muhammadiyah’s central 
leadership to demand the organisation’s departure from Masyumi.112 
With more and more initiatives such as this being taken by local 
fi gures seizing advantage of the regionalist climate at the time to de-
nounce their loss of political infl uence, Muhammadiyah’s executive 
committee, the Madjilis Tanwir, decided to meet in early June 1956. 
Th ose who supported breaking away proposed several alternatives, 
including the establishment of a separate political party—with the pos-
sibility of establishing a federation with NU and the PSII—a similar 
request made by NU a few years previously had been rejected by 
Masyumi’s leaders, including those belonging to Muhammadiyah. Th ey 
also advocated a complete abandonment of politics and a concentration 
on the organisation’s traditional activities, namely preaching and edu-
cation. It was only after the organisation’s main leaders threatened to 
resign that the “small calibre” (kaliber ketjil  ) leaders fi nally agreed to 
abandon their plans for a split and that the decision was made to main-
tain the organisation within Masyumi.113
111 Syaifullah, Gerakan politik Muhammadiyah dalam Masyumi, p. 172. HAMKA, 
however, declared that half of the Masyumi parliamentary deputies were orang 
Muhammadiyah. Th is is further proof of the uncertainty surrounding who be-
longed to which organisation. Muhammadijah-Masjumi (Jakarta: Masjarakat Islam, 
1956), p. 29.
112 Ibid., p. 8.
113 Ibid., pp. 27–30.
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A Religious Party?
Th e religious aspect of the Masyumi party determined how it was orga-
nised, favoured its expansion and contributed to a party unity which, 
in the fi nal analysis, turned out to be a fragile one. It also constituted 
for many activists and sympathisers an essential reason for their asso-
ciation with the party. Th e day-to-day running of the party revealed 
a certain increase in the infl uence of religion in political life—all 
Masyumi’s meetings, including their congresses, opened with a reading 
from the Koran—but also a politicisation of religious life—all major 
Muslim feast days, such as Isra dan Miraj and Idul Fitri, gave rise, at 
all party levels, to very well-attended festive gatherings. On those occa-
sions, political leaders were transformed into religious guides. When 
they spoke, they sounded more like preachers than politicians, and 
their speeches generally transcended the political concerns of the day. 
Th ere was a much more solemn and consensual tone than usual to 
these speeches, which had a predicatory character, with constant evoca-
tions of the submission to God through the takbir and the tahmid.114 
Masyumi was never a religious organisation in the way that Muham-
madiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama or Persatuan Islam were. It got involved 
neither in preaching programmes—the leadership had no section 
charged with dakwah —nor in the area of religious education, and 
Hikmah was the only one of its newspapers to have a section exclu-
sively devoted to religion. Masyumi’s ambition was somewhat diff erent 
from that of its constituent members in that it wished to spread the 
values of Islam throughout society by non-religious means, such as 
economic, governmental, social and cultural programmes.
Th e Values of an Islamic Society
Establishing an Islamic society while at the same time building an 
Islamic state was the raison d’être for Masyumi’s vast network. Despite 
the range of sensibilities represented within the party, its leaders never 
abandoned the idea of instilling the values which would form the 
framework of this society. Th ey did so, however, in a piecemeal and 
114 Th e takbir corresponds to the recitation of “Allahu akbar ”, while the tahmid 
concerns the expression “Alhamdulillah ”. See, for example, Mohammad Natsir, 
“Sari Chotbah Idulfi tri Dilapangan Ikada, Djakarta, July 1950”, Capita Selecta, 
vol. 2, p. 81.
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roundabout fashion, which sometimes led to open contradictions be-
tween the party’s offi  cial message and the reality on the ground.
A Society Reconciling Islamic Morals and Modernity
Th e representatives of modernist Islam, who held a majority in the 
party’s executive organs, were mainly concerned with not appearing as 
the defenders of an old-fashioned and outdated moral code. Th ey were 
resolutely turned towards the future and denounced religious practices 
which they considered to be both intolerable innovations (bida’h) and 
vestiges of an outmoded (kolot) conservatism. Th ey also endeavoured to 
embellish their programme for society with supposed Western values. 
In 1946, the party’s daily newspaper Al Djihad spoke out against 
the “disparaging rumours being spread from village to village” by the 
enemies of Islam.
 Darul Islam had not yet been associated with the incendiary air 
of rebellion, as it was later to be after Kartosuwirjo’s call to arms. It did 
nonetheless conjure up the image of a rigid society which was anti-
materialistic, against Indonesian culture and opposed to technical ad-
vances. It called for “no more automobiles, no more tanks and mortars, 
no more planes, but only camels; no more shows, no more Javanese 
percussion orchestras ( gamelan), no more puppet theatres (wayangan); 
no more churches or temples or pagodas but only mosques”; a civil 
service “composed entirely of hadjis, from a village scribe to the highest 
position”; a society, in short, “which would turn its back on the modern 
world and become a society of Bedouins.” 115 
 However, Masyumi’s programme for an Islamic society cannot be 
reduced to the blind assimilation of Western values and techniques. 
A civilisation which had given birth to the individualism of the 
Enlightenment, atheism, communism and Nazism could not claim 
to stand as a universal model. One needed to be circumspect when 
looking to modernity for inspiration, therefore, and seek a lucid adap-
tation of the teachings of Islam and the history of Indonesian society 
to the advances of the 20th century. 
 When one read Masyumi’s theorists, this process seemed an easy 
one: they based it on Islam’s sacred texts and presented their conclusions 
as indisputably self-evident. In reality, this way of proceeding made the 
115 Al-Djihad, 22 July 1946.
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task of establishing norms extremely diffi  cult, as the many contradic-
tions inherent in the various compromises reached were often ignored, 
leading to an accumulation of approaches which were both inconsistent 
with each other and out of tune with what was happening on the 
ground. Th ese diffi  culties should not lead us to give up on delineating 
Masyumi’s social ideology. If one looks beyond the incoherence, the 
absence of comments and the vagueness which can be found in the 
party’s programme, there was nonetheless a vision common to all the 
party’s modernists. Th e details may well have been sketchy, but the 
overall philosophy had a sound basis.
 If there was one area in which this desire to combine Muslim 
tradition with Western modernity was obvious, it was in the fi eld of 
relations between men and women. Masyumi became aware from an 
early stage that their position on this issue would be a sort of litmus 
test in the eyes of many Indonesians. It was a particularly sensitive issue 
since it was not enough to simply announce general broad-ranging 
principles concerning relations between men and women. Th e principle 
of equality between the sexes, which had been a mainstay of the party’s 
successive programmes, had to manifest itself through concrete mea-
sures both within the party and via legislative change. In 1938, in 
an article published in Pedoman Majarakat, Mohammad Natsir talked 
about his diffi  culty in reconciling the two legacies of the modernist 
movement, namely a faithfulness to Islam’s teachings which established 
an unequal relationship in marriage between men and women, on the 
one hand, and the awareness that these same principles would inevi-
tably be challenged by the developments inherent in a modern society, 
on the other.116 
 Th e fear of seeing their programme for society denounced by the 
proponents of social modernity because of its faithfulness to Islam’s 
teachings concerning the status of women continued to haunt certain 
Masyumi leaders. Women’s position in society and the question of 
marriage remained a thorny issue, and the diff erence of opinion be-
tween the party’s various wings was such that it damaged the party’s 
116 In the article, Natsir appeared far from convinced that he had succeeded in 
reconciling these two legacies. His tone seemed apologetic, and he explained how 
he was afraid of being called “anti-Western” or, worse again, of being compared 
with Mussolini or Hitler if he glorifi ed the role of the housewife. “Disekitar soal 
Krisis Perkawinan”, Capita Selecta, vol. 1, pp. 389–400.
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unity. In a break with the party’s tradition of not commenting on its 
internal divisions, Jusuf Wibisono, one of the most active members of 
its progressive wing wrote openly about it in the press in 1951:
Th ere exists a group of intellectuals who, although they are Muslim, 
are reluctant to join our party … Th eir opposition is partly directed 
at an outdated religious movement which infl uenced certain inter-
nal party rules such as the use of a curtain (separating men and 
women) during meetings. Th ey have a good knowledge of Islamic 
history. Th ey know that in the early centuries of that history, 
women could attain esteemed positions in society thanks to the 
considerable freedom of action they enjoyed. Th is was in accordance 
with the Koran and the Hadiths. If we study history, it shows us 
that one of the main reasons for the decline of the Muslim world 
was the control exerted in society by men over women’s freedom of 
action. Th e use of a curtain in our meetings is seen by the intel-
lectuals whom I referred to as an act which weakens (lessens) our 
women and which ends up hindering the development of our Mus-
lim women. Because of that, they are loath to join a party using 
outdated rules which harm the community of Muslim women.117
 Returning to these questions in 1954, Jusuf Wibisono advanced 
what could be considered as the Masyumi modernists’ credo on the 
subject. He was still very concerned about the disastrous eff ect which 
a retrograde policy towards women would have on the party’s support 
amongst the country’s westernised middle classes, and he proposed 
that “the search for guarantees for women’s position” be amongst the 
foremost objectives of an Islamic society. He understood that certain 
practices such as the “full body veil” could legitimately be perceived as 
having a regressive eff ect on women’s status within Islam, and declared 
that such customs were contrary to the teachings of Islam. Without 
actually mentioning them, he based his arguments on the writings of 
“Western scholars”, reminding his readers that polygamy could not be 
considered in Islam as a rule, but only as an exception. Where poly-
gamy was “practiced like a sport”, it was in complete contradiction with 
the principles of Islam. In response to the “so-called modern women 
who always cited the West as an example”, he advanced the classic 
modernist argument that one could not attribute any value to Western 
117 Suara Partai Masjumi, February 1951.
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monogamy which, although it was a legal obligation, often belied a 
covert form of polygamy which was much more regrettable than the 
“exception” narrowly prescribed by Islamic law.118 Th e boundaries of 
the debate were clearly defi ned, then, even amongst the most Western-
ised of the Masyumi leaders: certain practices of polygamy should be 
condemned but not its principle, since the Koran clearly referred to it. 
Party members jumped on any occasion to defend this party line from 
criticism, especially when it came from the Muslim camp. In Novem-
ber 1952, for example, the weekly magazine Hikmah, whose board 
of management was chaired by Natsir, took the Partai Sarekat Islam 
Indonesia branch in Semarang violently to task over comments made 
by one of its representatives who had claimed that “although we are 
an Islamic organisation, the PSII is a modern party, in harmony with 
its time and you cannot let it be said that the Muslim community, on 
the whole, agrees with polygamy.” Th e magazine reminded readers that 
a Muslim party should “have as its foundation stone the Koran and 
the Hadiths which authorise, and sometimes oblige a person who really 
needs it, to have recourse to polygamy” and it called on the PSII’s na-
tional leadership to take fi rm measures against its Semarang branch.119
 Masyumi’s female members adopted a diff erent approach to the 
question, however, starting a campaign against certain practices of 
polygamy which they considered to be abusive. Such cases of polygamy 
were considered to be on the increase, and they aimed their criticism 
in particular at the most illustrious Indonesian, President Sukarno. In 
1954, the head of state, who was an incorrigible seducer, announced 
that he was going to take a second wife, Hartini.120 His fi rst wife, 
Fatmawati, handled the news very badly, and although she did not ac-
tually go so far as to fi le for divorce, she took up residence in another 
house and refused to accompany her husband on the pilgrimage to 
Mecca despite gentle encouragement by two Muhammadiyah leaders, 
A.R. Sutan Mansur and HAMKA, to do so.121 Muslimat’s leaders took 
118 Abadi, 10 July 1954.
119 Hikmah, 8 November 1952.
120 Hartini was in fact Sukarno’s fourth wife. His second wife Inggit had managed 
to get a divorce after her husband had married Fatmawati. J.D. Leddge, Sukarno: 
A Political Biography, 2nd edition (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990), p. 277.
121 Abadi, 5 February 1955.
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up her cause and organised demonstrations protesting against the presi-
dent’s second marriage, whose consequence was to “transform women 
into household utensils” ( jang bikin wanita serupa perabot rumah).122 
 Th ere was an interesting epilogue to this whole aff air when in 
June 1955, after her marriage to the head of state, Hartini Sukarno 
became a member of the Bogor branch of Muslimat in West Java. 
During the little welcoming ceremony organised for the occasion, she 
promised her new fellow members that she would work and pray hard 
for the organisation, and she accepted with joy the present which she 
had been off ered: “a veil for her to wear” (kudung untuk dipakainja).123 
Th e whole controversy, which fi nally came to an end when Hartini 
joined the Masyumi family, had a defi nite political dimension to it. It 
also showed, however, that there was an extremely narrow line between 
the legitimate questioning of social practices which were deemed to 
belong to another age and a potentially unpardonable violation of the 
Holy Book; this greatly hindered Masyumi from adopting a clear policy 
line when the issue came before the legislature.
 In the area of marriage law, Indonesia had inherited a very com-
plex set of laws from its former colonial masters who had had the im-
possible task of establishing a single set of laws for all of the country’s 
religious communities. Dutch marriage law had only been applied in 
Indonesia’s Christian regions, and so the legal vacuum elsewhere allowed 
Islamic regions to maintain a custom which mitigated the inequality 
inherent in Islamic marriage. Instead of the traditional right held by 
the husband to unilaterally repudiate (talak) his wife, this custom 
entitled him to pronounce before the penghulu (the representative of 
the mosque charged with recording the exchange of vows between 
spouses) a conditional or “suspended” repudiation (talik and talak), 
which specifi ed that his wife could make use of this repudiation order 
if he did not fulfi l the commitments he had undertaken when he 
got married. Th is alternative form of marriage, which was in complete 
conformity with fi kh, allowed a wife, by considering herself to be 
repudiated, to separate from her husband if, contrary to what he had 
initially promised, he wished to take a second wife. Aware of this 
possibility of conditional repudiation, Indonesian Muslim women were 
therefore able to avail of an effi  cient means of fi ghting against the 
122 Ibid.
123 Abadi, 18 June 1955.
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rise of polygamy which was condemned both by the country’s fi rst 
feminist movements and by the most advanced members of the santri 
community.124 
 In 1946, the republican government in Yogyakarta decided to deal 
with this thorny issue. In an attempt to placate the sensibilities of radi-
cal Muslims, the law, which was promulgated in 1946 and augmented 
the following year by a decree issued by the new minister for religions, 
did not adopt in its entirety the alternative form of marriage we have 
just described. Th e new law obliged marriages and revocations to be 
recorded by a penghulu, who was now a state offi  cial. In the event of 
a husband contracting a second marriage, the penghulu had to remind 
him of his obligations towards his fi rst wife, and if a repudiation was 
being envisaged, he had a duty to summon the two spouses and at-
tempt to discourage the husband from pronouncing the talak.
 After the 1952 Constitution came into force, the issue of marriage 
legislation which would be applicable to the entire country came to the 
fore again.125 Masyumi was wary of coming under attack from feminist 
associations or from secular nationalists, and so they wisely allowed 
their female representatives to lead the way in the matter, satisfi ed more 
often than not to refer to Muslimat’s decisions on the matter. Th e 
feminist organisation did not baulk at the task and devoted a consi-
derable amount of its work to the question. Th is is hardly surprising, 
given that its statutes, adopted in November 1945, already show that 
one of its main objectives was “to make women aware of their rights 
and obligations in terms of marriage.” 126 In January 1951, during its 
fi fth congress, it adopted a motion “to press the government to rapidly 
draw up a bill on marriage which would guarantee the rights of women 
in accordance with the rules of the Muslim religion.” A few months 
later, the government, headed by Mohammad Natsir, set up a Commit-
tee for the Examination of new Regulations on Marriage, Repudiation 
and Revocation (Panitya Penjelidik Peraturan Hukum Perkawinan Talak 
dan Rujuk) chaired by two members of Masyumi: Teuku Mohammad 
124 Cora Vreede-de Stuers, “A propos du ‘R.U.U.’, histoire d’une législation 
matrimonial”, Archipel 13 (1974): 21–30.
125 For further reading on this issue, see Azyumardi Azra, Th e Indonesian Marriage 
Law of 1974: An Institutionalization of the Shari’a for Social Changes, in Sharia and 
Politics in Modern Indonesia, ed. Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003).
126 Article 4 of its statutes.
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Hassan and Zainal Abidin Ahmad. By the end of 1952, the Committee 
had put forward an initial proposal to codify marriage law for the 
entire country. Among the changes introduced by this new law were 
the recognition of equal rights between spouses in the case of a divorce 
and also, in cases where polygamy was permitted by one’s religion, the 
obligation for a man’s fi rst wife to give her explicit consent before he 
could take a second wife.127
 Curiously enough, Muslim organisations did not look upon these 
measures favourably, despite Zainal Abidin Ahmad’s best eff orts to 
explain them.128 Muslimat in particular criticised them for being too 
general in scope, and called for specifi c rules for each religion. In ac-
cordance with Masyumi’s position on the issue, Muslimat had voted, 
during its previous congress in August 1952, a report which fi rmly 
condemned certain forms of polygamy by men “who merely wanted 
to give free rein to their desires without any sense of responsibility 
towards divine law.” However, the same report also recognised “that 
this misuse of polygamy does not only come from men, but also from 
women who wish to marry a man who is already married.” Masyumi’s 
women members set themselves two goals, then: “not to criticise poly-
gamy as a part of divine law but to demand that the rules necessary 
for moral improvement be strictly implemented”, and also “to pursue 
the education of women in order to make them aware of their own 
identity and their responsibility for their own lives.” In the months 
that followed, Muslimat continued its work on the question, sending 
its proposals to Masyumi’s religious council and then to the women’s 
section of the Coordinating Committee for Muslim Organisations 
(BKOI Lembaga Wanita) which organised, in February 1953, a con-
gress on the issue. Th e BKOI refused to adopt the programme drawn 
up by the government’s committee and preferred instead Muslimat’s 
proposals, namely that the 1946 law be extended throughout Indonesia, 
despite the fact that it was less favourable to women. Th is was the 
solution which Parliament fi nally adopted in 1954, in spite of opposi-
tion from several feminist organisations.
 Th is was quite a tortuous route to take for a bill, which ended up 
with such a modest gain for women’s condition. It was certainly not 
127 Vreede-de Stuers, “A propos du ‘R.U.U.’”.
128 Abadi, 9 March 1953.
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the result of a Machiavellian plot by Masyumi’s male leadership; the 
solution agreed upon constituted an ideal scenario for the party, as it 
both strictly upheld Islamic law and allowed the party’s leaders to pre-
serve their image as modernists. By letting the party’s female fi gures 
defend a law which was the result of a traditional application of Islamic 
law, the party protected itself from potential criticism. Furthermore, 
the question of men’s responsibility for polygamy could be completely 
avoided as it was up to women to collectively give themselves the 
means, through education, to refuse any abuse of this practice. 
 Laying the responsibility for the safeguard of morality upon 
women was a classic technique within the Masyumi family. At the 
beginning of 1946, when the question of women participating in the 
armed confl ict arose, Muslimat, although they approved of it, addressed 
two warnings to Islamic militia groups: that they should not give the 
impression that the Indonesian army was lacking in men; and also 
that they should ensure morality was upheld on the battlefi eld, notably 
by providing female militias with clothes which would “hide their 
charms”.129 Once peace had been restored, the issue of public decency 
was transposed to sporting activities, and one of the motions most 
frequently adopted during the meetings of local branches of Muslimat 
called for clothes to be worn during sporting activities which were in 
conformity with “public morality”.130 Another source of outrage for 
Masyumi’s women’s organisation was the growing number of beauty 
contests “which led women to expose themselves in front of men and 
to publish their measurements.” 131
 However, the Masyumi family’s moral stance was, in fact, not 
always so strict. Th e long articles which were published in the party’s 
press on the question of physical appearance did indeed adopt a very 
strong moralising tone. In August 1958, for example, the journalist 
in charge of women’s issues for the weekly magazine Hikmah warned 
its readers about beauty salons, “where they were likely to waste their 
time and their money”. She also warned them about the easy option 
which consisted in “putting on make-up and shortening your clothes in 
129 Al-Djihad, 15 February 1946.
130 See, for example, the resolution in this respect adopted by the Palembang 
branch of the Muslimat. Abadi, 4 May 1954.
131 According to a communiqué issued by GPII Puteri in April 1956.
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order to make yourself pretty”, and invited them to pay attention, on 
the contrary, to the notion of inner beauty.132 However, the Masyumi 
press also dealt with other questions which were no doubt more in 
tune with its readers. It published short articles, for example, reporting 
on fashion shows, particularly those in Paris, or giving accounts of 
the sophisticated and sometimes dissolute lives of Hollywood stars.133 
132 “Beauty: A Problem for Women”, Hikmah, 2 August 1958.
133 Th e demonstrations organised in 1995 by Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia 
against the Muslim daily newspaper Republika, which was accused, amongst other 
things, of conveying pernicious Western values through its reports on American 
stars, shows the transformation of those who claim to continue Masyumi’s legacy. 
Robert W. Hefner, “Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries among 
Indonesian Muslims”, Indonesia 64 (October 1997): 77–104.
Plate 6.1   An advertisement for Lifebuoy soap made by Unilever which ap-
peared regularly in Suara Partai Masjumi, Hikmah and Abadi in 1951 and 
1952.
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Unlike in the Muslim press today, there was no particular censorship 
of advertisements, which were sometimes in stark contrast to the moral 
tone of the publication in question. While there were never any adverts 
for headscarf manufacturers presenting their latest models, a female 
fi gure in a sensual pose showing a partially revealed breast was often 
used to sing the praises of a skin-softening soap. Th e gap between prin-
ciples and practice was to be found even more fl agrantly in another 
area: the lottery. Masyumi had, naturally, made the outlawing of 
gambling one of the very concrete objectives of its social programme, 
and in July 1954, it joined with NU and the PSII to denounce a 
government project dealing with the regulation of a lottery. Despite 
this, Abadi nonetheless published a small section entitled “Who was 
Lucky” (Siapa Beruntung) which gave the winning numbers and the 
jackpot total—sometimes a considerable sum—of the very same lottery. 
Here again, the necessity for the party’s press to satisfy its readership 
indicated the scale of the task facing Masyumi in order to establish the 
Islamic society which its leaders were calling for.
 To conclude this examination of public morals, it may be inter-
esting to look at how the party’s leaders attempted to embody, at least 
partly, the ideal which they called on their supporters to aspire to. 
What such an inquiry reveals is that there was no clear disparity be-
tween the party’s programme for society and the way of life of the 
Indonesian urban elite in the 1950s. Th e status and way of life enjoyed 
by women in the party was neither wholly consistent with their stated 
objective of total equality nor with the complete separation between the 
sexes called for by contemporary neo-fundamentalist groups. Naturally, 
many of Muslimat’s members wore headscarves, but photos of their 
meetings also showed a sizeable number of them with their heads un-
covered—often almost a quarter of the assembly—thus contradicting 
the notion that there was an obligation to wear one. Th e proportion 
of women sitting on the party’s highest governing bodies did not diff er 
from other political organisations; the party’s executive committee 
counted two women for 12 men in 1954, while at the same time in 
Nahdlatul Ulama (Tanfi zihah), the ratio was one woman for 16 men. 
Th e situation within left-wing parties was not better, despite their pro-
pensity for brandishing the banner of women’s liberation from the 
constraints of Islam. Th ere was only one woman on the PNI’s 16-seat 
executive committee; the PSI had no woman either on its party council 
or on its executive committee; while the PKI’s central committee and 
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politburo were composed entirely of men.134 Moreover, the Masyumi 
leaders of the 1950s were not austere religious types who imposed 
a strict way of life upon those around them. Unlike the leaders of 
Persatuan Islam, their lifestyles did not really distinguish them from 
the rest of the Westernised Jakartan bourgeoisie, something which 
Ahmad Hassan, a religious dignitary from the Persis movement, criti-
cised Mohammad Natsir for. Disconnected from prevailing mentalities 
at the time, Hassan had adopted a very moralising stance on the 
issue of social mores. Th e notion of “reproachable” (makruh) behaviour 
which he regularly wielded tolerated no accommodation. He was, then, 
very shocked to see the Masyumi president’s daughters dressed in 
Western clothes, going out with friends or serving refreshments to their 
father’s guests.135 Apart from Jusuf Wibisono, who had accumulated 
considerable wealth through his business activities, most party leaders 
enjoyed a comfortable, though non-ostentatious, lifestyle in the 
Menteng district of Jakarta. Th ey endeavoured on occasion, however, 
to show their fellow countrymen the importance of a certain degree 
of humility. Mohammad Natsir, for example, immediately after having 
handed in his resignation as prime minister, refused to be accompanied 
to his house by his chauff eur and cycled home as a simple citizen.136
A Fair and Prosperous Society
Th e Masyumi leadership, following on directly from the ideas of Agus 
Salim and H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, but also of Mohammad Hatta, 
portrayed Islam from an early stage as an alternative to the opposition 
between the imposed collectivism of the Marxist system and the un-
fettered individualism of capitalism. In 1948, in a short book entitled 
Politiek dan Revolusi Kita (Politics and Our Revolution), the party’s 
principle economic theorist, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, reminded his 
readers that Islam condemned the excesses of these two doctrines 
134 Kementerian Penerangan, Kepartaiain dan Parlementaria Indonesia (Jakarta, 
1954). Masyumi’s situation in the Legislative Assembly elected in 1955 was com-
parable to that of other parties: it had four women representatives, as did the 
PNI, while the PKI had three women deputies and NU had two.
135 Deliar Noer, Aku bagian Ummat, aku bagian Bangsa, otobiografi  (Bandung: 
Mizan, 1996), p. 417.
136 Anwar Harjono, ed., Pemikiran dan perjuangan Mohammad Natsir (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Firdaus, 1996), p. 6.
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without repudiating their underlying principles, and that it also pro-
posed a balanced combination of both systems, founded on encouraging 
individual initiative for the benefi t of and under the control of the 
people.137 Th is theory, which was christened “religious socialism”, was 
adopted faithfully both by Sjafruddin in his numerous contributions 
to economic debates and by other party representatives.138 Moreover, 
it held, in the eyes of the party, a practical importance which went 
far beyond economic questions. Within the context of the Cold War 
between the two blocs, whose transformation into a military confl ict 
was seen as inevitable, this “third way” could off er Islam a historic op-
portunity to pose as the mediator of international aff airs.139 In tandem 
with their denunciation of the dangers of Marxist-Leninist theories 
in which, as we have already seen, they had become specialised, Mas-
yumi’s leaders also consistently condemned certain dangers inherent in 
capitalism. Th ese regular reminders of capitalism’s fl aws were made by 
Masyumi out of political expediency in response to the PKI’s portrayal 
of the party as the handmaid of capitalism and a leech on the working 
classes. In response to these accusations, Jusuf Wibisono, talking about 
Islam’s founding principles, declared that anti-capitalism was second in 
order of priority, behind the improvement of women’s status (another 
issue on which the party was often open to criticism). While recognising 
that some “good Muslims” could have “a capitalist mindset”, the president 
of the SBII explained that Islam could be considered anti-capitalist 
“because its aim is to create equality”; he also enjoyed reminding his 
opponents, in an ironic tone, of the similarities between Islam’s opposi-
tion to usury and the measures taken to combat it in the Soviet Union.
137 Extensive extracts of this book can be found in George McTurnan Kahin, 
Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1952), pp. 309–10.
138 Sjafruddin called it “sosialisme religious”, while Z.A. Ahmad termed it “religieus 
sosialisme”.
139 Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Islam dalam Pergolakan Dunia (Bandung: Al-Ma’arif, 
1950), Quoted in Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, p. 136. Th e expression 
“third way” was not used by Masyumi fi gures, and those who claim the party’s 
legacy today reject the legitimacy of this current within the party, which they 
consider to be a new form of capitalism. Th ey prefer the term “fourth way” 
( jalan keempat) to refer to the religious socialism which has experienced a unique 
revival in Indonesia. See Muhidin M. Dahlan, ed., Sosialisme Religius, suatu jalan 
keempat? (Yogyakarta: Kreasi Wacana, 2000), a collective book published by sup-
porters of HMI-MPO, a student organisation which identifi es with Masyumi.
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 From a historical and theological point of view, Masyumi’s theo-
rists founded their condemnation of capitalism on the example set by 
the Prophet. Z.A. Ahmad, in a book heavily imbued with revolutionary 
socialism—particularly in its anti-semitic undertones—invited his 
readers to “struggle against capitalism” (berdjihad menentang kapitalisme). 
According to him, Mohammad had endeavoured, in Medina, to build 
a society governed by principles of “loyalty and Muslim fraternity”.140 
Th e economic model that Ahmad referred to was based on an eco-
nomy of solidarity, in which people’s right to property could only be 
exercised so long as it was done in the common good. For Ahmad, 
this “collective and cooperative” conception of the production and ex-
change of goods stood in complete opposition to what was considered, 
at that time, to be the germ (bibit) of contemporary capitalism, namely 
the “Jews’ selfi sh mentality”. Capitalists were called the “source of all 
destruction” and considered as the “enemies of all nations”.141
 Masyumi’s theorists were undoubtedly much more comfortable 
when explaining what could not be included in Islam’s economic 
model than when proposing a clear defi nition which could be applied 
in concrete terms. In some cases, this tendency to stick to peremptory 
maxims could be explained by their lack of expertise in the area of 
economic policy. However, the example of Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 
who played a foremost role in the elaboration of Indonesia’s economic 
policy from 1950–58 when he served as minister for fi nance before 
becoming governor of the Central Bank, shows that this explanation 
is not entirely satisfactory. Even for one of Indonesia’s rare experts in 
this area, it was impossible to isolate economic questions from a pro-
gramme incorporating all aspects of society, both material and spiritual. 
He explained, for example, in a speech given to the Association of 
Jakartan Catholic Students in May 1957, the meaning which his party 
intended to give to the notion of social prosperity and the limits of 
economic science in this area.142 He opened his speech with a parable 
140 Zainal Abidin Ahmad, Dasar-Dasar Ekonomi Islam (Jakarta: Sinar Ilmu, 1950), 
p. 40.
141 Ibid., p. 42.
142 “Peranan Agama dan Moral dalam Pembangunan Masyarakat dan Ekonomi 
Indonesia”, in Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Islam sebagai pedoman hidup, Kumpulan 
karangan Terpilih, vol. 1, ed. Ajip Rosidi (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1986), pp. 
92–118.
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of his own about “the poor man suddenly made rich by the discovery 
of a precious stone”. Th ree possible destinies awaited this man, who, 
we discover later in the story, personifi es the Indonesian people: he 
could go mad as a result of such riches, fall into an even worse state 
of poverty after having squandered all his wealth, or improve his lot 
by using his intelligence to capitalise on his discovery. In the eyes of 
economic science, only the latter scenario was worthy of interest, and 
thus allowed the man to be called “homo economicus ”. In other words, 
classic economic theory could only be useful in the case of a rational 
use of wealth; it was indiff erent to the individual’s psychological mecha-
nisms, only enriched people in the material sense of the word and was 
of no help in the fi rst and second scenarios. Islam, on the other hand, 
which looked at the question of wealth from a much broader perspec-
tive, could help the man at a much earlier stage as soon as he had 
found the precious stone, a discovery which symbolised Indonesian 
independence. Economic science, Sjafruddin continued, was based on a 
fear of the future and incited man to accumulate wealth upon wealth. 
Religion, however, allowed individuals to go beyond this fear by means 
of divine mercy. According to Sjafruddin, then, homo economicus had 
to also be a homo religiosus, “for only the individual aware of his duties 
towards God, and therefore devoted to his neighbour, would be able 
to enjoy these riches for the greater benefi t of humanity.” 143
 A large part of the young Republic’s diffi  culties, according to him, 
came precisely from the excessive infl uence of classic economic thought 
cut off  from any moral dimension. Th e move from a colonial economy 
to a national economy “had merely amounted to a replacement of men 
and capital from the Netherlands by men and capital from our own 
country, and no specifi c requirements had been formulated concerning 
what attitude these men should adopt and what use should be made 
of this capital.” 144 For Sjafruddin, most Indonesian leaders were still 
enslaved in this insular, and thus illusory, way of thinking. President 
Sukarno, for example, was losing his way in an autocratic abuse of 
power and even Sutan Sjahrir, the leader of the Indonesian Socialist 
Party, “who was himself a confi rmed democrat, was misguided to let 
himself be convinced that the evils of our society could be resolved by 
143 Ibid., p. 99.
144 Ibid., p. 104.
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economic tools and an economic method.” 145 Sjafruddin concluded by 
saying that the implementation of an Islamic economy would come 
about by means of a “radical spiritual change”, and was the only way 
for the country to free itself from the diffi  culties it was embroiled in.
 Th e Masyumi leadership largely shared this economic vision. Th is 
no doubt informed the party’s economic policy and justifi ed, in parti-
cular, the apparent contradiction between its calls for prosperity and the 
economic stringency measures which it implemented in government. 
Masyumi’s conception of wealth went beyond its material, and even 
its human, aspects; the party wanted to embody a social programme 
which would be able to ensure the salvation of its fellow countrymen. 
Although it was not glorifi ed, poverty, or at least a certain frugality, 
did not constitute an obstacle to this programme.146 As Natsir pointed 
out in February 1954, in a speech given before a gathering of ulamas 
in Padang, it was better “to resolutely consider the situation, even if it 
was a harsh one” and draw the necessary conclusions by implementing 
budgetary cuts and adopting a humble attitude towards foreign aid, 
rather than getting trapped in an illusory attitude of pride contrary 
to the principles of Islam.147 Th is moral and even mystical approach 
to economic questions left the party open to several accusations. Was 
promising prosperity to people in the afterlife and emphasising the 
necessity of spiritual wealth over material riches not an ideal way to 
dampen the people’s legitimate aspirations for material well-being while 
preserving the entitlements of the Muslim bourgeoisie which Masyumi 
was supposed to incarnate? Th e PKI used this argument liberally in its 
opposition to the modernist party, describing Masyumi as the repre-
sentatives of “land-owners who exploited and oppressed peasants”.148
 Although the party’s adherence to its religiously inspired economic 
doctrine was genuine, two additional elements could shed more light 
on Masyumi’s economic policy. Th e fi rst, mentioned earlier, was the 
pragmatism which typifi ed the young generation that took over the 
145 Ibid., p. 113.
146 See, for example, Soekiman’s speech given at a Masyumi conference in Yogya-
karta on Islam’s desire to improve man’s destiny on Earth, but also in the here-
after. Hikmah, 12 November 1953.
147 Abadi, 27 February 1954.
148 D.N. Aidit, Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution (Jakarta: Jajasan 
Pembaruan, 1958), p. 57.
Chap6 (348-408).indd   404 8/14/15   5:41:00 PM
Th e Ideal of an Islamic Society 405
party leadership in the 1950s. Th ese men were keenly aware of the 
vision which Western leaders had of their country. Sjafruddin Prawira-
negara was well-known in international economic circles, and was 
certainly aware of the concerns of the world’s fi nancial elite with regard 
to Indonesia’s future. Th e solutions he advanced were to a large extent 
infl uenced by the economic doctrines in favour at that time in Europe 
and in the United States. Moreover, Masyumi was not alone in dis-
playing such receptiveness to the opinions of the capitalist world; the 
leaders of the PSI, and in particular the economist Sumitro Djojohadi-
kusumo, also served as mouthpieces for such theories.149 Th e second 
element is of a diff erent nature: by emphasising the moral—and there-
fore universal—dimension of their economic programme, the Masyumi 
leaders camoufl aged somewhat their lack of concrete achievements in 
the name of Islam. Since the foundation of the party, numerous mani-
festos had been published to remind its members of what constituted 
the cornerstones of an economy in conformity with the teachings of 
the Prophet. Th ese had emphasised the importance of the cooperative 
sector, the necessity of society to be regulated, the role played by obli-
gatory alms (zakat) in the redistribution of wealth, and the outlawing 
of loan-sharking (riba). Most of these documents, however, were more 
concerned with theological defi nitions and historical reminders than 
with proposals which could be applied to contemporary Indonesia, and 
so the party’s accomplishments in this area remained limited.150
 Th e term “Islamic economy” never appeared as such in the party’s 
programme. Th e only principle which the party referred to was the 
notion of a “planned economy” (ekonomi terpimpin) fi rst laid out in 
1949 and returned to regularly in the following years. It was a pro-
gramme which included planned production, limited and constructive 
competition between companies under state supervision, price and 
salary controls and incentives for the cooperative sector designed to 
149 On 1 and 4 March 1954, Abadi published a very long appeal made by Sumitro 
in favour of a contractionary monetary policy, entitled “Kenjataan sebenarja 
tentang keuangan kita”.
150 A good example of this is the contribution made by the theologian Z.A. 
Ahmad to the question of the zakat. He traced the evolution of this notion from 
the Prophet’s State up to the writings of Muhammad Rasjid Ridha, distinguishing 
eight groups of benefi ciaries and four types of donations. However, he showed 
no interest in establishing links between the zakat and modern economic realities. 
Ahmad, Dasar-Dasar Ekonomi Islam, pp. 47–50. Th e articles on Islamic econo-
mics published in Hikmah generally followed the same logic.
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promote a national economy.151 Most of the programme’s aims were 
not the preserve of Masyumi; apart from the parties inspired by com-
munism, all the country’s political organisations shared the same ideal 
of cooperative-based socialism mingled with economic nationalism.
 One of the few areas in which Masyumi strove to apply the prin-
ciples drawn from its religious analysis of society was that of coopera-
tives. Th ese economic entities, in the eyes of the entire population, 
embodied the concrete application of the middle way between capi-
talism and communism which the party claimed to represent, and they 
received incentives from both the Natsir and the Soekiman govern-
ments. Th e idea for their development was not exclusive to Masyumi, 
however. It had been launched in 1895 in the region of Purwokerto, 
and was developed by a small number of Dutch civil servants, before 
being adopted fi rst in 1920 by Mohammad Hatta, the “founding father 
of the cooperative system”, then by the PNI and fi nally by Dr. R. 
Sutomo, who used it as one of the cornerstones of his Parindra party 
in 1935.152 After the Physical Revolution, the Hatta government put 
in place in 1949 a plan encouraging small producers to come together. 
Th is was continued and developed further by successive Masyumi-led 
governments. In accordance with the programme laid out in 1949 and 
continued in 1952, the Natsir government set up the “Sumitro Plan”.153 
It was based around the Cooperative Service (Jawatan Kooperasi), an 
organisation created in October 1950 and charged with encouraging 
the creation of cooperatives in rural centres, as well as providing small-
scale producers with both technical advice and fi nancial assistance. Th is 
plan encountered a certain amount of success, thanks in no small part 
to the fact that it was renewed by successive governments.154 Apart 
from these measures taken while Masyumi was in power, the party 
151 Program Perjuangan Masjumi (II.1), 1949. Masyumi never abandoned this 
principle. Although the party fought relentlessly against Sukarno’s Guided Demo-
cracy, it continued to support the president’s Guided Economy. Abadi, 26 Feb-
ruary 1960.
152 Denys Lombard, Le carrefour Javanais, vol. 2, p. 103.
153 Named after the minister for trade and industry, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo. 
Sumitro was a member of the PSI who had formerly been a commercial attaché 
in Washington. He was close to Natsir and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara.
154 Between 1952 and 1954, for example, the number of cooperative members in-
creased from 1 million to 1.4 million. “L’évolution économique de l’Indonésie”, 
Notes et études documentaires, nos. 2014 and 2015, May 1955 (Paris: La Docu-
mentation française).
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leadership’s policy for establishing a cooperative economy consisted 
more in rejoicing in the success of local initiatives than in making any 
real attempt to build such an economy. Th e media impact of such 
projects was much more important to the party than their actual long-
term development.155
 Th e party adopted a similar attitude to its role in the collection 
and distribution of the zakat, which should have constituted one of 
the cornerstones of an Islamic economy.156 As we have already seen, 
the party and its organisations benefi tted from the zakat as a source of 
funding since their supporters had the impression that they were paying 
the obligatory alms by contributing to the party’s fi nances. However, 
any attempts Masyumi might have made to organise a system of re-
distribution of wealth based on the payment of the zakat at a local or 
national level were unsuccessful. Th ere was no system of coordination 
within the party, and its leaders merely cited initiatives which Masyumi 
had not launched as examples of the successful use of the zakat. In 
January 1952, for example, Hikmah devoted a long report to a visit by 
Mohammad Natsir to Pasarean in West Java where he had been im-
pressed by the method of redistribution set up by the villagers, which 
he considered to be a model for an Islamic economy. Every Th ursday 
evening, a Committee of Legal Alms-giving, comprising representatives 
from the 11 villages in the surrounding area—totalling 5,000 inhabi-
tants—gathered at a meeting chaired by the mayor of Pasarean. Every 
three months, a collection was organised, with all landowners whose 
paddy fi elds produced more than 900 kg of rice at harvest-time—a 
quantity fi xed by the ulama of the village—having to make a contribu-
tion. Th e zakat rice was then distributed amongst fi ve types of benefi -
ciaries: poor people ( fakirs and miskins, “those who had real diffi  culty 
in surviving”); people participating in the spread of Islam, such as 
preachers (muballigh) and teachers ( guru); vagabonds (“those who could 
not leave Pasarean for want of money” who were given the name 
155 Between 1946 and 1960, the Masyumi press (Al-Djihad, Abadi, Hikmah and 
Suara Partai Masjumi ) regularly reported on the party’s initiatives in this area. 
Generally, these eff orts consisted in mutualising some money and tools under 
the aegis of a fi gure belonging to Masyumi or to Muslimat, and sometimes 
they merely consisted in offi  cialising the traditional custom of mutual assistance 
(gotong royong).
156 Ahmad, Dasar-Dasar Ekonomi Islam, p. 48.
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ibnusabil, meaning “sons of saints”); the members of the zakat com-
mittee who were classifi ed in the category of amils (religious offi  cials); 
the mualafs (a term which was understood here to mean “those whose 
religious beliefs are not yet very strong and not new converts as there 
are none of those in the village”); and fi nally the gharim, “those towards 
whom society is indebted owing to their participation in the war of 
independence”. In all, according to Hikmah, a total of 17 tons of rice 
(2,514 gedeng) were redistributed every year. Th is system was exemplary, 
according to Mohammad Natsir, because it was not only designed to 
relieve the misery of the poor, but was also supposed to allow them 
make a fresh start and participate once more in the village economy, 
as the benefi ciaries were encouraged to sell a part of their rice, which 
would enable them to set up a small business and thus escape from the 
poverty trap.157
 Th is method of organising the zakat in Pasarean clearly illustrates 
Masyumi’s approach to the Islamic society which it advocated. Th e 
party’s programme, far from being part of a radical break with the 
past, was in fact steadfastly anchored in the reality of 1950s Indonesia, 
adopting initiatives which had already been implemented, or simply 
citing them as examples. By doing so, it no doubt engendered a certain 
degree of emulation between various communities—both local and 
professional—and sometimes helped them to coordinate their activities. 
However, Masyumi never managed, either through its actions or its 
concrete proposals, to show how a modern state, using its laws, its 
budgetary policy and its administrative machinery, could harness the 
activity carried out by those communities and use it to bring about 
an Islamic society.
157 Hikmah, 2 November 1952.
Chap6 (348-408).indd   408 8/14/15   5:41:01 PM
Conclusion 409
409
chapter  s even
Conclusion
The task of summing up in a few short pages Masyumi’s place in the history of the relation between Islam and politics soon runs 
up against what appears to be a contradiction between the party’s two 
aspects. While it carried out an original experiment in Muslim demo-
cracy, founded on a sincere adherence to a Western-style parliamentary 
regime, it also incarnated an eminently classical form of integralist 
Islam, which occupied a moral position demanding respect for Islamic 
norms. Th e party’s multi-faceted heritage is no doubt less incongruous 
than it initially appears to be, however, and can provide valuable 
insights into the characteristics of Indonesian Islam. It also invites 
us to rethink our conception of the link between Islam and politics, 
both by analysing Masyumi’s ideology in relation to the doctrines of 
other Islamic movements and by comparing this Muslim-democratic 
party with other religions’ ventures into politics, notably the Christian-
democrats in Europe.
Laying Down Markers for a Muslim Democracy
Masyumi was without doubt one of the most comprehensive attempts 
in the history of the Muslim world to reconcile Islam and democracy. 
Nonetheless, this political experiment was never successfully completed, 
and for many Muslims, both in Indonesia and across the world, it is an 
area which remains as yet unexplored. Th e theories elaborated by the 
party’s main leaders and, more importantly, the nature of their involve-
ment in Indonesian politics in the 15 years following independence, 
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place them fi rmly in the tradition of a “conciliatory apology” 1 of Islam, 
as advocated by the founding fathers of modernism, Djamalal-Din 
al-Afghani and Mohammad ‘Abduh. However, unlike their illustrious 
predecessors who based “Islam’s adaptation to the modern world on 
a compromise rather than on an intellectual conversion”,2 Masyumi’s 
leaders clearly showed in their choices an almost total adherence to 
the political culture of modern Western society. In this respect, they 
were a lot closer to moderate Indian reformists such as Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan, Amr Ali and Muhammad Iqbal than to more radical thinkers like 
Mawdudi from Pakistan or al-Bannah and Sayyid Qutb from Egypt, 
to whom they are often compared in Indonesia.3
 One can certainly fi nd in the writings of Masyumi leaders some 
of the concepts which were defi ned by the forebears of modern funda-
mentalism. Like Hassan al-Bannah, Sayyid Qutb and Mawdudi, Natsir 
and his colleagues envisaged Islam as an all-encompassing ideology 
able to give contemporary meaning to both Indonesia’s society and its 
new state. Th ey also followed the example found in fundamentalist 
writings of interpreting politics and society through the prism of the 
Koran by reconsidering important Islamic notions such as ijma, shura 
or the Amarma’ruf Nahi Mungkar in the light of modern-day needs.
Th e programmes for a Muslim democracy drawn up by al-Bannag and 
Mawdudi, however, had theological foundations and were radically 
opposed to the western model. Th eir reinterpretation of Koranic 
vocabulary formed the basis of a type of Islamic government which 
distinguished itself markedly from Western regimes. Th e consensus of 
the ulama and the use of deliberation as a remedy, for example, were 
presented as tools particular to Muslim political culture; they were not 
common points with Western democracy, but rather alternatives to it.4
1 To use Olivier Roy’s expression. Olivier Roy, L’échec de l’Islam politique (Paris: 
Seuil, 1992), p. 59.
2 “L’affi  rmation musulmane au XXe siècle”, Encyclopaedia Universalis.
3 Th is is particularly the case with Harun Nasution, “Th e Islamic State in Indo-
nesia: Th e Rise of Ideology, the Movement for its Creation and the Th eory of 
the Masjumi”, MA thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 1965, pp. 133–65, and 
with Yusril Ihza Mahendra, “Modenisme dan Fundamentalisme dalam Politik 
Islam: satu Kajian Perbandingan kes Parti Masyumi di Indonesia dan Jama’at-i- 
Islami di Pakistan (1940–1960)”, PhD diss., Universitas Sains Malaysia, Pulau 
Pinang, Malaysia, 1993, published in 1999 in Jakarta by Paramadina.
4 See, in particular, Ali Aouattah, “L’Etat islamique d’al-Banna à Sayyed Qutb”, 
Etudes, February 1995.
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 For most of the Masyumi theorists, however, Islam did not have 
a problematic relation with Western political modernism. Th eir desire 
to assimilate the above-mentioned Islamic notions with European and 
American ideas led them to be seen as the champions of a programme 
of inclusiveness. “Th e state founded on the principles of Islam” which 
they aspired to did not present itself as a rival to parliamentary demo-
cracy but as a witness to the universality of democratic values. In this 
regard, they were much closer to the movement initiated by Muham-
mad Iqbal, sometimes known as “contemporary critical Islam”.5 Th e 
Muslim community’s duty of ijtihad, which Masyumi’s thinkers re-
minded them of, was fi rst and foremost to be practised with this con-
ciliatory aim in mind. It was not to be exercised so as to purify Islam 
like the “pious ancestors” had done, and even less so in order to bring 
about a return to the “original paradigm” of the Medina community 
and the early days of Islam, as advocated by Mawdudi.6 Th is explains 
the signifi cant room to manoeuvre that the Masyumi leadership pos-
sessed when drawing up its model of Islamic government. Not only 
were the self-proclaimed Islamic states in the Arabic peninsula with 
their undemocratic regimes not one of Masyumi’s models for Indo-
nesia’s new institutions, but in addition, no other regime in the history 
of the Muslim world, including the one founded by Mohammad in 
Medina, could claim to embody the party’s political ideal. Th e “return 
to the tradition of the Prophet was of course the basis of the reform 
(islah)” 7 called for by the founders of the modernist movement, but 
for Natsir and his partners, it was the spirit of this tradition and not 
its practices which mattered.
 Numerous authors have demonstrated the limits of the ambitions 
nurtured by the founding fathers of Muslim reformism. Al-Afghani, 
Mohammad ‘Abduh and Rachid Rida never undertook a scientifi c his-
torical analysis of Islam’s sacred texts and dogmas, for example.8 It 
should be said that Masyumi’s leaders never took on such a task either, 
5 See Rachid Benzine, Les nouveaux penseurs de l’islam (espaces libres) (Paris: Albin 
Michel, 2008 [1st edition, 2004]), pp. 52 ff .
6 Marc Gaborieau, “Le néo-fondamentalisme au Pakistan: Maudûdî et la Jamâ’at-
i Islâmî”, in Radicalismes islamiques, vol. 2, ed. Olivier Carré and Paul Dumont 
(Paris: L’Harmattan, 1986), pp. 33–76.
7 Roy, L’échec de l’Islam politique, p. 49.
8 Olivier Carré, “Islam apolitique et christianisme politique? Clarifi cation”, Revue 
tunisienne de sciences socials 111 (1992).
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at least not on a theoretical level. However, their refusal to be obliged 
to refer to Islam for their political positions when in opposition and 
more importantly for their policy decisions when in power, did consti-
tute a challenge to what some considered to be the absolute superiority 
of the divine norm over the democratic norm. When it came to con-
solidating this freedom and transforming it into a coherent doctrine, 
the party was certainly found wanting; nevertheless, if we refuse to 
believe that Masyumi’s policies were simply guided by a principle of 
inconsistency, we must consider its policies as the manifestation of an 
underlying theoretical refl ection.
 Maxime Rodinson noted in Islam, politique et croyance that the 
party’s doctrines often gave way to the demands of reality, and that for 
want of taking this obvious factor into account, too many observers 
attributed the party’s actions to its deference towards Islamic dogma.9 
He noted, for example, that the Catholic Church, despite the theo-
logical separation between the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of 
Man suggested by the Bible (“Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and 
unto God what is God’s”), had often sought temporal as well as spiri-
tual power. Th e fact that Islam, unlike Christianity, had emerged in a 
tribal society without any state structures and was thus forced by the 
circumstances of the day to allow the Islamist movement to sacralise 
this politico-religious structure which drew no distinction between a 
believer and a subject, and which obliged the divine norms to be trans-
posed into the state’s substantive laws. Like many other Muslims who 
became involved in politics, Masyumi’s leaders did not wish to detach 
themselves formally from this theoretical framework. If we focus on 
the party’s political record, however, there is no doubt that it adopted 
a minimalist and inconsistent approach to the link between religion 
and politics. Th e party’s distancing of itself from this classical Islamist 
model was initially a question of omission, which can be explained by 
the circumstances of the moment, and in particular the predicaments 
of a turbulent period in Indonesian history.10 What is much more 
9 Maxime Rodinson, L’Islam: politique et croyance (Paris: Fayard, 1993), p. 245.
10 Th e term “classical” here is to be understood in its common 20th-century con-
ception which considers religion and politics to be inextricably linked. For Olivier 
Carré, this vision of Islam constitutes a misrepresentation of its practices prior to 
the modern era. According to him, the true Muslim tradition advocates, on the 
contrary, a certain secularisation of institutions. Olivier Carré, L’Islam laïque ou le 
retour à la grande Tradition (Paris: Armand Colin, 1993).
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unusual, however, is the progressive disappearance of any reference 
to Islam in the party’s programmes, a phenomenon which reached 
its apogee in the government manifesto entitled “Choosing Masyumi 
means …”, drawn up before the 1955 elections. Th is document was, 
in a certain sense, the most signifi cant in the history of the party as it 
was supposed to lay the foundations for widespread popular support 
for the party. One could of course claim that this electoral programme 
merely cloaked the party’s crypto-Islamism which it had been forced 
into adopting because of the suspicions of religious intolerance and 
hostility towards democracy which hung like a pall over activist Islam. 
Th is would not explain Masyumi’s fi nal stand against the abuses of 
President Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, however. If one were to con-
sider that the party advocated the primacy of religion over politics, it 
should logically have condemned Sukarno’s programme in the name of 
Islam’s values, or at the very least mentioned them alongside the uni-
versal Western democratic values which they invoked. Th is was not the 
case, however—no such mention was made of Islam.
 Beyond these voluntary omissions of any reference to Islamic 
norms, two more concrete elements also reveal Masyumi’s emancipation 
from the classical political culture of Islamism. Th e fi rst of these was 
the party’s acceptance, and even defence, of the Republic of Indonesia 
as a nation-state, despite the fact that most movements which claimed 
to belong to political Islam condemned such recognition, preferring 
to aspire to the emergence of a form of Pan-Islamism which would at 
least be regional in nature.11 Masyumi, however, always considered the 
umma in a national context. Apart from a few rare trips overseas and 
occasional speeches, its party leaders never took any fi rm commitments 
in favour of Pan-Islamism. Th eir ideal of an Islamic state did not go 
beyond the borders which had been inherited from the Dutch and no 
claim was laid to any other Muslim territory in the region, such as 
the Malaysian peninsula, the south of the Filipino peninsula or Sabah 
and Sarawak. Th is attitude was all the more remarkable since certain 
thinkers within the nationalist movement at the time, notably Muham-
mad Yamin, mooted the idea of a Greater Indonesia. One of the con-
sequences of Masyumi’s relative lack of interest in Pan-Islamism was 
the total abandonment of any calls for the revival of the Caliphate. 
Th e party’s stance on this issue was not a unique one within modernist 
11 Roy, L’échec de l’Islam politique, p. 27.
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Islam. In 1938, the Algerian reformist Ibn Badis had already hailed 
the end of an institution which he deemed to be obsolete.12 Although 
numerous Muslim reformists wished to see the re-emergence of an 
authority capable of governing the entire Islamic community—Rachid 
Ria, for example, had argued in 1923 for its transformation into a 
sort of elective papacy (Imanat )—Masyumi never took up this cause.13 
Th e party’s criticism of Turkey and Mustapha Kemal was aimed at the 
brutal secularisation of Turkish society, particularly the ban on any reli-
gious education, and not at the removal of the Caliphate. Th is lack of 
interest in an institution which embodied the indissoluble link between 
politics and religion no doubt demonstrates a further step towards the 
emancipation mentioned earlier of the political sphere from religion.
 Th e second element which shows the party’s disengagement with 
the classical conception of Islamic political culture concerns the evo-
lution of the party itself. As Pierre Rondo has already pointed out, 
generally speaking, “Islam’s demand for unity makes it suspicious of 
the divisions which divide men into groups and factions, awakening in 
them particular allegiances and loyalties.” 14 We saw this very phenome-
non at work in 1945 in the months following the proclamation of 
independence when the representatives of the Islamic community tried 
to oppose the creation of a multi-partite system, arguing instead for 
the formation of a new single party, an alternative generally considered 
more in line with Islamic principles.15 After the KNIP’s decision to 
allow the creation of political parties, Masyumi continued to follow 
this unitary goal but limited it henceforth to the Muslim community. 
Th e desire to unify the political representation of Muslims was not just 
a tactical ploy on the part of Masyumi; it also echoed tawhid, the 
doctrine of divine oneness, and implied that there was only one type 
of political Islam possible. Over the years, however, this myth died 
away. Th is was in no small part due to Natsir’s leadership of the party, 
which forced it to clarify its aspirations, abandon its insular founda-
tions (leading to Nahdlatul Ulama’s painful split from the party in 
1952), and be one Muslim party among others. Yet again, however, 
this transformation was never actually formulated into a doctrine.
12 Ali Merad, L’Islam contemporain (Que sais-je?) (Paris: PUF, 1984 [5th edition, 
1995]), p. 79.
13 Ibid.
14 “Political Parties in the Muslim World”, Pouvoirs 12 (1979): 71–91.
15 Ibid.
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 All the above evidence clearly leads us to the conclusion that by 
refusing to systematically characterise their choices as choices made in 
the name of Islamic values, and by absolving themselves from obe-
dience to a certain form of international Islamist culture, Masyumi 
contributed to a detachment from the religious norm in Indonesia. By 
doing so, it led to the development in Indonesian politics of a certain 
secularisation, which I take here to mean “de-sacralisation”, a notion 
we shall come back to later. Such a stance is not without precedent 
in the recent history of the Muslim world. It recalls in particular the 
evolution which the Turkish party, the AKP, has undergone in recent 
years. A comparative study—between these two organisations focussing 
in particular on the similarities between the two countries’ experiences 
of secularisation and on the influence which their relations with the 
West had on the evolution of Muslim parties—would indeed be a 
fruitful one.16 It would no doubt confirm the hypothesis that the 
parties who occupied positions of power played a key role in bringing 
Islamic organisations to gradually elaborate a programme for Muslim 
democracy. Politicians who are confronted with the reality principle are 
much more capable of initiating such an evolution than learned groups 
of ulama.17
 The path followed by Masyumi, then, was part of a transforma-
tion in Muslim reformism which did not only affect Indonesia. What 
is unique, however, is the precociousness of this detachment from Islam 
by a political organisation which claimed to belong to that very same 
religion. Two reasons, which are both linked to peculiarities within 
Indonesian Islam, can explain this. Both of these reasons are linked 
to the sociological groups which provided the party’s breeding ground 
rather than to the political context of the day.
 The first of these reasons lies in the peripheral nature of Indo-
nesian Islam and its general composition which, in comparison with 
16 Turkish secularism, which was much more radical than its Indonesian counter-
part, was not, however, founded on the necessity for different religions to live 
together, as other religions had already disappeared from the country. See Jenny 
White, “The End of Islamism? Turkey’s Muslimhood Model”, in Remaking Muslim 
Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
17 Vali Nasir points this out in his article, with the help of several examples, 
including Turkey. Vali Nasir, “The Rise of ‘Muslim Democracy’”, Journal of 
Democracy 16, 2 (April 2005).
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the Arab world, is rather disparate.18 Because of its late development 
and the strong infl uence which syncretism had upon it, Indonesian 
Islam gave birth to a large range of religious attitudes, the political 
consequences of which we have already mentioned.19 As Masyumi was, 
broadly speaking, an inheritor of the Islamic reformist movement, it 
stood as a rival to abangan Islam and, after 1952, to traditionalist 
Islam. Unlike an organisation such as Persatuan Islam which cultivated 
a very elitist approach to its mission (an approach which led it to 
adopt intransigent positions), Masyumi’s leaders were concerned with 
the need to build a party with a broad appeal and were involved in 
the actual exercise of power. Th is lent them a much more acute sense 
of the necessity of taking events and circumstances into account when 
drawing up its policies. Th eir awareness of Indonesia’s social, cultural 
and political peculiarities made it impossible for them to attempt a 
literal application of some politico-religious doctrine imported from 
abroad and encouraged them to look for original solutions. In its 
search for such solutions, the party, paradoxically, was often guided by 
Sukarno. It did not adhere to the president’s ideals, of course, but on 
several occasions, he obliged it, in reaction to his proposals, to clarify its 
ideal and thus contributed to the elaboration of the model for Muslim 
democracy which it evoked.
 Pancasila, which was the embodiment of Sukarno’s political genius, 
played a vital role in this evolution. Th e national ideology, which 
Masyumi accepted, was chosen so as to forge Indonesia’s identity from 
its pre-Muslim past—etymologically, both the term “Pancasila” and the 
expression used to describe the principle of a unique God (Tuan yang 
Maha Esa) come from Sanskrit—and was opposed to the idea that the 
natural form of government for the country should be Islamic. Th e 
absence of a direct reference to any Arabo-Muslim concept situated it 
outside the narrow fi eld of Islamic references and thus, for Muslims, 
amounted to an involuntary step towards secularisation. Finally, and 
most importantly, it deprived Islamic parties of any exclusive right to 
interpret Pancasila’s religious values. Th e president made some skilful 
18 One should nonetheless be careful not to give too much credence to the notion 
that a pure form of Islam exists in the centre and a diluted form at the periphery. 
See Martin Van Bruinessen, “Global and Local in Indonesian Islam”, Southeast 
Asian Studies 37, 2 (September 1999).
19 See supra Chapter 1 and also M.C. Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society: Islamic 
and other Visions (c. 1830–1930) (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007).
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compromises on Pancasila, accepting changes of little consequence, 
such as the modifi cation of the order of the fi ve tenets which put the 
principle of a unique God in fi rst place; however, Sukarno and his allies 
were also able to remain fi rm on what was essential. Th e appearance 
in the Jakarta Charter of a direct reference to sharia law established a 
link between a person’s condition as a believer and his condition as a 
citizen and was thus unacceptable because it broke with the mindset 
of Pancasila; at the same time, none of what was contained in the fi ve 
principles was in contradiction with Islamic belief. Th e universal charac-
ter which allowed them to be interpreted as Islamic in spirit, if not 
in origin, meant that Pancasila’s principles could appear to be a step 
on the way towards Masyumi’s ideal state. In his June 1945 speech, 
Sukarno showed Muslims the way to follow in order to put into prac-
tice this process of Islamisation. It required, according to him, their 
participation in a Western-style parliamentary democracy. On the 
whole, then, Pancasila seemed suffi  ciently indigenous to appeal to a 
party aware of the political expediency of promoting an Indonesian na-
tional identity—though Masyumi did also try to Islamise Indonesian 
history through its portrayal of the country’s heroes—but also general 
enough in its terms to allow it to be adapted by the party to its Muslim 
ideals. Confrontation with democracy was the price to pay, but the 
hard core of Masyumi leaders who gravitated towards Soekiman and 
Natsir accepted this all the more easily as it resonated with their own 
personal convictions.
 Th is compromise, which formed the ideological basis for the 
country’s institutions and allowed the two main political forces—
nationalism and Islam—to confront each other in parliament, consti-
tuted one of the main peculiarities of Indonesian political life. It lasted 
a little over 10 years, continuing to work as long as each side could 
entertain hopes of political success. Th e more open the democratic de-
bate was, the further Masyumi distanced itself from a literalist Islamic 
conception of power.20 In fact, in the run-up to the 1955 elections, the 
20 Th us prefi guring the “substantialist” movement within Indonesian Islam, which, 
in line with Bachtiar Eff endy, considered that Pancasila was not secular as it does 
not reject in toto the normative aspects of Islam and allows laws to be made 
which are not in contradiction with the precepts of Islam. Bachtiar Eff endy, 
Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2003), particularly Chapter 4.
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“pancasilisation” of Islam within the party prevailed very much over 
the Islamisation of Pancasila. After 1956, however, the move towards 
Guided Democracy limited the party’s prospects and led it to modify 
its political message radically. Th ere is no doubt that one of the reasons 
for this was that any hopes they had for an Islamic interpretation of 
Pancasila were dashed by the new possibilities which the president was 
exploring, notably his desire to govern with the communists. Th is 
aff ront to Islamic orthodoxy was too brutal not to solicit a response 
from the Masyumi leadership within the Constituent Assembly: it was 
a radical one and led them towards a return to integralist Islam which 
we will again examine to below. Th e party’s reaction was quite diff erent 
outside the Assembly, however, where it attacked Sukarno’s plans by 
invoking a conception of democracy inherited from the West.
 Th e second factor which explains Masyumi’s evolution towards 
Islamic democracy was its position towards the infl uence of the West, 
which diff erentiated itself from other Islamic movements of the day. 
Th ere were no signs within the party of the sense of humiliation in 
relation to the West which Roland Palou noted in Mawdudi,21 nor was 
there any indication of “the reconstruction of a sense of identity … 
by individuals confl icted by their sense of belonging to two diff erent 
value systems”, which Jacques Couland has rightly identifi ed as one of 
the sources of radical Islam.22 Th e schooling received by those who 
attended the education system set up by the Dutch at the turn of the 
century made them the children of the colonial government’s ethical 
policy. Th is included the Masyumi party leaders of the 1950s who, like 
the secular nationalists, refused to put colonisation into the same basket 
as Western liberalism, which had been inspired by the Renaissance and 
the Enlightenment. Th ey did, however, adhere to an interpretation, still 
prevalent amongst Islamists today, which considers that the former had 
been spawned by the latter; but for Masyumi’s leaders, old Europe had 
sired other off spring also, in particular democracy, which the Muslim 
world not only could, but should, be inspired by.
21 Roland Palou, “Abul A’la Mawdudi, penseur de l’islam politique”, Etudes (July–
August 1996).
22 Jacques Couland, “Islam et politique au regard des formes historiques d’identi-
fi cation. Une esquisse”, La pensée 299 (Summer 1994).
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Th e Limits of Integralist Islam
Th e manner in which Masyumi laid down the markers for a Muslim 
democracy is analogous to the appearance of Christian democracy in 
Europe,23 but the history of the party also shows the limits of its 
attempts to establish such a form of government. Th e party’s liberal 
identity was linked to certain moments in its history and certain 
fi gures within its leadership. Leaders such as Natsir, Roem, Sjafruddin, 
Prawoto, and even Soekiman and Wibisono were the principal archi-
tects of its ideology before the 1955 elections, but others, such as 
Isa Anshary, Zainal Abidin Ahmad or Kasman Singodimedjo, also left 
their mark on the party, notably in the Constituent Assembly debates. 
During the Assembly’s attempts to draw up a new constitution, the 
latter group tirelessly represented a current which was eventually to 
prevail within the party leadership, advocating a form of government 
inspired by intergalist Islam, which, naturally enough, was diffi  cult to 
reconcile with the principles of democracy. One could put this meta-
morphosis down to a sea change within the party resulting from the 
victory of one branch over another, but it is not as simple as that. It 
was a transformation which should be considered more as a shift within 
the party caused by specifi c political contingencies which led it to 
favour one aspect of its political identity over another. It should be re-
membered that there was, after all, a general consensus within the party 
concerning the hardening of its stance in the Assembly, as is evidenced 
by the unconditional support of its deputies for this new position.
 At its foundation in November 1945, Masyumi’s numerous social 
benefi t programmes gave it the appearance of a party which refl ected 
an integralist conception of Islam. It seemed, then, to invite a parallel 
with an aspect of intransigent Catholicism in the late 19th century 
which aspired to solve all political and social problems through religion.24 
23 Th e description of Konrad Adenauer and his colleagues (“His political activity 
was carried out in a Christian manner, but he never claimed that this meant his 
policy was a Christian policy, and even less so that it was the Christian policy”) 
can in my view apply mutatis mutandis to Mohammad Natsir and his principal 
supporters within the party. Joseph Rovan, Konrad Adenauer (Paris, 1987), p. 13, 
quoted in Jean Dominique Durand, L’Europe de la Démocratie chrétienne (Paris: 
Ed. Complexes), p. 95.
24 Emile Poulat, Le catholicisme sous observation, du modernisme à aujourd’hui, 
Entretiens avec Guy Lafon (Paris: Le Centurion, 1983), pp. 100–1.
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Catholic and Islamic integralism were both animated by a rejection of 
secularisation and they vigorously combated any doctrine which either 
attempted to limit religion strictly to the private sphere or tried to 
separate religion from politics. For Masyumi, this characteristic was 
exemplifi ed by their desire to see the famous Jakarta Charter included 
in the preamble to the Constitution. Th e charter had been drawn up 
on 22 June 1945 and was subsequently forgotten until 1957, when 
it re-emerged during the debates in the Constituent Assembly. Its de-
mands revealed the limits of the party’s evolution towards a Muslim 
democracy: the words establishing an almost automatic link between 
one’s status as a believer in Islam and the obligation to be subject to 
its laws made a complete separation of religion and politics impossible. 
By demanding the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the Constitution, 
Masyumi was returning to a much more classical conception of Islam’s 
relation to politics, a relation based on the notion of divine oneness 
(tawhid ) which was “extended to the individual, whose practices are to 
be considered holistically and are not to be classifi ed according to the 
domain in which they operate.” 25 By opposing President Sukarno’s pro-
jects through a defence of parliamentary democracy, which could only 
be legitimised by universal suff rage, while at the same time demanding 
in the Constituent Assembly the recognition of an immanent norm 
which would apply to all, even the people’s representatives, Masyumi 
revealed the tensions and contradictions which it had been riddled with 
for years and which contributed to the radicalisation of some of its 
former leaders in the years after it was outlawed.
 What, then, were the shortcomings in Masyumi’s programme for 
democracy which led it to fall prey to the party’s integralist current? 
Th ere are two possible answers. Th e fi rst of these is linked to the poli-
tical events of the day, namely the party’s failure to secure a popular 
mandate. Th e programme for a Muslim democracy in Indonesia never 
actually received the democratic approval of its people. As we have 
already seen, Masyumi’s poor performance in the 1955 elections an-
nounced the end of Indonesia’s liberal period, leading to the party’s 
decline and to its adoption of a classically Islamist position. Th e voters’ 
refusal to back Masyumi did not, however, signify a rejection of its 
25 Roy, L’échec de l’Islam politique, p. 26.
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programme for democracy. Much of its potential electorate voted in-
stead for Nahdlatul Ulama, whose programme, though a little unclear, 
also called for a system of parliamentary democracy. Democracy, then, 
did not appear as a central issue in the election. Th e electorate made 
their choice along much older divisions partly pertaining to religious 
identity but even more so along fault-lines separating Java and the 
other regions in the archipelago. Th e second reason for the instability 
of Masyumi’s programme can be attributed to the institutional struc-
tures within Islam. A comparison with European Christian democracy 
off ers a few interesting analytical perspectives on this question.
 Th e development of a Christian movement in politics only took 
place once Christians had emancipated themselves from Catholic inte-
gralism under the permission granted by a series of papal concessions. 
Under pressure from Catholic liberal opinion, Rome gradually aban-
doned its opposition to the republican system of government along 
with its claim that the Church should dictate the political activism 
of its fl ock. In 1901, Pope Leo XIII issued the encyclical, Graves de 
Communi Re, which marked his desire to limit Christian democracy to 
works of social benefi t, thus preventing the movement from extending 
its activities to the fi eld of politics, while at the same time reminding 
the Catholic faithful that their political activity could only be exercised 
in accordance with the wishes of the Church’s hierarchy. In 1905, 
Pius X in his encyclical, Il Fermo Proposito, confi rmed the principles 
laid down by his predecessor, but at the same time opened the way 
for derogations to the general rule, which would allow Catholics to 
present themselves for election.
 Despite several setbacks, Christian parties gradually managed to 
emancipate themselves from the authority of the Catholic hierarchy, 
opening the doors for the emergence, after the Second World War, 
of the leading Christian democrat parties. Th e seeds for this diffi  cult 
compromise had been sown several decades previously during the fi rst 
debates dealing with the crisis of modernism, which provided the intel-
lectual and rhetorical framework for such a development. A good 
example of this was the rhetorical process which would allow the 
Catholic hierarchy to loosen the reins on its fl ock’s political activities 
without losing face—this involved condemning as “utterly reprehen-
sible” the freedom espoused by modernity as a thesis, while recognising 
as “legitimate” the same freedoms when they were hypotheses, that is 
to say “the appropriate dispensation for the specifi c conditions in a 
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particular country”.26 Using this possibility to contextualise Christian 
principles as his theoretical basis, the philosopher Jacques Maritain 
established his famous distinction between acting on a spiritual level 
“as a Christian”, and acting “in a Christian-minded way” on a temporal 
level. Th is affi  rmation of a separate temporal order was soon adopted 
by the Christian democrats.27 It did not mean that religion was to be 
completely evacuated from the political sphere, however, and so dis-
tinguished itself from secular parties. As the philosopher Etienne Borne 
later wrote: “Christian democrats refuse to allow politics to be a sepa-
rate and self-suffi  cient universe, and they maintain that politics can 
only have substance and meaning through a realm beyond politics.” 28
 Th rough its programmes and political activity, Masyumi managed 
to elaborate a doctrine which, on the whole, was quite comparable to 
that of Christian democracy. However, unlike its Christian counterparts, 
the party did not avail of an uncontested religious hierarchy which 
could validate its theoretical developments. Natsir and his party col-
leagues could establish de facto a category which distinguished “acting 
in a Muslim-minded way” on a temporal level from “acting as a Mus-
lim” on a spiritual level, but such theoretical developments remained 
fragile. Th ere was no requisite religious authority which would allow 
them to enshrine such a distinction in black and white in their party’s 
offi  cial doctrine. In the case of Catholicism, the dialogue between the 
clergy and their faithful enabled the former to continue holding the 
Truth (the “thesis”) while allowing the latter the task of dealing with 
the contingencies of the day and working out compromises (the “hypo-
theses”). Such a scenario was impossible for Masyumi, as some of its 
leaders, such as Natsir, were both religious dignitaries and politicians. 
Th us, when the party’s poor results in the elections and the changes in 
Indonesia’s political situation seemed to punish the failure of its deci-
sion to distance itself from Islam’s political culture, it soon reverted to 
sharia law, that “mainstay of Islamic culture … the only incarnation for 
26 Civilita Cattolica, 2 October 1863.
27 Durand, L’Europe de la Démocratie chrétienne, p. 120.
28 A lecture by Etienne Borne at the conference entitled La Démocratie chrétienne, 
force internationale, organised by H. Portelli and T. Jansen, Nanterre, 1986. 
Quoted in Durand, L’Europe de la Démocratie chrétienne, p. 94.
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Muslims of what would otherwise be a community of worshipers on a 
purely formal level.” 29
 In hindsight, then, one can see the perspicacity of Nurcholish 
Madjid’s analysis in 1971 of the party to which he was the putative 
heir. He called on the Muslim community to elaborate a theoretical 
framework and a reform programme around three intimately linked 
principles, namely secularisation, intellectual freedom and openness 
towards modernity—the tenets which, according to him, had eff ectively 
guided Masyumi’s policies. Nurcholish’s former mentors were shocked 
by his harsh judgement of their political failings and rejected his analy-
sis out of hand. Th ey focussed their attacks in particular on the term 
“secularisation” (sekularisasi ), which was unacceptable to them, despite 
the fact that Madjid had himself contrasted it with the word sekularisme 
which signifi ed an atheistic system of thought.30 Moreover, he went 
on to defi ne the eff ort required by the Muslim community as one of 
de-sacralisation (desakralisasi ), that is to say avoiding the sacralisation 
of human institutions which some Muslims inferred from the divine 
message. Madjid’s reasoning was part of an approach aimed at ridding 
politics of the shackles of religious norms, which was very much in 
line with the stance adopted by Masyumi throughout the period of 
parliamentary democracy. His falling out with the party’s former leaders 
could no doubt have been avoided if he had confi ned himself to using 
the term “de-sacralisation”, but referring to “secularisation” evoked the 
sensitive issue of internal tensions and contradictions within Masyumi 
during the 1950s.
 Although they never managed to gain theological approval for it, 
this theme of secularisation was one of the focal points around which 
Natsir and his supporters elaborated Masyumi’s policies. However, their 
29 H.A.R. Gibb, La structure de la pensée religieuse de l’Islam (Paris: Larose, 1950), 
p. 35.
30 “Th erefore secularization is not intended to apply secularism and change 
Muslims to be secularists. It is intended to profanize everything profane, and free 
Muslims from the tendency of sacralising the profane. Th e willingness to always 
re-evaluate a truth-value before material, moral or historical conditions, should 
be the very attitude of Muslims.” Quoted in Greg Barton, “Neo-modernism: A 
Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Modernist Islamic Th ought in Indonesia”, 
Studia Islamika 2, 3 (1995).
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approach was challenged by the more radical theorists within the party, 
such as Z.A. Ahmad and Isa Anshary, who criticised their 1955 election 
campaign for being based almost exclusively on references to Western 
democratic values without any explicit mention of Islam’s teachings. 
Following the party’s electoral defeat, they imposed a return to classic 
Islamist political demands, thus paralysing the proceedings in the 
Constituent Assembly.
 At fi rst sight, then, the Indonesian experience of political Islam 
appears to confi rm the observations made by H.A.R. Gibb, a specialist 
on Islam who claims that the absence of a religious hierarchy in Sunni 
Islam often ends up pushing “Islamic theology into adopting extreme 
positions”.31 On closer examination, however, the desire expressed by 
Masyumi during the debates in the Assembly to break with its pre-
election positions was not an overarching one. Although it would not 
be unreasonable to conclude from Mohammad Natsir’s political writings 
and actions that he recognised the principle of Islam’s sovereignty over 
Indonesia, he did not envisage any important political decision being 
taken without a democratic debate. Moreover, the majority of Indo-
nesia’s citizens, non-Muslims included, would probably have agreed 
that there existed within Islam a certain number of universal principles 
which were capable of providing the cornerstone for the Republic’s 
legal framework and of inspiring its laws.32 Th e identifi cation and ap-
plication of such principles would, naturally, have required an ambi-
tious project of interpretation taking into account the country’s cultural 
31 Gibb, La structure de la pensée religieuse de l’Islam, p. 41. As we have already 
seen, Gibb was an author whom Masyumi fi gures liked to quote, but for other 
reasons.
32 It is worth pointing out in this regard that beyond any questions of religion, 
general, non-written rules can sometimes prevail in a democratic state, insofar as 
they are founded on a general consensus. In France, for instance, since a land-
mark decision in 1971 concerning the freedom of association, the Constitutional 
Council has awarded itself the right to examine the conformity of acts passed by 
the legislature with “the fundamental principles recognized under the laws of the 
Republic.” Th is notion was invented by the Council, which reviews the constitu-
tionality of laws and is thus the only institution capable of defi ning these very 
“fundamental principles” which cannot be found in any legal document. Th e 
decision appears to be a serious violation of democratic principles, but it is now 
a universally accepted procedure, as it is based on a widespread consensus in 
French society.
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distinctiveness. Th is could only have come about through a search for 
consensus (mufakat), which was so important in Indonesian politics 
but was clearly lacking at that time in the Constituent Assembly. If 
the Assembly had not been dissolved, would Masyumi have managed 
to achieve within its ranks the cohesion necessary to win signifi cant 
cross-party support for such a project? An anecdote heard on the streets 
of Jakarta at the end of the 1990s holds a possible answer: during the 
debates in the Assembly, one of the Christian leaders was said to have 
gone in search of Mohammad Natsir in order to inform him that he, 
personally, was prepared to back the establishment of an Islamic state.33 
Th e one condition to his support, however, was a guarantee that Natsir, 
and Natsir alone, would be its president.
33 Th is story was recounted to me in September 2000 by Hoedaifah Koeddah, 
a fi gure belonging to the Pemuda Pancasila organisation, whose role during the 
New Order was rather murky.
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ep i logue
Archetypal Contradictions within 
Muslim Reformism in Indonesia: 
Masyumi as Inheritors 
and Perpetuators
Th e Chains of Guided Democracy 1
Masyumi’s leaders were the main opponents to President Sukarno’s slide towards authoritarianism, and they were to pay a heavy 
price for this when Guided Democracy emerged. An amnesty was 
promised to the rebels and promptly given to those who played a mili-
tary role, but the party fi gures who had participated in the PRRI 
uprising found themselves in jail as soon as they returned from Java. 
Mohammad Natsir was placed under house arrest in Malang in 1960 
before being transferred in 1962 to the military prison on Keagungan 
Street in Jakarta,2 while Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Boerhanoeddin 
Harahap were both arrested in 1961. Th e government’s crackdown was 
not confi ned to the rebels; those who supported them, even if they 
only did so verbally, were also imprisoned. In 1960, for example, 
1 For more detailed analysis of the questions raised here and of the transforma-
tions within Indonesian Islam since the New Order, see Andrée Feillard and 
Rémy Madinier, Th e End of Innocence: Indonesian Islam and the Temptations of 
Radicalism (Singapore: NUS Press, 2006). 
2 Moch. Lukman Fatahullah Rais, ed., Mohammad Natsir Pemandu Ummat (Jakarta: 
Bulan Bintang, 1989), p. 107.
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Kasman Singodimedjo, who had been detained since 1958 for having 
given a speech in Magelang in which he “willingly provided help to 
enemies during a state of war”,3 was sentenced to three years in prison.4 
Th e Masyumi leaders who had not participated in the Hijrah—to use 
the expression employed within the party to refer to the PRRI rebellion
—continued to meet regularly after their party was banned. Before 
they were arrested in 1962, Prawoto Mangkusasmito and Mohamad 
Roem were the unoffi  cial leaders of this “Masyumi family”, a role 
which was subsequently adopted by Faqih Usman, the president of 
Muhammadiyah.5 
 Between 1960 and 1962, numerous members of the Minang 
diaspora, who “had just come out of the jungle” after their participation 
in the PRRI uprising, began to gather in certain mosques in Jakarta.6 
An informal network soon sprang up around the Al-Azhar Mosque in 
the new district of Kebayoran, where activities such as preaching were 
developed, and themes were elaborated which were to become central 
to the party’s policies for many years, in particular the denunciation of 
Christianity. 
 Th e main force behind the party’s fragile revival was the former 
Masyumi deputy, HAMKA. Of Minang origin, he had become a mem-
ber of Muhammadiyah’s leadership and taken up the position of imam 
in the Al-Azhar mosque. His virulent opposition to Guided Demo-
cracy, which he branded as Totaliterisme in his speeches and in Pandhi 
Masjarakat—a monthly magazine which HAMKA founded in July 1959 
and whose title signifi ed “Society’s Banner”—in which he published an 
article entitled “Demokrasi Kita ” written by the former vice president, 
Mohammad Hatta, led in August 1960 to the banning of the maga-
zine. He enjoyed very cordial relations with the army’s top ranks, and 
this no doubt protected him from the fi rst wave of government arrests. 
According to his son, he regularly received visits from both Lieutenant-
3 Th e terms used in the indictment. Abadi, 24 August 1960.
4 Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman, Kasman Singodimedjo 75 tahun, Hidup itu 
berjuang (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1982), p. 224.
5 Deliar Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafi ti, 
1987), p. 411.
6 H. Rusydi Hamka, “Mengiringi Safari Da’wah warga Bulan Bintang”, in Pak 
Natsir 80 Tahun, buku pertama, Pandangan dan Penilaian Generasi Muda, ed. 
H. Endang Saifuddin Anshary and Amien Rais (Jakarta: Media Da’wah, 1988), 
pp. 15–25.
Epilogue (426-452).indd   427 8/14/15   5:42:09 PM
428 Islam and Politics in Indonesia
General Sudirman, who was the commandant of the Army Staff  and 
Command School, and Colonel Muchlas Rowi, head of the Army’s 
Muslim Spiritual Centre (PUSROH Islam angkatan Darat).7 In April 
1961, these two military fi gures, acting on behalf of General Nasution, 
the Army Chief of Staff , encouraged HAMKA to launch a new Islamic 
magazine, and in April 1962, with the help of money provided by 
Nasution, the fi rst edition of Gema Isalm (“the Echo of Islam”) was 
published. In theory, Lieutenant-General Sudirman was the newspaper’s 
publisher and Colonel Rowi its editor-in-chief, but in actual fact, it, 
was run by HAMKA. 
 Th e Al-Azhar mosque became a refuge point for those concerned 
at the growing infl uence of the Communist Party over the government. 
As Indonesia at that time was being ruled under a state of emergency, 
no political meetings were authorised, but despite this ban, every 
Friday after prayer, numerous fi gures gathered at meetings presided by 
HAMKA in order to discuss the country’s future.8 At these gatherings, 
the beginnings of an alliance emerged between the army and the 
Muslim leaders who had not taken part in the Guided Democracy pro-
gramme. In 1961, General Nasution and his military staff  took the 
symbolic decision to celebrate idul fi tri at the Al-Azhar mosque, while 
Sukarno and his ministers gathered at the Palace mosque.9 In addition, 
the system used to organise da’wah at Al-Azhar inspired others to imi-
tate this model: General Sudirman, along with several offi  cers, founded 
the Higher Institute of Islamic Preaching (Perguruan Tinggi Dakwah 
Islam, PDTI) and in several regions, local da’wah organisations were 
created, often run by former Masyumi activists.10 Th is burgeoning 
opposition force made HAMKA one of the favourite targets for the 
LEKRA and the Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional (LKR), both of which 
were cultural organisations close to the Communist Party and the PNI. 
Th e magazine Bintang Timur (“the Star of the East”), for example, 
launched a virulent campaign against him in October 1962, claiming 
that three of his novels were plagiarised from the Egyptian writer 
7 H. Rusydi Hamka, Pribadi dan Martabat, Buya Prof. DR. Hamka (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Panjimas, 1983), p. 165.
8 HAMKA, “Mengiringi Safari Da’wah warga Bulan Bintang”.
9 HAMKA, Pribadi dan Martabat, Buya Prof. DR. HAMKA, p. 166.
10 Ibid.
11 Di bawah Lindungan Ka’bah (1938), Tenggelamnya Kapal van der Wijk (1938) 
and Di dalam lembah Kehidupan (1940).
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Mustafa Lutfi  al-Manfaluti (1876–1924),11 while the daily newspaper 
Merdeka denounced the activities of “new-Masyumi” in the Al-Azhar 
Mosque. 
 Shortly afterwards, in a second wave of arrests, almost all of 
the remaining former leaders of Masyumi who had not yet been 
brought into custody were locked up. Along with Prawoto Mangku-
sasmito, who had recently called for Sukarno to be tried for violating 
the Constitution, Mohamad Roem, Yunan Nasution, E.Z. Muttaqien 
and Isa Anshary were all imprisoned in Madiun.12 Th e following year 
in 1963, government repression hit the outer circle of the Masyumi 
family, starting in November with the detention of, Anwar Harjono, 
the leader of GPII, who was held for two months at the army’s head-
quarters before being placed under house arrest.13 In late December 
and early January, HAMKA, Ghazali Sjahlan and Jusuf Wibisono were 
all arrested: they were accused of having taken part in a secret meeting 
held a few months previously in Tanggerang at the house of a former 
Masyumi member, Arif Suhaemi, during which a secret plot was 
hatched to overthrow the government. Th e former minister for fi nance, 
Jusuf Wibisono, had been one of the few party leaders to clearly con-
demn the participation of his party colleagues in the PRRI and so his 
arrest clearly indicated that the regime was hardening its attitude to-
wards all who had occupied a position within Masyumi’s leadership. 
After the failure of the Constituent Assembly to carry out its mission, 
he had called for a rapprochement with Sukarno, and he was subse-
quently appointed to the leadership of the National Front by the presi-
dent. Wibisono had cut off  ties with all his former party colleagues, 
apart from Soekiman who had withdrawn from public life and as such 
did not represent a threat for Sukarno’s regime; he was nonetheless held 
in detention without trial for almost three years.14
Disenchantment with the New Order 
In the wake of the crisis which shook the country between 1965 and 
1966, the advent of a new Indonesian order asserting its opposition to 
12 Noer, Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional, p. 415.
13 Lukman Hakiem, Perjalan Mencari keadilan dan persatuan: Biografi  Dr Anwar 
Harjono (Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 1993), p. 13.
14 I.N. Soebagijo, Jusuf Wibisono. Karang di Tengah Gelombang (Jakarta: Gunung 
Agung), pp. 247 ff .
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Sukarno’s abuse of power raised great hopes amongst the leaders of the 
now-defunct Masyumi. Th ey hoped that the moribund regime’s treat-
ment of the organisation and its members would enable them to 
claim a prominent role in the new political dispensation. Th is hope 
was short-lived, however, as the new government’s strategy towards the 
two branches of political Islam—traditionalism and modernism—soon 
turned out to be very similar in nature to the approach adopted by 
the Guided Democracy system. 
 In December 1965, while most of Masyumi’s leaders were still in 
prison, a Coordination Committee for Islamic Activities was created, 
designed to bring together all the Islamic organisations campaigning 
for Masyumi’s reinstatement. It received the support of several army 
offi  cers who wished to see Nahdlatul Ulama’s infl uence diminished and 
who were of the belief that the modernist branch within Islam could 
not remain unrepresented any longer.15 As the Masyumi leaders were 
progressively released from prison—the last in early 1967—they began, 
from May 1966, to hold meetings at 58 Menteng Raya Street in an 
attempt to adopt a common strategy.16 Th ese gatherings of Islamic 
modernists soon gave birth to two competing projects. Th e fi rst one 
proposed purely and simply to revive Masyumi, banking on the good 
relations which existed between its former leaders and certain high-
ranking military offi  cers—General Sudirman, in particular. Th e second 
proposal was put forward by the former vice president, Mohammad 
Hatta, and his supporters, who, deeming Masyumi to have been a 
failure, intended to found a new organisation. Th is second group was 
composed of former leaders of Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, notably 
Mohammad Daud Ali, Ismail Metareum and Nurcholish Madjid 
(though Madjid later distanced himself from the group), but also 
received support from fi gures who formerly belonged to the Masyumi 
family. Hanwar Harjono, for example, took part for a while in the 
meetings before rallying behind Natsir,17 while Jusuf Wibisono, who had 
always been critical of his former party colleagues’ choice of strategy, 
also threw his support behind Hatta.18 
15 Allan A. Samson, “Islam in Indonesian Politics”, Asian Survey (December 1968).
16 Deliar Noer, Aku bagian Ummat, aku bagian Bangsa, otobiografi  (Bandung: 
Mizan, 1996), p. 590. Most of Masyumi’s leaders were released in May and June 
1966.
17 Ibid., p. 592.
18 Soebagijo, Jusuf Wibisono. Karang di Tengah Gelombang, p. 331.
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 It was the army who fi nally settled the debate between these two 
groups. In the second half of 1966, the president of the Committee 
for the Revival of Masyumi, Sjarif Usman, held several meetings with 
infl uential military offi  cers, such as Generals Amir Machmud, Kemal 
Idris, Sutjipto and Alamsjah as well as Colonel Murtopo. A spirit of 
optimism reigned at that time: during the second army seminar orga-
nised at Bandung, a resolution was taken to allow the former leaders 
of outlawed parties to once again take an active part in public life.19 
However, on 21 December 1966, the army’s regional commandants 
published a report, whose main aim was to prevent any political coups 
or manoeuvring by Sukarno, stressing that the army would take reso-
lute action against any group that contravened Pancasila or the 1945 
Constitution, as Gesapu, Darul Islam, Masyumi, the Socialist Party and 
the PKI (during the Madiun Rebellion) had all done.20 Th is strategy 
of recalling the party’s rebellious past soon became the New Order’s 
offi  cial policy. On 26 January 1967, General Suharto announced that 
the armed forces and the soldiers’ families who had suff ered during the 
campaigns against Darul Islam and then against the PRRI were not 
ready to accept Masyumi’s reinstatement.21 Th e government’s decision 
was an irrevocable one and when Prawoto Mangkusasmito protested 
strenuously against it, Colonel Ali Murtopo reminded him that “the 
prison door was still wide open”.22 In response to this impasse, Deliar 
Noer, who was able to observe these negotiations at close range, tried 
to convince Natsir and Prawoto to lend their support to Mohammad 
Hatta. Th e two men, however, despite their sympathy for the former 
vice president’s programme, felt imbued with a sense of moral duty 
towards their supporters, and so refused to abandon their campaign 
for the revival of Masyumi.23 In any case, the question soon became a 
moot one, as in May 1967, Suharto indicated to Mohammad Hatta that 
the government would not authorise him to establish his Indonesian 
Islamic Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia, PDII).24
19 K.E. Ward, Th e Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 24–5.
20 B.J. Boland, Th e Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (Th e Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff , 1982), p. 190.
21 Ward, Th e Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia, p. 25.
22 Noer, Aku bagian Ummat, aku bagian Bangsa, p. 593. 
23 Ibid. At the time, Deliar Noer was part of Suharto’s committee of political 
advisors.
24 Deliar Noer, Mohammad Hatta, biografi  politik (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1990), p. 648.
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 By mid-1967, the eff orts of those who supported a return of 
Islamic modernism to the political scene had come to naught. At this 
point, they resolved to begin the foundation of a new political party, 
the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi). Th e government authorised 
its creation on the express condition that none of the former Masyumi 
leaders would be able to sit on the party’s governing bodies. When 
Parmusi’s inaugural congress was held in Malang in December 1968, 
the participants were fi rmly reminded of this requirement, which 
Suharto had promised to remove after the general elections.25 Initially, 
the leadership that the party members elected was dominated by former 
members of the modernist party: Mohamad Roem was the president, 
and beside him on the executive committee were, amongst others, 
Anwar Harjono and Hasan Basri. Figures deemed to be too close to the 
government, such as Agus Sudono, Naro and Sanusi, were overlooked.26 
Although the most troublesome former Masyumi leaders withdrew 
voluntarily from the election, the government nonetheless let it be 
known on the last day of the congress that they would refuse to recog-
nise the new party’s leaders. Th e former Masyumi leaders therefore had 
to stand down and leave their positions to the provisional leadership 
which had already received the authorities’ approval in February 1968. 
Th e provisional leadership was composed mainly of Muhammadiyah 
leaders, such as Djarnawi Hadikusuma and Lukman Harun, who had 
never played any role in Masyumi.27 Th e only individual close to Natsir 
and Prawoto, who served for a while on Parmusi’s leadership, was the 
former GPII fi gure, Hanwar Harjono.
 Following Parmusi’s congress, the government proceeded to ex-
clude the modernist branch once and for all from the political land-
scape in two stages. In 1969, the government fomented serious disputes 
within Parmusi and placed one of its allies, John Naro, at the head 
of the party. Its credibility with Masyumi’s former electorate had com-
pletely disappeared by the 1971 elections, during which the party only 
received 5.4% of the vote. Two years later, the Suharto administration 
began a “rationalisation” of political life which consisted in obliging 
parties to gather under one of three umbrella organisations which 
were supposed to represent the main currents in society. Parmusi, the 
25 Ibid., p. 57.
26 Ibid., pp. 52–3. Natsir was not even present at the congress. 
27 For the composition of this provisional leadership, see ibid., p. 38.
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PSII, Perti and NU were all to be part of the United Development 
Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) representing political Islam. 
Having already succeeded in sabotaging the political rebirth of Islamic 
modernism, the government was now attempting to neutralise Nahdla-
tul Ulama which had almost unwittingly become the symbol of Islamic 
opposition to the regime. Although the traditionalist party had received 
the support of almost 70% of Muslims and 18.7% of the total elec-
torate in 1971, it only received 44% of the seats allotted to the PPP 
representatives in the new assembly.28 Th is was scarcely more than the 
percentage received by Parmusi (with 5.4% of the popular vote), and 
from that point on, Masyumi’s abortive successor was fi rmly established 
as the New Order’s fi fth column within the Muslim community. 
 More than fi ve years after their release from prison, the former 
leaders of Masyumi remained pariahs on the Indonesian political land-
scape. Th eir struggle for the revival of their former party and their 
attempt to maintain its legacy had both ended in complete failure due 
to three major obstacles. 
 Th ey were fi rst of all the victims of the new regime’s fears. Presi-
dent Suharto’s refusal to allow the modernist movement to re-emerge 
refl ected, above all, his concern that those who had appeared as the 
most ardent defenders of Western-style parliamentary democracy be-
tween 1957 and 1960, were to be excluded from political life. Following 
the example of the Sukarno regime during the 1960s, the New Order 
reorganised the political landscape by means of a clever manipulation 
of special interests, and it could not condone the revival of a political 
movement inspired by Masyumi and Mohammad Hatta which, a few 
years earlier, had opposed the very same abuse of power. In addition, 
with its resolutely Western form of modernism and its culture of demo-
cracy, Masyumi may have appeared, in the eyes of the New Order 
generals, as a dangerous rival in their quest for American approval. 
 Th e second obstacle which attempts to reinstate the modernist 
party concerned the interests of its traditionalist rival. With the re-
emergence of a modernist party whose legitimacy was reinforced by its 
long-standing opposition to the PKI, Nahdlatul Ulama was in danger 
of being subjected to fresh criticism over their support for the Old 
Order, as well as running the risk of losing its dominant position within 
28 Andrée Feillard, Islam et armée dans l’Indonésie contemporaine: Les pionniers de 
la tradition, Cahier d’Archipel 28 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1995), p. 143.
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Indonesian Islam and its monopoly over the Ministry of Religious 
Aff airs. Under the leadership of Kiyayi Wahab, NU had adopted a 
strategy which was radically diff erent to Masyumi’s. Th e traditionalist 
party had considered that the struggle against communism would be 
better served from inside the government, and so took the risk of 
giving its unconditional support to Sukarno, while simultaneously 
leading a vigorous campaign to counter the spread of the PKI in the 
countryside.29 Th is struggle culminated during the 1966–67 massacres 
in which Anshor, the NU youth movement, played an important role. 
NU’s participation in this dramatic episode which marked the birth of 
the New Order, did not, however, signify the creation of an alliance 
between the founders of the new regime and the traditionalists against 
their modernist rivals. It remains diffi  cult to determine the extent of 
the former’s participation in the manoeuvres aimed at thwarting the 
modernists, and what’s more, Nahdlatul Ulama also ended up being a 
victim of the New Order’s policy of “political rationalisation”. None-
theless, certain former Masyumi members did not hesitate to make 
specifi c accusations. Husni Th amri, for example, declared that two NU 
leaders, Idham Chalid and Subchan ZE, had approached Ali Murtopo 
and other New Order leaders in order to convince them to annul the 
election of former Masyumi fi gures at the congress in Malang.30 
 Finally, Masyumi’s former leaders were also faced with a signifi cant 
generation gap between themselves and the young Muslim activists who 
had played a primordial role in establishing the New Order but who 
did not support the modernist party’s cause. From 1964, harsh criti-
cism of large Muslim organisations began to circulate in the Koranic 
schools in Java. Th e young santris criticised equally Nahdlatul Ulama, 
whom they accused of being opportunistic, and Masyumi for being too 
Westernised.31 In addition to that, the main leaders of the the GPII—
29 Ward, Th e Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia, p. 62n21. Like its pre-
dicament in 1959 over how to react to Guided Democracy, NU was divided 
over the question of which attitude to adopt towards Sukarno, who continued to 
support the PKI. Th e young generation who was active in Anshor criticised on 
numerous occasions the “opportunistic” attitude of the traditionalist leaders, and 
eventually it was the most anti-communist leaders, such as Subchan Z.E., who 
prevailed within the movement after September 1965. 
30 Ibid., p. 62.
31 Lance Castles “Notes on the Islamic School at Gontor”, Indonesia, 1, April 
1966.
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E.Z. Muttaqien, Soemarsono, Achmad Buchari and Anwar Haryono—
had been imprisoned along with the older counterparts in Masyumi. 
Th ere was no advantage to be gained for them in participating in the 
events of 1965–66, and so this left the way clear for the Association 
of Muslim Students (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI). Although 
HMI was very close to the modernist movement, it always insisted 
on maintaining its independence vis-à-vis Natsir’s party. Following the 
advent of the New Order, some of its leading fi gures let it be known 
that they viewed the Masyumi more as “wrecks” of the old regime 
than as heroes who deserved a place in the new dispensation.32 In this 
strained atmosphere of the late 1960s, a new generation of Muslim 
intellectuals emerged. In 1967 in Yogyakarta, a small discussion group 
known as the “Limited Group” began to meet regularly at the house 
of Professor H.A. Mukti Ali, whose main admirers included Ahmad 
Wahib, Djohan Eff endi, Dawam Rahardjo and Nurcholish Madjid. 
Th e latter, who had been president of HMI since 1966, was one of 
the great bright hopes of the modernist party. He was often called “the 
young Natsir” (Natsir Muda) and enjoyed an excellent relationship with 
Masyumi’s former president who saw in him the embodiment of a pos-
sible resurgence of the party. Madjid himself, however, soon defl ated 
the hopes which the party had invested in him when, on 3 February 
1970, he gave a lecture before a gathering of student organisations 
entitled “Th e Necessity for a Renewal of Muslim Th ought and the 
Integration of the Umma ” (Keharusan Pembaruan Pemikran Islam dan 
Maslah Intergrasi Umat). His thesis was founded on a very harsh 
appraisal of the endeavours of Muslim parties. For Nurcholish, their 
leaders had lost all credibility in the eyes of public opinion and had 
discredited the political ideal which they wished to bring about. Th e 
prevailing mood within the Islamic community at that time was “Islam, 
yes! Islamic Party, no!” 33
 Nurcholish Madjid’s lecture was seen as a betrayal by the former 
Masyumi leaders, especially given that the address was not published 
in the Muslim press but in the socialist-oriented Indonesia Raya. Natsir 
32 Ward, Th e Foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia, p. 31.
33 Greg Barton, “Neo-Modernism: A Vital Synthesis of Traditionalist and Mod-
ernist Islamic Th ought in Indonesia”, Studia Islamika 2, 3 (1995). Th e transcript 
of Nurcholish Madjid’s lecture was published in Islam Kemodernan dan Keindo-
nesiaan (Bandung: Mizan, 1987).
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and those close to him castigated the secularisation (sekularisasi ) which 
Nurcholish was promoting.34 Th is dispute, which we will revisit later, 
no doubt contributed to the embitterment of Masyumi’s former leaders 
and thus to the radicalisation of their message. 
Th e Besieged Citadel and the Sanctuary Aff orded by 
the Da’wah
In 1967, Mohammad Natsir and his closest supporters—Mohamad 
Roem, Anwar Harjono and Yunan Nasution—founded the Indonesian 
Islamic Propagation Council (Denwan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, DDII). 
DDII emerged from the Indonesian Islamic community’s recognition 
that they needed a renewal, and it provided them temporarily with an 
organisation to rally around. As the prospect of their former party’s 
rehabilitation grew increasingly less likely, it became the sanctuary in 
which Masyumi’s values could be safeguarded but also one in which 
they would be transformed.35 
 Some of the former Masyumi leaders did not join the DDII, 
including Jusuf Wibisono and Soekiman who had considered for a 
period of time the idea of establishing their own party. Th ey envisaged 
a party which would be founded on Islam but which “mustn’t be too 
religious” (tidak terlalu agamis). However, having consulted with fi gures 
within the new regime, they were soon persuaded to renounce these 
plans.36 Jusuf Wibisono decided to join the ranks of the PSII (he claims 
to have done so in mid-1970), but the party’s poor results, which he 
attributed to unfair competition from Golkar, led him to retire from 
politics defi nitively.37 
34 Further reading on this issue can be found in Marcel Bonneff , “Les intellectuels 
musulmans, le renouveau religieux et les transformations socio-culturelles de 
l’Indonésie”, in Renouveaux religieux en Asie, ed. Catherine Clémentin-Ojha 
(Paris: École française d’Extrême-Orient, 1997).
35 On the popularity within Masyumi of the term dakwah (proselytization), which 
replaced the term tabligh (transmission) and gave a broader dimension to its 
mission, see Yudi Latif, Indonesian Muslim, Intelligentsia and Power (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), pp. 350–1.
36 Soebagijo, Jusuf Wibisono. Karang di Tengah Gelombang, p. 311.
37 K.E. Ward claims that Jusuf Wibisono and Soekiman became members of the 
PSII shortly after Masyumi was banned in 1960, but Wibisono vehemently con-
tests this claim. Ibid., p. 312. 
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 Dewan Dakwah’s headquarters were located in Masyumi’s former 
central offi  ce at number 45 Jalan Kramat Raya and remained the only 
stable landmark for a generation of modernists who had grown dis-
enchanted with Indonesia’s social and political transformations. Th e 
organisation launched into an energetic publishing programme, with 
the monthly journal Serial Media Dakwah—initially aimed at an edu-
cated readership and later to become Media Dakwah—becoming its 
fl agship publication. Other publications produced by the organisation 
included: Suara Masjid, geared towards a more modest audience and 
containing commentaries of sacred texts in very accessible language; 
Serial Khutbah Ju’mat, which proposed sermons to be used by those 
who preached on Fridays; Sahabat aimed at children; and Buletin 
Dakwah, which was a simple leafl et distributed outside mosques after 
Friday prayer.38 
 It was these publications which diff used the modernist movement’s 
radicalised new message. During the 1950s, the Masyumi leaders were 
moderate, confi dent and imbued with a remarkable spirit of tolerance, 
but like the vast majority of the Islamic movement worldwide, they 
gradually succumbed to a siege mentality. Th e West, which up until 
that point had been seen as an ally against communism, was now 
considered a threat. Th ere was a marked change in tone towards the 
Christian community from the early years of the New Order. By 1966, 
rumours began to circulate within the Muslim community describing 
mass conversions by Muslims to Christianity, and the triumphalist 
declarations by Protestant missionaries claiming that they had won 
over two million converts added further fuel to such talk.39 Although 
such assertions were not completely baseless, they were nonetheless 
blown out of proportion. According to Robert Hefner, nearly 500,000 
people were concerned by this wave of conversions; in certain towns in 
West Java, the Christian population rose from one or two per cent of 
the population in the 1950s to more than 10 per cent in the 1970s. 
38 H.M. Yunan Nasution, “Pak Natsir, pemandu ummat”, in Mohammad Natsir 
Pemandu Ummat, ed. Moch. Lukman Fatahullah Rais (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 
1989), p. 15.
39 Further reading on these declarations can be found in Avery T. Willis, Th e 
Indonesian Revival: Why Two Million Came to Christ (South Pasadena, CA: William 
Carey Library, 1977).
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Th ese converts came for the most part from former bastions of commu-
nism where the population had been traumatised by the massacres of 
1966–67 and the role played in them by certain Islamic organisations.40
 Masyumi’s former leaders soon became concerned about this 
phenomenon, and in 1967, HAMKA published his fi rst anti-Christian 
diatribes in Pandji Majarakat.41 His tone had changed radically from 
the 1950s: his tolerant attitude towards the anti-Christian violence 
perpetrated in Jakarta and Makassar reveals the insularity which had 
taken hold of his supporters and their feeling that Christians were 
taking advantage of their economic superiority to compete unfairly with 
Islam.42 In response to these early incidents, the government organised 
on 30 Nov 1967 a consultation meeting between the dignitaries of the 
country’s diff erent religious communities at which the Muslim commu-
nity was represented by Natsir, Rajidi, Fakih Usman, Prawoto Mangku-
sasmito and HAMKA. Th eir call for a modus vivendi to be established 
by the government which would outlaw any proselytising amongst 
the members of other religions was rejected by representatives of the 
Christian community on grounds that it would violate human rights.43 
 Dewan Dakwah, which saw itself as a sanctuary able to preserve 
Islam’s threatened identity, sent an increasing number of preachers to the 
regions it deemed to be the most vulnerable to Christian conversion.44 
Th rough the organisation’s publications, former Masyumi leaders 
showed their adoption of the new Islamist message being spread across 
the world, which considered the West as a corrupt oppressor to be 
combated. In the 1950s, the modernist party had focussed its attention 
on national problems, but now its former leaders were opening up 
to the causes pursued by the international Islamic community. Th e 
Six-Day War in 1967 and especially the Yom Kippur War of 1973 
40 Robert W. Hefner, “Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries among 
Indonesian Muslims”, Indonesia 64 (October 1997): 77–103.
41 HAMKA, Pribadi dan Martabat, Buya Prof. DR. Hamka, p. 173.
42 “All of these confl icts arose because of Christians who had apparently taken 
advantage of the transition period between the Old Order and the New Order to 
spread their religion within the Muslim community which, at the time, was both 
politically and economically weakened.” Ibid., p. 174.
43 Mujiburrahman, “Feeling Th reatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indone-
sia’s New Order”, ISIM dissertations, Amsterdam University Press, 2006, p. 41.
44 Hefner, “Print Islam”.
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reinforced their involvement in the Arab-Israeli confl ict, at least at a 
verbal level. Th ey established an increasing number of contacts through-
out the Muslim world and made more and more trips to Malaysia. 
Mohammad Natsir occupied important positions within international 
Muslim institutions: during the 1970s, he was vice president of the 
World Islamic Congress (Muktamar Alam Islami) in Karachi and a 
member of the World Organisation of Mosques (Organisasi Masjid 
Sedunia) in Mecca.45 Th e foreign ties which Dewan Da’wah’s leaders 
established allowed the organisation to become part of international 
Islamic fi nancial networks. It was able to benefi t, for example, from 
the generous donations which came from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt 
and Pakistan.46 
 Th e ideology transmitted by the DDII since the 1960s turned out 
to be based on the same ambivalence as Masyumi’s had been, albeit 
of a diff erent nature. In the 1950s, the modernist party emphasised a 
broad-minded approach towards the interpretation of the Koran at the 
expense of the literalist interpretation defended by Persis; 20 years later, 
the requirements related to the application of sharia law dominated the 
question. Moreover, Dewan Dakwah was more effi  cient in its campaign 
for the Islamisation of the country’s institutions than Masyumi had 
been when in government. It was behind vast campaigns which mobi-
lised the Muslim community and forced the government to make 
signifi cant concessions: a law on marriage in 1974; obligatory religious 
education in 1988; and most importantly, the 1989 law allowing a 
large degree of autonomy to sharia courts.47 Th e organisation’s main 
publication, Media Da’wah, became the mouthpiece for a branch of 
Islam which the political scientist R. William Liddle called “scrip-
turalist” and “fundamentalist”.48 Th e magazine reacted violently to the 
use of these terms. Th eir response to Liddle’s article was published 
45 Nasution, “Pak Natsir, pemandu ummat”, p. 19.
46 Hefner, “Print Islam”.
47 On these advances made by Islamic law, see Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra, 
eds., Sharia and Politics in Modern Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2003).
48 R. William Liddle, “Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Poli-
tical Th ought and Action in New Order Indonesia”, in Toward a New Paradigm: 
Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Th ought, ed. Mark R. Woodward 
(Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University, 1996).
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below a caricature of the illustrious professor depicted with a Star of 
David in the background, thus illustrating his very remarks.49 
 Th e former Masyumi members who belonged to DDII none-
theless retained an almost atavistic attachment to the principles of 
democracy and for this reason refused to bargain with the New Order. 
Very few of them accepted to sit on any of the new regime’s institu-
tions. Although HAMKA accepted the leadership of the newly created 
Indonesian Council of Ulama, he was severely criticised for this deci-
sion by his former party colleagues and resigned in 1981 after a dispute 
with the minister for religions.50 
 Relations between former Masyumi members and the government 
remained tainted with mutual suspicion. Th e army had long suspected 
the party’s former leaders of their involvement in the violent demonstra-
tions which punctuated the Japanese prime minister’s visit in January 
1974.51 Mohammad Natsir showed himself to be very critical towards 
the regime, and was accustomed to saying that “Sukarno was a gentle-
man in comparison with Suharto.” 52 In May 1980, along with Anwar 
Haryono, he signed the “petition of the fi fty” (Petisi 50) criticising the 
government’s use of Pancasila to muffl  e opposition to it. Like most 
of the petition signatories, Natsir was subsequently no longer allowed 
to leave the country, though he did not feel especially intimidated by 
this measure. In 1990, three years before he died, he co-authored with 
General A.H. Nasution and the former PNI leader Sanusi Hardjninata, 
a book entitled Indonesia at a Crossroads (Indonesia di persimpangan 
jalan) in which the Suharto regime was criticised for betraying the 
social ideals of the Revolution and for concentrating power in a small 
number of hands. 
Inheritors and Perpetuators
Th e creation of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals 
(Ikatan Cendekawan Muslimin Indonesia, ICMI) in 1990 under the 
49 Hefner, “Print Islam”.
50 HAMKA, Pribadi dan Martabat, Buya Prof. DR. Hamka, p. 217.
51 Abadi was once again banned. François Raillon, Les étudiants indonésiens et 
l’Ordre Nouveau. Politique et idéologie du Mahasiswa Indonesia (1966–1974) (Paris: 
Editions de la Maisons des sciences de l’homme, 1984), p. 102.
52 George McTurnan Kahin, “In Memoriam: Mohammad Natsir”, Indonesia (February 
1994).
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leadership of Jusuf Habibie, who was at the time minister for research 
and technology, was the culmination of the subtly elaborated strategy 
implemented by the Suharto regime which consisted in manipulating 
Muslim organisations for its own benefi t.53 It also showed the regime’s 
gradual transformation from one which was initially founded exclu-
sively on the support of the army, but was now looking for a new 
legitimacy by turning to Islam. Th e initiative considerably boosted the 
hopes of modernist Muslims, who represented a signifi cant majority 
within ICMI, convinced that they had at last found the means for 
their social and political recognition. Th e new organisation, however, 
soon came to embody the profound divisions which aff ected Muslim 
organisations. 
 Th ree diff erent groups vied for the moral leadership of ICMI. 
Th e fi rst was composed of the technocrats within the regime who were 
close to either Jusuf Habibie or senior fi gures in Golkar, the offi  cial 
party. Th e second consisted of Muslim fi gures, such as the intellectual 
Nurcholish Madjid or the former minister Emil Salim, representing a 
moderate branch which was concerned above all with gaining recogni-
tion for the social aspect of Islam’s values. Finally, the third group com-
prised Muslim leaders, such as Amien Rais, Adi Sasono and Lukman 
Harun, who, unlike the other two groups, wanted to turn ICMI into 
a vehicle for their political ambitions. Th ey wanted to be seen as the 
mouthpiece for a Muslim community which had long been oppressed 
by the government and was a victim of the growing infl uence of the 
Christian minorities in the country.54 Amongst this third group, the 
rhetoric used by certain radical preachers such as Imaduddin Abdul-
rahim became increasingly tinged with fundamentalism. Th ey put pres-
sure on ICMI to fi nd ways of eroding the ascendancy held by the 
Christian community over public opinion. Th ey launched their own 
daily newspaper, Republika, and set up a think-tank, the Centre for 
Information and Development Studies (CIDS) designed to counter the 
53 Further reading on the aims and organisation of ICMI can be found in Donald 
J. Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia (London and New York: 
Routledge Curzon, 2002), pp. 89–94.
54 Robert W. Hefner, “Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for 
the Indonesian Middle Class”, Indonesia 56 (October 1996). Adam Schwarz, A 
Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & 
Unwin, 1999), pp. 176–7.
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analysis developed by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) which was considered to be both pro-Christian and too close to 
Javanese mysticism (kejawan).
 Suharto’s fall from power in May 1998 and the subsequent elec-
tion campaign which took place in June 1999 led to the diff erent 
branches of Islam within ICMI reasserting their autonomy. Th is new-
found freedom brought about a profound reconfi guration of Indonesian 
Islam in its entirety and was a contributing factor in the disintegration 
of Masyumi’s political legacy.55 When studying this period, one is 
inevitably led to the fundamental issue of the participation by party 
fi gures (or at least by those who claimed to defend its legacy) in the 
radicalisation which a section of the Islamic community underwent 
at the time.56 When attempting to convey the diversity of the various 
intellectual and political paths taken by the members of the Masyumi 
family, a useful distinction can be established between two currents 
which former party members typically belonged to. Although these 
two types of attitude are fairly representative of the complexity of 
Masyumi’s evolution, one should bear in mind the danger of such a 
categorisation being too rigid.
 Th e most visible and vociferous of these two currents developed in 
the same vein as the transformation which had already begun within the 
DDII. It was one of the main protagonists of the neo-fundamentalist 
revival which permeated Indonesian Islam from the beginning of the 
1980s. Th e message and the actions of this movement were part of a 
mutation which saw it evolve from intransigent religious insularity to 
open interreligious violence. 
 Th is radicalisation was facilitated by several factors. Th e fi rst of 
these was a combination of the former Masyumi leaders’ disenchant-
ment and the provision of fi nancial assistance by the Wahabi propa-
ganda machine at the beginning of the 1970s. Masyumi’s leaders had 
been openly critical of Saudi Arabia during the 1950s, but having been 
55 Several parties and organisations have claimed to be the bearers of Masyumi’s 
legacy: the Crescent Moon and Star Party (Partai Bulang Bintang, PBB); the New 
Masyumi (Masyumi Baru); and the Islamic Fraternity Forum (Forum Ukhuwah 
Islamiyyah, FUI). None, however, have managed to be convincing successors to 
Masyumi. See Bernhard Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging 
Democracy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 30 ff .
56 See Feillard and Madinier, Th e End of Innocence.
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marginalised and left penniless by the dominant New Order regime, 
they began in the 1960s to accept the money provided by the inter-
national proselytising networks put in place by the Saudi monarchy. 
In 1969, for example, Mohammad Natsir became a member of the 
Muslim World League (Rabithah al-Alam al-Islami) based in Jeddah in 
Saudi Arabia. Th e oil crisis of 1973 bestowed considerable fi nancial 
means on the League, and in the same year, the DDII was made its 
offi  cial representative in Indonesia, thus becoming one of the principal 
vehicles for the spread of Wahhabism in the country. Th e organisation 
was charged with attributing scholarships to Indonesian students to 
enable them to pursue their studies in the Middle East, and in the 
early 1970s, it opened an offi  ce in Riyadh.57 Later in 1980, the DDII 
helped in the creation of the Institute of Arabic and Islamic Studies 
(Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab, LIPIA) which, thanks 
to the fi nancial assistance of the Saudi kingdom, allowed thousands 
of Indonesians to obtain degrees at the Imam Muhammad bin Saud 
Islamic University in Ryad, where the brightest students were sent to 
pursue their studies. Th e network established by the DDII and the 
LIPIA also played a key role in the distribution of the fi nancial assis-
tance which came from the large Salafi  foundations based in the Gulf 
countries and allowed the construction of hundreds of mosques on the 
Indonesian archipelago. 
 Th e participation of these Indonesian Muslims in networks which 
had long been steeped in a neo-fundamentalist ideology contributed, 
naturally enough, to their radicalisation. Th e translations they read of 
books and brochures written in Egypt or in the Gulf countries reso-
nated with their feeling of resentment towards the government, the 
Christian minorities and the West; this encouraged them to adopt a 
very black-and-white vision of their struggle as part of an age-old 
battle of global proportions opposing the forces of good and evil.58 
Th eir sense of being part of a fi nal confrontation in which the exis-
tence of the entire umma was at stake justifi ed the violence used in 
the Moluccas, Poso and elsewhere. It was the experience of the Afghan 
57 Details on the links between the DDII and Saudi Arabia can be found in 
the extremely well-documented report published on 11 December 2004 by the 
International Crisis Group. 
58 During the 1980s, the DDII also published around 20 translations of books 
written by the most radical members of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
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jihad, however, which was to play a much more decisive role in the 
radicalisation of Indonesian Islamist activists than any ideological in-
doctrination. Several hundred of these activists, foremost amongst them 
the future leaders of both the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah and the 
militia group Laskar Jihad, did more than just spend time studying in 
Mecca or Riyad. Th ey followed the well-trodden route taken by inter-
national militant Islamists during the 1980s, who, on their way home, 
were invited to spend time in Pakistani training camps close to the 
border. Very few of them, however, took an active part in the fi ght 
against the Soviets; most of them simply received military and ideologi-
cal training aimed at allowing them to open new fronts in the future 
global struggle against the enemies of Islam, a struggle which was 
already beginning to take shape beyond the realms of the Afghan war.59
 Th e infl uence of these militant networks was particularly strong 
in Indonesia because of their association with fi gures who were keen 
to revive the group which had formerly constituted the Darul Islam 
movement. Two fi gures who played a key role in this respect were 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar, whose biographies are indi-
cative of the complexity and disparity of the motivating forces behind 
this militant Islamist movement. Th ey founded the Ngruki Koranic 
School near Surakarta in Central Java, and had been imprisoned ini-
tially in 1978 for their association with members of the Darul Islam 
movement which had organised an Islamist rebellion in the 1950s. 
Th ey had in fact been victims of an intricate operation carried out by 
the Indonesian secret service aimed at reviving this group, under the 
pretext of combating communism, with the ultimate aim of muzzling it 
completely. Th eir trial turned them into martyrs for the Muslim cause. 
Th ey were released on appeal in 1983 and two years later, having learnt 
that the Supreme Court had just overturned the appeal court’s decision, 
thus obliging them to return to prison, they decided to fl ee the country 
for Malaysia. Th ere they took advantage of the very favourable atmo-
sphere for Islamist organisations which reigned in the country. Amongst 
other activities, they were involved in the recruitment of several dozen 
59 Further reading on this involvement in the Afghan war can be found in an arti-
cle entitled “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia Damaged but Still Dangerous”, 
published in the International Crisis Group’s Asia Report, no. 63, 26 August 2003. 
See also Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).
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Southeast Asian youths who were sent to fi ght in Afghanistan. When 
the war against the USSR ended, these recruits were to become the 
backbone of Jemaah Islamiyah and participated in the propagation of 
the Afghani jihad across Southeast Asia. After 1995, for example, with 
a Muslim rebellion brewing in the south of the Philippines, the organi-
sation moved its training camps there; later in 1999, the group’s mili-
tants set up operations in the Moluccas and central Sulawesi to exploit 
the bloody confl ict which had taken hold there. Th e networks which 
Jemaah Islamiyah developed at that time played a key role in the 
descent of a part of Indonesia’s radicals into a blind and nihilistic form 
of violence. Th e two attacks in Bali in October of 2002 and 2005 and 
those which took place in Jakarta (August 2003, September 2004 and 
July 2009) were proof, as it were, that the use of political and even 
military means to bring about an Islamic state in Indonesia had failed. 
For want of being able to mobilise suffi  cient support to bring about a 
balance of power which would allow its political claims to be expressed, 
this disreputable organisation, composed of Indonesians, Malaysians 
and Filipinos, turned to a sort of primal chaos, whose advent was to 
be accelerated by large-scale massacres and on which the hope of a 
Southeast Asian caliphate could be founded. Th e leaders of the Jemaah 
Islamiyah took comfort in a phantasmagorical universe made up of a 
programme—the battle of good against evil—which was as grandiose 
as it was vague. Th ey ended up not only isolating themselves from 
other radical movements with more concrete goals but, more impor-
tantly, discrediting the use of physical violence in the eyes of the Indo-
nesian Muslim community, who had long been rather tolerant towards 
the use of such means.60 
 Other movements were better able to take advantage of the wide-
spread disarray which accompanied the chaotic fi nal phase of Suharto’s 
regime. Between 1998 and 2002, a number of militias dominated the 
Indonesian political scene, proposing, in the name of defending Islam’s 
values, to take the place of a state which was considered to be inade-
quate. Th e removal of General Suharto, Jusuf Habibie’s presidency, the 
elections of June 1999 and fi nally Abdurrahman Wahid’s short-lived 
60 Rémy Madinier, “L’Asie du Sud-Est musulmane produit d’un imaginaire 
afghan? Le Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara à l’épreuve des sciences sociales”, in 
Figures d’Islam après le 11 septembre: disciples, martyrs, réfugiés et migrants, ed. 
Aminah Mohammad-Arif and Jean Schmitz (Paris: Khartala, 2006), pp. 123–49.
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term in offi  ce provided these groups with ample opportunity to attract 
signifi cant media attention. Th ese organisations capitalised on the reso-
nance which their simple message undoubtedly held for a population 
disoriented by the scale of the political, social and economic crisis the 
country was enduring; they recruited a fairly considerable number of 
new members, and by doing so extended Islamic radicalism beyond 
the small groups to which it had heretofore been confi ned. Th is desire 
to impose Islamic norms concerned two areas of public life in parti-
cular. Th e fi rst of these was public morals, an issue taken up by a 
number of groups for its usefulness in mobilising popular support. 
Across the country, hundreds of militias had sprung up, roaming the 
disreputable quarters of cities armed with bamboo canes in order to 
attack brothels, clandestine gambling houses and other dens of iniquity. 
Although on the surface these punitive expeditions appeared to be 
spontaneous, the mobilisation of reasonable men who were incensed 
with the inaction of the police, they often gave rise to a sort of reli-
giously based racketeering. During the largest punitive expeditions, 
“popular anger” was often quite selective and depended on the sums 
of money paid by those who ran the dens of iniquity, who were also 
strongly advised to employ thugs, linked to these self-same organisa-
tions, in order to “guarantee their protection”.
 Since 2003, the operations carried out by the “moral militia” 
have become scarcer. Th e leader of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front 
Pembela Islam, FPI), Habieb Rizieq, who has received a lot of media 
attention, has been arrested twice and has already agreed on several 
occasions to rein in his organisation’s activities. Although the actions 
of these militias today are less spectacular than before, their infl uence 
remains nonetheless real. Th ey are still dreaded by local authorities 
looking for legitimacy from Islam as well as by small traders who fear 
for their stalls; they continue to strive to denounce the “Christianisation 
of Indonesia”, and they have contributed considerably over the past 
number of years to the religious one-upmanship prevalent in Indonesia 
which incites people to prove their purity as Muslims. 
 Th e second area in which these organisations endeavoured to 
replace the mechanisms of a democratic state with religiously based 
violence was that of inter-religious confl icts. Th e collapse of the state’s 
authority which accompanied the deposition of Suharto led in the east 
of the country to the poisoning of relations between Muslims and 
Christians, which traditionally had been rather good. In the Moluccas 
between 1999 and 2001, more than 5,000 people died during the war 
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that waged between Christian and Islamic militias. Th e latter received 
decisive support from diff erent organisations throughout Indonesia. 
In May 2000, for example, Laskar Jihad, led by Ja’far Umar Th alib, 
another scion of the Arab network which had fought in Afghanistan, 
managed to leave Java and go to fi ght in the Moluccas. Having called 
on the government to do a better job of defending Muslims—the 
confl ict at that stage was relatively balanced between the two sides—
Ja’far managed to land his militia group on the island despite President 
Abdurahman Wahid’s orders to the contrary. Laskar Jihad undoubtedly 
benefi tted from complicity at the highest military level, as they were 
welcomed and even partially equipped by the army on their arrival 
in Ambon. Along with other militias such as Mujahidin Kompak and 
linked to the Jemaah Islamiyah network, they contributed largely to the 
wave of violence which shook the east of the country. Having helped 
to swing the confl ict in favour of the Muslim militias, some of these 
militant groups moved on to the neighbouring island of Sulawesi in an 
attempt to spread jihad there, and subsequently in the region of Poso, 
a veritable purge took place against the Christian community. 
 As a result of the agreements which became known as Malino 1 
and Malino 2, signed respectively in December 2001 and February 
2002 by representatives of the diff erent religious communities, direct 
confrontations between the two sides eventually ended. In the following 
years, however, attacks aimed at Christians were carried out regularly 
in the Central Sulawesi region, maintaining a climate of fear amongst 
the Christian population there. Elsewhere in Indonesia, it remains dif-
fi cult today for religious minorities to open new places of worship, 
and militias such as the FPI often intervene to demand the closure of 
churches which have not received the necessary authorisations. More-
over, in recent years, a shift in the nature of religious violence has been 
observed within the country. While Christian minorities were the main 
target of attacks during the chaotic period surrounding Suharto’s fall 
from power, since 2010 these attacks have mainly been directed against 
Islamic minorities considered to be deviant, particularly Shias and the 
Ahmadiyya community. Up until now, these minorities have not been 
granted protection by the authorities, who remain paralysed by an in-
terpretation of Pancasila’s fi rst principle which is extremely timorous.61 
61 Jeremy Menchik, “Productive Intolerance: Godly Islam in Indonesia”, Compara-
tive Studies in Screen and History 56, 3 (2014): 591–621.
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Th is may change, however, with the new president, Joko Widodo, 
elected to offi  ce in July 2014. Widodo is one of the few members of 
the country’s political class to affi  rm the Javanese nature of his Islamic 
belief; this may lead the government to modify its approach in dealing 
with Indonesia’s multi-confessional society and thus move away from 
the frustrating attitude adopted by Bambang Yudhoyono during his 
two terms in offi  ce, which was essentially to refuse to deal with such 
questions.
 Although Masyumi’s “perpetuators” were far from being at the 
root of Indonesian Islam’s violent excesses, they nonetheless, through 
the alarmist propaganda disseminated by DDII, fuelled feelings of 
urgency and hatred which pushed some Muslims onto the path of 
intolerance and violence. Masyumi’s legacy amounts to more than just 
this attitude of aggressive and fearful insularity, however. Th e liberal 
legacy of the party, although it is less spectacular and has received less 
media attention, continues to have a voice in the debate concerning 
Islam’s place in Indonesian society. Th e main fi gure of this liberal legacy 
is, of course, Nurcholish Madjid, mentioned earlier. His foundation, 
Paramadina, has given birth to a university of the same name, which 
includes several thousand students. Other fi gures who formerly be-
longed to the “Masyumi family” have also played infl uential roles in 
Indonesian Islam. Amongst these, special mention should be made of 
Harun Nasution, a graduate of McGill University in Canada and the 
founder of the State Islamic Institutes (IAIN), which were recently 
transformed into State Islamic Universities.62 Th e high standard of 
scholarship at these third-level institutions, and more importantly, the 
possibility of being able to hold reasoned and civilised debates there 
made it home to an open and tolerant form of Islam.63 Moreover, 
radical organisations, whether they were linked to the Muslim Brother-
hood or to the Salafi -inspired groups, were much likelier to recruit 
their members in the mainstream universities—particularly amongst 
students of science, medicine and computing—than in the institutions 
devoted to the study of Islam. In keeping with the legacy of Harun 
Nasution, the State Islamic Universities often have prominent fi gures 
62 Harun Nasution was close to Masyumi and wrote his MA dissertation on the 
party. 
63 Th is has been confi rmed by the violent campaigns carried out recently by radi-
cal groups against these establishments. 
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from the liberal branch of Islam at their head. Two notable examples 
are Azyumardi Azran, an eminent expert in Indonesian Islam and the 
rector of the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta 
between 1998 and 2006, and Amin Abdullah, the rector of the Sunan 
Kalijaga State Islamic University in Yogyakarta, who was for a long 
time the leader of the liberal wing of Muhammadiyah. Abdullah had 
hoped to succeed Syafi i Maarif, another moderate, at the head of the 
reformist organisation during its elections in 2005, but the victory of 
Din Syamsuddin, a member of the movement’s conservative wing and 
much closer to the DDII, shows the current balance of power between 
the “inheritors” and “perpetuators” within what was the most impor-
tant of Masyumi’s constituent organisations.
 Despite this defeat, the branch of Islam which claims to be an 
inheritor of the 1950s liberal legacy retained within Indonesian Islam 
a signifi cant degree of power, and one which is without doubt un-
paralleled elsewhere in the Muslim world. Under the leadership of 
Aburahman Wahid, Nahdlatul Ulama provided a constant and some-
times effi  cient opposition to the excesses of a version of Islam, backed 
by the regime in place, which prevailed at the end of Suharto’s reign. 
Its interventions to appease the interreligious tensions which have been 
rife in Java since the turn of the century were often successful. More 
importantly, it is an organisation which emerged from the traditionalist 
movement which now spearheads an open and confi dent form of Islam. 
Th e genesis of the Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL), 
founded in 2001, stems from the acknowledgement by a handful of 
young intellectuals close to NU that the voice of Islam had been 
hijacked by radicals. Led by Ulil Abshar-Abdallah, these activists used 
lectures, radio programmes and a particularly active internet site to 
disseminate ideas which follow directly in the tradition of the reformist 
movement inherited from the beginning of the 20th century. Th ey 
denounced in particular any literal interpretation of the Koran or the 
Sunnah and called for a revival of ijtihad. 64 
 Th e confrontation within Masyumi between reformists and tradi-
tionalists, which deprived the party of a lasting place at the cabinet 
table after the 1955 elections, weakened the party’s liberal legacy for a 
64 See, for example, the editorial which Ulil Abshar-Abdallah wrote on the issue 
in July 2007. “Th e Aftemath of the Opening of the Door of Ijtihad” (“Setelah 
Pintu Ijtihad Terbuka”, http://islamlib.com).
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long time. However, this legacy is no doubt more widespread today in 
Indonesia, in a society where the debate on the role of Islam remains 
very lively. Although the advent of a democratic system in 1998 may 
have allowed an intolerant and conservative form of Islamic populism 
to make a spectacular breakthrough both in public opinion and in the 
country’s institutions, Indonesia has none of the problems which have 
paralysed numerous Muslim countries where authoritarian regimes 
claim to defend an open form of Islam at the expense of democracy. 
Th is opens up the prospect of some interesting future developments, 
as the history of the PKS has demonstrated.
 Founded in July 1998, the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan) obtained 
1.3% of the vote in the 1999 elections. It subsequently changed its 
name to the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejaterah, PKS) 
and made a remarkable breakthrough in 2004, winning 7.3% of the 
electorate’s support. Despite the drop in support for Islamic parties, 
the PKS managed to maintain its share of the vote in 2009 with a 
score of 7.9%, and became the foremost Islamic party in Indonesia. 
Th e political deftness it showed in striking an alliance with the party 
of the future president, Susilo Bamban Yudhoyono, allowed it in 2004 
to obtain the speakership of the People’s Consultative Assembly for its 
president Hidayat Nur Wahid, and later in 2009 to secure several min-
isterial portfolios. Its unambiguous electoral success was just reward 
for a party whose activists were both conscientious and effi  cient and 
whose image was that of being much less corrupt than other political 
organisations. It can also be explained, however, by the adoption of a 
far more moderate line by the party. As it moved closer to joining 
government, the PKS appears to have undergone a similar transforma-
tion to that which Masyumi experienced. Th e questions of sharia law 
and an Islamic state, favoured by purists, were to a large extent eclipsed 
by a political message which emphasised the need to see the values of 
Islam permeate public life and the workings of the state. Pancasila, 
which had not been mentioned in 1999, was in 2004 and 2009 consi-
dered the natural foundation upon which all political programmes in 
the Indonesian Republic should be built.65 In 2002, much to the anger 
65 Masdar Hilmy, “Partai Keadilan Sejahtera”, Studia Islamika 14, 1 (2007); 
Ahmad-Norma Permata, “Prosperous Justice Party and the Decline of Political 
Islam in 2009 Election in Indonesia”, in Islam and the 2009 Indonesian Elections, 
Political and Cultural Issues: Th e Case of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), ed. 
Rémy Madinier (Bangkok: IRASEC, 2009).
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of other Islamic organisations represented in Parliament, namely the 
United Development Party (PPP) and the Crescent Star Party (PBB), 
the party also proposed to replace the Jakarta Charter with another 
concept called the Charter of Medina (Piagam Madinah) which would 
allow all religions to be treated equally and to apply their own religious 
laws, including sharia law for Muslims. 
 Th ese changes in stance by the PKS have raised questions about 
its sincerity. Th e participation of the party’s local representatives in the 
shift towards a stricter form of Islam which has taken a grip over some 
of the country’s counties and towns in the past few years has also left 
it open to accusations of extremism. Th e widespread decentralisation 
which the country has undergone since the beginning of this century 
has increasingly allowed local authorities to announce and sometimes 
implement coercive measures aimed at enforcing respect for a certain 
form of Islamic morality. Among these measures fi gure a ban on women 
being out in public alone after a certain hour, the closing of certain 
main roads on Fridays during prayer, and fi nes for Muslims caught 
drinking alcohol or breaking their fast before nightfall during Ramadan. 
Th e power to issue such ordinances did not generally come within the 
remit of local government and thus they could be, though rarely were, 
revoked by the Home Aff airs Ministry; they are part of a tendency 
within Indonesian Islam to constantly look for the moral high ground 
which, in recent years, has profoundly transformed the face of the 
country. Islam has become the only paradigm able to off er an alter-
native to globalisation, which has become a byword for Westernisation, 
and so referring to Islam allows Indonesians to, as it were, bite the 
hand that feeds it.66 In addition, it off ers an anchor to communities 
whose identities have been shaken by profound changes in society and 
has also benefi tted from the competition which exists between local 
party elites concerned about the political fallout of not participating 
in the construction of a society in accordance with Islamic law.
 However, the radicalisation of those who either out of conviction 
or convenience have followed these somewhat irrational inclinations 
has, in the past few years, given rise to a backlash which may announce 
a decline in its fortunes. In June 2006, a section of the political elite, 
66 Along the lines of the phenomenon of Mekka-Cola expertly analysed by Gabriel 
Martinez-Gros and Lucette Valensi in their L’Islam en dissidence: genèse d’un 
aff rontement (Paris: Seuil, 2004), p. 11. 
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bolstered by the support of nationalist military offi  cers, launched a vast 
movement calling for a revival of Pancasila, the only way, in their eyes, 
to guarantee peaceful coexistence between religions. Moreover, recent 
opinion polls have shown a clear shift in public opinion: in 2001 
and 2002, a sizeable majority (67%) declared themselves in favour of 
recognising sharia law for Muslims (which would have implied the 
implementation of the Jakarta Charter), whereas almost 83% of the 
population declared themselves in favour of Pancasila in 2006, and in 
2007, 85% affi  rmed their attachment to a unitary Indonesian Republic 
founded on Pancasila rather than on Islam.67 
 Th e parliamentary elections of 2014 seem to have confi rmed this 
underlying trend. Political Islam’s share of the vote has stagnated: it 
received 31% in 2014, better than its score of 29% in 2009, but down 
from its performances in the previous two elections (37.5% in 2004 
and 36.5% in 1999). Within this disparate political family, the most 
successful parties have been the most moderate ones, more inclined to 
promote “Islamic values” rather than an “Islamic project”. Th e PBB, 
the PPP and in particular the PKS, who represent a more intransigent 
form of Islam, have on the whole seen their political fortunes decline. 
Despite the PKS’s move towards a more tolerant political message, its 
share of the vote dropped slightly in 2014, and, more signifi cantly, 
remains much lower than its Middle Eastern counterparts who, like 
the PKS, emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood movement.68
 It would no doubt be premature to speak of a sea change within 
Indonesian Islam. However, both the transformations within the PKS 
and changes in public opinion show the very real confrontation today 
between the partisans of an intransigent and literalist form of Islam—the 
perpetuators of an insular tradition which infl uenced the Masyumi 
movement from the 1960s onwards—and those who advocate an open 
and tolerant form of Islam—the torchbearers of the great liberal tradi-
tion of the 1950s.
67 Surveys carried out by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (Pusat 
Penelitian Islam dan Masyarakat, PPIM) in 2001, 2002 and 2007 and by the 
Lembaga Survey Institute in 2006.
68 Detailed analysis of recent transformations in political Islam can be found in 
Kikue Hamayotsu, “Th e End of Political Islam? A Comparative Analysis of Reli-
gious Parties in the Muslim Democracy of Indonesia”, Journal of Current South-
east Asian Aff airs 3 (2011): 133–59 and in Vedi R. Hadiz, “No Turkish Delight: 
Th e Impasse of Islamic Party Politics in Indonesia”, Indonesia 92 (October 2011): 
1–18.





abangan (J) [red] Usually designates1 in Indonesia Javanese inclined 
towards mysticism or kejawen, that is less inclined 
towards Islamic orthodoxy than the santri.
adat (A) By extension custom. As a source of law, adat or 
custom is diff erent from hukm (pl. ahkam), rules 
revealed in the Koran or the Traditions.
Al-Irsyad  Reformist movement founded at the beginning 
of the 20th century by Ahmad bin Soorkati, 
a Sudanese specialising in education for the 
Hadrami community.
AMS Algemene Middlebar School. Dutch upper 
secondary school for Indonesians during the 
colonial period.
BFO Bijeenkomstvoor Federaal Overleg (Consultative 
Federal Assembly of the United States of 
Indonesia).
BKMI Badan Kongres Muslimin Indonesia (Committee 
of the Islamic Indonesian Congress). Mainly 
controlled by Masyumi.
BKOI Badan Koordinasi Organisasi Islam (Coordination 
Committee of Islamic Organisations). Founded 
in the run-up to the 1955 elections and close to 
Masyumi.
1 Th e etymology of the terms cited in this glossary is indicated in parentheses: 
J  =  Javanese; A  =  Arabic; S  =  Sankrit.
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BKPRI Badan Kongres Pemuda Republik Indonesia 
(Committee of the Congress of Indonesian 
Youth Organisations). Founded in November 
1945 to organise the country’s youth 
movements.
BPUKI Badan Panjelidik Usaha-Usaha Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia (Review Committee for the 
Preparation of Independence). Created in March 
1945 by the Japanese.
CIDS Centre for Information and Development 
Studies. 
 A think-tank founded by the ICMI at the 
beginning of the 1990s to counter the 
interpretations given by the CSIS.
CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 
A think-tank founded at the beginning of 
the New Order era to support the regime’s 
developmentalist policies.
dakwah (A) In Arabic, da‘wa. Invitation to accept the word 
of God, Islam. In the 20th century, the term 
is used in the sense of proselytisation and 
preaching activities.
Daulah Islamiyah Nusantarian Islamic State. Th is term was used 
Nusantara  by Jemaah Islamiyah and is distinguished from 
Kartosuwirjo’s Negara Islam which recognises 
the existence of national frontiers in Southeast 
Asia.
DDII Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia 
(Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council). 
Large predication movement founded in 1967 
by the reformist Muslims of Masyumi. It is 
a conservative Islamist movement, and its 
press organ, Media Dakwah, emphasises the 
superiority of Islam and the threats surrounding 
it in a world dominated by undercover anti-
Islamic forces. Headed by Mohammad Natsir 
until his death in 1993.
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DI (A) Darul Islam (House of Islam). Name given to the 
Muslim movement led by Kartosoewiryo in West 
Java that declared an Indonesian Islamic State 
(Negara Islam Indonesia) on 7 August 1949, and 
by extension, name given to the ensuing rebellion 
in Aceh, South Sulawesi and Kalimantan.
dwitunggal A coined term of Sanskrit origin, meaning 
“inseparable”. It was used to refer to the 
duumvirate constituted by Sukarno and Hatta 
(president and vice president) at the head of 
Indonesia.
fatwa (A) In Arabic, fatwā. A jurist’s pronouncement on a 
point of Muslim law (see mufti ). In Indonesia, 
fatwas are pronounced by various religious 
organisations but have no legal authority.
FDR Front Demokrasi Rakjat (Th e People’s Democratic 
 Front). Left-wing coalition founded in 1948.
fi qh (A) Jurisprudence in Islam. Legal prescriptions 
 pertaining to civil law and the family, inheritance, 
 property, criminal and constitutional law.
FKASWJ Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnahwal-Jama’ah 
(Communication Forum for the Followers of 
the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet). 
Religious group founded by Ja’far Umar Th alib in 
Yogyakarta which was behind the creation of the 
Laskar Jihad militia.
FPI Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front). 
Militia (vigilante group) founded in 1998 by 
Habib Rizieq Shihab, its president.
GAPI Gabungan Politik Indonesia (Indonesian Political 
Federation). It brought together a signifi cant 
number of nationalist organisations during the 
1930s.
Gerakan Pemuda Traditionalist Islamic youth movement linked 
Ansor/Ansor  to the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).
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Golkar Golongan Karya (Functional Groups). 
Governmental party formed under the New Order.
GPII Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (Movement of 
Masyumi Youth). Former youth organisation of 
Masyumi whose legacy DDII circles try to maintain. 
After the ban on Masyumi, it survived under the 
name of Gerakan Pemuda Indonesia (GPI).
hadith (A) In Arabic, h. adīth. Traditions recounting the actions 
or words of the Prophet or his tacit approval of 
words or acts eff ected in his presence.
Haji (A) Title of one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca.
HIS Holland Inlander School. Dutch primary schools for 
Indonesians during the colonial period.
Hizbullah (A) Muslim militia formed during the Japanese 
Occupation of Indonesia. Armed wing of the 
Masyumi party during the fi ght for independence.
HMI Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia (Association of 
Muslim Students). Infl uential modernist Muslim 
student association.
HMI-MPO Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia-Majelis Penyelamat 
Organisasi (Association of Muslim Students-Council 
to Save the Organisation). Scission of HMI as 
MPO refused Suharto’s 1985 policy of ideological 
uniformisation.
hudud (A) In Arabic, h. udūd. Punishment laid out by Islamic 
law for specifi c crimes considered as off ences against 
Allah, such as fornication (fl agellation) or theft 
(chopping off  of the hand).
IAIN Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institute of 
Islamic Studies). Th ird-level institution of higher 
Islamic learning dependent on the Ministry of 
Religions and whose teachers are civil servants. Th e 
fi rst IAIN was created in 1952. Th e four largest 
IAINs have been transformed into State Islamic 
Universities (Universitas Islam Negeri, UIN).
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ICMI Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia 
(Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals). 
Founded in 1990 by B.J. Habibie, President 
of the Republic of Indonesia from May 1998–
October 1999.
ijma (A) In Arabic, ijmā‘. Th ird source of Muslim 
law after the Koran and the Sunna. Consists 
traditionally of the consensus of the ulamas.
ijtihad (A) In Arabic, ijtihād. In Islamic law, the use 
of individual reasoning and the method of 
reasoning by analogy. Th e scholar qualifi ed to do 
so is the mudjtahid.
IPKI Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia 
(Association for the Defence of Indonesian 
Independence). Th is political organisation was 
founded in 1954 in military circles.
JI (A) Jemaah Islamiyah. Terrorist organisation 
responsible for several bombings in Bali and 
Jakarta between 2002 and 2005. Th e bombings 
in 2009 of the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton 
hotels in Jakarta were organised by a JI splinter 
group.
JIB Jong Islamieten Bond (Organisation of Young 
Muslims). Founded in 1925 under the joint 
initiative of Sarekat Islam and Muhammadiyah.
KAMI Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (Indonesian 
Student Action Front). Anti-communist 
organisation active after 1965, which supported 
the army during the change in power.
kaum muda Modernists, in contrast to the kaum tua, 
traditionalists.
kauman Appointed quarter for religious offi  cials.
kenduri Ceremonial meals to honour and petition the 
supernatural spirits. See also slametan.
keramat Sacred places, saints’ tombs.
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Kiai (J) Title given to Muslim scholars or Sufi  sheikhs 
in Java, or to respected personalities with 
religious charisma. Use of the term was recently 
expanded to include charismatic Muslim persons 
not necessarily erudite about Islam.
KNIP Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central 
Indonesian National Committee). Independent 
Indonesia’s fi rst assembly.
Laskar Jihad FKAWJ militia led by Ja’far Umar Th alib, 
especially active in the Moluccas confl ict from 
2000–02.
LIPIA Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab 
(Jakarta Institute of and Arabic Studies). Islamic 
institute of learning linked to the al-Irsyad 
Indonesian reformist movement and to Saudi 
Arabia.
madhhab   (A) Also known as mazhab. School of Islamic law. 
Th ere are four schools in Sunni Islam: Shafi ’i, 
Hanafi , Maliki and Hanbali.
Manipol-USDEK Manifestopolitik/Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, 
Sosialisme Indonesia, Demokrasi Terpimpin, 
Ekonomi Terpimpin dan Kepribadian Indonesia 
(Political Manifesto, 1945 Constitution, Guided 
Democracy, Guided Economy, Indonesian 
Identity). One of the pillars of Sukarno’s 
ideology during Guided Democracy.
Marhaenism Political doctrine developed by Sukarno which 
adapted Marxism to the conditions of an 
agrarian society. It was embodied by a fi ctional 
fi gure known as Marhaen.
Masyumi Madjlis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative 
Council of Indonesian Muslims). Founded by 
the Japanese in 1943; its acronym was adopted 
by the party founded in 1945.
MIAI Majelis Islam A’laa Indonesia (Supreme 
Islamic Council of Indonesia). Federation of 
Muslim organisations formed in 1937 which 
subsequently became Masyumi.
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Muhammadiyah Reformist Muslim organisation founded in 1912.
MULO Meer Uitgebreid Lageer Onderwijs. Dutch lower 
secondary school for Indonesians during the 
colonial period.
mushrik (A) Polytheist.
NASAKOM Concept forged by Sukarno at the end of the 
1950s, gathering the main ideological movements 
 within Indonesia, namely nationalism (nasionalisme), 
 religion (agama) and communism (komunisme).
NII Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia). 
Declared by Kartosuwirjo in 1949. After the 
execution of its founder in 1962, this Darul Islam 
 movement re-formed covertly under the New Order.
NU Nahdlatul Ulama. Association of ulamas formed 
in 1926 in East Java to defend traditionalist Islam 
practices.
Parkindo Partai Kristen Indonesia. Indonesian Christian 
(Protestant) party founded in 1945.
Parmusi Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Muslim Party). 
Indonesian modernist Islamic party founded in 
1968 after the government refused to rehabilitate 
Masyumi, which was banned by Sukarno in 1960.
Partai Katolik Catholic Party. Founded in 1949, it came about 
from the fusion of several regional Catholic parties 
and was the inheritor of the Javanese Catholic 
Political Association (Pakempalan Politiek-Katholiek 
Djawi, PPKD) created in 1927.
Partai Murba Proletarian party, founded in 1948 by Tan Malaka.
PARTII Indonesia Islamic Partai (Indonesian Party of Islam). 
 Emerged in 1933, following a split within the PSII.
PBB Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party). Close to 
DDII, it calls for the implementation of the sharia. 
A small minority party.
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peranakan See totok.
PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party). 
Sejahtera is the new name of Partai Keadilan (PK, 
Justice Emerged from the usroh /tarbiyah Party) 
movement. Its share of votes (then PK) went from 
1.3 per cent in 1999 to more than 7 per cent in 
2004 and 2009.
PRRI Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia 
(Revolutionary Government of Republic of 
Indonesia). Opposition government that arose 
against Sukarno and the rising Communist Party in 
1958 in West Sumatra. It was suppressed within a 
few months.
PERMESTA Regionalist movement from south Sulawesi which 
developed at the end of the 1950s and whose 
name is an acronym of the expression “perjuangan 
semesta”, meaning total struggle.
PERMI Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim 
Union). Th is modernist organisation was founded 
in Sumatra in 1930 and was dismantled by the 
colonial authorities in 1937.
PERSIS Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union). An intransigent 
reformist movement founded in 1923 in Bandung.
PESINDO Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist 
Youth Movement).
PETA Soekarela Tentara Pembela Tanah Air (Volunteer 
Army of Defenders of the Homeland). Militia 
group close to PUTERA.
Piagam Jakarta Jakarta Charter. Controversial accord of the 
1945 Constitution between representatives of 
secularist nationalism and leaders of political Islam. 
Suppressed at the last minute on 18 August 1945, 
it carried mention of the obligation for Indonesian 
Muslims to obey the sharia, with no other 
specifi cation other than “in accordance with the 
principles of a just and civilised humanity”.
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PII Peladjar Islam Indonesia (Association of 
Indonesian Islamic Pupils). Close to Masyumi.
PKI Partai Kommunis Indonesia (Indonesian 
Communist Party). Founded in 1920 under the 
name Communist Union of the Indies.
PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National 
Party). Founded in Bandung in 1927 and under 
the leadership of Sukarno, was one of the main 
actors in the post-war nationalist movement. After 
independence, it remained a major political party.
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Party of Unity 
and Development). Founded by the New Order 
in 1973 as part of the “rationalisation of political 
life” and it included all the country’s Muslim 
parties until the beginning of the 1980s.
pribumi (J) “Son of the soil” or native Indonesian. Used 
in particular to discriminate against Chinese 
Indonesians.
PSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist 
Party). Founded in 1945 from the merging of 
Sutan Sjahrir’s People’s Socialist Party (Partai 
Rakjat Sosialis) and Amir Sjarifuddin’s Socialist 
Party. Th e latter withdrew from the party in 1948.
PUTERA Pusat Tenaga Rakjat (Centre of People’s Power). 
Created in 1943 by the Japanese. A federation of 
all of the political and social organisations in Java 
and Madura which were charged with preparing 
Indonesia for independence.
raissam Th e rais aam or rois aam is the highest position 
within Nahdlatul Ulama.
Reformasi Name given to the “reform” movement that arose 
in 1998 in Indonesia, encompassing not only a 
change in government but also a long-term reform 
of institutions, moving towards greater democracy.
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Sajap Kiri Left Wing. Founded in 1946 and composed of 
the Socialist Party, the PKI, the Pesindo, the Partai 
Buruh and the Christian parties.
SAKTI Sarekat Tani Indonesia (Union of Indonesian 
Peasants). Close to the PKI.
santri (J) Student of pesantren, Islamic boarding schools in 
Java; praticising Muslims (as opposed to abangan).
SBII Sarekat Buruh Islam Indonesian (Union of 
Indonesian Muslim Workers). Affi  liated to Masyumi.
SDII Sarekat Dagang Islam Indonesia (Union of Muslim 
Traders). Affi  liated to Masyumi.
sharia (A) In Arabic, shar‘iyya. Islamic law, that is, the rules 
revealed in the Koran and the Traditions forming the 
basis of Islamic law, thus a general term to designate 
divine law in its entirety. Islamists sometimes use it 
in the narrow sense of “punishments” (hudud ).
shirk (A) Associationism or association of God with other 
divinities or with Man. Condemned by Islam as 
being contrary to the principle of monotheism 
(tauhid ).
Shumubu Offi  ce of Religious Aff airs during the Japanese 
occupation.
slametan See kenduri.
SNII Sarekat Nejalan Islam Indonesia (Union of Muslim 
Fishermen). Affi  liated to Masyumi.
SOBSI Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (Central 
Organisation of Indonesian Workers). Close to the 
PKI.
STII Sarekat Islam Tani Indonesia (Union of Indonesian 
Muslim Peasants). Affi  liated to Masyumi.
sunna (A) Normative custom or precedent based on the 
example of the Prophet Mohammad, consigned by 
the traditionalists after the death of the Prophet.
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tafsir (A) In Arabic, tafsīr. Commentary of the Koran.
taqlid (A) In Arabic, taqlīd. Blind obedience to ulamas.
tawhid (A) In Arabic, tauh. id. Uniqueness of God, 
monotheism.
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian 
National Army).
totok “Indigenous”. Refers to foreigners born in their 
home country who have recently emigrated, in 
contrast to peranakan, a term which refers to 
the descendants of totok.
UIN Universitas Islam Negeri (State Islamic 
University). Name given after 1998 to major 
institutes of higher Islamic learning, previously 
called IAIN.
umma Entire Muslim community (in Indonesian, umat 
islam).
wakaf (A) In Arabic, waqf. Property donated for religious 
purposes, which cannot be sold or transferred.
wali (A) In Arabic, waliyy. Designates a saint in Islam. 
One who is “close to God”.
zakat (A) In Arabic, zakāh. Religious tax due annually 
at a rate of 2.5 per cent of one’s disposable 
income.
ziarah (A) In Arabic, ziyāra. (Non-canonical) pilgrimage, 
generally to the tomb of a saint.
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Translated by Jeremy Desmond
THE MASYUMI PARTY BETWEEN 
DEMOCRACY AND INTEGRALISM
The Masyumi Party, which was active in Indonesia from 1945 to 1960,constitutes the boldest attempt to date at reconciling Islam and democracy. 
Masyumi proposed a vision of society and government which was not bound 
by a literalist application of Islamic doctrine but rather inspired by the values 
of Islam. It set out moderate policies which were both favourable to the West 
and tolerant towards other religious communities in Indonesia. Although the 
party made significant strides towards the elaboration of a Muslim democracy, 
its achievements were nonetheless precarious: it was eventually outlawed in 
1960 for having resisted Sukarno’s slide towards authoritarianism, and the 
refusal of Suharto’s regime to reinstate the party left its leaders disenchanted 
and marginalised. Many of those leaders subsequently turned to a form of 
Islam known as integralism, a radical doctrine echoing certain characteristics 
of 19th-century Catholic integralism, which contributed to the advent of 
Muslim neo-fundamentalism in Indonesia.
This book examines the Masyumi Party from its roots in early 20th-century 
Muslim reformism to its contemporary legacy, and offers a perspective on 
political Islam which provides an alternative to the more widely-studied 
model of Middle-Eastern Islam. The party’s experience teaches us much 
about the fine line separating a moderate form of Islam open to democracy 
and a certain degree of secularisation from the sort of religious intransigence 
which can threaten the country’s denominational coexistence.
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